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This thesis contributes to current debates on aid politics, policy and practice by 
exploring the dynamics of the new aid agenda which emerged in the 1990s and early 
2000s, focused on poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals. 
Concerns with aid effectiveness have led to renewed interest in programme aid 
(particularly budget support), coordination of aid and harmonisation around 
developing country strategies, and ownership.  
Through an exploration of aid in Rwanda since 1994, I demonstrate the 
complexity of translating into practice a global consensus about the need for 
coherent, coordinated and effective aid. Different understandings and interests exist 
among donor agencies, within donor agencies, between donors and the developing 
country government, and within that government. On the one hand these reflect the 
specific Rwandan context, the recent history of the country, the nature of the 
Government and its development strategies, individual donor interests, donor 
domestic social and political issues, and personal agency. On the other hand, these 
differences relate to more general donor positions, including how donor policies tie 
in with international shifts in thinking on aid. I further analyze problems around the 
ownership of development policy and practice in aid-dependent environments.   
The thesis discusses the Government of Rwanda’s development strategy, its 
political and developmental priorities, and how these have been affected by its 
reliance on external assistance. It considers the relationship between the Government 
and donors and amongst donors by examining coordination and harmonisation 
mechanisms on the ground. It concentrates particularly on bilateral donors, and takes 
a deeper look at Belgium, a ‘traditional’ donor to Rwanda, and the UK, a ‘new’ 
donor, in order to compare and contrast donor positions. I conducted primary 
research over 18 months in Rwanda, the UK and Belgium, using semi-structured 
interviews with government officials, politicians and civil society representatives, 
observation of interactions between the Government and donors, as well as in-depth 
analysis of policy documents.  
Diversity among the positions of actors in the aid system is not a new 
phenomenon. However, given the increasing convergence at the international level 
around universal goals, my research indicates that a much deeper understanding, and 
acceptance, of the political and practical complexity of aid at the country level is 
essential for improving aid effectiveness.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
This thesis contributes to current debates on aid politics, policy and practice by 
exploring the dynamics of the new aid agenda which emerged in the 1990s and early 
2000s. These focus on the reduction of poverty by enhancing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of aid, primarily through improving the coordination of donor agency 
interventions around a country-led poverty reduction strategy.  
In 2004, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) was heavily dependent upon 
international development assistance from a wide range of bilateral and multilateral 
donors, as well as non-governmental organisations. This situation of dependency has 
contributed to the adherence of the GoR to a dominant set of norms for development, 
marrying neoliberal economic principles with a concern for human advancement. 
Nevertheless, the voice of the Government is very strong within its vision for the 
development of the country. 
The policy principles of most of the main donor institutions present in Rwanda are 
remarkably similar, with poverty reduction as the over-arching objective. However, 
there is anything but homogeneity amongst donor agencies, just as there is anything 
but homogeneity within the GoR.  Multiple donors are engaged in Rwanda, yet their 
composition, policies, instruments and reasons for providing aid have shifted greatly 
over the last ten years. The picture is one of considerable complexity, with donors 
differing in their views on both the political and technical aspects of providing aid, in 
turn reflecting diversity in their understanding of the Rwandan state. 
Through an exploration of the dynamics of aid in Rwanda between 1994 and 
2004, I highlight the problems of translating the apparent international consensus 
into practice in the face of significant variations within the policies, priorities, 
agendas and perspectives of the different actors involved in the aid system. In-depth 
case studies of Belgium and the UK provide a deeper insight into donor positions. A 
variety of sources and research methods were used: academic and agency literature 
on aid and development theory and practice; academic and agency literature on 
Rwanda; semi-structured interviews conducted in Rwanda, Belgium and the UK in 
2003 and 2004; and observation of conferences, seminars, meetings and workshops.  
 
Chapter 2 - Coordination and Ownership: The Aid Agenda of the 1990s and 
2000s 
 
This chapter focuses on the shifts in aid thinking during the 1990s and early 2000s 
whereby international debates, aid agency policy and increasingly developing 
country rhetoric took on board a new range of theoretical and conceptual ideas. The 
concern with addressing poverty has focused international attention on the need not 
only to increase the amounts of aid flowing to the poorest countries of the world, but 
also to ensure that better use is made of that aid through improved coordination 
amongst actors and through country ‘ownership’ of development policies and 
programmes. The new agenda captures two clear rationales for the provision of aid: 
moral imperative and strategic self-interest.  
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The New Aid Agenda 
The basic system is as follows. If the recipient can demonstrate its commitment to 
a poverty reduction strategy through sound economic management and good socio-
political governance, then donors will commit to supporting it. However, this 
requires that the poverty reduction strategy meets donors’ own accountability 
requirements, hence the provision of capacity building and technical assistance from 
the donor in addition to, or as elements of, aid to support the preparation and 
implementation of this strategy. To ensure the best use of donor resources and 
provide accountability, conditions applied to aid include economic and socio-
political governance, policy dialogue and effective monitoring and evaluation 
systems. For their part, donors commit themselves to better working practices to 
improve aid effectiveness in the form of coordination, harmonisation and alignment. 
Programme Aid and Budget Support 
The new agenda has seen the re-emergence of programme aid, in particular 
general budget support and sector budget support. Programme aid is more than a 
mere funding mechanism but incorporates a framework of assumptions, activities 
and conditions. It is considered to be superior in terms of allowing for policy 
dialogue, enhancing ownership, and improving coherence. However, there is a 
contradiction between the concept of national ownership and the increased influence 
donors have over the national policy environment through dialogue and conditions 
attached to budget support. In theory, budget support is considered to be an 
appropriate instrument where there is ‘trust’ in the relationship. What we see, 
however, is a tendency for budget support to be provided to weak states, often with a 
dubious track record on governance. Budget support also has a tendency in increase, 
rather than decrease, transaction costs.  
Aid Effectiveness 
In the early 2000s, there were intense debates at international and national level 
about improving aid effectiveness through better coordination of aid, particularly 
through alignment of aid around recipient programmes, and harmonisation of donor 
procedures. This represents a second profound shift in the aid effectiveness debate. 
The first was that of enhancing recipient ownership of development strategies. The 
harmonisation agenda stresses the joint nature of responsibilities for aid 
effectiveness. Despite this, many of the problems of coordination identified in the 
1980s remain unresolved. One fundamental issue is that of who coordinates the 
coordinators, an issue which is salient at both international and national levels and is 
manifested in competition amongst agencies over who leads on particular questions. 
While donors have taken on board the principle of this agenda, they are less inclined 
to adapt their practices. However, analyses rarely consider the political imperatives 
which continue to affect firstly the way in which donors perceive coordination and 
secondly donor capacity to change their working methods. 
Conditionality and Policy Dialogue 
The new aid agenda adds new dimensions to debates on conditionality. The 
language has moved from imposing conditions from the outside – which are unlikely 
to be implemented – to ‘mutual commitments’ whereby donors agree a set of terms 
with the recipient. Central to this are dialogue between donors and the recipient 
   xvii
government, and the ‘streamlining’ of conditionality. This has resulted in new types 
of partnership instruments, such as memoranda of understanding (MoU), common 
frameworks and partnership principles, which lay out a series of donor, government 
and joint commitments often with quantifiable benchmarks or targets. This brings 
with it new challenges, most notably the circumstances under which budget support 
should be halted, demonstrating that new programme aid is highly political.  
Partnership and Ownership 
Underpinning all of these debates are the core concepts of ‘partnership’ and 
‘ownership’. I recognise two key dimensions here: recipient government ownership 
of development programmes in relation to donors and external actors, i.e. between 
donors and recipients; and public ownership of development programmes in relation 
to government, i.e. between recipient governments and the people. The notion of 
‘ownership’ is therefore quite specific; it is closely tied to the other elements of the 
poverty agenda and sits within the framework of a ‘development partnership.’  
Ownership consequently sits at the heart of the aid effectiveness system. Yet 
‘ownership’ under these circumstances cannot be equated with home-grown ideas, 
inherent, internal ownership or ‘free choice’. It carries prescriptions about what is 
expected of recipient countries, namely that their objectives are largely congruent 
with donor goals. This leads to a potential conflict between the desire of donors to 
promote ownership in the interests of more effective aid, the desire of recipients to 
have ownership, and the reality that donors remain accountable to their own 
constituencies for the use of aid resources. 
 
Chapter 3 – Donor Engagement in Rwanda: Politics, Priorities and Practices 
 
In June 2002, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) published the final version of its 
first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). In November 2002, donors and the 
GoR reached agreement on the adoption of a coordination framework to facilitate the 
implementation of the PRSP. However, the consensus around the PRSP masks 
considerable differences in donor activity in Rwanda. Between 1994 and 2004 
important shifts can be observed in the presence, policies and practices of the main 
donors.  
Trends in Donor Behaviour 1994-2004 
The civil war and genocide in Rwanda were catalysts for change in donor 
engagement. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide most donors directed their 
support through UN agencies and NGOs, and it was only in 1995 that bilateral aid 
programmes really began to resume. Subsequently, Rwanda’s top donors have 
changed with France, Germany and Belgium (‘traditional’ donors) playing a lesser 
role, and the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden (‘new’ donors) significantly 
increasing their presence. Patterns can be observed amongst those donors increasing 
their aid, those increasing then decreasing their presence, those decreasing and then 
re-engaging, and those who have withdrawn altogether. This demonstrates how much 
fluctuation there can be in donor presence in a country, with peaks and troughs 
reflecting key events in Rwanda and the Great Lakes. However, these shifts also 
reflect changing circumstances in donor countries, such as increases or decreases in 
aid budgets, new political priorities, or administrative procedures.  
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Objectives for Aid: Donor Rationales for Supporting Rwanda 
There is a clear distinction between donors who have a long history of supporting 
Rwanda and those whose presence was initiated in response to the genocide. In terms 
of core objectives, we see a shift from emergency support towards poverty reduction, 
with security and stability remaining as central issues. The degree of priority attached 
to Rwanda also varies, e.g. Rwanda is a top-priority county for Belgium but of 
minimal importance to the USA. The interest of individual ministers also accounts 
for donor presence, as does civil society pressure.  
How Donors Provide Aid: the Instruments 
Comparing 1993 with 2003 we see that overall amounts of aid to Rwanda have 
not changed considerably. The instruments, however, have. While the UK and 
Sweden provide budget support to the GoR, other donors prefer the project approach. 
The reasons for this include a domestic policy preference for project aid in general 
and concerns about governance in Rwanda, both political and institutional. Although 
often seen as two very separate groups, there is considerable collaboration between 
budget support and project donors, with signs of more donors moving towards a 
sectoral approach to the provision of aid. This does not mean, however, that budget 
support is a logical next step. Moreover, the shift to projects within a sectoral 
approach challenges the idea of projects as bypassing government systems. 
Presence, Policy Dialogue and Conditions on Aid 
The diplomatic and technical presence which donors have on the ground in 
Rwanda differs widely, which in turn affects the capacity of the agency to engage in 
both policy dialogue and coordination. While nearly all donors stated that they did 
not attach conditions to their aid, they each have a range of instruments and systems 
which frame their programmes. We can often observe a difference between the broad 
political conditions which frame the entire programme, such as a demonstrated 
adherence to poverty reduction and good governance, and technical, procedural 
conditions attached to individual projects.  
Budget support is subject to a different set of conditions. In Rwanda, budget 
support is provided by the UK, Sweden, the European Commission, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. Despite attempts to harmonise budget support, 
each of these donors uses different technical and political mechanisms and triggers.  
 
Chapter 4 – From Global to Local Frameworks: Coordination, Harmonisation 
and Alignment in Rwanda 
 
This chapter explores coordination activities in Rwanda in 2003 and 2004. In 
2003 coordination was a limited concern, but was more central by the end of 2004. 
The chapter reveals the complexity of turning a unitary vision about aid effectiveness 
at the international level into reality, highlighting profound questions around 
ownership, power and control.  
The Aid Coordination Architecture in Rwanda 
In 2004, a complex web of inter-related committees and coordination groups 
framed the aid system in Rwanda. This consisted of three main levels, Firstly, the 
Development Partners Meeting (DPM) which represents the highest level of 
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interaction between the GoR and donors and acts essentially as a diplomatic 
instrument with both technical and political objectives. Secondly, the Development 
Partners Coordination Group (DPCG) which acts as an in-country forum for policy 
dialogue and information exchange on technical matters and partner activities. 
Finally, answering to the DPCG at the technical level are two technical working 
groups, the Budget Support Harmonisation Group (BSHG) and the Harmonisation 
and Alignment in Rwanda of Projects and Programmes (HARPP) group, and the 
sectoral ‘clusters’. 
Although this system appears coherent and well structured, a large number of 
issues remained unresolved at the time this research was conducted (2003-04). 
Questions abounded about responsibility, participation, accountability, capacity, 
control and ownership, not just between the GoR and donors, but also amongst 
donors.  
Coordination in Practice: The Clusters 
Little real progress was made with cluster groups until 2004. New dynamism was 
firstly linked to pressure being applied from the highest authority on ministries to 
develop sector strategies. This was presented as important in terms of implementing 
the GoR 7-Year programme adopted after the elections in 2003; but it also helped to 
demonstrate progress in implementing the PRSP to donors, and to access Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) from the World Bank. Secondly, the appointment 
of a coordination specialist within the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (UNRCO) 
sought to bring structure to aid coordination in Rwanda and to bolster GoR capacity 
to take greater control of the process.  
An analysis of the cluster system as foreseen in 2002 and in practice in 2004 
exposes a series of problems: lack of activity by many cluster groups; considerable 
overlap between sectors; limited participation of government representatives; lack of 
clarity on the role of clusters; and cluster leadership. Different perspectives between 
the government and donor sides are evident, with views on the role of clusters 
shifting over time. The education and health sectors provide examples of how 
clusters work in practice. 
Budget Support and Harmonisation 
Harmonising the procedures of budget support donors was high on the agenda in 
late 2003, with attention focused on the preparation of a Partnership Framework. An 
analysis of this process highlighted several issues. Firstly, the driving forces behind it 
were clearly the European Commission and the UK with other budget support donors 
being more hesitant. Secondly, donors had different levels of capacity to commit to 
the Framework, so it ended up as a set of ‘reciprocal commitments’ which were 
unenforceable and which were subordinate to bilateral arrangements. Thirdly, a 
“pluralism of approaches” was considered preferable as this lowered the risks for the 
GoR, essentially representing a move away from harmonisation. Fourthly, these 
discussions concerned only a very small group of donors, reflecting that budget 
support donors were engaged in a different relationship with the GoR to non-budget 
support donors. Finally, issues around predictability remained unresolved, an area of 
considerable concern to the GoR. 
Government Leadership and Internal Coordination Issues 
   xx 
Since 1994, the GoR has expressed frustration with the aid system and has 
demanded greater control over aid flows, more predictability and flexibility in 
funding, greater transparency and better coordination amongst donors. A range of 
instruments have been established over time to address these issues. However, in 
2003-2004 the GoR appeared no clearer on coordination in practice than many 
donors. This reflects internal debates about responsibility for aid coordination within 
the government, as well as deeper concerns about aid coordination, internal power 
structures, and national sovereignty with regard to policy processes.  
Perspectives on Coordination 
Primary data revealed a positive perspective on coordination amongst donor and 
government officials, but considerable differences in opinion about what 
coordination meant, how fast it should be developed, and what the end goal was – 
better collaboration amongst actors in general or progression towards the provision 
of budget support by all donors.  
 
Chapter 5 – From Emergency Aid to the Poverty Agenda: Donor-Government 
Relations in Rwanda 1994-2004 
 
While international shifts in the aid system frame the working relationship 
between the GoR and donors today, the very specific context of the Rwandan 
experience affects how donors engage with Rwanda. This chapter examines the 
recent history of aid in Rwanda and the contextual factors impacting upon 
relationships. 
The Emergency Response to the Genocide and the Round-Table Process 1994-
1997 
During this period aid primarily flowed as humanitarian assistance through UN 
agencies and international NGOs, with dialogue run through the UN-sponsored 
Round Table mechanism. The rapidly changing requirements brought about by 
population movements – of refugees, displaced people and the political elite – and 
the unfolding regional security situation hampered efforts to implement a coherent 
policy. Relations between the GoR and the donor community were strained by: 
ongoing instability in the region, fuelled by the presence of hostile forces within 
refugee camps outside Rwanda’s borders; doubts on the part of many donors, 
mingled with guilt, about the new regime with regard to internal political 
developments and the refugee situation; GoR frustrations, mixed with bitterness, 
over unfulfilled pledges and support to refugees unmatched by support to survivors 
within Rwanda; and GoR frustration over its lack of control over aid flows. Some 
donors, particularly those with a longer history in the region, expressed concern 
about political events with occasional freezes on aid, although in general limited 
pressure was placed upon the GoR in an atmosphere which accorded considerable 
‘genocide credit’ to the new regime. Coordination amongst agencies was limited 
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From Emergency Assistance to Budget Support: Rwanda as a ‘special case’ 
1997-2000 
1997 to 2000 revealed an evolving pattern of divergence between supportive and 
hesitant donors, reflecting contrasting assessments of Rwanda’s situation. On the one 
hand, there were positive assessments of the progress the GoR was making in terms 
of establishing social, economic and political order. To support these efforts, 
attempts were made to mobilise direct support for the GoR, championed by new 
donors (notably the UK and Sweden) who were strongly supportive of the Kigali 
government and who argued for Rwanda to be treated as a ‘special case’ for 
assistance. On the other hand, continuing insecurity in some parts of the country until 
1998 and Rwanda’s military engagement in the escalating conflict in the DRC, 
compounded with questions about the domestic politics in Rwanda and human rights 
raised concerns in other quarters. A number of donors became increasingly nervous 
about the new regime, with countries such as Norway and Ireland gradually reducing 
their presence and others placing additional conditions upon aid. 
There was a shift from what was widely seen as a dysfunctional Round Table 
process to more ad-hoc meetings which eventually consolidated into regular 
Development Partners Meetings. By 2000 coordination of aid, types of aid, as well as 
ownership of the process were becoming increasingly salient. 
The Shift to Rwandan Soil and the Poverty Reduction Agenda 
A third period can be proposed from 2000 until the present day, dominated by the 
consolidation of the poverty agenda and the end of Rwanda’s political transition. 
Donors demonstrated a willingness to coordinate around Rwanda’s poverty strategy, 
with budgetary and sectoral programme support playing an increasingly important 
role. The shift of partner meetings to Rwandan soil increased GoR ‘ownership’ of the 
aid process.  
However, relationships continued to be overshadowed by the broader political 
context. Regional security and conflict, as well as human liberties and institutional 
governance dominated dialogue between the two sides. Aid was withheld by some 
donors, primarily the ‘new’ donors, over governance issues, demonstrating a 
commitment by some to apply more stringent conditions to aid, which contrasted 
with deepening collaboration on the poverty agenda. Inconsistencies amongst donors 
in their reactions to events sent mixed messages to the GoR. This highlights 
contradictions between donor analyses of the socio-political context and their 
technical relations with the GoR.  
 
Chapter 6 – Dependence on Aid, Independence of Mind: Policy Positions of the 
Rwandan Government 
 
Ensuring an adequate flow of resources in the face of limited domestic capacity 
has been a central concern of the GoR. This is reflected in a policy discourse which 
adheres to the dominant norms of international development and which has 
consequently solicited a favourable response from donors. However, the GoR also 
has its own priorities which it strongly defends. An analysis of the policy positions of 
the GoR since 1994 reveals continuity in priorities which go beyond the core donor-
Government poverty agenda, and which are at times controversial. This helps explain 
the different ways in which donors understand and engage with the GoR.  
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National Policy in the Face of Aid Dependency 
The GoR has made considerable progress in rehabilitating the Rwandan economy 
and society since 1994. Rwanda has relied heavily on external financial and technical 
support, and arguably is becoming increasingly aid dependent with the growth in aid 
to the central budget. Nevertheless, there is concern amongst Rwandan officials 
about the need to combat any culture of dependency and to ensure that policy is 
‘owned’ by Rwanda. Dependency does not mean that Rwanda should compromise 
on core principles.  
Consequently, while the poverty agenda is a central feature of Rwandan policy, it 
only represents part of the GoR’s overall aims. Often overlooked by donor agencies, 
there are key founding principles at the heart of GoR policy which have remained 
constant since 1994, namely concerns about unity and reconciliation, exclusion and 
discrimination, internal and external security, and governance. Poverty plays a lesser 
role. The example of the GoR’s position with regard to security threats from the 
DRC illustrates how the GoR presents its case and deals with external criticism. 
Rwanda as a ‘Developmental State’? Appealing to the International Community 
Rwanda displays some characteristics of the ‘developmental state’, marrying a 
tightly controlled political system with an apparently genuine commitment to socio-
economic reform. With its long-term goal of transforming Rwanda into a modern 
economy building on its human resource endowments, the GoR is concentrating 
heavily upon economic growth and transformation. Poverty reduction and social 
development are also important objectives. While the international community has 
played a significant role in policy in these areas, there are also examples, such as in 
justice and rural development, where the GoR has strongly pushed its own ideas – 
often in the face of donor resistance – which illustrates its commitment to 
development.  
Good Governance: Technocratic and Political Angles 
Governance is central to the concerns of the international community; however, 
the GoR’s commitment to improving governance in Rwanda has been present within 
its policy priorities since 1994, notably in terms of improving public sector 
management, addressing privatisation and the structural reform of the economy, 
strengthening the judiciary and promoting democratisation. The GoR’s perspective 
on governance sees it as an instrument of national unity, reconciliation and security, 
rendering the ‘new’ Rwanda fundamentally different to the old.  
Within its discourse there is space for democratic development and a strengthened 
voice for civil society; however, limits are set upon political freedoms in the interests 
of national unity. The circumscription of political liberties in Rwanda, which 
arguably increased prior to and following the elections of 2003, has led to 
accusations of the GoR becoming increasingly authoritarian. The political 
vulnerabilities of the new regime are present within a harshening of the rhetoric with 
regard to the genocide and ‘genocide ideology’. The provision of aid has been 
affected by these tendencies.  
The Faces of the GoR 
Consequently, it is possible to ‘read’ the current situation in Rwanda in different 
ways. This affects how donors perceive the GoR, how they engage with the regime, 
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how they deal with the genocide legacy and GoR discourse, and what they choose to 
‘see’. For donors providing aid under a broad-based programme, a core question is 
how to balance negatives and positives, such as the presence of a more independent 
media against limitations set upon these, an improvement in fundamental human 
rights against limited freedom of expression, a state genuinely committed to socio-
economic development and institutional good governance against a deteriorating 
political governance record. 
 It is clear that donors are far from controlling development processes in Rwanda, 
and that the GoR does not passively defer to donor demands. This demonstrates that, 
despite dependence upon external resources, the GoR does have a strong degree of 
ownership over policy and processes. 
 
Chapter 7 – Donor Positions: Belgium and the United Kingdom in Rwanda 
1994-2004 
 
In the early 2000s the development cooperation ministries of Belgium and the UK 
published new policy papers on Rwanda, committing themselves to supporting 
poverty reduction, peace building, governance, socio-economic development and 
human rights, and working within the framework of Rwanda’s PRSP. There are, 
however, considerable differences between the strategies.  
History and Domestic Political Factors 
While Belgium’s official links with Rwanda date back to the 1920s, the UK has 
only significantly engaged with Rwanda since 1994. Belgium’s support for pre-
genocide regimes and the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Rwanda during the 
genocide led to an atmosphere of ‘mutual distrust’ between the Belgian and 
Rwandan governments after 1994. The relationship evolved towards one of ‘cautious 
engagement’ on the part of the Belgian government, allowing engagement and an 
increase in support but also sufficient detachment to satisfy an often sceptical 
Belgian public where viewpoints were at times polarised and highly critical.  
In contrast, the UK’s lack of an historical legacy in Rwanda was considered a 
strength, enabling a relationship of trust to be built up with the new Rwandan regime. 
The UK was very supportive of the GoR at times when other donors were expressing 
qualms. British presence expanded rapidly, in particular after 1997. The programme 
was characterised by limited in-depth knowledge of Rwanda early on, strong 
personal commitments on the part of high-level British politicians, and limited public 
interest. Only after about 2002 were more questioning voices raised within the UK 
about the programme, linked to reports of human rights abuses within Rwanda and 
the DRC. As this more critical analysis of the GoR filtered into British cooperation 
activities, the Belgian government appeared to be adopting a more positive stance.  
Development Cooperation and Foreign Policy 
Despite tensions between the two governments, Belgium never stopped providing 
aid to Rwanda, reflecting the importance to Belgium of the Great Lakes region in 
strategic and cooperation terms. For the UK, Rwanda is of no real strategic 
importance although it has become increasingly engaged in the wider Great Lakes 
region since about 2002. 
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Belgian aid in the mid to late 1990s was affected by a wider reform of Belgian 
cooperation which prevented a coherent strategy being adopted before 2002. 
Consequently, there was a great deal of continuity in project activities on the ground, 
with Belgium providing aid through a variety of channels. The UK provides the bulk 
of its aid as general budget support, reflecting  new approaches being adopted within 
DFID. The UK has been very active in bolstering Rwandan systems to manage 
budget support and in promoting instruments such as Sector Wide Approaches. 
Although Belgian policy papers in 2003 were proposing the use of sectoral and 
budget support in broader cooperation policy, there remained considerable doubts 
about using these in Rwanda due to concerns over political and administrative 
governance.  
Policy Dialogue and Conditionality 
The UK’s use of budget support in Rwanda called for new accountability 
mechanisms, captured primarily in a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1999. 
Central to the UK’s approach has been the policy dialogue potential offered by close 
collaboration with key politicians, officials and line ministries. The revised MoU of 
2004 reveals greater political analysis and increased conditionality – albeit in the 
language of ‘mutual commitments’. This more political angle is evidenced in delayed 
disbursement of budget support instalments in 2004 due to concerns about Rwanda’s 
engagement in the DRC and progress on political liberalisation. This delay raised 
fundamental questions about the predictability of budget support as an instrument.  
While Belgian policy documents express the importance of policy dialogue and 
political conditions upon aid (again phrased as ‘commitments’), the nature of Belgian 
cooperation which focuses on support for the people not the government and the 
practical reality of project mechanisms means that there is very little evidence and 
impact of such conditions on the ground.  
 
The chapter concludes that the differences between donors can be divided into 
two categories: the political and the administrative. These can be sub-divided into 
agency-wide factors and factors specific to the recipient country. Four core issues 
affecting aid policy and practice in Rwanda stand out. Firstly, how donors interpret 
political, social and economic events affects dialogue with the GoR and choices for 
aid. Changes in aid approach can be attributed to policy decisions applied throughout 
the agency or to specific reactions to events in Rwanda. Secondly, the history of the 
donor in Rwanda profoundly affects its relationship with the GoR and its room for 
manoeuvre vis-à-vis home constituencies. Thirdly, the type of aid instruments 
employed affect the nature of the relationship between the donor and the GoR in 
terms of policy dialogue and capacity for leverage. Finally, underpinning all other 
elements is the domestic environment of a donor which frames the entire relationship 
in political, administrative and technical terms. Political transitions in the UK and 
Belgium impacted upon development policy and practice in Rwanda, but changes 
were also linked to swings at a global level in development thinking, tied to 
economic and social currents. Since 1994, there have been no dramatic changes in 
relations between the GoR and these two particular donors, but the positions have 
nonetheless shifted demonstrating the salience of political contexts to aid 
relationships. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion: The Complexity of ‘Ownership’ of Development 
Policies and Processes 
 
This research was conducted at a time when systems were being constructed to 
turn the new principles of aid oriented around poverty reduction into practice. While 
limited to observations on the establishment of this system, rather than outcomes or 
results, this research raises important questions about the new principles of aid. 
‘New’ Programme Aid in Rwanda 
Budget support is a cornerstone of the new aid agenda. In Rwanda, the majority of 
donors continue to prefer the project mechanism although increasingly projects are 
being coordinated with GoR priorities. Budget support in Rwanda throws up several 
issues. Firstly, trust in the recipient government and robust systems to manage funds 
are considered necessary conditions for budget support. The UK and Belgian 
approaches illustrate two very different positions: the prudent approach of Belgium 
to engage cautiously until the systems are in place to ensure political and 
administrative accountability; and the risk-taking of the UK which has spent years 
building the institutions and policies necessary to fulfil accountability requirements. 
Sector budget support has been seen as a compromise mechanism for enhancing aid 
effectiveness without the risks. Some donors are falling back on this mechanism, 
counteracting the idea of a linear progression from projects to sectoral aid to budget 
support and bringing to the fore new complexities around institutional capacity for 
managing sector strategies. 
Secondly, experiences in 2003 and 2004 highlight how budget support can be a 
very unpredictable instrument, with delays in disbursement for technical and political 
reasons. Given the greater dependency which budget support induces, this poses 
considerable risks for the recipient. Harmonisation also represents a risk in that 
donors could potentially bring about political instability by withholding budget 
support. In Rwanda, there was limited evidence of real harmonisation taking place; 
indeed, the move away from cross-conditionality towards more flexibility amongst 
budget support donors implies a shift in the opposite direction.  
Thirdly, there are contradictions between local ownership of aid and policy 
processes and donor exigencies in respect of policy dialogue and conditions. This 
may affect democratisation and government-populace accountability. 
Finally, aid agencies continue to be under pressure to spend their budgets, 
increasingly so as aid to Africa rises. Budget support is seen as a core instrument to 
enable more money to be moved faster. This imperative may override concerns about 
accountability and ownership. 
Coordination and Harmonisation: Re-assessing Ownership 
The Rwandan case highlights the difficulty of translating global agreements on 
coordination into practice. Although the GoR is a partner in the process, it is 
essentially donor-led. There is limited evidence to suggest a government-wide 
consensus and there has been no consistent message or drive from the GoR side. 
There appears to be a fundamental tension between demands for quick results and 
Government ownership.  
Questions of sovereignty and power also arise. The new aid agenda is increasing 
the power of the Ministry of Finance relative to other ministries in their relations 
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with external actors. Lines of accountability may consequently be rendered more 
‘normal’, i.e. internal, but this also highlights how aid systems can impact upon 
power relations within recipient governments. On the donor side, there is evidence of 
coordination becoming a new ‘flag-flying’ mechanism, with donors keen to show 
how engaged they are with the new agenda.  
The Rwandan case also shows how actors understand coordination, harmonisation 
and alignment in different ways, raising questions about whether coordination can 
function without overall agreement on the core concepts and agendas. This is all the 
more salient when it comes to analyses of the Rwandan state. Harmonisation is 
hampered not only by different donor domestic constraints, but by their different 
understandings of what is happening in Rwanda. Coordination on the ground may be 
a largely technical matter, but understanding the political context is crucial. 
Coordination activities are increasing transaction costs for donors on the ground, 
yet motivations are unclear. There is pressure from headquarters to engage with the 
coordination agenda, but the evidence would suggest that this is not becoming 
inherent to daily practices or leading to changes in donor structures. Constraints 
imposed at headquarter level obstruct space for changing donor behaviour in 
practice, and consequently for enabling recipient ownership.  
The Global Consensus Revisited 
The central argument emerging from this study is that profound differences at 
multiple levels between the strategies and agendas of aid actors present a serious 
obstacle to the application of international agreements about the components 
necessary for effective aid. The tendency to talk about ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ or 
‘partners’ masks very profound differences between them and within them. There is 
agreement at the global and local level that aid should focus on poverty reduction, 
that good governance and country ownership are essential to aid effectiveness from 
the recipient side, and that improved coordination, harmonisation and alignment are 
essential on the donor side. Yet, the priorities and perspectives of each actor vary 
widely when it comes to policy and action. In this situation, no one agenda is more 
nor less legitimate. The choices that donors make about how to and what to engage 
with reflects their particular understanding of the GoR. 
From a developmental perspective, Rwanda has made remarkable progress since 
1994, appearing genuinely committed to economic growth and social development. 
From another angle, however, the GoR shows signs of increasing authoritarianism 
and regional belligerence. On the basis of the former assessment, Rwanda is a prime 
candidate for increased donor assistance, and arguably increased budget support; the 
latter analysis, however, implies that donors are shoring up a potentially 
authoritarian, neo-patrimonial regime. It can be argued that in providing assistance 
donors are creating space for political dialogue in order to steer the GoR towards 
better governance and service provision; and that by encouraging the GoR to invest 
in social services, justice, governance and accountability, Rwanda may become a 
sustainable democracy. However, a very subtle understanding of the political 
dynamics of the country is required for this and there are doubts as to whether that 
knowledge exists within the daily activities of officials in aid agencies. 
At multiple levels – international, agency, national and sub-national – a range of 
historical, cultural, economic and political factors impact upon donor activities. 
These factors are both Rwanda-specific and system-wide. These divergences can be 
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both problematic and beneficial for the GoR in that they create considerable 
difficulties in the management of aid, yet they also provide room for manoeuvre.   
Ownership of Aid Policy and Processes in Rwanda: donor-dominated, recipient-
led or joint? 
The concept of ‘ownership’ is central to the new discourse on aid, and of prime 
concern are the locus of ‘ownership’ and notions of ‘having’, ‘giving’ or ‘taking’. 
The Rwandan case highlights the problem of equating ownership with the recipient 
setting the agenda. Rwanda’s poverty strategy was strongly influenced by external 
assistance and consequently it is not merely a Rwandan agenda, but an agenda which 
satisfies the external financiers also. This is far from representing a free-rein for the 
recipient to ‘have’ full ownership and set its own development agenda. This does not 
mean that there is no government ownership; indeed, the GoR’s capacity to forge its 
own identity and to enforce it has been a constant throughout the post-1994 period. 
Donors have aligned around Rwanda’s poverty agenda, but only in the sense of 
making this the common framework for programmes and projects. Most donors 
continue to work in accordance with their own prerogatives. Ownership can therefore 
be seen as an aspiration to be worked towards. Since 1994 the GoR has asserted 
more control over aid as government institutions have been consolidated and 
structured policies developed, and also as Government capacity to manage aid and 
policy has increased. Donors have been willing to concede some ownership with the 
adoption of the PRSP. This represents a mutual process of donors ‘giving’ ownership 
as the GoR ‘takes’ it. There are limits to this linear idea, however. On the one hand, 
there are limited signs of the GoR forging a coherent strategy to ‘take’ ownership. 
Pragmatism in terms of maintaining access to resources mitigates against this. On the 
other hand, there is a limit to how much control donors will ultimately concede over 
aid policies and processes. While the new aid agenda may have the aim of increasing 
recipient ownership as a central theme, the reality is that conditions and selectivity 
are, if anything, greater. 
Consequently we can observe the establishment of a system of joint ownership 
based on mutual responsibilities. The policy process is as follows: the GoR puts 
forward its agenda, which reflects what donors want to see; then a process of 
negotiation ensues with donors requesting particular amendments to satisfy their 
needs. This would imply that provided donors are happy with a strategy they will 
allow the GoR to ‘own’ it; where there is dispute, which is more likely in sensitive 
areas like justice or governance in comparison to health or education, while donors 
may not refuse to support it, they will try to amend it. This is not country ownership, 
but rather joint ownership. 
Real country ownership and consequently real aid efficiency attuned to country-
specific requirements would require a complete change in donor perspectives and the 
establishment of a truly bottom-up system. The aid system as it currently stands is 
unavoidably inimical to national autonomy. 
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The international community … has reaffirmed the importance of putting the 
recipient country in the driver’s seat in devising its development program and 
in leading coordination processes. (World Bank Operations Evaluation 
Department April 2000, emphasis in original) 
The Government of Rwanda needs to take charge and put itself in the driving 
seat (Director of Strategic Planning and Poverty Monitoring Department, 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Rwanda, 17 March 2004)  
 
Just who should be ‘driving’ development policy and processes in poor countries 
is a contentious issue. The analogy of the ‘driving seat’ is a recurrent and powerful 
metaphor in contemporary development discourse, reflecting concerns about who 
controls the ideas, policies, programmes and management mechanisms which make 
up the complex system of international development assistance. It reflects, more 
precisely, a wider debate about the ‘ownership’ of development processes and the 
voice within this of the recipients of aid. This represents a profound shift in 
development thinking away from the imposition of strategies by external donor 
institutions to a system led by the recipient country.  
This thesis is concerned with a series of ideas about international development 
assistance which came to dominate the relations between donor agencies and 
recipient governments in the 1990s and early 2000s. These focus on the reduction of 
poverty by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of aid, primarily through 
improving the coordination of donor agency interventions around a country-led 
poverty reduction strategy. A series of agreements endorsed by a large number of 
donor governments, international agencies and recipient countries set guidelines and 
targets which sought to turn the international consensus on the imperatives of 
reducing global poverty into concrete actions in the early 2000s.  
Through an exploration of the dynamics of aid1 in Rwanda between 1994 and 
2004, this thesis highlights the problems of translating this apparent consensus into 
practice in the face of significant variations within the policies, priorities, agendas 
and perspectives of the different actors involved in the aid system.   
 
 
                                                 
1 Foreign assistance takes many forms, covering emergency relief, food aid, military support, 
technical and financial assistance, grants and loans, debt relief, voluntary and state aid. It is provided 
by states, international agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private bodies. It is 
delivered in different ways, according to a range of rationales, to fulfil a variety of objectives. This 
study does not address all these forms; rather it concentrates on the official development assistance 
(ODA) provided by the governments of rich countries through ministries of development cooperation 
to governments of poor countries (bilateral aid). ODA is defined by the Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (referred to henceforth as 
OECD-DAC) as being undertaken by official agencies, aimed at economic development and welfare 
and provided on concessional financial terms (Cassen 1994: 2).  
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Aid in Rwanda 1994-2004: The Research Topic  
 
In 2004, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) was dependent upon international 
development assistance to the tune of almost 50% of its overall budget, and over 
80% of its development budget. It was receiving over $350 million a year in aid from 
over 30 bilateral and multilateral donors and a wide range of non-governmental 
organisations. National policies and programmes aimed at promoting economic 
growth, social welfare and political change were heavily influenced by external 
actors: foreign technical assistants were bolstering weak internal capacity within 
government institutions; policy consultants and advisors were flying in and out of 
Rwanda’s capital city, Kigali, to help with the preparation of policy papers and 
evaluations; a sizable community of expatriate aid workers was present throughout 
the country. This situation of dependency on external financial and technical 
resources has contributed to the adherence of the GoR to a dominant set of norms for 
development, marrying neoliberal economic principles with a concern for human 
advancement.  
Nevertheless, the voice of the Government is very strong within its vision for the 
development of the country. It is adamant that it is the ‘owner’ of its development, a 
position intimately bound up in the recent history of the country. The nature of the 
GoR, the response of the international community to post-genocide Rwanda, the 
specific challenges of rebuilding and developing a country devastated by civil war 
and genocide, and ongoing issues around the stabilisation of the country are all 
elements within a political discourse which is both proud and independent.  
A glance at the policy principles of most of the main donor institutions present in 
Rwanda demonstrates remarkable similarity in their positions. Reducing poverty is 
the over-arching objective, and reference to country ownership is standard. Indeed, in 
their policy discourse there appears to be convergence of donors and the GoR around 
the global ideas for development mentioned above. A whole series of mechanisms 
have been put in place over the last few years to address the international concern 
with aid effectiveness, and donors are increasingly focusing their assistance around 
the GoR’s own development strategies.  
However, this thesis demonstrates that there is anything but homogeneity amongst 
donor agencies in Rwanda, just as there is anything but homogeneity within the GoR. 
Multiple donors are engaged in Rwanda, yet their composition, policies, instruments 
and reasons for providing aid have shifted greatly over the last ten years in tune with 
events in the country and domestically in donor countries. In the aftermath of the 
genocide, the programmes of some of Rwanda’s ‘traditional’ donors, such as France, 
Belgium and Switzerland, were profoundly affected. The picture is consequently one 
of considerable complexity, with donors differing in their views on both the political 
and technical aspects of providing aid, despite the apparent consensus on the over-
arching principles. This reflects diversity in their understanding of the Rwandan 
state. On the one hand, the achievements of the GoR in establishing social and 
economic stability in the wake of the genocide have brought it international acclaim; 
‘new’ donors who were not present in Rwanda prior to the genocide, such as the 
United Kingdom (UK), Sweden and the Netherlands, have taken the lead in 
supporting the GoR, placing faith in its commitment to lasting peace, stability and 
socio-economic development. Rwanda has been seen as a testing ground for post-
conflict strategies and a model country with regard to poverty-focused development 
   3 
strategies. On the other hand, concerns abound about the nature of the Government, 
its true commitment to bringing about deep political reform in Rwanda and its 
strategic intentions in the Great Lakes region. Even as the country has stabilised, 
beneath the surface tensions within the Rwandan population remain and unresolved 
questions about justice, human rights and political freedoms are causing many 
analysts to predict a return to violence. This alternative perspective is evident within 
the cautious approach of many donors to providing aid to Rwanda.  
In parallel to this diversity amongst donors, the GoR itself responds in different 
ways to individual donor agencies, in tune with its own perspectives of them and 
their histories in Rwanda, and on the basis of its own strategic interests.  
This thesis seeks to analyse these different perspectives on Rwanda in light of the 
international consensus on aid effectiveness. It questions the diversity amongst 
donors and the political factors on both the donor and recipient sides which lie 
behind the aid relationship. In doing so, it draws on two main bodies of literature. 
The first of these is the policy material produced by the international agencies and 
institutions which frames much of development thinking. Vast quantities of 
background analyses, case studies, policy guidelines and analytical frameworks are 
produced by international institutions such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the OECD-DAC which feed into the dialogue amongst aid 
actors about development. These are complemented by policy-oriented research 
conducted by analysts based within these agencies. In addition, many bilateral donors 
have considerable research resources at their disposal with in-house policy research 
teams, national think-tanks and independent consultants adding to this body of 
literature. This material provides substantial information on the thinking behind 
development policies and processes, but needs to be treated with caution given that it 
is deeply embedded in aid systems, is aimed at a particular audience and tends to be 
subjective. As Crush observes,  
the texts of development have always been avowedly strategic and tactical – 
promoting, licensing and justifying certain interventions and practices, 
delegitimizing and excluding others… The primary purpose of the development 
text (like most others) is to convince, to persuade, that this (and not that) is the 
way the world actually is and ought to be amended. But ideas about 
development do not arise in a social, institutional or literary vacuum. They are 
rather assembled within a vast hierarchical apparatus of knowledge production 
and consumption sometimes known, with metaphorical precision, as the 
‘development industry’. (Crush 1995) 
Mosse likewise draws attention to the problem of  
giving pre-eminence to [policy] texts as representations of discourse. Texts are 
important, but… they cannot be read at face value without reference to the 
arguments, interests and divergent points of view that they encode and to which 
they allude. (Mosse 2005) 
This reflects what Yanow terms the “purposive ambiguity” of policy (Yanow 1996) 
which has the strategic objective of accommodating multiple and conflicting values 
and meanings across time and place.  
In addition to these policy texts, a wide body of more objective, academic 
literature on development policies and processes is equally drawn upon in this study. 
This work covers aid theory, aid practice, aid to Africa, and aid to specific countries 
within Africa.  
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The second body of literature which underpins this study relates specifically to 
Rwanda. The genocide of 1994 elicited a great deal of academic interest in a 
previously relatively understudied country. Since 1994, the causes and consequences 
of the genocide have been scrutinised from every angle – historical factors, ethnicity, 
socio-economic structures, political systems, and regional relations. The role of aid 
and donors is often considered in this literature, given the importance of external 
factors and actors in Rwanda’s history. The most comprehensive academic studies on 
aid to Rwanda have been conducted by Peter Uvin. Aiding Violence (Uvin 1998) 
provides an in-depth study of how development assistance and the aid system 
advertently and inadvertently underpinned Rwanda’s descent into chaos. Similar 
themes are also addressed by Scherrer (2002), Storey (1999), Andersen (2000) and 
Pottier (2002). Subsequent work by Uvin complements the 1998 study, most 
importantly an article published in 2001 which looks at the way in which the 
international community has acted in Rwanda since the genocide (Uvin 2001a). Uvin 
has also been commissioned by various donor agencies to research particular policy-
related questions, including on aid conditionality by the OECD-DAC (Baaré, Shearer 
and Uvin 1999), on justice for the Belgian government (Uvin 2001b), and on civil 
society for the British (Unsworth and Uvin 2002).  
Work on the aftermath of the genocide and the reconstruction of the country has 
focused particularly on reconciliation and justice, taking in issues of security, 
stability and governance. More recently, poverty has become a more prominent 
theme of research on Rwanda. Studies on poverty in Rwanda drawn on in this 
research include Mutebi, Stone and Thin (2001), Renard and Molenaers (2003), van 
Leeuwen (2001) and van Hoyweghen (2000).  
In addition to this work on aid and poverty in Rwanda, two other sources of 
information have been equally important to this research. The first of these are the 
critical reflections on Rwanda’s socio-economic and political development emerging 
from academics and NGOs. The Centre for the Study of the Great Lakes at Antwerp 
University in Belgium produces an annual study on the Great Lakes which is 
particularly useful in providing a chronicle of the evolution of post-genocide 
Rwanda. On Rwanda, influential work has been conducted by Reyntjens (among 
others) on the political side, and Marysse (among others) on the economic side. 
Studies produced by international human rights NGOs, such as Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group, are also highly 
valuable.  
The second source is the more policy-oriented material emerging from 
international donor institutions and consultants. The World Bank and IMF, for 
example, produce regular in-depth analyses of general macro-economic development 
in Rwanda, as well as analyses of individual sectors. A considerable amount of 
material is produced by international consultancy groups, commissioned by donor 
agencies, on specific aspects of development in Rwanda. Rwanda has been the focus 
of studies on topics such as post-conflict reconstruction (World Bank 1998), 
education and poverty (World Bank 2004), and coordination and aid mechanisms 
(SPA 2002, 2003). Again these analyses have to be treated with some caution. 
Studies produced by and for particular donor agencies are often seeking to advance 
particular agendas or are conducted over very short periods of time which can impact 
upon their academic validity.  
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This thesis builds on this literature. However, it seeks to complement it by looking 
beyond the particularities of the Rwandan case to consider wider factors impacting 
upon how donors act, notably the domestic socio-political environment of donors and 
their engagement with the international aid agenda.  
 
Research Questions 
This research grew out of an interest in the dynamics of the relationship between 
donors and recipients in aid-dependent countries. I was particularly interested in the 
extent to which an aid-dependent government, emerging from economic and political 
crisis, can define its own development agenda when it is supported by multiple 
donors each with their own ideas and constraints. Rather than starting with a pre-
determined agenda, the research question and methodology evolved out of the 
realities encountered in the field. As the research progressed, the initial idea 
gradually evolved into a study of the different ways in which donors engage with a 
country emerging from crisis, and how this relates to international aid agendas, 
drawing on insights from a range of academic disciplines. Rwanda was chosen as an 
example through which to explore these ideas. Therefore, the research did not begin 
with a specific interest in Rwanda per se; rather, a period of reflection led to the 
decision to look at Rwanda as an example. The topic was then refined into an 
exploration of the intervention of two donor countries in Rwanda over the period 
1994 to 2004 with contrasting histories, policies and methods: Belgium and the UK. 
From a minimal presence prior to 1994, the UK had become one of Rwanda’s 
primary bilateral donors by 1999, providing increasing amounts of aid in the form of 
direct budget support to the Government. Belgium, on the other hand, has a long 
history in Central Africa and its aid policy on Rwanda has been profoundly affected 
by recent events. Rwanda nevertheless remains among Belgium’s top recipients of 
aid, delivered largely through project mechanisms. As such, this thesis builds upon 
observations made by Uvin about aid in Rwanda since the genocide:  
During the years leading up to the genocide, donors adopted what can only be 
called a policy of voluntary blindness to the politics of prejudice, injustice, 
exclusion and human rights violations in Rwanda. Development aid basically 
lived in a well intentioned but separate sphere… Things have changed 
dramatically since that time. Almost all those now working in Rwanda are 
aware of the social and political challenges facing the country. (Uvin 2001a) 
However,  
Since 1994 donors have differed radically in their assessments of basic matters 
such as the current dynamics of the Rwandan conflict, the nature and intentions 
of the government, the weight of the past in explaining the present, or the nature 
of current ethnic, social and economic trends in society. As a result, even if 
donors have had the same broad aims, they are unable to agree on priorities and 
policies. (idem) 
During the period of fieldwork two new dimensions were added to the research 
agenda. Firstly, in order to place the British and Belgian interventions into their 
context, a much broader overview of the spectrum of donors active in Rwanda was 
required. I therefore built up a profile of the main Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) bilateral donors in the country. Secondly, 
although the issue of coordination of aid was on the international agenda at the start 
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of this study, I had not anticipated how topical it would be amongst actors on the 
ground. Consequently, ‘coordination’ became a lens through which to explore the 
areas of consensus and divergence amongst donors and the GoR, how actors engage 
with each other, and questions of ‘ownership’ of development processes. It was in 
the context of coordination activities – meetings, seminars and workshops – that 
debates amongst individual representatives of donor agencies and the GoR addressed 
the realities of the new international aid agenda.  
The thesis focuses on bilateral aid in particular, that is transfers from government 
to government. However, given the importance of international institutions like the 
World Bank, the IMF, various agencies of the United Nations, and the European 
Union (EU) to the overall aid context in Rwanda, this study also touches upon these 
multilateral bodies. I do not deal explicitly with aid provided by NGOs or the private 
sector; however, bilateral aid from many donors is often channelled indirectly 
through multilateral agencies or NGOs; thus throughout the study the voices of these 
groups are important. Finally, this research does not look at how ‘ownership’ is 
experienced by the local population, nor at participatory processes. It concentrates on 
policy-making and aid organisation at the macro-level and input level, focusing on 
core GoR ministries, main bilateral donor head offices and their representations on 
the ground. It does not measure outcomes, practice or results.  
The complexity of the relationships between aid actors in Rwanda raises a series 
of questions about the new aid agenda, and particularly how ‘ownership’ of 
development processes by the recipient government is affected by the different 
positions of donor agencies, despite these donors professing similar objectives for 
aid. In the ensuing chapters, a series of questions are addressed. What are the 
development policy priorities of the GoR and to what extent are these framed by the 
situation of external dependency? What does ‘ownership’ mean in such a situation? 
What explanations can be advanced for the differences between donor approaches in 
Rwanda and how have these evolved in tune with shifts in thinking at the 
international level? How do donors translate their global commitments on aid into 
practice in a country like Rwanda? What does this mean for ‘ownership’ by the GoR 
of development processes? How do the GoR and donors interact in practice? What 
lessons emerge from the Rwandan situation of relevance to broader development 
theory? 
The conclusions of the study would suggest that the starting point for an effective 
agenda for development should not be a search for global consensus, but rather a 
better understanding on the ground about the constraints and perspectives of the 
various actors from which a more country-led strategy can be devised.  
 
The Language of Development 
From the outset, this study is caught up in the complexity of the highly value-
laden, normative terminology of development. ‘Development’ itself is a contested 
term, embedded in the social and political world which created it. It carries a series 
of assumptions about the world system. What can be considered right and wrong, 
good and bad about a given donor programme depends on a specific interpretation of 
what development and aid are intended to achieve. Although alternative views exist 
on priorities and modalities, the term ‘development’ is imbued with particular values 
of Western culture and generally equates to ‘developmentalism’ – the teleological 
process of transforming a traditional society into a modern nation state which 
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performs certain functions in line with Western, or more recently what are 
considered to be ‘global’, values (see Crush 1995; Rist 2002; Quarles van Ufford and 
Giri 2003; Boas and McNeill 2004). Development is often seen in terms of an 
imposition on weaker countries of the worldview of dominant nations, with aid as a 
tool of that process. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that many elites from 
developing countries also subscribe to this worldview, have played a role in forming 
it, and gain from it. Consequently, they should not be considered as external to this 
process or as passive victims.  
The concepts of ownership, coordination, alignment and partnership which form 
the bedrock of the aid agenda explored in this thesis hold specific meanings for the 
actors within the ‘world’ which I am investigating. To take one example, 
‘ownership’ in the world of aid holds particular meanings about control and power, 
about possession, and about interactions; and it does not translate easily. In Rwanda, 
the term ‘ownership’ is used with remarkable frequency by donor, government and 
civil society actors. Two main European languages are used in interactions between 
these actors, English and French. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ownership 
as “the fact or state of being an owner; proprietorship, dominion; legal right of 
possession.”2 This implies something inherent, something one ‘has’. The French 
word used for ownership is appropriation. The Petit Robert defines this term as the 
action of making something one’s own. This carries connotations of a zero-sum 
game; taking possession of something which then is no longer the possession of 
someone else. Interestingly, the synonyms given lead from acquisition to occupation, 
seizure, conquest and usurpation (Petit Robert 1990). I asked one informant, a high 
level Rwandan official very involved in debates on aid, what ‘ownership’ would be 
in Rwanda’s local language, Kinyarwanda. There did not seem to be an obvious 
answer as he had to think for some time before proposing two possibilities: kubigira 
ibyawe which carries connotations of something which comes from yourself – an 
internal original idea – but also implies there are external ideas which you see as a 
benefit which you can take and make yours. The other possibility was kwigana 
which means copying from somewhere else.3 
The translation question is only one aspect of the complex world of development 
discourse and arguably one which has rarely been studied. Academic analyses of this 
question tend not to focus on whether there is linguistic comprehension of the words 
employed; rather they focus on the metaphors and meanings of the language of 
development, the power struggles masked within them, and the political worlds in 
which these ideas are embedded. For example, Mosse considers the metaphorical 
language of development to be deliberately confusing:  
Policy discourse generates mobilising metaphors (‘participation, ‘partnership’, 
‘governance’) whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is 
required to conceal ideological differences so as to allow compromise and the 
enrolment of different interests, to distribute agency and to multiply the criteria 
of success within project systems. (Mosse 2005)4  
                                                 
2 An additional definition is given, namely “the fact or state of being or feeling responsible for solving 
a problem, addressing an issue, etc.” This seems to equate much more with the ‘international’ sense of 
the term. 
3 Interview, Director of the Strategic Planning and Poverty Monitoring Department (SPPMD), 
Ministry of Finance, Kigali, 11 October 2004 
4 On this, see also Yanow (1996), Crush (1995a), Boas and McNeill (2004). 
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A final point on this is the tendency within literature on aid and development to 
use the term ‘donors’ as a generic group (just as there is a tendency to talk of 
‘recipients’ as a generic group). The actors in the aid relationship are often split into 
two groups – on the one side the donors (those who give the money) and on the other 
the recipients (those who receive and benefit from it). As we shall see in chapter 2, 
the word ‘partners’ is now considered preferable. Rarely is there sufficient 
explanation given about who exactly these terms refer to. In grouping ‘donors’ 
together in this fashion, homogeneity is ascribed to what is in fact a very disparate 
set of individual agencies and institutions, each with its own mind-set and 
prerogatives. Within each of these there is also substantial variation. A similar 
problem occurs in the use of the term ‘donor community’ or ‘international 
community’. The word ‘community’ implies commonality of perspective which, as 
this thesis shows, is far from the case.   
This study falls into its own trap with regard to the terminology used – the 
following chapters are replete with the problematic language of development. It is 
hard to get away from this, and I do not attempt to; but it is important to bear this 
bias in mind.  
 
 
Fieldwork and Methodological Questions 
 
Three main research methods were employed to gather data for this study: policy 
analysis and archival work; semi-structured interviews; and participant observation. 
Primary data were collected during fieldwork in the UK, Belgium and Rwanda 
between June 2003 and December 2004. Feedback seminars in the three countries of 
study were conducted towards the end of the fieldwork period which provided 
additional reflection. This combination of research methods allowed alternative 
angles to be explored, but each threw up its particular challenges.  
Policy analysis and archival work focused on public policy documents produced 
by donors active in Rwanda. These included official policy papers on general aid 
strategies, country strategy papers on Rwanda, project and programme overviews, 
evaluations, and website presentations of country information. Much of this 
information was available on public websites; however, more specific information on 
the Rwanda programmes tended to become available only through contacts in the 
agencies. On the side of the GoR, I analysed the main policy papers on economic and 
social policy - on macro-economic development, governance, education and health.5 
While some of these were available electronically, many were only accessible from 
ministries in Rwanda, particularly older documents. Obtaining consistent records of 
meetings was problematic, with archiving of recent documents generally weak across 
agencies in the country. The British Department for International Development 
(DFID) office in Rwanda only held documents back to 2001, for example. Very little 
had been archived in Belgium’s Directorate-General for Development Cooperation 
(DGCD) since the late 1990s; so access was patchy. In Rwanda, there are very few 
libraries or centres housing official documentation. Many documents dating further 
back than 2000 were only obtained through persistent requests to officials. It took 
two months to gain entry to the United Nations’ documentation centre which was 
                                                 
5 Many of the policy documents quoted in this thesis are written in French. Where direct quotes have 
been used, these have been translated into English by myself and marked ‘translated from French’.  
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officially closed for lack of funding. The difficulty I experienced in accessing this 
documentation raised broader questions about the knowledge of agency actors with 
regard to the very recent history of policy processes in Rwanda, of consultancy work 
conducted, reports written and evaluations carried out. 
Three main blocs of time were spent in Rwanda: September to December 2003; 
February to May 2004; and September to October 2004.6 Short trips were made to 
Brussels and London before the first trip to Rwanda and between each visit. 
Organising the fieldwork in this way allowed time for reflection and for questions to 
be taken backwards and forwards between each field site. It also had two important 
benefits. Firstly, I was able to follow events in all the countries over a period of time, 
allowing me to observe the evolution of debates on poverty reduction and aid 
coordination from one year to the next. It also permitted me to observe how events 
impacted upon debates and relationships. For example, the first trip to Belgium in 
June 2003 fell shortly after general elections which saw the ousting of the Green 
Party from government, and consequently the Green Development Cooperation 
Minister. Development policies were in temporary limbo, and much debate revolved 
around the possible devolution of development assistance to Belgium’s federal 
government bodies. Interviews conducted at this time were strongly affected by these 
circumstances. A year later, with a new Minister and policy in place, debates had 
changed. In Rwanda, the first phase of fieldwork started between presidential and 
parliamentary elections in August and September 2003. Relations between donors 
and the government were coloured by the election process; a year later different 
issues were on the table.  
These examples highlight the difficulty of conducting research in a rapidly 
changing policy environment. The fieldwork findings, particularly interviews, reflect 
events happening in a particular context at a given moment in time. Moreover, on the 
donor side field staff change frequently, although this was more the case for the UK 
than for Belgian officials. There were also significant changes within Rwandan 
ministries. The narratives of the individuals interviewed are obviously coloured by 
their personal experiences, their knowledge of the Rwandan context and their 
personal views.  
Secondly, an unanticipated consequence of splitting the fieldwork trips was that 
many research relationships were substantially strengthened. A total of just over 
eight months was spent in Rwanda. I believe that had I spent one long bloc of time in 
Rwanda I would have gained much more limited access to a number of people who 
became key informants. The majority of interviewees were senior civil servants, 
politicians, and senior representatives of donor agencies in important positions, often 
with very limited time to spare for an independent, student researcher. Many of these 
people accorded me a formal interview during my first trip; it is not likely that much 
time would have been found for a second such interview within one eight month 
period. However, because I went away and returned after a couple of months each 
time, I found that many informants were glad to see me again, were curious about my 
                                                 
6 During this visit, I also conducted some separate, although complementary, research for a DFID-
funded research project into post-basic education and training (see www.cas.ed.ac.uk/research). On 
the basis of this research project, I was commissioned by DFID through the consultancy group the 
Centre for British Teachers (CfBT) to undertake a short piece of consultancy work in Rwanda. The 
fieldwork for this consultancy was undertaken during two weeks in December 2004. Consequently, 
during my final visits to Rwanda, my identity as a researcher was slightly different.  
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progress, and were interested in talking about recent developments on their side. I 
therefore was able to interview a number of people on several occasions. While this 
allowed relationships of trust to be deepened, these interactions became increasingly 
informal – often moving from the office to a restaurant setting. This made note-
taking difficult; so later interviews rely heavily on fieldwork diaries in which I recall 
discussions after the event.  
The analysis of policy discourse was complemented by over 300 qualitative 
interviews, which permitted me to gain insights into issues behind the policies – the 
process, compromises and politics. These interviews were mainly with policy 
makers, programme staff and officials within ministries of all three countries, but 
alternative perspectives were sought from politicians, representatives of NGOs, 
technical assistants, consultants and development analysts (see Appendix 1). 
Interviewing such elites7 presents its own challenges in terms of access, power 
relations, sensitivity of material, and establishing the ‘truth’ from often very 
subjective accounts (see Richards 1996; Lilleker 2003). Particularly important is the 
question of recording and referencing this material. While a tape recorder was used 
on occasion, generally I relied solely on note-taking in interviews. Interviewees 
sometimes specifically said that information was off-the-record. These remarks are 
often “more important than anything previously said... These are the gems that often 
given an argument kudos and credibility” (Lilleker 2003). I would feel obliged to 
stop writing, relying on memory to record such remarks later. In order to ensure the 
anonymity of informants, I have rarely attributed remarks to named individuals in 
this thesis.  
Moreover, in Rwanda, and to a lesser extent in Belgium, there were additional 
challenges around culture, language and behaviour specific to conducting elite 
interviews outside my own (British) cultural context. A major advantage was my 
ability to carry out interviews in both French and English, which facilitated access to 
a wide range of informants. In Rwanda, Anglophone informants were sometimes 
suspicious of Francophone researchers, so being British was an advantage; at the 
same time many of my Francophone informants were set at ease by my comfort with 
the language. Given that all interviewees were fluent in English, French or both, no 
interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda or Dutch; however, my interest in 
attempting to learn at least a few words of Kinyarwanda was seen by some Rwandan 
informants as a sign that I was different to many foreigners working in the country. 
In Belgium, Dutch-speaking informants tended to prefer to speak English rather than 
French.  
Initial contacts with donor agencies and international NGOs were made by simply 
contacting the offices in the country, and I then relied greatly on ‘snowballing’. The 
policy constituency and the aid sector in Rwanda are both small; once I had 
established good relations with a number of key informants, I was continuously 
passed on to other people. I was also often put in touch with former or retired staff 
with whom I conducted face-to-face or telephone interviews where possible. This 
allowed greater insight into the more historical aspects of the study. While such 
snowballing can allow some bias to enter the research in terms of who I was directed 
                                                 
7 Lilleker defines ‘elites’ as “those with close proximity to power or policymaking; the category 
would include all elected representatives, executive officers of organisations and senior state 
employees” (Lilleker 2003).  
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towards and who not, my wide-ranging contacts in a variety of agencies and 
ministries led to a fairly comprehensive sample. 
These interviews were all semi-structured. The most structured were a series of 
initial investigations into the policies of all the main donors in Rwanda (see chapter 
3) for which I relied on a more uniform questionnaire to allow comparison between 
programmes (see Appendix 2). Although all the other interviews had a specific 
focus, I was more interested to hear individual narratives than gather particular 
responses.  
To complement one-to-one interviews, and to understand the interaction between 
actors in practice, I attended a number of conferences and seminars on donor-funded 
government activities in Rwanda. These forums, aimed at presenting new policy 
papers, evaluating projects and consulting on programmes, involve policy-makers, 
representatives of Rwandan civil society, donors and international NGOs. These 
events offered a prime opportunity to observe the public discourse and the questions 
being asked, to meet new and established informants, and to hold informal 
conversations with participants. Ethically, questions could be raised about my access 
to these forums. I rarely sought official permission to attend but my presence was 
generally not questioned even after my face was well-known. A great part of this was 
my profile. As a young, white, smartly dressed woman, clearly from a donor country, 
I was not out of place attending such events. This profile was also an advantage in 
gaining access to policy-makers in the GoR, although I was careful to stress that I 
had no official connection to any donor agency, except when specifically contracted 
(see footnote 5 above). In addition to these large forums, I was also permitted to 
observe a number of smaller ‘coordination’ meetings organised by donors or the 
GoR to observe coordination in practice (see chapter 4).  
A final valuable research method was the holding of mid-term feedback 
workshops. These were conducted at the end of the fieldwork period - in September 
2004 in Kigali and November 2004 in Brussels and London – and represented an 
opportunity for me to provide many of my informants with preliminary findings from 
my research; and to solicit their feedback and further input. These helped me to begin 
to formulate my ideas, to ‘give something back’ to those who had given up a huge 
amount of time for me, and to get clarifications.  
The material gathered in the course of this fieldwork is not without its biases and 
problems, not least the question of whose voices remained unheard. However, the 
combination of techniques used and the range of narratives gathered allowed a 
comprehensive picture to be built up of interactions amongst actors involved in aid 
policy and provision in Rwanda in 2003 and 2004. This provided ample material to 





Chapter 2 gives an overview of the current debates on development policy and 
practice in which the questions of this thesis are located. This concentrates on the 
dominant themes of the 1990s and 2000s emerging from the main donor agencies 
around poverty reduction and aid efficiency. Chapters 3 and 4 provide an overview 
of aid in Rwanda in 2003 and 2004: chapter 3 gives an introduction to the different 
bilateral donors active in Rwanda and provides a comparative analysis of their 
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positions and policies. This acts as a background to chapter 4 which outlines the 
ways in which these donors came together with the GoR around coordination 
activities in 2003 and 2004. I then go on to explore three areas in more depth which 
emerge from this overview in light of the broader aid agenda. Chapter 5 explores the 
history of aid relations in Rwanda between 1994 and 2004, looking at aid flows, the 
political context and mechanisms to improve dialogue between aid actors. This 
history frames both relations between donors and the GoR and the application of the 
new aid agenda in Rwanda. Chapter 6 then considers factors internal to the GoR, 
namely the policy position of the GoR and its engagement with the international 
poverty reduction agenda, how its development strategy has evolved in light of 
internal and regional political imperatives and dependency on external support, and 
how it presents itself to both internal and external audiences. This provides some 
explanation for the reactions from donors to particular policy decisions. Chapter 7 
takes a deeper look at issues on the donor side by exploring the positions of two 
bilateral donors, the UK and Belgium, in comparative perspective. These different 
elements are then brought together in chapter 8 in a reflection on the new aid 
principles and what we can learn from the Rwandan experience of specific relevance 
to Rwanda and to broader aid debates.  
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The effectiveness of aid has been a topic of debate amongst development 
theorists, policy-makers and practitioners since overseas development assistance 
from rich to less well-off countries became an established part of international 
relations in the 1950s and 1960s. The aid system has been explored from a great 
many angles, across many academic disciplines, and on a regular basis new ideas 
emerge which have a profound impact upon the delivery of aid. In its relatively short 
history, theories underpinning aid have shifted continuously, driven in part by a 
political constituency in search of quick wins and easy answers. Much of the 
thinking about aid theory emerges from international organisations, such as the 
World Bank, the United Nations and the OECD-DAC as well as national research 
bodies and think-tanks associated with individual governments which provide 
intellectual input and critiques of development aid. Hence, theories on aid policy and 
practice are often intricately tied up with the political agendas of governing elites at 
any given time. At the same time, there is a great deal of continuity in aid theory and 
policy. Many of the early development theories formulated in the 1940s and 1950s 
continue to prevail in modified form today. New ideas have rarely completely 
overturned old ones; rather there has been a process of knowledge accumulation, 
where the weaknesses of previous paradigms are addressed within new frameworks. 
Dominant positions lie alongside alternative perspectives, interacting with them, 
rejecting or absorbing ideas in tune with political prerogatives.  
This chapter provides an introduction to the theories underpinning the way in 
which aid is delivered in Rwanda. It does not seek to provide a history of aid, nor to 
untangle the complex web of topics related to aid and development theory. Although 
theories around foreign aid are inextricably linked to development theory and 
practice, they are not necessarily the same. There is a difference between the actions 
to be undertaken and the money to fund them. For example, the development concept 
may be ‘poverty reduction’ but the associated aid instrument would be the ‘poverty 
reduction support credit’ or ‘poverty reduction budget support’. The discussions in 
this chapter refer to aid theory rather than broader development theory. The objective 
is to provide a background to the assumptions and concerns around aid which emerge 
from this study of policy and delivery of aid to Rwanda. These reflect shifts during 
the 1990s and early 2000s in which international debates, aid agency policy and 
increasingly developing country rhetoric took on board a new range of theoretical 
and conceptual ideas. The concern with addressing poverty has focused international 
attention on the need not only to increase the amounts of aid flowing to the poorest 
countries of the world, but also to ensure that better use is made of that aid through 
improved coordination amongst actors and through country ‘ownership’ of 
development policies and programmes. This likewise ties in with concerns about aid 
efficiency, transparency, accountability and the principle of national sovereignty.  
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The first section outlines the new principles of aid which encompass the poverty 
reduction agenda, programme aid and budget support, questions of ownership and 
conditionality, as well as coordination and harmonisation. The following sections 
then tease apart these various elements. In the final chapter of this thesis these core 
ideas are revisited in light of the empirical evidence from Rwanda.  
 
 
The New Principles of Aid in the 1990s and 2000s 
 
In 1989 the World Bank published a policy paper entitled Poverty, Adjustment 
and Growth in Africa (World Bank 1989); its World Development Report in 1990 
was simply subtitled Poverty (World Bank 1990). This heralded a new era in 
development thinking among international agencies, with a return to the agenda of 
poverty as an explicit focus of international cooperation. This is not to say that 
poverty had been absent from development strategies; arguably it has been the 
underlying rationale of development assistance since the 1950s, but it has often been 
subsumed within other goals, notably economic growth and institutional reform. The 
negative social outcomes of the structural adjustment era of the 1980s and the 
changing geo-political climate of the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War 
brought poverty, and more broadly speaking human and social  development, back to 
the fore within the policies of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the 
main multilateral and bilateral agencies. There were also calls for improved 
effectiveness of development assistance in an atmosphere of declining aid volumes 
and concerns about the impact of aid. The early 1990s saw a reduction in aid in light 
of fiscal pressures in donor countries, especially to Africa, at the same time as new 
areas of focus emerged. Substantial funding was diverted to the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and in response to the financial crisis in Asia. This led some 
analysts to consider that the future of aid itself was in question as the 21st century 
approached (see for example Lancaster 1999; van de Walle 1999). At the same time, 
new principles and priorities began to surface, such as democratisation, human rights 
and social well-being, which led others to see a continuing role for aid (see for 
example Riddell 1999).  
Ensuing debates in the international institutions and the OECD-DAC, as well as a 
series of global summits and conferences on themes such as education, gender and 
sustainable development brought a range of concepts back onto the table, including 
coordination, coherence and programme aid. It is important to stress the word ‘back’ 
here, as none of these ideas are new. The history of development assistance is replete 
with these ideas, the question being one of priority at any given time as well as 
conceptualisation. By 2000 this process had consolidated itself into what could be 
termed a dominant new aid agenda aimed at the reduction of poverty.1  
                                                 
1 Since 1990 an array of terms has been used with regard to poverty, all carrying different nuances, 
such as poverty alleviation, poverty eradication, poverty elimination and poverty reduction. There 
have also been debates around what poverty means and concepts such as moving in and out of 
poverty. For a good discussion of the shift from poverty alleviation to poverty eradication see Mafeje 
(2001). This shifting terminology is also captured within successive DFID publications (see DFID 
1997, DFID 2000). Given the MDG focus on poverty ‘reduction’, this is the term employed mostly in 
this thesis to cover the overall poverty-focused agenda. 
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This agenda is multi-dimensional and very complex. At the heart of it lies the 
concern, first captured in modernisation theory of the 1950s, with boosting economic 
growth in low income countries in the name of ‘development’ and of integrating 
these countries into the global economy through the liberalisation of markets. 
Alternative theories have been advanced over the decades, from dependency theory 
to the New International Economic Order and post-colonial theories captured under 
post-development theory. Nevertheless, the core of modernisation theory, that is the 
importance of liberal values and the free market, continues to dominate the economic 
thinking emerging from the multilateral institutions and many bilateral agencies, 
boosted by the collapse of communism. However, the 1990s saw an addition to this 
agenda of a wide array of social and political concerns,2 arising from the negative 
consequences of four decades of ‘development’ – persistent inequalities between and 
within low income countries, weak social infrastructure and rising poverty levels, 
political crises and conflict (particularly in Africa), environmental degradation, and 
gender imbalances. During the second half of the 1990s, debates within the OECD-
DAC, in turn reflecting a series of global conferences held in the late 1980s and early 
1990s,3 consolidated these new concerns into a set of quantifiable targets for 
international development cooperation (see OECD-DAC 1996; King and McGrath 
2004: 22-24). These targets provided the background to the Millennium Declaration 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2000 (UN 2000b) and the 
subsequent establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These laid 
down an agenda for action to reduce poverty substantially by the year 2015, 
representing a consensus about development without precedent.  
The adoption of the MDGs, together with pressure from civil society groups in the 
late 1990s to focus attention on poverty, debt relief and fairer international trade 
rules, brought about a reversal in the diminishing aid budgets. In 2002, at the 
International Conference on Financing for Development at which the Monterrey 
Consensus was agreed, pledges were made by donor agencies to boost flows of aid 
and debt relief to the poorest countries (Monterrey Consensus 2002). This coincided 
with pledges of support for the latest African development plan, the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which in many respects closely resonates with 
the global development agenda (see Hayman, King and McGrath 2003). Subsequent 
meetings of the G8 group of nations have continued this focus on Africa, notably in 
Kananaskis (Canada) in 2002 and Gleneagles (UK) in 2005. 2005 also saw the 
publishing of a report by the Commission for Africa, established by UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and involving a number of high profile Africans, which called 
for the doubling of aid to Africa (Commission for Africa 2005).4 
                                                 
2 Nelson and Eglinton (1993) talk about this in terms of a shift from a ‘narrowed donor agenda’ to a 
‘broadened global agenda’.  
3 These included the 1990 Jomtien Conference on Education for All, the 1992 ‘Earth’ Summit held in 
Rio, the 1994 Cairo conference on Population and Development, and the 1995 Beijing summit on 
Gender.  
4 It should be noted, however, that despite the pledges made at these various summits, real change in 
terms of aid flows has been less than spectacular. In the run-up to the September 2005 summit of the 
United Nations aimed at providing a progress report on the attainment of the MDGs, background 
reports admitted that without a considerable increase in resources the Goals were unlikely to be 
reached. While aid flows are focusing more on Africa and least developed countries, since Monterrey 
there have not been significant increases in resources and, indeed, flows continue to lag behind 
amounts of the early 1990s (see World Bank 2005, chapter 5). In light of this, the pledges made 
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The desire for improved effectiveness of development assistance inherent in the 
new agenda added several new, interlinked elements to the framework. First of these 
was the concern to embed development strategies in local processes, both state and 
society. This represented a marked shift in thinking from the normative, externally-
imposed structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, and was an attempt to 
counteract perceptions that aid was inefficient due to a lack of responsibility on the 
part of the recipient.5 The concept of ‘ownership’ consequently became a watchword 
of development in the 1990s. This called for development programmes to emerge 
from local processes, reflecting local contextual factors and needs. For the heavily 
indebted poor countries (HIPC), access to debt relief and aid resources became 
dependent upon the preparation of national poverty reduction strategies (PRS). As 
these were to be prepared through participatory processes with the population, this 
also linked into concerns for democratisation and public participation in policy-
making processes in order to render governments more accountable to the people. 
This added a much more explicit political dimension to aid, captured under the rubric 
of ‘governance’. This concept has been analysed by a variety of authors, 
concentrating on the two areas of institutional governance and political governance. 
Stokke gives ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ definitions of governance with narrow focusing 
on institutional development and administration management and broad covering 
openness, accountability and transparency of government institutions (Stokke 1995: 
23; Crawford 2001).6  
In relation to this question of local ‘ownership’, another concern which emerged 
was that of aid coordination and coherence on the grounds that aid effectiveness 
would be enhanced by donors agreeing to support a recipient’s own country 
development strategy. This entailed a move towards joint responsibility for aid 
outcomes (OECD-DAC 1996: 14). Following on from the Monterrey Consensus of 
2002, a commitment to improve coordination, harmonisation and alignment was 
made in Rome in 2003 (Rome Declaration 2003), reiterated in Paris in 2005 (Paris 
Declaration 2005). Important within this is the recognition that recipient commitment 
is not sufficient; it must be complemented by a commitment on the part of donors to 
reform collectively their approach to aid. A final factor is the re-emergence of 
programme aid as a primary instrument of foreign assistance, and the revisiting of 
conditionality in conjunction with this.   
Several authors have reflected on whether the principles outlined here represent a 
new paradigm in the history of aid theory, notably focused around the MDGs. For 
example, Maxwell (2005) outlines what he calls the “meta-narrative” which 
emphasises the MDGs “as an over-arching framework.” The paradigm represents a 
compromise between the Washington and the post-Washington consensus, that is 
“marrying openness and a market-oriented approach” with “an emphasis on 
institutions and human capital.” There is a clear link between poverty reduction 
strategies, macro-economic policy, effective public expenditure management and 
                                                                                                                                          
throughout 2005, while important, need to be treated with caution (see The Independent, ‘Have we 
made poverty history?, 27 December 2005).  
5 The term ‘recipient’ has gone largely out of favour in development discourse, with most literature 
referring rather to ‘partners’. I continue to use the word recipient in this thesis as a way of 
distinguishing between the givers of aid (donors) and the beneficiaries of aid (recipients). As we shall 
see below, the term ‘partnership’ is problematic.  
6 See also Burnell (1997), Masujima (2004) and Taylor (2004). On pro-poor governance see Braathen 
and Palmero (2001).   
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harmonised aid. This ‘meta-narrative’ also takes on board the more recent concerns 
with security and poorly-performing states. For Rogerson, Hewitt and Waldenberg 
(2004), there are several elements to the “leading paradigm of aid” which include a 
compact on ownership and aid effectiveness, a focus on the MDGs as a guideline for 
country priorities, partnership approaches, streamlined conditionality and 
performance-based allocations of aid. Renard (2005) also considers a new aid 
paradigm to have emerged with the MDGs representing universal goals and values, 
and the PRSPs as the instrument for achieving them at the country level. This has 
supplanted older paradigms such as the project approach and structural adjustment 
policies. Important within this is the extent to which donor agencies have taken on 
board this agenda.   
Figure 2.1 seeks to capture the various elements of the new principles. It shows 
that if the recipient can demonstrate its commitment to a poverty reduction strategy 
through sound economic management and good socio-political governance, then 
donors will commit to supporting it. However, this requires that the poverty 
reduction strategy meets donors’ own accountability requirements, hence the 
provision of capacity building and technical assistance from the donor in addition to, 
or as elements of, aid to support the preparation and implementation of this strategy. 
To ensure the best use of donor resources and provide accountability, conditions 
applied to aid include economic and socio-political governance, policy dialogue and 
effective monitoring and evaluation systems. For their part, donors commit 
themselves to better working practices to improve aid effectiveness in the form of 
coordination, harmonisation and alignment. 
 
Figure 2.1  Aid Architecture of the 1990s-2000s  
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Government’s position on effective aid partnerships” (DFID 2005a: 4) stating that 
UK aid is to be based on five principles, summarized as follows:  
- developing country ownership, by supporting nationally owned poverty 
reduction plans which take account of the views and concerns of poor people; 
- participatory and evidence-based policy making, including supporting the 
involvement of national parliaments in the policy-making process; 
- predictability, through more advance notice of aid amounts and reasons for 
reducing or stopping flows;  
- harmonization, reducing overall burdens on developing countries by drawing 
conditions from a country’s own strategy and coordinating more with other 
donors; 
- transparency and accountability, around the decision-making process on 
issues like conditions. 
Furthermore, an “effective aid partnership should be based on a shared 
commitment to three objectives”: reducing poverty and achieving the MDGs; 
respecting human rights and other international obligations; and strengthening 
financial management and accountability as well as reducing the risk of funds being 
misused through weak administration or corruption (idem: 1). The resonance with 
the agenda outlined above is evident within the prioritisation and the terminology 
employed.7  
At the same time, it is important to recognise that elements of this agenda, 
building on similar principles and language, are also being pushed by African 
scholars and political leaders who are calling for Africans to take control of their 
own agendas by building on their internal strengths, traditions and principles of self-
reliance adapted to a continent which is intricately entwined in the global economy 
(see, for example, Kifle, Olukoshi and Wohlgemuth 1997; Cliffe 2002). This 
demonstrates that it is not merely an externally imposed agenda, but one which also 
resonates with thinkers in Africa. On the policy level, this is most clearly captured in 
the revitalised African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and the Commission for Africa (see Hayman et al. 2003; Commission for 
Africa 2005).8 
A final point before moving on to a more in-depth reflection on four core areas of 
the new agenda – programme aid, coordination, conditionality, and partnership and 
ownership – is the degree to which the new aid principles have brought about a shift 
in the rationale for providing aid.  Lancaster outlines five main rationales behind the 
provision of aid: promotion of development; diplomatic, that is as a tool of foreign 
policy; commercial; cultural; and humanitarian, in particular as a response to human 
and natural disasters (Lancaster 1999). Other analysts classify the rationales for 
giving aid according to theories from the ‘right’ and the ‘left’ (see Riddell 1987; 
Thérien 2002; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). These rationales 
are more or less present throughout the history of aid, with individual donor agencies 
privileging certain aspects over others. For example, aid from the Scandinavian 
countries has generally been associated with “humane internationalism” (Forster and 
Stokke 1999); the French have traditionally linked aid to the promotion of specific 
                                                 
7 As this policy paper brings together many of the new ideas about aid policy and practice in the 
2000s, it is referred to throughout this chapter. 
8 A great deal has been written on NEPAD, an overview of which is provided in Hayman et al. (2003). 
See also Bond (2002), Abrahamsen (2004) and Taylor (2005b). 
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cultural values; the USA and the UK have been more prone to promoting diplomatic 
objectives, although since 1997 the UK position has shifted to a more ‘moral’ 
rationale. In parallel, the concept of ‘development’ has also shifted, from promoting 
growth to human development, from economic reform to governance, and from 
poverty reduction to security concerns. The current aid principles are imbued with 
two clear rationales: moral imperative and strategic self-interest (Forster and Stokke 
1999). The moral imperative inherent in the new agenda is that of helping the 
poorest, but there is also strategic self-interest in terms of economic growth and 
access to markets, and increasingly in the 2000s the international security agenda has 
come into play, with self-interest in terms of addressing migration, disease, drug 
trafficking, the environment, international criminal networks, terrorism and 
insecurity also lying behind the provision of aid:  
Why should the rich world bother? For a start, out of self-interest. A stable and 
growing Africa will provide a market of several hundred million people… It 
will also provide a stable source of supplies… By contrast, if Africa persists in a 
state of insecurity and economic stagnation that will not just be bad for 
Africans, it will be bad for the rest of the world. It will lead to still more 
powerful pressures for migration… it will also be a source of disease for the 
world as a whole… an Africa with failing states and deep resentment can 
become a source of conflict which is not only internal but spreads across 
continents in international terrorism and crime. (Commission for Africa 2005: 
65-66) 
 
Programme Aid and Budget Support 
 
Integral to the poverty reduction approach, as well as aid effectiveness debates, 
has been the re-emergence of programme aid as an instrument of development 
assistance. ‘Programme aid’ is “aid that is not intended to finance a specific project” 
(White and Dijkstra 2001: 17) and is generally “linked to the implementation of 
policy reform in the recipient, that is, it is policy-based aid or subject to 
conditionality” (idem). As such, it is distinct from project support. Programme aid 
covers a range of instruments: debt relief, import support, balance of payments 
support, as well as budget support.  
Since the 1960s the various instruments which make up programme aid have 
fallen in and out of favour amongst donors in an almost cyclical pattern. In the post-
colonial period in Africa of the 1960s and 1970s, programme aid was used to support 
capital investments, through import support, and to shore up weak governments (van 
de Walle 2001). It also allowed for highly visible investments and the transfer of 
technology of interest to the former colonial powers (Mosley and Eeckhout 2000). 
This aid was largely unconditional. However, a lack of progress gave rise to project 
aid in the 1970s, which, according to van de Walle (2001), worked increasingly 
outside government systems, thus further weakening their capacity. Projects, 
however, proved unsustainable and prone to moral hazard. Within the IFIs in 
particular, it was felt that project assistance was having little impact given the weak 
economic environments of developing countries; absorptive capacity was low and 
indebted countries needed quick-disbursing aid. It was felt that broader 
macroeconomic reforms were necessary and that programme aid conditioned upon 
policy change could bring this about (Mosley and Eeckhout 2000; White and 
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Dijkstra 2003). Hence, programme aid returned to fashion in the 1980s, this time in 
the form of assistance for Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). This was 
largely the domain of the IFIs, with bilateral donors preferring to channel their 
bilateral resources via projects through the non-state sector, mainly NGOs. Structural 
adjustment assistance was a response to the financial crisis being experienced in 
many developing countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s and spiralling debt, 
paralleling a shift in the dominant development theory from structuralism to neo-
liberalism.  
The 1990s saw another shift in programme aid, this time to combat the problems 
arising from the SAP of the 1980s. The ‘new’ programme aid of the 1990s was 
linked to debt relief under the HIPC initiative and increasingly revolved around the 
poverty reduction agenda with new instruments and strategies adopted, namely sector 
programme support, policy dialogue, selectivity and capacity-building (Foster and 
Leavey 2001; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003; Booth and Lawson 
2004). Projects still exist, but under the programme approach the aim is to capture 
them within a coherent policy framework. Programme aid continues to be primarily 
aimed at promoting economic growth along neo-liberal lines (Degnbol-Martinussen 
and Engberg-Pedersen 2003; White and Dijkstra 2003); however, “key new features” 
(Unwin 2004) have been added to these principles, notably the emphasis on 
partnership, ownership, integrated Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), 
macro-economic governance and policy conditionality. Moreover, ‘new’ programme 
aid is not just the domain of the IFIs (whose structural adjustment programmes of the 
1980s have been reformed into the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility and the 
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility), but is increasingly employed by bilateral 
donors, notably the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and more recently the 
UK.  
Of particular importance to this thesis is the increasing interest demonstrated by 
donor agencies in budget support. Budget support covers a variety of instruments, 
which have shifted over time and about which confusion still seems to reign. While 
‘direct budget support’ encompasses several sub-categories which many donors will 
use at one time or another (especially debt relief and balance of payments support), 
‘general budget support’ is more limited to non-earmarked aid and is employed by 
fewer donors (see box 2.1). The most fundamental distinction is between funds 
which are ‘on budget’ (i.e. paid through Government systems) and ‘off budget’ (i.e. 
paid into separate project accounts or trust funds). In general, most donor agencies in 
their literature and rhetoric just talk about ‘budget support’ and would appear to be 
referring to general, rather than direct budget support. The UK is very explicit in 
linking budget support to poverty reduction strategies.  
Settling on one clear definition of budget support is not central to this thesis, but 
we draw on Booth and Lawson (2004)9 to highlight the core components of ‘new’ 
programme aid: 
                                                 
9 Booth and Lawson were commissioned to put together a framework for a joint evaluation of budget 
support on behalf of the OECD and the EU. This was under preparation for a number of years. Firstly, 
the ‘evaluability’ of budget support was assessed, then a series of draft frameworks was discussed in 
various forums aimed at establishing a common framework for evaluating the impact of budget 
support in a number of countries. Country evaluations began in early 2005, among which Rwanda 
features. As such, the work by Booth and Lawson is important as it has involved a large range of 
donor representatives and in-depth discussions about the budget support mechanism. At the time of 
writing, the country studies have not been made publicly available.  
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funds to the national budget (general budget support); 
policy dialogue, including conditionality focused on key public policy 
and public expenditure issues and processes; 
technical assistance and capacity building linked to the funds, and 
focused on key public policy and public expenditure issues and processes; 
efforts to align the donor’s aid, including policy dialogue and 
conditionality, with national goals and systems; 
efforts to harmonise with other donors, especially in respect of 































This demonstrates the extent to which programme aid is more than a mere funding 
mechanism but incorporates a framework of activities and conditions. Budget 
support is expected to have a number of benefits, including macro-economic effects 
(stability, increased social sector spending, promotion of a conducive environment 
for private investment), the empowerment of the recipient government,10 enhancing 
the efficiency of public expenditure, strengthening intra-government incentives and 
capacities, and having poverty reducing effects in terms of pro-poor growth and 
                                                 
10 Note that this refers to the empowerment of the government not the ‘country’ or ‘people’.  
Box 2.1: Programme Aid and Budget Support – Definitional Issues 
Foster and Leavey (2001) distinguish between: 
 Balance of Payments Support, generally associated with the IFIs and paid directly to the 
recipient Central Bank with few restrictions. 
 General Budget Support, made available to the recipient Government budget and using 
Government accountability mechanisms with conditions for use attached, notably vis-à-
vis policy reform or policy priorities (so sometimes with notional earmarking).  
 Debt relief, which may or may not have conditions attached, as with the HIPC initiative 
which is dependent upon the existence of a participatory poverty reduction process.  
 Sectoral budget support, which is disbursed through Government systems but 
earmarked to a specific sector strategy. Sector earmarked support represents another 
level down in that aid is earmarked to particular activities within the sector.   
 Project aid, using Government systems, parallel systems or disbursed through non-
state actors.  
 Multilateral aid 
 
Booth and Lawson (2004) distinguish between: 
 Direct Budget Support: a generic term covering funds channelled through a partner 
government’s own systems, and including debt relief, debt buy-back, food aid, balance 
of payments support, adjustment lending, earmarked direct budget support and non-
earmarked direct budget support.  
 General Budget Support: a sub-category of direct budget support which refers to non-
earmarked or notionally-earmarked funds. 
 Sector Budget Support: financial aid earmarked to a discrete sector or sectors. 
 
European Commission (from Booth and Lawson 2004: 16): 
 General Budget Support (as defined by Booth and Lawson above) is known as Macro-
economic Budget Support  
 
UK policy paper on budget support (DFID 2004b): 
 refers to Poverty Reduction Budget Support, which it states is also known as Direct 
Budget Support. This adds a new dimension – the specific provision of budget support 
for poverty reduction activities. 
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empowerment (Booth and Lawson 2004). Unwin (2004) adds to this list the benefits 
of predictability and stability through long-term commitments from donors, the 
reduction in transaction costs through the integration and coordination of donor 
support, and the space provided for greater dialogue around governance agendas. For 
the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA),11  
Budget support instruments can be a particularly effective way of promoting 
African ownership and development in countries with well-designed poverty 
reduction strategies and reasonable levels of fiscal accountability… 
development assistance provided through the budget can lower transaction costs 
and make assistance more accountable to the democratic political process. (SPA 
2002a: 13)  
A sub-category of general budget support which is particularly important in the 
context of this study is ‘sector budget support’ (SBS), which is delivered through the 
general budget but earmarked towards a particular sector. In practice there would 
appear to be two categories of this: direct sector support that is delivered to line 
ministries or implementing institutions; and ‘notionally earmarked’ support which 
transits the central budget but which is intended for a specific sector. SBS is often 
linked to the sector-wide approach (SWAp) as an instrument of support. The SWAp 
was introduced as a concept towards the end of the 1980s, allowing donors to 
concentrate on a few sectors and striking a balance between projects and macro-
economic programmes (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003: 49). It 
allows for a combination of approaches, from dialogue on policy and strategy to 
implementation of discrete projects within a sectoral framework; so it may include 
both SBS (earmarked through the budget) or off-budget support such as discrete 
projects or off-budget common baskets oriented towards a specific sector (Booth and 
Lawson 2004). The SWAp acts as a coordination tool also, and for some carries the 
intention to shift eventually towards the provision of SBS by gradually bolstering 
weak sector systems through a range of instruments and conditions to strengthen 
accountability (Foster and Leavey 2001). As such, the SWAp explicitly recognises 
that programme aid does not exclude the possibility for projects to continue. Indeed, 
as Foster and Leavey (2001: 9) observe, “there is no reason in principle why project 
investments, pilot projects, or technical assistance should not be financed as part of 
general or sector budget support”. What is preferable, however, is that these operate 
under Government direction and systems.  
The rationale for programme aid is that it is considered to be superior in terms of 
“stronger influence on the policy environment, superior ownership properties [and] 
greater overall coherence” (Killick 2004). However, there are a number of potential 
contradictions and problems with this. The first concerns the relationship between 
budget support and national ownership. Budget support is primarily used in aid-
dependent, sub-Saharan African countries, where donors have significant potential 
for influence (Unwin 2004). Indeed, Foster and Leavey note that budget support can 
                                                 
11 The Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) is an informal association of bilateral and multilateral 
donors, launched in 1987, aimed at supporting and monitoring the implementation of poverty 
reduction programmes. It has shifted its focus from support to indebted countries to aid effectiveness, 
notably mainstreaming and implementing the PRS approach, and the promotion of genuine change in 
donor practices to support PRSPs. It concentrates particularly on aligning donor processes around 
national poverty reduction strategies, on ‘programmatic support’ rather than off-budget projects or 
NGO assistance. 
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have high costs in terms of negotiating and managing policy agreements where aid 
dependence is low; there tends to be a lack of consensus on policy within and 
between the recipient government and the donor community. They suggest that a 
project approach may be more appropriate under these circumstances, and that it 
should be up to the recipient Government to decide the form of aid where it has the 
capacity to do so and where there is policy consensus (Foster and Leavey 2001: 
10).12 This casts considerable doubt on the claim that budget support is a superior 
instrument for national ownership. As a report of the Norwegian Development 
Agency observes, where aid dependency is lower “governments might be reluctant to 
negotiate on policy with donors” (Norad 2004: 4).  
This last statement reflects the centrality to the budget support approach of 
influencing local policy processes. Indeed, budget support comes with several 
conditions attached, such as an agreed policy framework between donors and the 
recipient government, a commitment on the part of the recipient to sound public 
financial management, evidence that budget support has comparative advantage over 
other instruments, and an agreement on the part of the recipient to accept policy 
dialogue and technical assistance (Booth and Lawson 2004). The provision of budget 
support is therefore both conditional upon recipient adherence to good governance 
and aimed at bolstering recipient governance capacity.  
This has raised concerns among a number of analysts. As the UK policy on 
budget support states, this instrument requires “a measure of trust on all sides” 
(DFID 2004b: 11), but given that it is largely provided in highly aid-dependent 
countries, where the governments are often weak, this essentially equates to “an 
immense leap of faith” (Unwin 2004). Several authors feel that programme aid 
should only be provided to governments with a proven track record (Killick 1998; 
Mosley and Eeckhout 2000; White and Dijkstra 2003), and there are concerns that 
through this instrument, donors risk bolstering or artificially strengthening poorly-
performing states (Clapham 1996: 183). This is taken further by Taylor who argues 
that pumping more money into Africa, and particularly African states, will not have 
the desired effects until governance issues have been thoroughly addressed. 
Providing support to the social sectors on the basis of poverty reduction strategies 
fails to take into account the possibility that many African states are not truly 
committed to these agendas (Taylor 2005a).  
Moreover, in focusing almost exclusively on the provision of support to the state, 
there is some concern that support via other channels, especially in support of civil 
society, may diminish, in turn undermining countervailing forces within developing 
countries. But it also potentially impacts upon the engagement that donors have with 
the poor people who they are supposed to be helping (Unwin 2004). As Hinton and 
Groves (2004) observe: “there is increasing evidence that direct budget support may 
not alter the balance of power in favour of the poor.” Moreover, these authors note 
that as fewer donor staff travel outside the capital due to changing work 
requirements, this reduces the possibilities for poor people to engage directly with 
international actors.  
Finally, programme aid is expected to reduce transaction costs for both donors 
and the recipient government. However, certainly in the early stages as systems are 
                                                 
12 Note that this is disputed by Cordella and Dell’Ariccia  who claim that “program financing is 
preferable when total aid is small relative to the recipient’s own resources; while project aid results are 
superior for relatively large programs” (Cordella and Dell'Ariccia 2001). 
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being established, it would appear that the increased policy dialogue and the 
conditions attached lead to greater burdens on all parties involved (Mosley and 
Eeckhout 2000: 142-143), a point recognised by proponents of budget support 
(Booth and Lawson 2004; DFID 2004b). Killick observes that this is even more the 
case where there is a mixture of SWAps and budget support, where there is a less 
than perfect convergence of government and donor objectives, and less than 
complete trust of the former by the latter. This leads to “the tendency for the 
development of rather elaborate mechanisms for dialoguing, monitoring, reporting 
and ex post evaluation [which] is apt to impose substantial burdens” (Killick 2004: 
22).    
 
 
Aid Effectiveness: the Coordination, Harmonisation and Alignment 
agenda 
 
The second core element in the new principles of aid is that of aid effectiveness, 
and notably debates in the early 2000s around coordination, harmonisation and 
alignment. The aim was to counter past experiences where the  
policies and requirements of donors are usually different from each other and 
from those of the partner country. This has often led to priorities that are not 
aligned with country needs, misdirection of efforts, inconsistent systems and 
programmes, information gaps, avoidable duplication and waste. Donor 
practices have often served to undermine, rather than bolster the effectiveness of 
countries’ own systems and institutions. In addition, the sheer numbers of 
procedures, reports, and visiting missions that partner countries have to handle 
every year entail severe costs. (OECD-DAC 2005a: 11)  
This amalgamated into a global agenda a range of reflections on how to render aid 
more efficient which had been ongoing since the 1980s (see, for example, Cassen 
1994). These reflections have covered a wide range of issues, such as monetary flows 
between countries, strategic interests versus moral obligations, coherence between 
agendas in international relations, effectiveness of a range of instruments, actors and 
activities, etc. Our concern is with particular mechanisms aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of aid through better coordination amongst actors, on the basis of 
reflections within international institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD-
DAC which have in turn impacted upon the actions of bilateral and multilateral 
agencies in their country programmes.  
In 1989, the OECD-DAC set out its priorities for development cooperation in the 
1990s (OECD-DAC 1989). These aimed to address the deficiencies arising from the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in the context of a changing global political 
order. They captured new concerns, including participatory development and aid 
effectiveness in terms of enhancing coherence between the different objectives and 
interests of aid actors. Realisation was growing of the negative effects of divergence 
amongst donors, notably the burden placed upon weak recipient government systems 
of dealing with a multitude of different donors all with their own procedures, 
priorities and practices. The OECD-DAC called for greater coordination amongst 
donors and better dialogue within the multilaterals, but also at bilateral level to work 
closer with partners. There was an emphasis on the partner country establishing 
policies and priorities and assuming responsibility for aid coordination. This 
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represented a first important shift. In the face of weak capacity of many developing 
country administrations to effectively take a lead, the focus in the 1960s and 1970s 
was very much on coordination by donors amongst donors, with the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) playing a central role. By the end of the 1980s, 
however, this had shifted towards coordination around national planning and 
budgeting systems, captured in the concept of ‘aid integration’ (Cassen 1994; 
Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003: 190-193) with the OECD-DAC 
calling for the harmonisation and simplification of aid procedures. Ten years later the 
problems remained fairly similar. 
Throughout the 1990s these questions were constantly on the table within the 
OECD-DAC, for example captured within its 1996 document Shaping the 21st 
Century (OECD-DAC 1996), and towards the end of the 1990s increasingly within 
the World Bank, for example in the 1998 study Assessing Aid: What Works, What 
Doesn’t, and Why (World Bank 1998a). The main emphasis over this period was on 
the twin concerns of policy coherence and coordination, which the complexity of the 
poverty agenda demanded, given its intrusion into new social and political areas 
(Hyden 1999: 72-73). Policy coherence sought to ensure firstly that the range of 
foreign policy interests of donor countries – diplomacy, trade and aid – was 
consistent with development objectives, or at least did not come into conflict with 
them; and secondly to ensure coherence within aid policy between channels, actors 
and objectives.13 But it also went a step further to cover not only coherence within 
donor country policies, but also at the international level between different donor 
agencies, and at a recipient level between donor and recipient policies (Forster and 
Stokke 1999). This was happening as donor agencies were in the process of defining 
the international development targets mentioned above, and also reflected wider 
concerns with economic globalisation and the integration of developing country 
economies into the post-Cold War economic order. Consequently, coordination is 
closely linked to coherence; indeed, coherence is considered a major factor in 
improving coordination.  
By the early 2000s, the discourse had moved on from coordination and coherence 
as the momentum accelerated. Since 2002 the emphasis has been firmly placed on 
‘alignment’ around country poverty reduction strategies and ‘harmonisation’ of 
policies and procedures (see box 2.2). This represents a more complicated package of 
measures; subsequent chapters demonstrate how getting to grips with the 
terminology has been a task in itself. Three international conferences and agreements 
formalised the evolution of these ideas, and have become key reference points. The 
first was the Monterrey Consensus of 2002 in which developing countries committed 
to improve their policies to stimulate growth, reduce poverty and achieve the MDGs, 
and developed countries committed to provide more and better aid, as well as 
improved trade and aid policies (OECD-DAC 2005a). The main emphasis in the 
Consensus was on mobilising additional financial resources, and with regards to 
coordination was focused on improving coordination and coherence at the level of 
the IFIs. But it also laid the basis for the 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, 
in which donors committed themselves to harmonising their operational policies, 
procedures, and practices with partner country systems. The Rome conference also 
concentrated on country ownership and government leadership. In March 2005, 
                                                 
13 Hyden (1999) adds the dimensions of political will and power to debates on coherence in 
considering consistency between policy intentions and policy outcomes. 
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representatives of both donor and recipient countries came together to assess 
progress on meeting the commitments of the Rome Declaration. This resulted in the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which called for greater progress on all 
aspects of aid effectiveness: aid flows, coordination, harmonisation, alignment, 


















Since 2003, a great deal of energy has been devoted to developing the concept of 
harmonisation within the World Bank, the SPA, the OECD-DAC and individual 
bilateral agencies. Country harmonisation action plans have been prepared, reports 
on meeting the Rome commitments have been produced, and case studies have been 
conducted of harmonisation in specific developing countries. The discourse of donor 
agencies, notably the multilaterals, is now replete with references to this new 
concept. As we shall see in this study of Rwanda, these global debates have had a 
profound impact upon cooperation activities within developing countries.  
This drive represents a second profound shift in the aid effectiveness debate. The 
first was that of enhancing recipient ownership of development strategies with 
donors committing to supporting these strategies in a coherent and coordinated 
fashion.14 Now the prescriptions laid out in agency documents tend to stress the joint 
nature of the responsibilities. For example, the OECD’s Shaping the 21st Century 
lays out joint, recipient and donor responsibilities. Both partners should create 
conditions conducive to development such as minimising the risks of violent conflict, 
strengthening protection against corruption and involving civil society more. For 
their part, developing countries should adopt sound macro-economic policies, 
commit to social development and the rule of law, create a favourable climate for 
investment and improve public financial management. Donor countries should 
provide reliable assistance to meet priority needs, address inconsistencies within 
international trade and investment systems, provide support to strengthen capacity in 
recipient countries, and improve access for the latter to information, technology and 
                                                 
14 The precedent for this in the 1980s was the attempt to get donors to support the normative reform 
agendas of the SAP (Forster and Stokke 1999). In a similar vein to the PRSPs, the premise was that 
the partner country would take the lead and donors would adhere to the SAP on the grounds that they 
had been evaluated and accepted by the international community.  
Box 2.2: Unpacking the Rhetoric - Defining Coordination, Harmonisation and 
Alignment 
Coordination is all-encompassing: “A good framework for aid co-ordination will enable leadership 
by partner governments, simplify working relationships and create flexibility where it is missing. It 
will also facilitate dialogue between donors and civil society and the private sector in a partner 
country… A good framework for aid co-ordination spans donor-partner relations, intra-donor 
relations, and individual donor systems.” (OECD-DAC 2003: 18) 
 
Harmonisation refers to donors bringing their operational policies, procedures, and practices into 
line with each other, and into line with those of the recipient country. It involves greater 
collaboration between donor agencies to establish and use common arrangements for planning, 
funding and disbursing aid. 
 
Alignment involves donors bringing their development assistance into line with the priorities and 
strategies established by the recipient country and progressively relying on recipient countries’ own 
procedural systems.  
 
Source: (OECD-DAC 2003, 2005b) 
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knowledge (OECD-DAC 1996: 14-15). In both the Rome and Paris Declarations 
similar sets of responsibilities are outlined. In the early 1990s, considerable 
responsibility was laid on developing countries to improve the administrative, 
financial and political capacity for aid to function through better governance. What 
the more recent declarations do is shift some responsibility back towards the donor 
side, recognising that the problem of aid effectiveness was not merely down to a lack 
of recipient ownership, but also attributable to the failure of donors to harmonise 
their practices and procedures. The emphasis is therefore upon joint responsibility 
which emerges strongly from the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation.15 Within this 
there is a shift in what coordination means from better information sharing and 
avoiding duplication towards the technical harmonisation of procedures.  
Despite this process, many of the problems of coordination identified in the 1980s 
remain unresolved. The first of these is the fundamental issue of who coordinates the 
coordinators. All the official documents dating back to the 1980s stress that the 
developing country government should take the lead on coordination. But as 
Whittington and Calhoun (1988: 307) observed “part of the problem is simply that all 
donors want to co-ordinate, but no one wants to be co-ordinated” (emphasis in the 
original). This reflects Forster and Stokke’s claim that “[t]here will always be 
competition between institutions in setting the international agenda; taking the lead 
in policy co-ordination, therefore, also serves a self-promotional purpose” (Forster 
and Stokke 1999: 27). Here, the authors are referring to the OECD carving a role for 
itself by putting the concept of ‘coherence’ on the agenda. In a similar vein, the 
history of aid coordination demonstrates a tension between the UNDP and the World 
Bank to take the lead on these questions; likewise it is clear that within the OECD-
DAC there are some bilateral donors who are more engaged on these issues than 
others. This is salient at the international level, but also at the country level, where as 
we shall see there is competition between agencies to lead on particular topics and 
sectors. While weak capacity on the recipient side can be given as a reason for 
donors to be more directive, this has been raised in many country studies as a 
particular problem (OECD-DAC 2005b).  
In the mid-1980s, Cassen highlighted a series of problems with coordination. On 
the donor side, he noted that coordination potentially inhibited donor freedom to 
pursue strategic objectives through aid programmes; disagreements amongst donors 
at technical, ideological and political levels; high costs in terms of time and expense; 
and the fact that “donors often do not have a common understanding of development 
strategy, technology, and policy in key technical areas” (Cassen 1994: 184). On the 
recipient side, he highlighted administrative costs, “unbearable pressures” in terms of 
demands for policy reform, limiting the scope to play donors off against each other, 
and differences between central ministry and line ministry interests (idem: 185). In 
the 1994 update of the original study conducted in 1986, Cassen observed little real 
change, concluding that there was a lack of real commitment to coordination. 
Writing in 1988 about coordination in Sudan, Whittington and Calhoun emphasised 
the lack of donor willingness to share information and to take the time to participate 
in attempts to establish a clear record of who was doing what. The authors proposed 
various reasons for this, including donor bureaucracy, the lack of incentives for 
                                                 
15 This idea of donor responsibility is not entirely new, however. King and McGrath (2004) observe 
how the Pearson report of 1969 called for donors to live up to their commitments towards developing 
countries. 
   28 
individuals within donor agencies, low staffing levels to deal effectively with 
coordination, and a lack of faith in Government systems. This led the authors to 
conclude that: “Many of the donors who rhetorically call for co-ordination simply do 
not mean it... few donor co-ordination efforts have proceeded beyond the level of 
general discussion” (Whittington and Calhoun 1988: 306).  
Almost 20 years later there are clear similarities in the problems with establishing 
effective coordination of aid. In the run-up to the Paris 2005 Forum, the OECD-DAC 
was frank in its assessment of progress. Although  
a range of harmonisation activities is taking place in even more countries than 
were envisaged at the time of the Rome Forum… with a few notable 
exceptions, the alignment and harmonisation agenda has not yet been 
sufficiently internalised both by donors and developing countries through 
changes in development agencies’ operational policies, procedures, and staff 
incentives. (OECD-DAC 2004: 4)   
The various studies conducted in preparation for the Paris Forum threw up a wide 
range of challenges: a reluctance on the part of donors to align with country 
strategies in weaker states; communication problems between headquarters and field 
staff and within recipient institutions; difficulties in translating commitments into 
concrete actions; donor reservations about the depth of recipient commitments to 
poverty reduction; a continuing high number of uncoordinated donor missions; poor 
information sharing; lack of predictability in aid flows; poor incentives for donor 
staff; recipient countries not taking the lead; and high transaction costs for both 
donors and recipients (de Renzio, Booth, Rogerson and Curran 2004; OECD-DAC 
2004, 2005b; Paris Declaration 2005). Indeed, a survey on harmonisation conducted 
by the OECD-DAC came to one conclusion that although donors “have clearly 
internalised the principle of aligning their programming on the needs and priorities 
identified in the [Poverty Reduction Strategies]… [t]here is little evidence that 
donors have adapted their programmes in support of PRS priorities” (OECD-DAC 
2005b: 16, emphasis in original). 
What rarely emerges from these official documents, however, are the political 
imperatives which continue to affect firstly the way in which donors perceive 
coordination and secondly donor capacity to change their ways of working. This was 
something noted by van de Walle (1999) who was sceptical about the possibilities for 
coordination to move beyond mere information sharing, given bureaucratic 
constraints on donors.  
 
Conditionality and Policy Dialogue 
 
The third aspect of the new principles of interest to this study is that of policy 
conditionality and how it has changed under the new aid agenda. The conditions 
attached to aid have always constituted one of the most controversial aspects of 
development assistance – their nature, their morality, and whether or not they work. 
While conditions in the form of performance criteria, preconditions and programme 
reviews have formed the basis of IFI aid policies since the 1950s (Killick 1998; 
Stokke 1995), Stokke argues that it was only in the 1970s that conditions prescribing 
reforms in developing countries became more transparent (Stokke 1995: 7). The term 
‘conditionality’ tends to be used in conjunction with what is known as ‘first’ and 
‘second’ generation conditionality. First generation conditionality is linked with the 
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economic reform programmes pursued during the 1980s, that is the requirement for 
poor, indebted countries to pursue radical Structural Adjustment Programmes to 
qualify for assistance. It was mainly associated with the IFIs, but the main bilateral 
donors also came on board this agenda, often using ‘cross-conditionality’. This 
involved linking bilateral programmes to IFI conditions. Second generation 
conditionality emerged in the context of the post-Cold War wave of democratisation 
in the early 1990s and was more political in nature. This reflected changing 
geopolitical structures which allowed political conditionality to be imposed almost 
universally (Crawford 2001), but also reflected 
the programme of an alliance, comprising international financial institutions, 
seeking to bring about the capitalist transformation of African economies; 
Western governments, flexing their diplomatic muscles in the aftermath of the 
Cold War; Western public opinions, outraged at the brutality and corruption of 
at least a significant number of African regimes; and finally, at least vicariously, 
the African publics who were vociferously demonstrating their own discontent 
with the existing order, and on whose behalf the Western aid donors could 
claim (often misleadingly) to speak. (Clapham 1996: 195) 
Second generation conditionality did not replace first generation conditionality but 
rather added to it by including democratisation and human rights conditions to 
existing technical and institutional ones (Stokke 1995; Burnell 1997; White and 
Dijkstra 2003). Indeed, the pursuit of political and economic reforms simultaneously 
was increasingly seen as essential: “democracy was valued as providing the political 
context most likely to sustain economic reform efforts” (Crawford 2001: 13). 
The poverty agenda has been seen to represent a third generation of conditionality 
(Burnell 1997; White and Dijkstra 2003: 11), based on the specific requirement for 
heavily-indebted poor countries to demonstrate a commitment to a clear poverty 
reduction strategy in order to qualify for debt relief. Cross-conditionality continues 
under this third generation, with many bilateral and some multilateral donors making 
their aid programmes contingent on the existence of a PRS arrangement with the 
IFIs. At the same time, this third generation, like the second, has not discarded the 
former prescriptions but rather added to them (Killick 2004). Nevertheless, over the 
last five to ten years, as the poverty reduction agenda has taken off, this third 
generation conditionality has been portrayed as incorporating a new approach, based 
around mutually agreed commitments, quantified in targets and benchmarks, rather 
than externally-imposed conditions. This has ushered in new sub-categories of 
conditionality. For example, the UK’s 2005 policy document mentioned above 
distinguishes between ‘fiduciary’ conditionality which is linked to the terms of aid 
agreements, ‘policy’ conditionality which is specific to a particular piece of policy 
being pursued, and ‘process’ conditionality which relates to the adoption of policy 
through a particular methodology, such as consultation of the population.16  
Debates have raged amongst scholars (who mainly criticise it) and agencies (who 
mainly defend it) about the ethics of conditionality, as well as its effectiveness. Uvin 
(2004) provides an overview of four interlinked arguments about conditionality. 
Firstly, he questions whether conditionality is ethically sound and should be 
employed at all, particularly as its application tends to impact most heavily upon the 
poor and the vulnerable rather than the political elite at which it is aimed. Secondly, 
                                                 
16 On ‘process’ conditionality, see also Uvin (2004: 73). 
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he asserts that even if it were ethical it is never fully implemented. Thirdly, even 
when it is employed it does not necessarily produce the intended results. And finally, 
not only does it not work but it actually destroys what it is seeking to achieve, i.e. it 
is counterproductive. This is mainly the case where there is a domestic backlash 
against conditions or where, for example, conditionality to foster democracy 
undermines the democratic process itself by shifting accountability away from 
domestic actors to external agents (Uvin 2004: 59-69). 
The principal point of debate is whether conditionality is actually applied and 
whether it works. There have been numerous occasions on which aid has been frozen 
or suspended to countries (Nelson and Eglinton 1993; Santiso 2002; Uvin 2004), 
there are many examples of conditionality playing a role in supporting government 
forces to enact policy change (Koeberle 2003; White and Dijkstra 2003: 490), and 
there has been at least partial application, especially where it is in the recipient’s 
interests (Morrissey and Verschoor 2004). Despite this, it is generally considered to 
have had limited results and not to have worked. There are a number of reasons for 
this, most importantly the primacy of donor political economic and political interests, 
where the blurred boundaries between development and diplomacy enhance the 
potential for contradictions (Clapham 1996: 198; Crawford 2001: 246-247). This 
leads to donors giving confused messages. Kanbur describes the system as 
“dysfunctional”, given that “the recipients know, the donors know, and in fact 
everybody knows that these are paper conditions – the outcome will be driven by the 
need of both sides to maintain normal relations and the flow of aid” (Kanbur 2000: 
416).  
Nevertheless, conditions attached to aid continue to define the system. Indeed, 
“most people, including scholars, spontaneously assume that aid is a powerful lever 
for policy change.” (Uvin 2004: 56). The reflects the all-important question of 
accountability – of donors to their tax-payers, of recipients to their donors, and 
increasingly of recipient governments to their populace. However, as noted above, 
the language has shifted in tune with the new aid agenda, and new instruments have 
emerged, particularly with regard to general and sector budget support. In the spirit 
of partnership, the language has moved from imposing conditions from the outside – 
which are unlikely to be implemented – to ‘mutual commitments’ whereby donors 
agree a set of terms with the recipient. Within this there are two important factors: 
dialogue between donors and the recipient government; and the ‘streamlining’ of 
conditionality. Policy dialogue has always formed an integral part of conditions on 
aid, referring to wide-ranging discussions around government processes which can 
happen at a variety of levels involving a number of instruments: through bilateral or 
multi-actor partnership talks; within individual projects; more or less formal; and at 
financial or administrative levels of the policy-making process (Stokke 1995). The 
main problems of such dialogue are: firstly, that it risks subverting accountability, 
with recipients being accountable first to the donor and only then to their population; 
and, secondly, that the policies the donors are promoting may not be the best ones for 
the country (White and Dijkstra 2003). Under the new aid agenda, dialogue has come 
to refer specifically to the mutual negotiation of conditions. This is well illustrated in 
the UK’s 2005 policy paper:  
We will not make our aid conditional on specific policy decisions by partner 
governments, or attempt to impose policy choices on them (including in 
sensitive economic areas such as privatisation or trade liberalisation). Instead 
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we will agree with partners on the purpose for which aid is being given, and 
will agree benchmarks to assess progress. We will draw these from countries’ 
own plans, where available, and these benchmarks will relate to the impact and 
outcome of countries’ overall programmes in reducing poverty, rather than to 
specific policies. (DFID 2005a: 2) 
The second factor is the notion of ‘streamlining conditionality’ (OECD-DAC 
2005a: 21). This reflects attempts to get donors to agree to a common ‘pool’ of 
conditions focusing on a few core policy objectives (Killick 2004). In the interests of 
aid effectiveness, rather than each donor establishing a separate set of conditions, 
donors should draw conditions from the recipient’s own policy documents; so this in 
turn depends upon the recipient government having a national development strategy 
aimed at poverty reduction which has received international approval from the IFIs 
and donors. While donors are not expected to all apply the same conditionality, the 
logic is that they will draw their conditions from an agreed framework, reflecting the 
government’s own commitments. This links back to the harmonisation approach and 
the desire to reduce the burden on recipient governments. 
Emerging from this are new types of instruments, including memoranda of 
understanding (MoU), common frameworks and partnership principles.17 In a wide 
range of countries Partnership Frameworks have been established which seek to 
translate wider commitments on harmonisation into practice at the country level.18 
For example, in Mozambique fourteen donor agencies have signed up to a joint 
memorandum of understanding with the government to regulate the provision of 
budget support (see Harding and Gerster 2004; Killick, Castel-Branco and Gerster 
2005). In Rwanda, as we shall see, individual MoUs have been signed with the GoR 
by the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands. These frameworks lay out a series of donor, 
government and joint commitments often with quantifiable benchmarks or targets. 
These are drawn from national poverty strategies and provide a means of monitoring 
progress on conditions and ensuring accountability for both sides.  
 Within the new approach to conditionality the concept of ‘selectivity’ is very 
strong. This refers to the provision of aid to ‘good performers’ amongst developing 
country governments, an idea put forward in Killick’s extensive exploration of 
conditionality in 1998, and taken up in various subsequent discussions (Killick 1998; 
Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003; White and Dijkstra 2003). This 
constitutes a form of ex post conditionality, that is rewarding countries with aid on 
the basis of their performance and commitments with regards to reform and change. 
For the European Commission (EC) this is captured in the notion of ‘performance-
based conditionality.’19 The EC has been running pilots of this in countries such as 
Burkina Faso since as early as 1996. The idea is that the donor does not prescribe the 
instruments by which objectives are to be achieved, but aid is delivered on the basis 
of outcomes. The split of aid into ‘fixed’ and ‘floating’ instalments allows greater 
flexibility, with the latter decided by the recipient country on the basis of when it 
                                                 
17 For example, the SPA set up pilot exercises on sectoral support in the late 1990s, such as  education 
in Ethiopia, agriculture in Mozambique, and health in Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia (see White and 
Dijkstra 2003).  
18 See http://www.aidharmonization.org/ah-cla/secondary-pages/editable?key=302 
19 The idea of ‘performance-based conditionality’ - also termed ‘outcome-oriented’, ‘outcome-based’ 
and ‘results-oriented’ - is addressed with regard to the IMF by Khan and Sharma (2003) and Koeberle 
(2003).  
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expects conditions for disbursement to be met (Adam, Chambas, Guillaumont, 
Jeanneney and Gunning 2004). The UK’s position is that:    
In deciding how to allocate aid between countries, the UK will take account of 
the extent of poverty in a country, and of its ability to use aid effectively (as 
evidenced by the expected impact of its poverty reduction programme and its 
commitment to sound financial management and accountability standards). 
(DFID 2005a: 1) 
Under the PRSP approach, recipient governments must demonstrate their 
commitment to poverty reduction through the establishment of an internationally-
acceptable poverty reduction strategy, elaborated with civil society participation. Aid 
is subsequently provided to help implement this policy through the building of 
capacity and concrete activities. Selectivity has also seen bilateral donors restricting 
the number of countries they work with, as has been the case for the Netherlands, 
Norway and Belgium, which have all reduced the number of core ‘partner’ countries 
or sectors in which they work.  
Perhaps the best example of selectivity for aid allocations is provided by the 
USA’s Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), an instrument adopted in 2002 aimed 
at supporting the best-performing developing countries. Countries are to be selected 
on the basis of a wide range of eligibility criteria with strong normative overtones: 
“funds from the new program [should] go to low-income countries that are ‘ruling 
justly, investing in their people, and encouraging economic freedom’” (Brainard, 
Graham, Purvis, Radelet and Smith 2003: 28). Countries are assessed against sixteen 
indicators and are ranked in relation to other countries in the same income bracket. 
The indicators cover such issues as corruption levels, accountability, government 
effectiveness, civil liberties and political rights; immunization rates, education and 
public spending on health; and inflation, regulatory environment, trade policy and 
‘days to start a business’ (idem: 40-41).20 
The selective or performance-based approach raises a number of problems, 
including how to take into account exogenous factors which inhibit performance but 
which cannot be attributed to government; the length of time required to reach a 
stage where outcomes can be tangibly assessed, especially in countries which are 
only just finalizing poverty reduction strategies; the assessment of outcomes which 
requires stronger and more credible data and much greater trust between partners; 
and the potential for creating a ‘culture of results’ rather than real change (Adam et 
al. 2004). This also reflects the findings of the OECD-DAC survey on harmonisation 
which observes that the poverty reduction strategies as they currently stand are 
proving to be weak tools for performance assessment, with donors demanding an 
excessive number of indicators beyond the scope of weak country statistical data 
systems (OECD-DAC 2005b). At the same time, Uvin (2004) is concerned that the 
focus on quantifiable process targets risks ignoring the outcomes and realities of 
those processes. For example, the requirement for popular participation in poverty 
reduction strategies may be reduced to a mere semblance of participation rather than 
a real national dialogue process. Finally, there is the problem of performance-based 
                                                 
20 Soederberg provides a good critical analysis of the MCA, locating it within the context of post-9/11 
American imperialism, with its ‘pre-emptive’ approach to the provision of aid to poor countries and 
its selectivity criteria based on dominant American cultural, political and economic values 
(Soederberg 2004). 
   33 
aid in countries characterised by weak governance. The particular problems of 
applying the poverty agenda in these countries is being addressed through recent 
reflections on ‘fragile states’ (see Lockhart 2005; Picciotto, Alao, Ikpe, Kimani and 
Slade 2005).  
This discussion demonstrates that conditions upon aid under the new agenda have 
become more complex despite attempts to ‘streamline’ conditionalities. The 
language may have changed from conditionality to mutual commitments and 
benchmarks but the system has changed very little. The provision of aid under the 
new agenda is conditional upon adherence to a new prevailing set of norms, as the 
following extract from the UK’s 2005 policy paper demonstrates:  
Good policy matters for development. Macroeconomic stability and growth are 
essential for lasting poverty reduction. But the policies needed for poverty 
reduction and long term development are much broader, and encompass the 
social, cultural, economic, civil and political rights of all men, women and 
children. They also include governance issues, environmental concerns and 
social exclusion. (DFID 2005a: 4) 
Although the UK has committed itself to limiting conditions to those agreed with the 
recipient, drawn from the recipient’s own policy documents, the actual content of the 
recipient policy is determined in large part by external actors, a point also raised by 
Uvin (2004). This raises questions about how ‘new’ this approach to conditionality is 
and whether it represent a real change in relations or just a careful use of language. In 
light of donor requirements for accountability vis-à-vis their own constituents, 
Stokke’s words of 1995 continue to ring true: there will always be conditions on aid, 
both implicit and explicit; they are a “part of everyday life in aid relations”  (Stokke 
1995: 34).  
While the search for quantifiable indicators has allowed more explicit technical 
conditions to be established, it is much harder to quantify political conditions, 
especially in areas like human rights and political governance. Indeed, as Mosley and 
Eeckhout observe:  
although much has been added to the conditionality menu since 1981, nothing 
has been taken off: conditional programme aid is thus now being expected to 
deliver stabilisation, pro-poor growth and now good governance, to say nothing 
of a whole array of supplementary agenda items… including environmental 
protection, greater equity of provision between men and women, 
demilitarisation and conflict prevention. The ironic consequence of all this has 
been that financial programme aid, which was hoped to improve on project aid 
by imposing lesser burdens on hard-pressed administrators in developing 
country ministries, is now far from doing so and is arguably increasing those 
burdens (Mosley and Eeckhout 2000: 142-143). 
Conditionality under a programme aid approach brings with it new challenges, 
namely whether it is in fact “easier to ‘turn on and off’” (White and Dijkstra 2001: 
19) than project aid. Indeed, it is widely recognised that, in theory, donors can halt 
disbursements of budget support at any time if it is felt that conditions are not being 
met (Cordella and Dell'Ariccia 2001; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 
2003; Booth and Lawson 2004; Killick 2004): 
Its ease of disbursement means that budget support can be stopped more quickly 
than other aid instruments. Events, such as an incident of human rights abuse or 
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increased military spending, can raise political or public opinion concerns about 
providing general support to a partner government’s budget. (DFID 2004b: 10).  
This means that predictability, one of the reasons behind the provision of budget 
support, is not guaranteed, a fact recognised by donors:  
the present method of implementation of budget support has not made aid more 
predictable… it would be unrealistic to assume that the tension between 
accountability and predictability of aid can be completely eliminated. (idem)  
Behind this lies the reality that ‘new’ programme aid is a highly political 
instrument which the concern not only with governance but also policy dialogue 
demonstrates. This dialogue is changing from “mostly a technical dialogue about 
capital, technology and organization, to an all-encompassing political dialogue about 
the structure of society and management of society’s development processes” 
(Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003: 41). This throws into doubt the 
whole concept of ownership and partnership, to which we now turn.  
 
 
Partnership and Ownership 
 
Underpinning all of these debates are the core concepts of ‘partnership’ and 
‘ownership’ which emerge again and again in the above discussions about 
coordination and harmonisation, programme aid, and conditionality. These terms are 
fundamental to current aid discourse and are closely interlinked; but there is no one, 
clear definition of either which is used across the board in agency or analytical 
literature. However, “[a]lthough it lacks precise analytical definition, [ownership] 
captures something critical for aid effectiveness” (Carlsson, Somolekae and van de 
Walle 1997: 10). The poverty reduction approach is premised upon improving aid 
effectiveness through increased country ownership of development policy and 
processes; without internal commitment to a reform process in the interests of the 
population, development is deemed to be unworkable. Indeed, lack of ‘ownership’ or 
government commitment was acknowledged as one reason for the failure of 
structural adjustment policies (Renard and Molenaers 2003: 7).21 Ownership requires 
a new relationship between donors and recipients, based on a much more equal 
undertaking and mutual responsibility. 
The documents of donor agencies and recipient governments alike, as well as the 
range of international declarations mentioned in this chapter, are replete with 
reference to these terms (see box 2.3). Moreover, these are constantly used by actors 
on the ground, representative of the extent to which the particular language of 
development permeates the entire system. Important within the examples given in 
box 2.3 is the notion of the recipient country taking responsibility for the 
development, management and implementation of policies for poverty reduction: 
“each developing country and its people are ultimately responsible for their own 
                                                 
21 In their study of policy ownership in Uganda, Morrissey and Verschoor consider that in fact 
‘ownership’ is not necessarily essential for good policy to be formulated and implemented. 
“Ownership may be desirable, but it is not necessary” (2004: 2); what is necessary is that the policy 
constituency has bought into the need for and the idea of the reform, and sees it as in their interest, 
that it is ‘committed’; but policy can be adopted or adapted from elsewhere, with external influences, 
so does not necessarily have to be ‘home grown’. 
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development” (OECD 1996: 14).22 This in effect entails a transfer of leadership and 
power from the donor to the recipient, to be initiated by the recipient. But it is 
broader than recipient government ownership; the emphasis is clearly upon country 
ownership.23 Ownership (and partnership) therefore have two dimensions: recipient 
government ownership of development programmes in relation to donors and 
external actors, i.e. between donors and recipients; and public ownership of 
development programmes in relation to government, i.e. between recipient 
governments and the people. The notion of ‘ownership’ is therefore quite specific; it 
is closely tied to the other elements of the poverty agenda and sits within the 
framework of a ‘development partnership.’ For Abrahamsen, this represents a 
“recasting” of the aid relationship “with donors attesting that they no longer seek to 
impose their vision of development on poor countries’ but instead wish to be partners 





























The OECD-DAC’s background paper to the Paris Forum in 2005 placed 
‘ownership’ at the heart of the aid effectiveness system, and tied it intimately in with 
                                                 
22 Note, however, the contradiction between this statement and the title of the report from which it 
comes, Shaping the 21st Century: the contribution of development cooperation, which implies some 
manipulation by external forces.  
23 Note that in our discussion above about programme aid, the relationship there was very much 
between donor and recipient governments.  
Box 2.3: Ownership and Partnership - Examples from Donor Discourse 
In a partnership, development co-operation does not try to do things for developing countries 
and the people, but with them … Each donors’ programmes and activities should then 
operate within the framework of that locally-owned strategy in ways that respect and 
encourage strong local commitment, participation, capacity development and ownership. 
(OECD-DAC 1996: 13-14) 
 
We attach high importance to partner countries’ assuming a stronger leadership role in the 
coordination of development assistance… [and will provide] support for country analytic work in 
ways that will strengthen governments’ ability to assume a greater leadership role and take 
ownership of development results. In particular, we will work with partner governments to forge 
stronger partnerships. (Rome Declaration on Harmonisation 2003) 
 
Ownership. The development community would respect the right—and responsibility—of the 
partner country itself to establish its development agenda, setting out its own strategies for 
poverty reduction and growth. (OECD-DAC 2005a: 13; Paris Declaration 2005) 
 
’Ownership’ is defined as the effective exercise of partners’ authority over their development 
programmes including when they rely, entirely or partially, on external resources to implement 
them. (OECD-DAC 2005b: 9) 
 
For us, ‘country ownership’ requires that the country has leadership over its development 
policies. It requires partner governments in consultation with citizens to define a poverty 
reduction programme, which donors can support...We do not only equate country ownership with 
government ownership. We believe that civil society, including poor people, should also have a 
voice and stake in their development, and that governments should be accountable to them. 
(DFID 2005a: 11) 
 
Africa must take the lead in this partnership, take on responsibility for its problems and take 
ownership of the solutions - which are far more likely to work if they spring from African insights 
and judgements than if they are imposed from the outside. (Commission for Africa 2005: 67) 
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the concept of ‘partnership’. The aid effectiveness system is depicted as the pyramid 
reproduced in figure 2.2. This aims to capture the four core elements of the 
international agreements: ownership; alignment; harmonisation; and managing for 
results. The paper proposes that the concept of ‘ownership’ within this can be 
understood in two directions: top-down, whereby the starting point is the developing 
country (the ‘partner’) setting an agenda to which donors respond by aligning their 
support around it. Donors then harmonise their procedures to improve aid 
effectiveness. The other reading is bottom-up, whereby the stages are considered as a 
process of maturing. Donors adopt common procedures, which allows alignment 
around a set of core objectives with the ultimate goals of facilitating country 
ownership (OECD-DAC 2005a: 14). 













Source: OECD-DAC (2005a: 14) 
 
This figure raises a considerable number of questions, however, which we will 
return to in more depth in chapter 8 in light of the situation in Rwanda. One 
immediate question is why a pyramid is considered the optimal shape, for which no 
clear explanation is provided in the document. The other striking element is the use 
of the term ‘partners’ in an ambiguous fashion. The references to ‘partners’ setting 
the agenda and to ‘partner systems’ does not mean a joint effort by both sides of the 
relationship – the donor and the recipient together – but refers to the recipient only. 
This reflects the shift in development discourse away from a giver-receiver 
relationship to a joint venture on equal terms.  
The concept of ‘partnership’ really came to the fore in the second half of the 
1990s, although several authors date it back to the 1969 Pearson Report (Maxwell 
and Christiansen 2002; Abrahamsen 2004; King and McGrath 2004). The concept 
has generally been more closely associated with countries like Sweden, whose aid 
has traditionally been premised on a relationship of solidarity, as well as the OECD-
DAC and the European Commission. It was subsequently taken on board by the IFIs 
(Rogerson et al. 2004), and then since the mid-1990s has been central to the 
discourse of most aid agencies. For example, DFID’s 1997 White Paper introduced a 
new vocabulary to British aid: “from aid and assistance (or even cooperation) to 
‘partnership (and ‘genuine partnership’); ‘international’ development replaces 
overseas aid or overseas development” (Burnell 1998: 789). For Burnell, this was not 
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‘ownership’ and ‘responsibility’ as “a key under-current”. ‘Ownership’ likewise 
became a central concept for Dutch aid in 1996 on the premise that aid should be 
inspired by the needs and wishes of the recipients and less by the views of donors 
(van Gastel and Nuijten 2003).24 These authors claim, however, that the definition of 
‘ownership’ becomes increasingly less clear in subsequent policy documents, and 
eventually gives way to ‘partnership’ as the central idea of Dutch aid.  
As we saw with the new language of conditionality, the rhetoric about partnership 
and ownership conceals complex realities. For Fowler (2000), partnership is nothing 
more than a “terminological Trojan Horse”, masking inequalities behind the 
semblance of equality. Moreover,  
[I]n order to be accepted as a partner in the first place, the criteria set up by the 
donor must be met. One of the central criteria involved in selecting partners 
(also emphasized in partnership policy) is that the partner shares the goals and 
objectives of the donor. Moreover, to continue being a ‘partner’ the objectives 
and goals set up in the partnership must be fulfilled. (Baaz 2005: 74) 
While the name now given to development cooperation may be partnership, the 
game is to be played according to rules that the donor has decided in advance. 
(Burnell 1998: 798) 
Abrahamsen, in her review of the literature on partnerships, observes two 
tendencies: those who see partnership as a positive shift to facilitate greater 
responsibility and power by the recipient side, while at the same time recognising the 
limitations to it due to the nature of the giver-receiver relationship; and those who 
see it as a rhetorical exercise which masks the continued domination of the South by 
the North. She sees the latter position as somewhat simplistic and proposes rather 
that partnerships allow a degree of agency for developing countries: “it is only with 
the introduction of partnerships that developing countries are primarily partners 
rather than recipients; the active creators of their own future and development rather 
than the objects of external benevolence.” The discourse assigns partners “prime 
responsibility for their own development strategies”; thus it “confers obligation and 
duties, at the same time as it opens up new possibilities for decision and action” 
(Abrahamsen 2004: 1460). The concept of partnership is therefore both coercive and 
voluntary in offering new opportunities for agency by developing countries. This 
point is reiterated by Baaz who finds that neither recipients nor donor agents are 
passive in this process. However, her exploration of perceptions of partnership 
amongst donors and development workers in Tanzania highlights the embedded 
paternalism in the way in which these actors perceive of and understand their 
‘partners’ (Baaz 2005). Clapham’s earlier work on structural adjustment in Africa 
mirrored this perspective, seeing ‘ownership’ emerging in the way that African states 
evaded imposed agendas through resistance, acceptance and formal acceptance 
coupled with attempts to subvert: “African states were… not merely the passive 
victims of programmes imposed on them, but were able to devise alternative 
responses to the demands made on them” (Clapham 1996: 176). 
As with the idea of ‘partnership’ there has been a great deal of critical analysis of 
the ‘ownership’ concept. A central problem is the reality that as “the North claims 
                                                 
24 Van Gastel and Nuijten claim that ‘ownership’ has existed in Dutch development policy for several 
decades, having its roots in the self-reliance discourse of the late 1960s and 1970s which was taken on 
board within the Dutch aid agenda (van Gastel and Nuijten 2003: 9).  
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ownership of the values involved, the ownership is taken away from the South” 
(Stokke 1995: 75). This discourse is largely prevalent in countries which are highly 
aid-dependent and where external influence over development processes is strong. 
Consequently, the ‘ownership’ on offer within the new principles of aid is highly 
circumscribed, as Rogerson et al. observe: 
There is an inherent tension between on the one hand a voluntary, country-
owned statement of priorities (the PRSP) and on the other hand a mandatory, 
externally driven judgement as to its quality and feasibility... In aid-dependent 
countries, the requirements of donors will inevitably start to ‘pollute’ the home-
grown vision, if the government is, quite rationally, attempting to get the widest 
possible support for it. (Rogerson et al. 2004: 12) 
‘Ownership’ under these circumstances cannot be equated with home-grown ideas, 
inherent, internal ownership or ‘free choice’ whereby the recipient would formulate 
its own ideas and donors would then conform to and respect those. ‘Ownership’ as 
used in development discourse carries prescriptions about what is expected of 
recipient countries, namely that their objectives are largely congruent with donor 
goals, and thus limits the space for real country ownership to emerge. This leads to a 
potential conflict between the desire of donors to promote ownership in the interests 
of more effective aid, the desire of recipients to have ownership, and the reality that 
donors remain accountable to their own constituencies for the use of aid resources.25  
 
 
Conclusion: how ‘universal’ is the new aid agenda? 
 
The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals marked the beginning of a 
new era in development cooperation, one characterised by consensus-building 
amongst both donor institutions and recipient countries around principles, 
programmes and outcomes. The ensuing drive to improve aid effectiveness with a 
range of new aid instruments and coordination mechanisms gives the impression of a 
single purpose of mind amongst aid actors. However, the reality is quite different. In 
1999, Riddell wrote that “African aid relations are still beset by donor rivalry, 
notwithstanding all the noble words about collaboration and co-operation” (Riddell 
1999). To a great extent, this continues to hold.  
Central to this is that in the 1990s the aid agenda became more complex, with no 
clear theoretical framework. Development theory today represents an amalgamation 
of various aspects of previous paradigms. The poverty agenda of the 1990s and 
2000s incorporates a mixture of classic economic theory aimed at economic growth 
overlaid with concerns about human rights and social needs. It gives space for both 
top-down prescriptions and bottom-up solutions, and consequently is riddled with 
potential inconsistencies and contradictions. Nevertheless, it continues to represent a 
normative approach to development, which is considered to be the agenda and which 
provides limited space for alternative visions. However, because it constitutes such a 
mixed bag, there is room for individual donor agencies to choose to prioritise 
particular elements of the agenda according to their own requirements, theoretical 
                                                 
25 On this last point see Porteous (2005) who raises the concern that “in their eagerness to hand over 
‘ownership’ of (foreign-financed) development to governments, the donors underestimate or overlook 
the governance short-comings which undermine development.” 
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perspectives and values. While there are dominant tendencies, these issues render 
coherence and coordination all the more complex and have led to contrasting 
perceptions not only amongst donor agencies but also within donor countries, where 
debates on aid have increasingly become intertwined with debates on foreign policy 
and international trade.  
Despite the semblance of universal agreement on the new aid agenda, this is rather 
a “stylised ‘consensus’ view” (Rogerson et al. 2004: 10). The international 
declarations have been driven not by all agencies but by a sub-group of like-minded 
thinkers. As Rogerson et al. further note “[n]ot everybody subscribes equally to all of 
these elements and… not all who do subscribe then act on them consistently… Few, 
however, reject any of them explicitly and categorically” (idem). Within the 
‘consensus’ there is considerable scope for differences in interpretation. Some 
agencies are clearly driving the ‘new’ thinking, notably the Scandinavian countries, 
the Netherlands and the UK, as well as multilateral institutions such as the OECD-
DAC, the World Bank and the European Commission. International agreements such 
as the Millennium Declaration mask the voices of a wide range of constituencies, and 
the compromises and negotiations which were a part of the process of reaching 
agreement. While there may be general accord on certain core concepts, such as the 
salience of poverty reduction or the benefits of programme aid, turning this into 
practice is another matter. As the OECD-DAC observes: 
While overall the trend in aligning donor assistance with partner country 
priorities is positive, some donors give only “qualified” endorsement of country 
priorities. Their reasons run the gamut from minor quibbles on details to 
fundamental reservations about key parts of the strategy or even about the 
partner government’s commitment to poverty reduction. In some cases, a donor 
may approve of the broad direction of the strategy, but disagree substantially 
over the proposed pace and methods of its implementation, and hence of the 
extent of the external financial effort required. Several donors report that PRSs 
often do not clearly prioritise among sectors or reforms in need of support, and 
thus may offer little guidance for programming purposes. This, unfortunately 
keeps the door open for donors to continue to decide “unilaterally” on the parts 
of the strategy (sectors, institutions) on which they prefer to focus their support, 
and in what timeframe, and it reinforces donors’ tendency to adapt country 
problems to fit their own sectoral or policy preferences… In other cases, 
donors’ reluctance derives from scepticism over the nature of national 
leadership, its commitment to poverty reduction relative to non-development 
objectives, or, even where this is not the case, the depth of its ownership and 
capacity to implement its PRS. (OECD-DAC 2005b: 25-26)26  
At the same time, the new aid agenda represents some profound shifts in thinking. 
Most important of these is the notion of joint responsibility for aid effectiveness, 
which has opened up space for the recipient voice to be heard more clearly. Although 
donor agencies continue to dominate the thinking on aid, developing countries have 
been actively involved in the preparation and negotiation of the agreements and 
strategies outlined here. This has also led to additional pressure on donors to 
demonstrate that they are living up to their own commitments. While far from 
optimal, the trend in publicly assessing donor practices with regard to budget 
                                                 
26 See also A. Riddell (2002) for an overview of very different donor perspectives on programme aid. 
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support, harmonisation and conditionality is a step towards at least acknowledging 
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In June 2002, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) published the final version of its 
first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). This document was welcomed in 
donor circles. The World Bank considered that it “reaffirm[ed] the commitment of 
the Government to sustainable poverty reduction… provide[d] a comprehensive 
poverty diagnosis and spell[ed] out the government’s strategy and priority actions to 
reduce poverty in Rwanda.” The Bank further described it as “innovative” (World 
Bank and IMF 2002: 1), providing “a sound basis for Bank and Fund concessional 
assistance and for debt relief” (idem: 9). The PRSP was seen as representing a 
Rwandan-owned strategy, adopted in consultation with the local population, for 
addressing poverty reduction and socio-economic development in the medium-term. 
At the annual meeting between the GoR and donors in November 2001, the interim 
PRSP had already been endorsed by donors “as the framework for development 
interventions by all stakeholders” (GoR 2001c). In November 2002, agreement was 
reached on the adoption of a coordination framework to facilitate the implementation 
of the PRSP: 
Participants to this Conference approved the co-ordination framework presented 
by Government based on sector clusters, facilitating agencies and ministries… 
It further noted that the mechanism, if well implemented, would go a long way 
to improve co-ordination and donor-government dialogue. To this extent it 
needed to be dynamic and flexible. Government and a number of donors once 
again expressed the importance of increasingly channelling their support 
through the budget. However, recognising that this may not be possible for 
some countries or could not happen soon, Conference insisted on the need to 
align programmes of donors unable to give budget support to national priorities 
rather than stand alone programmes… Conference concluded by acknowledging 
that Rwanda was on the right path and deserved increased support. It noted the 
meeting of minds between Rwanda and its partners on many issues, 
appreciating the frank and open dialogue. (GoR 2002e)   
This citation from the communiqué of the November 2002 GoR-donor conference 
demonstrates the extent to which the new aid principles outlined in chapter 2 had 
taken root in Rwandan relations with donors. High on the agenda were coordination 
around the PRSP, the need for increased aid to support a country seen as going in the 
right direction, debates around the provision of budget support, and the importance 
of fostering policy dialogue between partners.  
However, this ‘meeting of minds’ amongst the GoR and donors in Rwanda masks 
considerable differences in donor activity in Rwanda. Between 1994 and 2004 
important shifts can be observed in the presence, policies and practices of the main 
donors, reflecting the specific context of Rwanda and broader trends in aid. This 
chapter provides a comparative overview of the main bilateral donors present in 
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Rwanda over this period. It considers the trends in donor involvement; how aid 
quantities have increased and decreased; the objectives and instruments used; and the 
role of political dialogue and conditionality in aid programmes. What emerges is a 
complex picture which, when placed in the context of the drive to foster increased 
national ownership of development policy and processes, raises considerable 
challenges for the GoR.  
 
 
Trends in donor behaviour 1994-2004: Engagement, Disengagement 
and Re-engagement1 
 
Appendix 3 provides an overview of official donors, that is bilateral and 
multilateral agencies, to Rwanda for the period 1992-2003 on the basis of 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) statistics.2 This 
shows the range of bilateral and multilateral donors which support Rwanda, the 
differences in the quantities provided, and the ways in which aid has increased and 
decreased over the years. As this demonstrates, donor support to Rwanda is by no 
means linear; rather, there are continual peaks and troughs in levels of assistance. 
The following analysis concentrates on a few of the main bilateral donors to Rwanda 
which have played a significant role over the last 10 to 15 years in terms of aid 
allocations and political engagement and which have a tangible presence on the 
ground, notably Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA). All 
of these donors are signatories to the declarations and agreements outlined in the 
previous chapter.  
The civil war and genocide in Rwanda were catalysts for change in donor 
engagement. The response of donors to these events and their consequent relations 
with the new GoR have had a profound impact upon aid dynamics. Bilateral aid 
flows more or less came to a halt during 1994. In the immediate aftermath of the 
genocide most donors directed their support through UN agencies and NGOs, and it 
was only in 1995 that bilateral aid programmes really began to resume. This led to 
considerable changes in Rwanda’s top eight bilateral donors between 1993 and 2003, 
as table 3.1 shows. Germany and Belgium are still very present, but they have been 
replaced as major partners by the USA, the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden. In 
1993 the UK provided a mere $1.2 million in comparison to $42.9 million in 2003, 
Sweden $3.3 million as against $13.1 million and the Netherlands $7.8 million as 
                                                 
1 The chapter draws on two main sources of material: donor literature and overviews available through 
websites; and a series of semi-structured interviews with senior representatives of donor agencies in 
Rwanda over 2003 and 2004. The questionnaire which formed a guide for these interviews is available 
in Appendix 2, and the list of interviewees can be found in Appendix 1. Although not adhered to 
rigidly, given time constraints within some interviews and the relevance of the questions to all 
agencies, this provided sufficient comparative material to draw up the tables presented in this chapter. 
In 2004, follow-up interviews were conducted with some representatives, e.g. the Netherlands, 
Canada, Sweden and Germany in order to track shifts in policy and also to address specific questions 
on coordination and harmonisation.  
2 Unless otherwise specified, the source of statistics in this chapter is the Economic and Social Data 
Service (ESDS) International, based at the University of Manchester. The dataset employed is the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development International Development Statistics (see 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/International/Introduction.asp - accessed 12 May 2005). This source will 
henceforth be referenced as ‘ESDS International (2005)’.  
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against $23 million. None of these donors had a bilateral programme with Rwanda in 
1993, nor did they have any in-country representation. The aid mentioned here was 
channelled either through multilateral agencies or NGOs. The change by 2003 is a 
direct result of the war and genocide. 
  
Table 3.1: Top Eight Bilateral Donors to Rwanda in 1993 and 2003 
1993  2003 
Donor Total (US$m)  Donor Total (US$m) 
Germany 38.6  USA 52.6 
Belgium 36.7  UK 42.9 
France 35.5  Netherlands 23.0 
USA 26.0  Belgium 20.8 
Switzerland 20.2  Germany 13.9 
Japan 14.9  Sweden 13.1 
Canada 11.2  France 10.9 
Netherlands 7.9  Canada 10.8 
Source: ESDS International (2005) 
 
Table 3.1, however, masks a lot of activity in the intervening period. Viewing the 
trajectory as laid out in figure 3.1 provides a clearer picture of how aid flows have 
fluctuated. For ease of comprehension, donors are divided into two groups: ‘new’ 
and ‘traditional’ donors. These terms have been widely used in recent literature on 
aid to Rwanda, most explicitly in an OECD report of 1999. The ‘new’ donors are 
those who did not have a strong presence prior to the genocide, including the 
Netherlands, Norway, the UK and Sweden, and to a lesser extent Italy, Ireland and 
Spain (Baaré, Shearer and Uvin 1999: 11-12). ‘Traditional’ donors refers to those 
with a long-standing presence in the country, such as France, Belgium, Germany, 
Canada and Switzerland. This division is recognised by donors themselves, as the 
following quote from a Belgian policy document demonstrates:  
The important characteristic in relations between Rwanda and donors is the 
arrival of new bilateral donors after the genocide, henceforth present in the 
country with large-scale programmes and financial support. This is notably the 
case for the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands. Among the ‘traditional’ bilaterals 
can be found Belgium, Germany, the USA, France and Switzerland, which have 
all remained in Rwanda. (DGCD 2002: 18, translated from French) 
The first graph shows the ‘new’ donors plus the USA. The second graph covers 
the ‘traditional’ donors, whose overall pattern is quite different to that of the first 
group. With the exception of Germany, there was a much more muted response in 
1994, and a general decline in aid.  
Caution is required when considering these graphs; they should be considered as 
nothing more than an illustration of trends. Actual amounts disbursed in a given year 
may differ greatly from the amounts specified in the official statistics. These tend to 
constitute overall aid commitments, some of which may be for multi-annual 
activities and some of which are funds promised rather than funds spent. The 
statistics here include different types of aid, including humanitarian relief, 
programme aid, food aid and debt relief, provided through a variety of bilateral, 
multilateral and private channels. Consequently, the information provided directly to 
the OECD by donors may differ greatly from the local experience of aid flows. To 
take an extreme example, the OECD statistics state that the USA allocated $52.6 
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million to Rwanda in 2003. The aid matrix for 2003 published by the Rwandan 
Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, which is based on information provided by 
donor agencies and large NGOs present in the country, registered that the USA 
disbursed $20 million in 2003 (Minecofin 2004c: 10).  
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Source: ESDS International (2005)  
Note: the USA provided almost $200 million worth of humanitarian assistance 
in 1994, hence the line goes right off the chart.  
 
That caveat aside, these data, complemented with information from alternative 
sources, do allow patterns to be observed: 
Donors increasing their aid  
This category particularly relates to the UK and Sweden, whose bilateral aid 
programmes have substantially increased since 1997. Neither of these donors was 
active in Rwanda prior to the genocide. Both provided humanitarian aid in response 
to the crisis, peaking in 1994 then declining until 1997; since then the trend has been 
generally positive. The UK provided mainly humanitarian aid in the aftermath of the 
genocide. After 1997 the UK presence expanded rapidly, growing from a one-person 
representation in 1995 to a fully devolved office in 2003. Since 1999 the UK has 
interchanged with the USA as Rwanda’s principal bilateral donor. Up until 1997, 
Sweden was mainly providing humanitarian aid to Rwanda. It subsequently 
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developed a full bilateral programme with aid more than doubling between 2000 and 
2003. Both of these donors are seen as key supporters of the GoR, providing aid as 
general budget support. There was a slight drop in aid in 2003, possibly due to 
disbursement patterns during an election year in Rwanda, but projections would 
suggest that these two donors are by no means decreasing their engagement. The 
USA is harder to place, given that its engagement seems to fluctuate constantly. Its 
aid soared in 1994-1995 as a direct humanitarian response to the genocide, then 
declined through to about 1997. The budget is decided annually on the basis of 
results from the previous year, making patterns hard to discern. However, on 
aggregate, since 2000 there has been a positive trend, with amounts outstripping 
support from the early 1990s. The actions of the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) seem to be less affected by political events than 
other donors.3 It is likely that 2004 will see another large increase in aid as 
substantial amounts of support have been allocated to Rwanda for HIV/AIDS 
projects under the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).  
Donors increasing, then decreasing their aid  
Like the UK and Sweden, both the Netherlands and Norway were designated as 
‘new donors’ in the years following the genocide. Neither had a significant presence 
in the early 1990s and what aid they provided was channelled through NGOs rather 
than as bilateral programmes. Immediately after the genocide, the Netherlands 
became an important political ally of the new regime in Kigali and the main backer 
of the United Nations Trust Fund (UNTF) which financed reconstruction projects for 
the Rwandan administration. The Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation at 
the time, Jan Pronk, was personally very engaged and committed to mobilising 
support for the new regime (Douma 2000; Pottier 2002). However, following an 
initial increase in aid in 1994, it then declined until 1997 and stabilised at around $20 
million between 1999 and 2002. Although administrative reasons have been 
advanced for some of this change, as we shall see below the Netherlands has been 
constrained by domestic, political factors. Norway, likewise, was considered a key 
new partner after the genocide. However, it has pulled back almost completely. It 
now maintains no bilateral presence on the ground, citing human rights reasons for 
not making Rwanda a priority partner (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002: 
14).    
Donors decreasing their aid…  
Amongst Belgium, France, Germany, Canada, Switzerland and Japan – Rwanda’s 
‘traditional’ donors – the overall pattern is one of diminishing support overall 
between 1991 and 2003. Two trends are worth noting. Germany, Canada and 
Switzerland all increased their aid around 1994-1995 in response to the genocide, 
Germany substantially. France, Belgium and Japan on the other hand did not. There 
was a general rebound until about 1997 since when engagements have decreased. 
With the exception of Japan, these are the donors which have been the most cautious 
                                                 
3 Although USAID as a donor agency is not a big political player in Rwanda, in the immediate 
aftermath of the genocide the USA was accused of being slow to recognise the new regime and of 
being influential in stalling funds from the World Bank. The amount the USA did eventually allocate 
to Rwanda was significantly less than that allocated to the refugee camps outside Rwanda’s borders 
(Terry 2002: 172).  
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about the new regime. They have questioned most strongly its intentions in the 
region, notably with regard to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), its human 
rights record and its internal political agenda. As agencies they have also been the 
most politically affected by the genocide, with most of these countries undertaking 
some sort of enquiry into their own role. Often individual agency representatives 
have been very personally affected. 
… but re-engaging  
However, several ‘traditional’ donors seem to be showing signs of re-engaging in 
Rwanda. After stabilising at a low of around $6 million between 1999 and 2001, 
Canada’s aid increased in 2003 and it has just finalised a new 10-year programme of 
support, although aid is not set to rise significantly. Japan had all but disappeared 
from the aid charts by 2001 with no bilateral presence in the country after 1994. In 
2004, permanent representatives of the Japanese aid agency, JICA, were back in 
Kigali negotiating bilateral projects. Belgium held its first formal bilateral talks for 
over 10 years with the GoR in 2004, agreeing a new programme in which it 
committed to doubling its aid. Rwanda remains a priority partner for Switzerland, for 
whom the genocide came as a great shock, although aid allocations are unlikely to 
increase dramatically and concerns abound about Rwanda’s governance. And even 
France, which has the most politically charged relationship with the GoR, is making 
a comeback.4 In terms of presence and action on the ground, France maintains a 
fairly low profile; yet it continues to provide fairly substantial quantities of aid. Some 
of this has been in the form of debt relief – explaining the minor peak in 1997 – but it 
also undertakes low-profile bilateral aid projects.  
It is finally worth noting a couple of bilateral agencies, in addition to Norway, 
which no longer maintain a presence in Kigali, namely Italy and Ireland. Italy closed 
its office in Kigali in 2000; as emergency assistance gave way to development, 
NGOs became the primary channel for support (Ministero degli Affari Esteri 2000).5 
In the early 2000s, Ireland was considering engaging very strongly in Rwanda, 
providing budgetary support as in Uganda in addition to funding prominent Irish 
NGOs in Rwanda. However, these plans were put on hold in 2004. The official 
explanation was budget constraints limiting the possibilities for developing strong 
new partnerships. However, NGOs critical of Rwanda in Ireland may have 
                                                 
4 In March 2004, an article in Rwanda’s tri-weekly newspaper, New Times, reported on talks between 
President Kagame and the French Ambassador in which the ambassador is quoted as saying “I have 
been here for four months to clean up the dirt on the table in order to restore a better relationship with 
Rwanda” (New Times, March 9 2005). Nevertheless, relations continue to fluctuate with frequent 
diplomatic tensions. For example, tensions were particularly high in March 2004 when investigations 
by the French anti-terrorist judge Jean-Louis Bruguière re-opened debates about the shooting down of 
the plane carrying President Habyarimana in April 1994. In April 2005, a representative of the 
Rwandan government was again accusing the French government of harbouring genocide suspects 
and not cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha; and calling for 
French military officials to be prosecuted (New Times, 5 April 2005). 
5 Between 1999 and 2001 there had been diplomatic tension between Italy and Rwanda over the 
adoption of children (see ‘Italy may return Rwandan children’ BBC News, 12 April 2001; New Times, 
12-13 April 2004). This was mentioned in connection with Italy’s withdrawal by a couple of 
informants (Fieldwork Diary: 21 April 2004; 25 April 2004).  
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influenced that decision through lobbying the Irish parliament over the Rwandan 
regime’s governance record.6  
 
As this overview demonstrates, behind the aid figures lie deeper issues. On the 
one hand, speculative correlations may be drawn between aid flows and events in 
Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes Region. Peaks and troughs can often be observed 
around key moments in Rwanda’s recent history, the most obvious being the 
genocide with some donors providing substantial amounts of aid in 1994-1995 and 
others drawing back. Presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2003, marking 
the end of the political transition process in Rwanda, constitute another period when 
there was a small upturn in aid flows from many donors. It remains to be seen if this 
is indicative of a wider trend of increased support following the adoption of the 
PRSP in 2002, or if it is specifically linked to the election process itself. On the other 
hand, a general decline in aid can be observed between 1995 and 1997. This may be 
due to the wind-down in emergency support with the large-scale return of refugees in 
1996, but may also be due to emerging donor concerns about the nature of the new 
regime. As chapter 5 demonstrates, where the recent aid history of Rwanda is 
considered in more depth, aid was frozen on occasion during this period. Between 
2001 and 2002, on the other hand, aid generally began to rise again, which may be 
linked both to the finalisation of the PRSP mentioned above and to the end of the war 
with the DRC which had been ongoing since 1998.   
On the other hand, drawing such conclusions demands caution. Alternative 
explanations can be advanced of a more technical nature. For example, one 
informant attributed a drop in aid levels to attempts to follow GoR procedures such 
as procurement more closely, which were more time-consuming and led to lower 
disbursement levels.7 The increase in Canada’s aid might reflect a rise in the overall 
domestic aid budget after a prolonged period of cutbacks between 1994 and 2000 and 
Canada’s new engagement with Africa in support of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD).8 Aid agencies are often less than willing to 
publicly attribute decreases in aid to politicised events. Often the fluctuations are 
accounted for in terms of bureaucratic procedures which impact on actual 
disbursement over a year, particular projects which have been delayed, changes in 
staffing at a local level or changes in priorities at the donor government level.  
Nevertheless, this overview does provide an illustration of tendencies which can 
be complemented by a closer look at donor programmes, their projections, and how 
their presence is felt on the ground.  
  
 
Objectives for Aid: Donor Rationales for Supporting Rwanda  
 
The motivations of donor countries to provide development assistance vary from 
country to country and may change over time, reflecting particular social beliefs or 
the political philosophies of governments in power. These varying motivations can 
                                                 
6 Comments made by Irish Embassy officials in Uganda; representatives of Concern and Trocaire in 
Rwanda (Fieldwork Diaries: 19, 20, 21 April 2004). 
7 Donor representative intervention at presentation of preliminary research findings, Kigali, 7 October 
2004. 
8 Interview, Head of Cooperation, Canadian Embassy, Kigali, 14 October 2003.  
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be observed in Rwanda within donors’ policy histories and their prime objectives 
under current programmes. From table 3.2 a clear distinction can be observed 
between those donors who were present before the genocide and whose current 
engagement in Rwanda stems from this historic presence, often overlaid with 
recompense for any part they may have played in allowing the genocide to happen; 
and the donors which have only become involved since 1994. The presence of these 
latter donors is in direct response to the genocide.  
 
Table 3.2: Donor Objectives in Rwanda 
Donor Policy history Rationale Current Objectives 
Belgium Present since 1960s.   
Bilateral programme resumed 
1995. 
New convention signed 2004. 
Former colonial power, historic 
ties.  
Priority country for 
engagement, along with 
Burundi and DRC. 
‘Do no harm’ approach, 
working with population rather 
than government. Poverty 
reduction and sustainable 
development.  
Canada Present since 1960s.   
1994-1999: humanitarian aid  
1999-2003: transition 
programme. 2004: 10-year 
programme adopted 
Historic/linguistic ties. Africa as 
focus. Promoting human and 
sustainable development.  
Promotion of Canadian values. 
Human security: governance, 
gender equity and reaching the 
poorest. Rural development as  
priority under 2004-2014 
programme. 
France Present since 1960s.  
1994-1999 humanitarian aid  
Since 2000 return to 
development projects under 3-
year Action Plans. 
Largest donor pre-1994, so 
historic and linguistic ties. 
Politically constrained by 
genocide legacy but no 
intention to withdraw. 
Human needs approach - to 
ensure people have food, 
health, education. Promotion 
of French language and 
culture. 
Germany Present since 1960s. 1995-
1997 humanitarian aid & 
rehabilitation of former 
projects. 1997-2001 Rwanda 
was a ‘partner country’, now a 
‘priority country’.   
2-year programmes 
Official rationale is failure of the 
international community to help 
Rwanda, therefore deserving of 
constructive support now. 
Shifting to MDGs and poverty 
reduction. 
‘Do no harm’ approach to 
poverty reduction, working with 
population rather than 
government. Reconciliation 
and reconstruction. Main 
sectors: governance, health, 
education, rural economy 
Netherlands Present since 1994.  
Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) signed 
2001. 
Strong support post-genocide 
for reconstruction; rationale for 
engagement is genocide. 
Rwanda as a special case - 
mission is to contribute to 
peace, stability and security, 
and hence poverty reduction.  
Sweden Present since 1994 (country 
office since 1997). 
Humanitarian aid up to 1999.  
MoU signed 2002. 
Response to genocide, and 
desire for more engagement in 
Africa.  
Strengthening governance and 
capacity for poverty reduction 
and security. 
Switzerland Present since 1960s.  
1994-2001 emergency 
assistance. Since 2002 support 
to PRSP under a 3-year 
programme. 
Genocide response constitutes 
main focus. Now supporting 
poverty reduction but 
constrained by past 
experiences. 
Promoting participatory 
approach and decentralisation; 
more linked to trade than other 
donors. 
UK Present since 1994.  
MoU signed 1999 with 10-year 
programme - 3-year budget 
commitments. 
Initial engagement was a 
response to genocide (Rwanda 
as a special case), shifting to 
poverty reduction logic.  
Poverty reduction & MDGs 
through institutional 
strengthening and budget 
support. Additional focus on 
education sector. 
USA Present since 1960s. 1994-96 
massive humanitarian 
programme. 1997-2004 
programme - annual budget. 
No specific strategic interest, 
but keen to see stability in the 
region.  
Poverty reduction through 
economic development and 
improved governance, so 
MDGs by default. 
 
In terms of objectives, security and stability emerge as key for donors such as the 
Netherlands and Sweden. There is also a clear transition from emergency support in 
response to the genocide to more orthodox support for the poverty reduction agenda 
in line with policy developments globally and in Rwanda itself. However, some 
consider the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and support 
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for Rwanda’s PRSP as much more central than others. For example, Canada 
considers the MDGs as a reference point only, notably because the GoR uses them as 
such, but not as the lynchpin of its cooperation programme. The USA, while 
supporting poverty reduction, rarely mentions the PRSP in its documentation. The 
UK’s programme on the other hand is explicitly linked to achieving the MDGs and 
implementing Rwanda’s PRSP. Several donors, such as Belgium, Canada and 
Germany, were keen to stress that their programmes aimed at supporting the country 
and the population, rather than the government. Promotion of cultural values also 
emerges as a theme for Canada and France.  
Another factor emerging from table 3.2 is the extent to which Rwanda is 
considered a priority country for support. The USA is one of Rwanda’s top bilateral 
donors, but Rwanda is not a priority country by any means. In contrast, Belgium, 
which provides less aid in financial terms, places Rwanda amongst its top recipients 
for aid (see table 3.3). For most others – the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, 
Switzerland and Sweden – Rwanda figures among priority partner countries. This 
has important consequences for the political engagement of the donor country and 
often reflects domestic interest in Rwanda and the region, as well as particular 
development policy objectives such as conflict prevention or poverty reduction.  
 
Table 3.3: Prioritisation of Rwanda 
Donor Importance Great Lakes Regional Policy 
Belgium Rwanda as 2nd or 3rd recipient of aid since 1997 
(DGCD 2004). Strong focus of diplomatic 
attention, with many ministerial visits.  
Great Lakes is priority region (DRC is 1st 
recipient of aid). Regional framework adopted in 
2002 for Rwanda, DRC, Burundi.  
Canada General commitment to Africa, but Rwanda not a 
high priority country - not amongst top 30 
recipients (CIDA 2005: 33). However, Rwanda 
included on Canada’s new list of 25 
‘Development Partners’ for poverty reduction.  
No specific regional policy due to limited funds, 
so concentration on Rwanda. Kigali office also 
covers Burundi where humanitarian aid 
provided. Humanitarian aid also provided to 
DRC. 
France No intentions to pull out, but limited engagement 
for political reasons. Strategic interests in Africa 
in general. 
No specific regional policy 
Germany Rwanda is among 40 priority countries for long-
term engagement. Personal commitment by 
previous development cooperation minister.  
No specific regional policy 
Netherlands Priority partnership country (but on condition of 
no budget support). Post-1994 years marked by 
personal commitments of different ministers. 
Great lakes is a ‘special focus area’ with a 
regional approach to security questions. 
Rwanda office also covers Burundi.  
Sweden New commitment to Africa. Rwanda is 23rd on 
the Swedish International Development 
Agency’s (Sida) list of main recipients and 10th 
among African countries (Sida 2003: 10) 
Regional approach to conflict resolution, 
covering Rwanda, Burundi, DRC (Sida 2004b, 
2004a). 
Switzerland Priority country (geographical similarities to 
Switzerland) with ‘special programme’ status 
(SDC 2005). 14th recipient in 2003.  
Developing a regional approach - recognising 
conflict and security as regional; humanitarian 
aid to DRC and Burundi 
UK Rwanda as 11th highest recipient in 2002-03 
(DFID 2004: 180), and main 'new' country to 
receive significant increases in funding. Personal 
commitment by previous development 
cooperation ministers. 
No regional policy initially, although under 
pressure to develop one from UK civil society by 
2003. Programmes developed for Burundi and 
DRC 2004-05. 
USA Not priority at all, no strategic interest.  No regional policy 
 
As table 3.3 indicates, for Canada and Germany, Rwanda numbers amongst 
priority countries for poverty reduction and long-term support. The Netherlands and 
Switzerland, on the other hand, accord Rwanda ‘special status’. For both these 
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donors this reflects a strong desire to engage with Rwanda, but concerns about 
governance issues prevent full partner status being given. When the UK expanded its 
programme in 1997, Rwanda was also considered a “special case” for assistance 
(DFID 1999: 3) but the official rationale for supporting Rwanda has since shifted 
more firmly to poverty reduction. The other interesting comparison is whether 
support to Rwanda constitutes a discrete country programme or whether it sits within 
a broader regional framework. About half these donors have a specific Great Lakes 
policy, recognising that development in Rwanda cannot be separated from the 
broader regional context which continues to be severely affected by conflict. Several 
of these donors provide humanitarian assistance in Burundi and the DRC and are 
increasingly engaged in supporting political transition processes in both these 
countries.  
One final issue which emerges from this table is the element of personal 
commitment from particular ministers of development cooperation. In the immediate 
post-genocide period, ministers from the Netherlands and the UK took a strong 
personal interest in Rwanda, laying the foundations for lasting programmes. Changes 
in ministers in these countries have also affected the continuation of programmes, as 
we shall see in more detail in chapter 7. Representatives from other donor countries 
also mentioned the personal interest of senior government officials in aiding 
Rwanda, such as Germany and Belgium.  
Support for Rwanda tends to be packaged in terms of reactions to the genocide or 
commitments to helping one of the poorest countries in the world under the poverty 
reduction agenda, but donor involvement also often reflects pressure to engage 
coming from civil society in the home country. While in the UK and the USA there 
appears to be limited public interest in Rwanda or the Great Lakes Region as a 
whole, in other countries Rwanda and the Great Lakes are of greater public concern, 
receiving significant press coverage, Parliamentary questions, and civil society 
lobbying. Several of the donor countries are home to large Rwandan Diasporas, 
notably Belgium and Switzerland and to a lesser extent Canada and the Netherlands, 
where the Diaspora is highly politicised and vocal although often very divided.9 The 
Netherlands’ programme in particular has been affected by a critical civil society 
lobby which has succeeded in limiting how aid can be delivered and monitors the 
programme very closely.10 Civil society in Belgium is also vocal about Rwanda but 
with less impact on the actual aid programme (see chapter 7). There is limited 
evidence of significant commercial interests of donor countries in the region but 
Belgian, Dutch and German companies have some financial stakes in Rwanda.  
 
 
How Donors Provide Aid: the Instruments 
 
The above discussion demonstrates the degree to which the objectives, rationales 
and policy priorities of donors differ. The second core issue which distinguishes 
donors is the way in which they provide aid to Rwanda. Comparing the years 1990-
1993 with 2000-2003 shows that overall amounts of aid have not substantially 
changed (see figure 3.2). Despite the civil war which broke out in 1990, additional 
                                                 
9 Several opposition parties to the Rwandan government have been established in exile, with Belgium 
something of a hub for these (see ICG 2002; Rafti 2004).  
10 See, for example, Cordaid, ICCO, Kerkinactie and Novib (2003) 
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aid flowed into Rwanda during 1990 to 1993 to support firstly the Structural 
Adjustment Programme signed with the international financial institutions in 1990, 
and secondly the peace process after a cease fire was brokered in 1993. In 1992, 
grants were awarded worth $283.1 million and loans worth $78.6 million, giving a 
total of $362.6 million.11 In 2002, Rwanda received $280.7 million in grants and 
$95.2 million in loans, giving a total of $374 million (ESDS International, May 
2005). 1994 to 1996 constitute exceptional years for aid flows given the huge 
amounts of humanitarian relief entering the country, particularly coming from the 
USA and much of it passing through NGOs and humanitarian relief bodies. The 
genocide provoked a huge response, but the ongoing reconstruction and development 
needs of the country have not given rise to a major change in overall quantities of aid 
in comparison to the pre-genocide period, nor any significant change in the 
proportion of grants to loans. Nevertheless, as described above, the donors 
themselves have changed quite significantly, with ‘new’ donors providing 
considerable aid packages. This suggests that Rwanda might have seen a substantial 
drop in aid if it had not secured the support of the USA, the UK and the Netherlands 
in the ten years following the genocide. 














Source: ESDS International (2005)  
 
However, there has been a transformation in the main instruments for aid delivery. 
Donors use a variety of mechanisms, as shown in table 3.4. All provide support 
through NGOs, some directly through specific projects accounted for within the 
country programme but undertaken by NGOs (e.g. Belgium and the USA), and some 
indirectly, undertaken by international NGOs funded from headquarters but not for 
specific Rwandan projects (e.g. the UK). All also employ technical assistants (TA) 
and consultants on their programmes to fulfil a variety of tasks. TA accounts for 
around 20% of aid (ESDS International 2005). The UK, for example, has had a team 
of short and long-term TA placed within the Ministry of Education since 2000; long-
term TA have also been provided to the Ministries of Gender and Lands. These TA 
particularly aim to bolster institutional capacity and provide policy and planning 
input. In addition, the UK has also hired a huge number of consultants on short-term 
missions to assist with policy and planning. Belgium also employs long-term TA, 
                                                 
11 The financial and political support provided by the international financial institutions to the former 
Rwandan regime, even as the human rights situation was degenerating and plans for the genocide 
were being laid, are explored in depth by Uvin (1998), Andersen (2000) and Storey (2001).  
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who are linked to specific projects and who work with Rwandan counterparts. These 
TA focus more on project management, although capacity building is a key 
component of their activities. These tend to be non-negotiable elements of a project, 
although the GoR has a say in who is actually appointed. In general, TA are expected 
to fulfil a variety of roles, such as providing specialist knowledge, training 
counterparts and managing projects. Finding TA with good combinations of all these 
skills is a challenge, leading to debates about the quality of such assistance and 
particularly whether it leaves a lasting trace.  
 
Table 3.4 : Aid Instruments  
Donor Budget 
Support 






Belgium No Possibly in future 








Canada No Through Common 
Development 










France No No Main 
instrument 
No TA in 
ministries 
Yes 






number of TA 
Yes 
Netherlands No Demobilisation; 
decentralisation 
(CDF); possibly in 






No  Consultants Yes 














No TA attached 
to projects 
Yes 
UK Yes Education  Some 
projects 




USA No No Main 
instrument 
No TA in 
ministries 
Yes 
* Most donors concentrate on particular sectors. What this refers to is the provision of direct support 
to the budget of a particular line Ministry, responsible state agency or common donor fund (cf. 
Chapter 2, pgs. 30-31). 
** The term ‘silent partnership’ refers to one donor giving another donor a mandate to act on its 
behalf in policy discussions in a given sector.  
 
Of particular significance is the division between donors providing budget support 
and those concentrating on projects. This is recognised by donors themselves:  
As far as cooperation approaches are concerned, the central element of 
differentiation between the donors, notably within the EU member states, is the 
question of recourse to direct budget support. (DGCD 2002: 19, translated from 
French) 
Within the total state budget of Rwanda the proportion of external support to the 
current budget (that is as general budget support) has increased dramatically since 
1996 (see table 6.1, page 124). Indeed, budget support since 2000 has accounted for 
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over half of total foreign grants. This is largely due to the high levels of direct budget 
support from three major donors – the World Bank, the European Union and the UK 
– and increasingly from Sweden. However, as table 3.4 indicates, the vast majority of 
bilateral donors employ projects as their primary instrument, despite the greater push 
at the international level towards programme instruments in the interests of aid 
coherence, effectiveness and national ownership. Indeed, only two bilateral donors in 
Rwanda provide budget support,12 the UK and Sweden. These donors are heavily 
involved in thinking around the new aid agenda in general and unsurprisingly their 
rationale for providing budget support in Rwanda is to strengthen the poverty 
reduction agenda through reducing transaction costs for the GoR and themselves and 
increasing national ownership of the development agenda (see table 3.5). At the other 
end of the spectrum are those donors which are not keen proponents of budget 
support anywhere, namely the USA, Germany and Switzerland.  
 
Table 3.5 : Budget Support in Rwanda 
Donor BS  in 
general 
BS  in 
Rwanda 
Reasons for provision or not of BS in Rwanda 
Belgium Exceptional 
cases 
No Provides forms of BS in other countries (e.g. earmarked for salary 
support in Burundi) but unable to do so in Rwanda. Accountability is the 
official rationale but also concerns within the Belgian administration 
about the GoR and fungibility.13  
Canada Yes No Provides BS in other countries but unable to do so in Rwanda due to 
concerns around accountability given the capacity of the GoR.  
France Yes No No BS in Rwanda due to: ongoing dispute between GoR and French 
administration over outstanding debts; concerns about fungibility 
(particularly use of BS for military purposes); concerns about 
accountability to own administration.  
Germany No No Prefers project mechanism. Would have problems in Rwanda due to 
GoR capacity and fungibility, so political and technical reasons. 
Netherlands Yes No Would normally provide BS in Rwanda - no technical reason for not 
doing so - but prevented by Dutch Parliament on account of the GoR’s 
human rights and governance record.  
Sweden Yes Yes Provides BS and acts as a ‘silent partner’ through the UK on education 
and support to macro-economic policy and planning. 
Switzerland No No Not provider of BS on the whole, preferring decentralised aid. Possible 
provision of SBS hampered by Rwandan engagement in the DRC and 
governance record.  
UK Yes Yes Provides nearly all of its aid as GBS or SBS. 
USA No No Does not provide BS on principle due to accountability requirements. 
Of particular interest are the donors which might be expected to provide budget 
support, and are doing so elsewhere, but are not using the instrument in Rwanda, e.g. 
the Netherlands, Canada, France and, to a lesser extent, Belgium. Two main reasons 
                                                 
12 Recalling the definitional problems around budget support outlined in chapter 2 (pg. 29), direct 
budget support includes different types of programme aid, including debt relief and food aid. This 
section concentrates mainly on general budget support (GBS) (referring to non-earmarked or 
notionally earmarked aid channeled directly into the central budget of the GoR) and sector budget 
support (SBS). The term ‘budget support’ (BS) in this section is used generically to cover GBS and 
SBS.  
13 “Aid is said to be fungible when Government offsets donor spending on a particular purpose by 
reducing its own expenditure on the same purpose. For example, donor funding earmarked to health 
will not increase total health spending if Government reduces its own health spending, and uses the 
funds thus released for some other purpose” (Foster and Leavey 2001). Fungibility also refers to the 
situation where aid substitutes for government funding by being used to reduce taxes (van de Walle 
and Cratty 2005).  
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are advanced for this: concerns about accountability; and concerns about political 
governance. Several donor representatives observed that they needed to be able to 
account for the use of their funds to their own authorities; so needed a clear record of 
where their money was going. They felt that the administrative capacity of the GoR 
to manage funds effectively was too weak. There was also a strong concern 
expressed about fungibility. In theory budget support would be provided to boost 
GoR capacity to fund core policy programmes, particularly in the social sectors. 
However, once budget support has been allocated it is hard to track exactly where it 
goes and whether the funds are used for the stated purpose. In earmarking budget 
support for poverty reduction activities, other national resources may be diverted to 
alternative areas, such as defence. Although budget support donors and the 
international institutions track the GoR’s budget carefully in order to ensure that 
allocations to priority poverty-related sectors are increasing, and that additional 
resources are not flowing to areas such as defence, it is widely recognised that 
fungibility is unavoidable (van de Walle and Cratty 2005). For some donors this 
represents an unacceptable risk in the particular context of Rwanda, related to the 
second major reason for not providing budget support in Rwanda – political 
governance.  
Rwanda’s regional relations, and notably its military engagements in the DRC, 
were one key concern. Rwanda entered into direct conflict with the DRC in 1998 and 
did not finally withdraw its troops until 2002. Tensions continue to abound, and 
several donors feared funding was being diverted to military ends. The other main 
concern was the GoR’s record of alleged human rights abuses and flaws within the 
democratic process. These reasons were mainly espoused by Rwanda’s more 
‘traditional’ partners, e.g. Belgium, Canada, France and Switzerland, although very 
often the official reason given for not providing budget support was financial 
management and accountability.  
The Netherlands makes a particularly interesting case of a context-specific 
rationale for the non-provision of budget support. In the years following the 
genocide, the Netherlands came out as a strong supporter of the GoR. Dutch bilateral 
aid to Rwanda (like that of Sweden) sits within a regional programme for peace and 
stability (Minbuza 2004; Uvin, Bourque and Cohen 2004), seeing these as a 
prerequisite for poverty reduction (see tables 3.3 and 3.4). However, unlike Sweden, 
the Netherlands does not provide budget support, despite conceding that the technical 
conditions are right and despite being a strong advocate of the ‘new’ aid agenda in 
general.14 The reason for this is directly attributable to political pressure on the 
domestic front. From being the GoR’s greatest friend, the Netherlands has become a 
much more critical supporter. Changes in ministers in the Netherlands have impacted 
significantly on the relationship, with a more critical trend emerging under the 
present cooperation minister. This is also linked to pressure exerted by a strong NGO 
lobby which has condemned Rwanda’s engagement in the DRC, its human rights 
record and the democratisation process (Steedman and Andenas 2002; Cordaid et al. 
2003). Consequently, when Dutch aid was reviewed in the late 1990s, Rwanda did 
not figure as a priority ‘partner country’. Its elevation to this status in 2001 came 
with the caveat that no general budget support be provided and that a Memorandum 
of Understanding be signed laying down a series of benchmarks.  
                                                 
14 Interview, Dutch embassy official, Kigali, 17 March 2004. 
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The reasons for not providing budget support are therefore both technical and 
political, specific to Rwanda and related to broader donor policy positions. Budget 
support and non-budget support donors are often juxtaposed, something which does 
happen in the Rwandan context as the GoR tries to push its preference for budget 
support, as we saw in the introduction to this chapter. However, more donors appear 
to be moving from a discrete project approach towards a more sectoral approach. For 
example, Canada has been undertaking fairly scattered projects, often short-term, but 
under its new programme it aims to concentrate aid more closely on the rural 
development sector. It is considering providing direct support to the Common 
Development Fund (CDF) for the labour intensive public works programme under 
the Ministry of Local Affairs (CIDA 2005). This is closer to a Sector-Wide 
Approach (SWAp) and sector budget support (SBS), and represents a way of getting 
around constraints on the provision of full budget support.15 A similar shift is evident 
in Belgian policy. Belgium may allocate sector budget support in the education 
sector and is assisting the development of a SWAp in health. Germany also adopted a 
more programme-style approach in late 2004, and began to provide sector budget 
support for decentralisation in mid 2005. The Netherlands has been funding local 
administrations, but now aims to channel this directly to the CDF for 
decentralisation. It is also planning to grant sector-specific support in the justice 
sector. Indeed, the Netherlands has been progressively dismantling its project 
architecture in favour of SWAps, and a representative of the Dutch embassy stated 
that the institutional support currently given to the justice sector aimed at ensuring 
the institutions and accountability mechanisms were in place for it to receive sector 
support in future.  
Whether this equates to the idea of moving “along the spectrum from project to 
sector-wide approaches, and from these to direct budget support” (Commission for 
Africa 2005: 62) is debatable. Many donor representatives saw these different 
instruments rather as complementary. What this does indicate, however, is a 
departure from the ‘traditional’ project approach. The argument about project aid 
bypassing government systems requires re-thinking. While GoR officials complain 
that they have limited control over project aid and that donors providing such aid are 
often untransparent in how funds are spent, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, 
most donors appear to use some sort of co-management system, negotiate bilateral 
programmes closely with the GoR and claim to be aligning around GoR priorities as 




Presence, Policy Dialogue and Conditions on Aid 
 
Nearly all the bilateral donors interviewed in the course of this research were 
eager to stress how quickly they engaged with the new regime in the wake of the 
genocide. Both the German and Dutch representatives claimed that their agency was 
the first to launch bilateral cooperation with the GoR in 1994.16 At the Round Table 
Conference organised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 
                                                 
15 See also da Câmara (2001: 28-29) on this point. 
16 Interviews: 1st Secretary and Deputy Chief of Mission, German Embassy Kigali, 30 September 
2003; Deputy Head of Mission and Head of Cooperation, Dutch Embassy, Kigali, 10 October 2003. 
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July 1995, Belgium stated that it was one of the first donors to establish a ‘positive 
and constructive’ policy in October 1994, then confirm it with a pledge of about $20 
million (UNDP 1995: 96-97).17 At the same conference, both Austria and Canada 
stressed how early they had sent missions to Rwanda in 1994 and restarted bilateral 
cooperation. These affirmations reflect a desire to be ‘seen’ to be supporting Rwanda 
and its Government. The size of aid packages, the types of instruments used, the way 
in which donor engagement has changed over time, and the priority given to Rwanda 
are all crucial to the relationship between the GoR and individual donors. The 
physical presence of donor agencies in Kigali, the mandate accorded to local offices, 
and the nature of the interaction of donors with the GoR and other aid actors are also 
important factors in considering the application of the new aid agenda in practice.    
Table 3.6 provides an overview of the institutional system of each donor in terms 
of where development cooperation sits within the donor government; the presence of 
the donor in Kigali in the sense of diplomatic and development cooperation 
representation; and the mandate of these offices. There are essentially two different 
institutional set-ups outlined here: countries with separate ministries for development 
cooperation and foreign affairs (e.g. UK and Germany); and those with a semi-
autonomous development cooperation agency or department within foreign affairs, 
often with a separate minister (e.g. Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland). These different set-ups impact upon policy coherence 
within donor countries, most importantly between development and foreign policy 
goals. A number of countries also have autonomous implementation agencies, such 
as Belgium, France (although this agency is not active in Rwanda) and Germany, 
which are responsible for implementing projects and programmes. With the 
exception of Sweden and Switzerland, all these donors have an embassy in Kigali, 
although some are quite small with limited diplomatic functions, such as the UK and 
Canada.  
Policy dialogue with the GoR and engagement in coordination activities with the 
GoR and other donors is affected by the number of senior staff an agency has on the 
ground and the level of devolved authority of local representations. The number of 
staff greatly impacts upon the capacity of a donor agency to participate in 
coordination issues. For example, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands and 
Germany all have representatives of their respective development cooperation 
agencies located within the embassy often combining diplomatic and development 
cooperation roles. Development cooperation representatives from Sweden and 
Switzerland also carry out diplomatic roles in the absence of embassies in Rwanda. 
There are often only one or two senior development cooperation staff in all of these 
agencies, although some have additional policy advisors on particular sectors. DFID 
(UK) has the largest development cooperation office in Rwanda in terms of senior 
policy and programme staff. As we shall see, the numerous meetings aimed at 
enhancing collaboration amongst aid actors can be very time-consuming. Those 
agencies with very limited senior staff often struggle to combine attendance at these 
events with other programme management and dialogue responsibilities.  
 
                                                 
17 In an interview in 1999 in the Rwandan newspaper, La Nouvelle Relève, the Belgian Ambassador to 
Rwanda, Jean Lint, noted that Belgium had re-opened its embassy in September 1994 and was one of 
the few donors to have constructive relations with the new GoR (28 February 1999). 
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Table 3.6 : Donor Representation in Rwanda 
Donor Institutional System Presence in Kigali Cooperation Mandate  
Belgium Development Cooperation 
Directorate-General (DGCD) 
semi-autonomous within Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, with separate 
Minister. Autonomous 
implementation agency - Belgian 
Technical Cooperation (BTC). 
Full embassy. DGCD staff in 
Embassy (overview, policy, 
monitoring). Separate BTC 
office for project management 
Final decisions and policy 
directed from HQ, but local 
authority to negotiate 
projects and programmes.  
Canada Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), 
with Minister for International 
Cooperation within Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade.  
Small embassy (micro-
mission). Cooperation attaché 
in embassy. CIDA 
representatives in separate 
office.  
Decentralised funds. Most 
policy decisions made on 
ground, then transmitted to 
HQ.  
France Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation and 
Development (DGCID) 
Autonomous implementation 
agency – French Development 
Agency (AFD) 
Full embassy. 2 cooperation 
staff located in embassy to 
monitor projects. No AFD 
present.   
Embassy draws up plan of 
action, approved by HQ 
where final decisions made. 
Some control over 
decentralised credit 
envelope, managed locally. 
Germany Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ),  Separate from Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Autonomous 
implementing agency – German 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ). 
Also have KfW Development 
Bank (financial support) and 
German Development Service 
(DED) (technical assistance)  
Full embassy. Representatives 
of BMZ in embassy. Separate 
GTZ office and DED present. 
No KfW. 
Decisions effectively taken 
at HQ level but on advice of 
embassy. Bi-annual 
negotiation of programme 
through bilateral talks. 
Netherlands Development Cooperation under 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Full embassy. Head of 
Cooperation and additional 
staff within embassy.  
Devolved authority. Own 
budget and remit to spend 
at will; Parliament approves 
overall policy. 
Sweden Swedish International 
Development Agency (Sida) is 
semi-autonomous agency 
reporting to Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
No embassy (section of 
Nairobi, Kenya). Sida 
represented on the ground, 
with de facto diplomatic status 
in absence of embassy. Small 
office. 
Delegated authority but no 
decentralised budget in 
Rwanda. 
Switzerland Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDC) under 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
No embassy (nearest: Nairobi, 
Kenya, but Kigali SDC office 
not under Nairobi embassy). 
Representation of SDC on 
ground, with limited staff, plays 
diplomatic role.  
Fully devolved authority; 
decentralized programme. 
Budget and broad 
orientation from HQ, as well 




UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) separate to 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
(FCO – Foreign Affairs) 
Small embassy with limited 
functions (Kampala, Uganda is 
nearest full embassy). DFID 
office, with several sectoral 
advisors and a large body of 
programme support staff.  
Fully devolved office since 
2003. Overall policy set in 
London, but country 
programme and budget 
managed in Rwanda. 
USA United States Agency for 
International Development 
(USAID) is an autonomous 
federal agency, receiving 
guidance from State Department. 
Full embassy. Separate USAID 
office, employing over 60 staff.  
Budget decided at HQ level; 
country office allocates 
budget to programmes with 
HQ approval. 
 
The mandate for negotiation that these staff have is also important. Those 
agencies with devolved authority have the greatest flexibility with regard to budget 
allocation, disbursement mechanisms and engagement on policy matters. This can 
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allow considerable flexibility, particularly to fund activities at short notice (da 
Câmara 2001: 21, 29) or even to plug gaps in other donor programmes. An example 
of this is when DFID stepped in to help the French distribute textbooks when their 
own funding ran short. At the same time, this does not render field offices 
independent of policy directives from headquarters. However devolved an office’s 
authority may be, it will still be subject to central decisions. As mentioned above, 
this is the case for Dutch provision of budget support. Flexibility in management and 
accountability arrangements for all donors tends to be minimal.  
While difficult to judge and based largely on anecdotal evidence, it is worth 
noting the nature of different donors’ presence in Rwanda. This is often 
disproportionate to budgets and activities. Some donors, such as the UK and the 
Netherlands, together with the World Bank and European Commission, have a high 
political profile, are engaged closely in policy dialogue at a high level with the GoR 
or are working mainly with government institutions. Indeed, few people outside of 
Government seem aware of what the UK is doing, given its lack of visible projects 
and its policy of not ‘flying flags’. Conversely, there are those donors with a high 
cooperation profile, such as Germany, Belgium, the USA and Switzerland whose 
projects are advertised widely in the press or via road signs and who may have a 
large number of technical assistants in the field. During the months spent researching 
this topic in Kigali, Belgium, Canada and Germany appeared to have the lowest 
profile in terms of their presence in large public seminars and conferences. Finally, 
there is often a marked contrast in terms of public profile and dialogue in proportion 
to aid quantities. The following chapter on the coordination history of Rwanda 
outlines how certain donors are more likely to make politicised statements about 
Rwanda without necessarily maintaining a large presence in the country nor 
providing high amounts of aid. During fieldwork observations, representatives from 
Switzerland appeared to be very present in joint forums and were often quite vocal, 
despite their limited budget.18 By contrast, the USA – one of Rwanda’s largest 
bilateral donors – does not appear to engage in overt political dialogue with the GoR. 
At the same time, most donors were keen to stress that they undertook behind-
closed-doors dialogue and negotiation with the GoR, a point also mentioned by da 
Camara (2001: 25).  
As far as conditions attached to programmes are concerned, when asked about this 
nearly all bilateral donors stated that they did not attach conditions to their aid. 
Nevertheless, each donor has in place a range of instruments which frame and define 
their relationship with the GoR. These take the form of formal conventions and 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), specific bilateral negotiations, country 
strategy papers and programmes. Table 3.2 above shows that the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK have all signed MoUs with the GoR which are subject to annual 
reviews. This represents a new type of bilateral convention, laying down mutual 
commitments of the partners and outlining progress indicators or ‘benchmarks’ 
against which to assess progress. These benchmarks cover both poverty-oriented 
policies and social and political governance issues. We will consider the UK’s MoU 
in more depth in chapter 7. For 2002 and 2003-2004 independent joint reviews of 
these MoUs were conducted and both joint and country-specific recommendations 
                                                 
18 This point was raised by one GoR informant, who was frustrated about Swiss governance demands 
on aid despite their relatively small aid package (interview, Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 
December 2003).  
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were made (see Steedman and Andenas 2002; Killick, Katumanga and Piron 2005). 
Switzerland is also considering signing an MoU along similar lines and joining the 
joint review process. Belgium and Germany, for their part, negotiate their 
programmes in bilateral discussions. Switzerland has an overarching convention, a 3-
yearly programme framework and a bilateral agreement for each individual project. 
This wide range of systems employed by donors to frame their bilateral relations 
represents a considerable burden for the GoR which has to devote time and resources 
to negotiating individual programmes.  
The application of conditions related to development activities is complex. 
Although an overall country strategy may carry specific conditions, such as GoR 
adherence to good governance or to poverty reduction, actual activities are often 
conditioned in a different way. Belgium provides a good example of this. The overall 
programme is framed by a Convention, and a Country Strategy Paper outlines the 
broad programme framework for bilateral relations. This includes some reference to 
political conditions such as progress on democratisation and regional security. 
Formal bilateral discussions take place to plan programme activities, referred to as a 
Joint Commission (Commission Mixte). Although there was no Joint Commission in 
Rwanda between 1993 and 2004, informal bilateral discussions did take place, with 
the Belgians emphasising their ‘constructive dialogue’ with the GoR around 
governance issues. Actual projects, through which Belgian aid is delivered to 
Rwanda, are somewhat divorced from this political framework. Each project is 
subject to a project agreement which outlines the responsibilities of both partners, 
mainly focused on technical inputs and tangible outcomes. Individual projects are 
subject to joint management and evaluation, with regular meetings taking place 
between partners.  
Budget support is subject to a different set of conditions. As subsequent chapters 
demonstrate, budget support is more political than projects, and tends to require 
high-level policy dialogue, notably around public financial management issues. 
However, given the questions of fungibility and accountability mentioned above, 
budget support is often subject to political conditionality also. 
Before addressing this point, it is worth taking a brief look at the other donor 
agencies in Rwanda which provide budget support, namely the World Bank, the IMF 
and the European Commission (EC). Although our focus is on bilateral donors, it is 
impossible to consider budget support questions (as well as conditionality and 
coordination) without taking these institutions into account. This is particularly 
important because budget support donors like the UK and Sweden draw upon 
analyses of the IMF and World Bank when assessing financial accountability 
parameters. Moreover, these agencies, along with the UNDP, are intimately involved 
in the coordination and harmonisation system, as we shall see in chapter 4. 
Table 3.7 provides an overview of the programmes, aid instruments and 
conditions employed by the EC, the World Bank and the IMF. These programmes 
are crucial to the GoR as they provide large amounts of aid through grants and loans 
to the central budget. Indeed, the EC and World Bank (through the International 
Development Association19) have been two of Rwanda’s most important donors 
                                                 
19 The International Development Association (IDA) is the section of the World Bank which supports 
developing countries through the provision of interest-free loans and grants. (see  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,menuPK:83991~pagePK:1
18644~piPK:51236156~theSitePK:73154,00.html, accessed 23 November 2005) 
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since 1994 (see Appendix 3).20 As table 3.7 indicates, since the late 1990s, these 
agencies have aligned their support around Rwanda’s poverty reduction process. 
They also provide long and short-term technical assistance to the Ministry of 
Finance, line ministries and government agencies. The World Bank in particular has 
undertaken various in-depth analyses of issues in Rwanda, such as on post-conflict 
reconstruction (World Bank 1998b) and education (World Bank 2004).  
Table 3.7: Multilateral Aid to Rwanda 
Donor Aid Instruments and Programmes since 
1994 
Framework and Conditions on Aid 
EC European Development Fund (EDF) 6&7 
(1994-2000, but some projects ongoing to 
2005).  
EDF 8 (2000-2006) 
EDF 9 (2003 to present) 
Regional programmes 
Mixture of budget support, programmes and 
projects 
Earlier programmes on rehabilitation, infrastructure in 
particular. 
Since 2000 support to: poverty reduction; institutional 
support; rural development; justice and governance. 
Indicators taken from PRSP; annual monitoring. Two 
instalments – fixed and floating (triggered by PRS 
Progress Report) 
WB Emergency Credits (1995, 1997); Economic 
Recovery Credit (1999-2001) 
Institutional Reform Credit (2002-2004) 
Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) 
(2004-2006) 
Other programmes: Human Resources; 
Common Development Fund; HIV/AIDS 
Regional programmes (e.g. demobilisation, 
trade) 
Programme framed by Country Assistance Strategies 
(1998 and 2002).  
Shift since 1998 from recovery to poverty reduction support 
PRSC linked to PRSP. 
Triggers for disbursement include macro-economic 
performance and governance, pro-poor budgeting and 
progress on the PRSP (including floating instalments 
linked to annual PRS Progress Report). 
IMF Emergency post-conflict loan (1997) 
ESAF/PRGF (1998-2002) 
PRGF (2002-2005) 
Macro-economic stability and performance; twice-yearly 
review process. Rwanda granted a number of waivers on 
performance criteria in 2004 
 
The EC is quite a different actor to the World Bank and IMF, acting to some 
extent like a discrete bilateral donor. Indeed, the first question posed to me when 
interviewing the head of the EC Delegation in September 2003 was whether I 
considered the EC to be a multilateral or a bilateral donor. It has its own ambassador, 
its own budget and its own programme; it also provides only grants, not loans like 
the World Bank and IMF. It also has a sizeable delegation in Rwanda which has a 
considerable amount of devolved authority. On the other hand, its funds derive from 
a range of other donors (the European Union member states) and decisions about 
funding are subject to a ‘board’ of members as with the World Bank and IMF.21 It 
therefore has the trappings of a multilateral agency, and it is placed in this category 
in this thesis. In contrast to the EC, the IMF and World Bank representations in 
Rwanda are small,22 reliant upon frequent external missions for programme 
preparation, discussion and evaluation, with decision-making power resting in 
                                                 
20 No information is provided in Appendix 3 on IMF support. However, since 1998, the IMF has 
approved two funding arrangements for Rwanda: an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF)/Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) worth $105.3 million (from 1998 to 2002); and a 
PRGF worth around $5.9 million (from 2002 to 2006) (see 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/tad/exfin2.cfm?memberKey1=820, accessed 23 November 2005).  
21 The European Union in its broader manifestation fulfils a number of different roles in Rwanda, 
covering both  technical cooperation and diplomatic activity. The role of the European Union in 
relation to coordination and harmonisation questions is explored in Hayman (2005c). 
22 The African Development Bank (AfDB), while providing important quantities of aid to Rwanda, 
does not have any representation in Rwanda beyond a small project management unit based in the 
Ministry of Finance.  
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Washington. This is a source of some frustration for both the GoR and other donors. 
Problems arising within one project cannot be dealt with swiftly, often affecting the 
entire portfolio, as communication channels tend to be slow. In addition, the 
frequent, often large-scale missions arriving periodically throughout the year require 
both the GoR and other donors to fit in with their timetables.  
In interviews, GoR officials expressed both satisfaction and frustration with 
multilateral aid. On the one hand, multilateral agencies provide more long-term 
predictability in their funding, are willing and able to undertake large investment 
projects, such as in infrastructure, which many small bilateral donors will not 
support, and are less affected by political fluctuations.23 On the other hand, aid from 
multilaterals is subject to burdensome conditions and tends to be hampered by long, 
slow procedures. Bilateral aid is generally seen as more flexible and more directly 
negotiated.  
Returning to conditions attached to budget support, one issue affecting Rwanda is 
the lack of consistent messages coming from budget support donors. Different 
triggers and mechanisms are used by budget support donors for disbursing. The UK, 
for example, provides four quarterly instalments under three-year rolling 
programmes. Sweden’s allocation is decided annually and provided in one payment 
in the first half of the year. The EC provides two instalments over the year – one 
fixed and one floating. These have often been subject to administrative delays, 
sometimes disbursed on the 31st of December of a given year, leading to considerable 
criticism from the GoR. The World Bank’s support revolves around the new Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) mechanism for which the first disbursement was 
approved in October 2004. Although the criteria for disbursement differ from donor 
to donor, there has been a strong element of cross-conditionality with regard to 
macro-economic performance. The existence of an IMF agreement signed between 
the IMF and the GoR has been a necessary condition for most budget support 
donors.24 This has often caused problems, as in 2003 and 2004 when Rwanda faced 
difficulties in reaching an agreement with the IMF. Both the EC and the UK have 
demonstrated signs of moving away from cross-conditionality, allowing them to 
disburse funds on the basis of a positive assessment by the IMF even if a full 
agreement has not been reached. Another common trigger for disbursement amongst 
these donors is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Progress Report (PRS-PR), e.g. for 
Sweden, the EC and the World Bank. Delays in producing this report in 2004 
hampered disbursements.  
In addition to these technical conditions, political conditionality is also very 
important, particularly for the UK and Sweden, and less so for the EC. Officially, the 
World Bank and IMF do not use political conditionality so funds are never explicitly 
withheld for political reasons. However, there is often an implicit link between 
macro-economic performance and governance questions. In 2003, for example, the 
GoR’s overspent on its budget, put down to the election process and to money being 
                                                 
23 The multilateral agencies, including the EC (but with the noteworthy exception of the United 
Nations as a system, although individual UN agencies seem less affected), do not come under the 
same pressure as bilateral donors over their history in Rwanda before the genocide and any role they 
may have played during the genocide. There is rarely any mention made by GoR officials of the past 
support of these agencies for Rwanda in sharp contrast to several bilateral donors, despite studies 
highlighting how multilateral aid may have helped fuel the civil war and genocide (see for example 
Andersen (2000); Storey (2001)).  
24 Minutes of the Budget Support Harmonisation Group, 17 December 2003. 
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channelled into a large hotel project, which contributed to the GoR going off-track 
with the IMF (IMF 2004: 10). Both Sweden and the UK, on the other hand, have 
explicit benchmarks in their MoUs regarding political progress, civil society, human 
rights and Rwanda’s regional relations. In 2004, Rwanda’s belligerent tone towards 
the DRC and its alleged incursions into DRC territory were one reason why UK and 
Swedish budget support instalments were disbursed late in 2004 and early 2005. The 
message being sent to the GoR through this delay was undermined to some extent, 
however, by the continued disbursement of aid from both the World Bank and EC.  
Another major factor with regard to budget support is the extent to which donors 
using this instrument should be involved in national budget policy. In 2004 there was 
considerable debate around the desire expressed by budget support donors to have 
more involvement in the preparation of the budget. The EC and UK were frustrated 
that the World Bank seemed to have more privileged access to the Ministry of 
Finance (Minecofin) on budget issues despite providing fewer resources. This led to 
demands for Minecofin to consult donors more before submitting the budget to 
Parliament, evoking strong reactions from the GoR.25 We will return to this in the 





The introductory paragraphs on support for Rwanda on the Swiss and UK 
websites provide a very contrasting picture:  
At the end of 2004, Switzerland decided to extend for another four years (2005-
2008) a special cooperation programme with Rwanda even though the country 
does not meet certain criteria for regular bilateral development cooperation. 
These criteria relate to political conditionality principles notably in human 
rights, democratization and relations with neighbouring countries. (SDC 
website, November 2005)26  
Rwanda has made extraordinary progress since the 1994 genocide… The 
country is at peace, the economy is stable and growing at over 6% and a 
Poverty Reduction Strategy focused on the Millennium Development Goals has 
been agreed. Access to quality education and health services is increasing 
rapidly and the incidence of poverty is declining… DFID is Rwanda’s largest 
bilateral partner with a programme of some £46 million in 2004/05, two-thirds 
of which is provided as budget support. (DFID website, November 2005)27 
These two quotes capture two very different perspectives on support to Rwanda, and 
provide insight into the challenges facing the GoR in dealing with donors. Since the 
adoption of the PRSP in 2002, a general consensus has been reached amongst 
bilateral donors and multilateral agencies on the need to support Rwanda’s poverty 
reduction strategy in a more coherent fashion. However, this chapter has 
demonstrated the range of variations amongst just some of Rwanda’s donors. 
Although the rationale for supporting Rwanda is increasingly expressed in terms of 
                                                 
25 Observations from World Bank meeting on the PRSC, 5 October 2004. Interviews: Secretary-
General of Minecofin, 4 May 2004; EC official, 29 April 2004. 
26 http://www.sdc.admin.ch/countrydoc.php?userhash=35782872&l=e&navID=117 (accessed 23 
November 2005)  
27 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/rwanda.asp (accessed 23 November 2005) 
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assisting poverty reduction and attaining the MDGs, for many donors historical 
relations or a response to the genocide provide the background to their involvement.  
The comprehensive, comparative analysis of OECD donors conducted by Baaré et 
al. in 1999 captured emerging trends between ‘new’ and ‘traditional’ donors. 
However, this analysis needs to be revisited. ‘New’ donors such as the Netherlands 
have demonstrated serious concerns about engaging in Rwanda, and Norway and 
Ireland have pulled back completely. Even the UK, one of Rwanda’s most staunch 
supporters, is demonstrating growing concerns about governance, and this is now 
impacting upon its budget support programme. At the same time, a number of 
Rwanda’s ‘traditional’ donors are showing signs of re-engaging after years of 
fluctuating support. This reflects personal commitments, political priorities and 
strategic interests.  
The differences amongst donors cover a huge number of areas, including 
institutional systems, accountability mechanisms, aid instruments and country set-
ups. While many of the choices made by donors are determined by political 
perspectives on the GoR and Rwanda more generally, this should not be exaggerated. 
Choices about increased budgets, particular aid instruments or sectors to support may 
be determined by Rwanda-specific factors, but they may also point to broader trends 
within the wider programme of that particular donor. Debates about budget support 
are illustrative of this. While a donor like the Netherlands is constrained from 
providing budget support by the specific political environment in Rwanda, others, 
such as Germany or the USA, tend to be reluctant to provide budget support 
anywhere. Consequently, the choice of instrument is not necessarily determined by 
Rwandan circumstances but may reflect changes on the domestic front of a political 
and technical nature, aid philosophy and sectoral interests. This chapter demonstrates 
that each donor has a very particular way of working, channelling funds in ways 
deemed most pertinent and efficient, through existing networks in what are its own 
priority areas. These issues will be revisited in more depth when we come to analyse 
the cases of Belgium and the UK in chapter 7.  
As the logic of assisting a country emerging from crisis gave way to one of 
supporting one of the world’s poorest countries to implement a poverty reduction 
strategy, debates around aid have surfaced in Rwanda which resonate strongly with 
the global aid agenda. There have been transformations over the last five years in the 
ways donors work, with several donors providing budget support and more and more 
donors applying sectoral approaches in tune with the GoR’s own programme. 
Although projects continue to be the most common instrument, project management 
systems are changing with increased government-to-government dialogue. Despite 
their differences, donors are seeking to improve the effectiveness of aid through 
enhanced coordination and harmonisation of policies and procedures, as highlighted 
in the citation from the GoR-donor meeting of 2002 given in the introduction to this 
chapter. 
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From Global to Local Frameworks: Coordination, 





Despite the diversity in the aid policy and practice of donors in Rwanda, a great 
deal of collaboration is evident on the ground amongst these agencies but also with 
broader aid actors, including the GoR, multilateral agencies and civil society. This 
chapter considers how the new principles on coordination, harmonisation and 
alignment are translated into practice through an exploration of the different 
mechanisms for improving aid coordination at various technical levels. This provides 
considerable insight into the reality of applying the new aid principles in a country 
like Rwanda, highlighting issues such as ownership of the coordination process, the 
administrative burden on both the GoR and donors of coordination and questions of 
capacity. It also highlights where there are differences in terms of donor engagement 
and perspectives.  
The data draw primarily on first-hand observations and interviews conducted in 
Rwanda between September 2003 and October 2004, as well as minutes of meetings 
and documentation from 2002 to 2004. By this time, aid effectiveness was high on 
the international aid agenda following the Monterrey Consensus and the Rome 
Declaration. By the end of the fieldwork period, preparations were underway for the 
Paris Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in March 2005, placing pressure on aid 
agencies to demonstrate progress in this domain. This period in Rwanda therefore 
saw considerable debates around aid coordination – what it meant in practice, who 
should be leading, and the role of different aid instruments and actors. The first part 
of the chapter describes the coordination framework in Rwanda as observed in 2003-
2004; we then go on to analyse several of the issues arising, focusing on the 
harmonisation of budget support and different perspectives on coordination. 
 
 
The Aid Coordination Architecture in Rwanda: An Overview  
 
In 2004, a complex web of inter-related committees and coordination groups 
framed the aid system in Rwanda (see figure 4.1). This consists of three main levels, 
each of which involves a range of internal and external actors and serve specific 
purposes. The Development Partners Meeting (DPM) represents the highest level of 
interaction between the GoR and donors. This has its roots in the Round Tables 
organised by the UNDP in the aftermath of the genocide, as well as a series of 
meetings, held in Europe in 1997, 1998 and 1999, which brought the GoR and 
donors together to debate increased direct support for the GoR. In 2000 the first of 
these was held in Rwanda, and it has subsequently become an annual event, with the 
exception of 2003 when the election process disrupted its preparation. We will 
explore the history of these meetings in chapter 5.  
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Figure 4.1 Aid Coordination Architecture in Rwanda in 2004 


































* CEPEX: Central Bureau for Public Investments and External Funding (Minecofin) 
** SPPMD: Strategic Planning and Poverty Monitoring Department (Minecofin) 
 
The DPM is essentially a diplomatic instrument, bringing together senior officials 
from donors countries - cooperation and foreign ministers and senior civil servants 
responsible for Africa from agency headquarters, as well as country-based 
ambassadors and heads of cooperation - with the highest authorities in Rwanda, 
represented by either the President or the Prime Minister and chaired by the Minister 
of Finance. Having grown out of the pledging meetings of the Round Table, it has 
always had both a technical and political side. It is a chance for the GoR to present 
its development programme to donors, to showcase progress and solicit pledges of 
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aired. The DPM often includes donors who do not have an official bilateral presence 
in Rwanda, but who support it through multilateral institutions and NGOs, such as 
Austria, Denmark, Egypt, Ireland, Italy, Norway and South Africa. These meetings 
are also attended by international and local NGOs and representatives of Rwanda’s 
productive sector where appropriate. For example, the December 2004 DPM focused 
on raising support for the water and energy sectors and so involved representatives of 
Rwandan public and private enterprises active in this domain. 
The importance placed by different bilateral donors on participating in these 
annual partnership talks has changed over the years. In 1995 and 1996 a number of 
ministers of development cooperation attended the Round Table meetings, such as 
from Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands in January 1995, often accompanied by 
large delegations. In contrast, the senior official from the UK at the Round Tables 
was the East Africa regional officer. However, at the London meeting in July 1999 
many DFID officials were present and the meeting was chaired by the British 
Secretary of State for International Development. By the DPM of December 2004 in 
Kigali, there were no senior donor officials present beyond ambassadors to Rwanda 
and a few civil servant representatives from headquarters.1  
The second level – operational/management – consists of the Development 
Partners Coordination Group (DPCG) which acts as an in-country forum for policy 
dialogue and information exchange on technical matters and partner activities. The 
DPCG was set up immediately after the DPM of November 2002, holding its first 
meeting on 18 November 2002. When it was established its primary objective was to 
discuss feedback from ‘cluster’ leaders on sector activity and matters of common 
concern. The ‘cluster’ system was proposed in 2002 as a way of improving 
coordination around sectoral priorities of the PRSP (Minecofin 2002a), as we shall 
see below. Participants to the DPCG include donor heads of cooperation, 
ambassadors or senior embassy or cooperation programme staff.2 This group met 
every two months at first, then monthly from October 2003. These meetings are 
regularly attended by nearly all the main OECD bilateral donors, as well as 
representatives from many of the United Nations agencies present in Rwanda. The 
World Bank and IMF attend less frequently, and on the bilateral side the French have 
only appeared rarely.3 A major issue throughout the first year of its existence was 
whether the DPCG should involve just donor representatives in order to allow donors 
to thrash out particular issues before presenting them to the GoR. However, by 
March 2004 the DPCG had come to be co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator 
and the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance (Minecofin). Over time, 
feedback on cluster progress and debates about coordination in Rwanda have come 
to be overshadowed by information-sharing on a wide range of topical issues of 
mutual interest, such as the election process in 2003, NEPAD and the African Peer 
Review Mechanism throughout 2004, and the Development Partners Meeting and the 
                                                 
1 This cannot be attributed to a lack of importance placed by senior officials on attending this meeting 
alone; the frequent date changes in the months preceding this event may have impacted on the 
availability of senior officials. 
2 Some donors, such as Belgium and Germany, tend to be represented at the DPCG by the 
ambassador. Others, such as the UK, are represented by senior cooperation staff. This may be down to 
DFID having more senior programme staff in country than other donors, who are stretched more 
thinly. However, this may also be indicative of a difference in whether the DPCG is considered to 
serve more of a technical or diplomatic role.  
3 Participant lists from 12 out of 17 DPCG meetings held in 2003 and 2004.  
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Great Lakes Conference in 2004. The DPCG also provides a forum for information 
exchange and debate on donor activities, such as joint reviews, evaluation missions, 
consultancies and studies.4  
Answering to the DPCG – the technical level – are two technical working groups, 
the Budget Support Harmonisation Group (BSHG) and the Harmonisation and 
Alignment in Rwanda of Projects and Programmes (HARPP) group, and the sectoral 
‘clusters’. The BSHG started out as a separate body called the Rwanda 
Harmonisation and Alignment Initiative (RHAI). This was initiated by a number of 
agencies5 in response to GoR requests for donors to increase “alignment of their 
assistance in support of Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy and achieve greater 
harmonisation of their practices and procedures” (RHAI 2003: 1) and linked to 
recommendations made by the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA), which had 
undertaken an analysis of coordination issues in Rwanda in October 2002 (SPA 
2002b). In November 2003, the RHAI adopted a ‘Partnership Framework for 
Harmonisation and Alignment of Budget Support’. At this point the RHAI was 
transformed into the BSHG with the purpose of overseeing the implementation of the 
Framework under the aegis of the DPCG. We will return to this below. 
Largely as a response to this initiative, the HARPP was established in June 2004, 
foreseen as a “technical and procedural working group for project support donors” 
under the DPCG.6 This initiative was primarily aimed at project donors, but it was 
swiftly realised that budget support donors should also be involved, given that most 
of these were also undertaking projects and that it was impossible to draw a clear 
dividing line between projects and programmes. The aim was to create a space for 
concrete discussion on the practicalities of coordination for which there was limited 
scope within DPCG meetings.7 The overarching objective was to reduce transaction 
costs for both the GoR and donors throughout the project cycle (design, 
implementation and evaluation), and to explore the possibilities of establishing 
basket funds, aligning projects with the GoR budget calendar and GoR priorities, and 
developing common recruitment principles. Small working groups were established 
to look at these various issues.8 HARPP meetings are attended mainly by technical 
and donor advisory or programme staff – with Rwandan counterparts rarely present 
despite being invited – creating an informal atmosphere of open discussion. During 
2004, the main actions of the HARPP were to establish terms of reference and to 
draft a partnership framework for the harmonisation of projects and programmes, 
laying down partnership principles and progress indicators.  
The ‘clusters’ constitute the main instrument of technical coordination in Rwanda. 
The system as originally foreseen involved eight cluster groups, each with a lead 
donor and a lead line ministry (see table 4.1). The role of the clusters was to support 
the sectoral planning process of GoR ministries, facilitate the debate around 
harmonisation and advise the GoR, while also coordinating amongst donors to avoid 
duplication.9 Terms of reference for the clusters were presented in November 2002 
                                                 
4 Source: minutes of DPCG meetings from 2003 and 2004. 
5 The RHAI was chaired by the UK and the European Commission (EC) and included representatives 
of Belgium, Canada, France, IMF, the Netherlands, UNDP, Sweden and the World Bank.  
6 Minutes of DPCG meeting, 3 June 2004.  
7 Minutes of HARPP meeting, 24 September 2004. 
8 Minutes of HARPP meeting, 1 June 2004. 
9 Although the clusters are presented as something of a new idea in the literature around this time, 
there is a historical precedent in Rwanda to these, namely the thematic groups established during the 
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which outlined specific tasks for lead ministries and donors, with the ministry side 
responsible for ensuring sector-wide consultation, information dissemination and 
guarding against duplication and overlap, while the donor side was responsible for 
coordinating donor interventions and interests and presenting them to the GoR, as 
well as advising the ministry on sector strategies.10 
 
Table 4.1 ‘Clusters’ Groups identified in 2002  




Ministries of: Agriculture, Land, 






Ministries of: Infrastructure, 





Social Sector Ministries of: Education, Health, 
Gender, Youth, Local Affairs, 







Ministries of: Public Services, 
Education, Local Affairs, Gender  











Governance Ministries of: Local Affairs, Internal 
Affairs, Gender, Justice, Foreign 
Affairs, Defence, Gender, National 
Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 
National Commission on Human 
Rights, National Electoral 
Commission, Constitutional 
Commission 







Ministries of: Local Affairs, Public 
Services, Land, Agriculture, 
Infrastructure, Gender 
Ministry of Local 
Affairs 
Netherlands 
HIV/AIDS Ministries of: Health, Education, 
National HIV/AIDS Commission, 
Youth, Local Affairs, Gender, Defence  
Ministry of Health USAID 
Source: Adapted from PRSP Progress Review 2003 (Minecofin 2003b: 22-23) 
 
In addition to this system, it is worth mentioning a number of ad-hoc initiatives 
which fall loosely under the ‘coordination’ rubric, but do not constitute a part of the 
framework outlined in figure 4.1. Firstly, the European Commission (EC) hosts two 
                                                                                                                                          
Round Table process in areas like education, food security, population, justice, child rights and private 
sector development. These involved representatives from the GoR, civil society, NGOs and donors 
and were supported by the UN. Some groups, such as education, child rights and justice, were more 
active than others (UNDP 1998:33). Some thematic groups were apparently involved in preparing 
aspects of the PRSP (interviews: UNDP official, 16 April 2004; Oxfam Rwanda, 28 November 2003). 
Moreover, this concept dates back at least 20 years. Cassen (1994: 182) mentions sector sub-
committees being set up in Kenya in the 1980s involving donors and chaired by Government “to 
harmonize aid and government activities.” Whittington and Calhoun (1988) also mention calls for 
forming sectoral ‘sub-groups’ in Sudan in 1983 involving Government and donors to monitor 
implementation of the economic recovery programme. 
10 ‘Terms of Reference for Sector Facilitation Ministries and Lead Donor Agency’. Presentation to the 
Third Partnership Talks, Kigali November 2002. 
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regular meetings: a weekly meeting of the heads of mission of the European Union 
(EU) member states which addresses diplomatic issues; and a monthly meeting of 
EU heads of cooperation which discusses coordination issues and the EC 
development programme in Rwanda (Hayman 2005c). As an umbrella for member 
states, the EU has on occasion undertaken joint démarches and produced joint 
statements, for example in response to Rwanda’s Parliamentary report on genocide 
ideology in August 2004 (EU 2004). A joint statement was also presented at the 
December 2004 DPM by the Ambassador of the Netherlands representing the EU 
Presidency of the time. Secondly, a number of donors publicly present portfolio 
reviews of their projects and programmes, for example the EC and African 
Development Bank (AfDB) in 2004, to which other interested donors and civil 
society representatives are invited. Although these do not constitute coordination 
activities per se they do allow a public exchange of information about donor 
activities. Along similar lines, the regular workshops and seminars at which GoR 
policy papers and reports are discussed, to which donors and NGOs are invited, 
facilitate the coordination of activities and debate between actors. One example of 
this was the meeting organised to launch the Poverty Reduction Strategy Progress 
Report process in April 2004. Finally, a number of embassy officials come together 
to discuss the small project grant programmes run by many embassies which are 
separate from their official development cooperation programmes.11  
However, although this system appears coherent and well structured, and much 
progress has been made since 2002, a large number of issues remained unresolved at 
the time this research was conducted. Questions abounded about responsibility, 
participation, accountability, capacity, control and ownership, not just between the 
GoR and donors, but also amongst donors. There were also very different 
perspectives on coordination. In order to provide an insight into the realities of 
coordination, we look first at the clusters in practice before considering issues 
specific to the harmonisation of budget support.  
 
 
Coordination in Practice: The Clusters 
 
While there was initial enthusiasm for the cluster system following its 
establishment, beyond an initial flurry of meetings in December 2002 and January 
2003 the clusters were generally slow to get off the mark. Little real progress was 
made until 2004, when new dynamism was pumped into the system. Several factors 
explain this. The cluster system is intimately connected to the PRSP. A Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Progress Report (PRS-PR) is prepared annually to monitor the 
implementation of the PRSP. As we saw in the previous chapter, for some donors, 
such as the EC and World Bank, the information in this document is a necessary 
trigger for the disbursement of funding. The PRS-PR outlines progress made in 
priority areas of the PRSP, e.g. in the rural development and social sectors and on 
macro-economic stability. At the DPM of 2002 it had been recognised that, having 
adopted a sound PRSP, the GoR now had to translate this into sound sector plans. By 
2003, a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) had been adopted in the education sector 
and the concept was to be replicated across the administration. For this the Strategic 
                                                 
11 Interview, US Embassy official, 6 October 2004.  
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Planning and Poverty Monitoring Department (SPPMD) of Minecofin produced a set 
of ‘Guidelines for the development of sector strategies and decentralised plans’, 
subtitled ‘From the project approach 2003 to the sector approach 2020’ (Minecofin 
2003a).12 Sector strategies were to be drafted with teams of ministries plus all major 
actors in the sector, including donors, decentralised authorities, the private sector and 
NGOs.  
In January 2004 a retreat was held for Government ministers and senior ministry 
staff where pressure was applied from the highest authority on ministries to develop 
sector strategies. This was presented as important to putting into action the GoR 7-
Year programme adopted after the elections in 2003 and to demonstrating to the 
people that the GoR was fulfilling its promises. The message emerging from this 
retreat was for ministries ‘to be results-oriented, to act quickly and efficiently, and to 
improve communication’ leading to a whole new dynamism.13 But these strategies 
also represented a way of demonstrating progress in implementing the PRSP to 
donors. Consequently, the preparation of sector strategies and corresponding chapters 
for the PRS-PR became a central activity of clusters in 2004, often with input from 
the private sector and civil society.14 Indeed, sector strategies were expected to be 
officially ‘validated’ by the clusters, and the GoR was keen to have as many sector 
strategies as possible validated before the PRS-PR was finalised.  
An additional factor behind the drive to produce sector strategies was access to 
the latest World Bank funding mechanism, the Poverty Reduction Support Credit 
(PRSC). This was targeted at four priority sectors in Rwanda: education, health, 
water/sanitation and energy. From the outset there was confusion about the links 
between the PRSC and the PRSP. In theory the PRSC programme should have drawn 
from the PRSP sector strategies, and indeed sector strategies were a prerequisite for 
the PRSC. However, given the weakness of these (with the exception of the 
education sector), the World Bank became heavily involved in preparing the 
strategies itself. This was in part driven by the desire of the World Bank to put 
Rwanda’s PRSC programme before the Board in June 2004, resulting in considerable 
pressure to move quickly. Although other donors were invited to participate in this 
process, there was concern that this was an agenda driven by the World Bank, where 
GoR ownership risked being supplanted in the interests of getting the funds as 
quickly as possible. The preparation of these documents required a number of 
meetings, substantial technical assistance, input from a range of stakeholders, and 
large missions to Rwanda, all adding new workloads. There were additional concerns 
that this would be ongoing, given that 2005 would see not only a review of the 
existing PRSC sectors but also preparation of new ones. The European Commission 
was particularly vocal on this issue, pointing out the dangers of undermining both 
ownership and the nascent harmonisation system if the PRSC failed to be sufficiently 
                                                 
12 This document is written back-to-back in French and English, not Kinyarwanda.  
13 Interview, Director of SPPMD, Minecofin, 17 March 2004. 
14 The finalisation of the 2004 PRS-PR took over six months partly due to criticism that the previous 
year’s Report had been prepared in a hurry with insufficient participation of non-state actors. The 
2004 Report process was launched with an official meeting in April 2004 bringing together a wide 
range of politicians, central ministry officials, local government officials, donors and civil society 
representatives to organise sector drafting teams to work on different chapters of the report. The final 
version of the Report was published in October 2004. 
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sensitive to emerging processes in Rwanda in the interests of practical expediency 
and time pressures.15  
By October 2004 the Minister of Finance was pressuring line ministries about 
delays in their sector strategies, pointing out how it could lead to the GoR missing 
the World Bank target, demanding progress reports and offering support if ministries 
felt they did not have the capacity.16 At the same time, the drive cannot only be 
attributed to access to resources under the PRSC, given that cluster activity was 
happening in non-priority sectors where the existence of a sector strategy was less 
important to funding, such as justice.  
The new dynamism in 2004 also derived from the appointment of a coordination 
specialist within the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (UNRCO), who sought to 
bring some structure to aid coordination in Rwanda and to bolster GoR capacity to 
take greater control of the process (Smirl 2004). This position was funded jointly by 
donors such as the UK, Switzerland, Canada and Sweden. Throughout 2004, this 
coordination specialist, in collaboration with officials in CEPEX, the Ministry of 
Finance and the donor community, provided the impetus for a variety of initiatives to 
improve coordination in Rwanda.  
Table 4.1 above describes the clusters as originally foreseen; table 4.2 outlines 
what actually happened in practice up to the end of 2004. This shows quite a 
different scenario. Only a few groups have met regularly since 2003, notably the 
private sector and HIV/AIDS clusters led by USAID and the education cluster led by 
DFID. The infrastructure and human resources clusters have never met at all. Other 
groups, such as health and decentralisation saw some initial activity, then petered out 
until mid 2004 when new life was breathed into them. The main point that emerges 
from this table, however, is the complexity of this division into sectors with clear 
areas of overlap between some clusters, such as health and HIV/AIDS; private sector 
and rural development; rural development and decentralisation; and capacity building 
and the social sector. Moreover, some of the clusters cover a huge amount of cross-
cutting territory, notably the governance cluster but also the social sector and rural 
development clusters. While the social sector breaks down relatively simply into 
health and education, the rural development and governance clusters have proved 
much more difficult. Minutes of DPCG meetings of January and May 2003 highlight 
confusion about who should be the lead on both the donor and GoR side for rural 
public works.17 This officially comes under the Ministry of Local Affairs but 
overlaps strongly with the broader rural development strategy for which the Ministry 
of Agriculture is responsible with various donors providing support on particular 
elements (e.g. Germany on youth and rural development; the AfDB on water and 
natural resources; UNECA on energy; Sweden on rural electrification).  
                                                 
15 Letters from the European Commission to World Bank (March 2004), and to the Minister of 
Finance (April 2004).  
16 Interview, CEPEX official, 14 October 2004.  
17 The High Intensity Labour Local Development Programme (known by its French acronym PDL-
HIMO) aims at undertaking development activities such as road-building and conservation projects. 
Local people are paid for their labour on these projects, thus making use of Rwanda’s human capital 
in the interests of development while injecting cash into the local economy (Ntagara 2003).  
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Table 4.2 Cluster Activity up to December 2004 




EC & Minagri Dec 2002; March 2004.  Concerns from outset about overlap with other clusters, notably private sector (e.g. credit), 
decentralisation and demobilisation. Little action and rural sector strategy considered to be 
weak.  
Agriculture, rural 
development, land and 
environment Rural 
Development 
World Bank & 
Minagri 
‘Rural sector’ meeting held to 
prepare a paper for the 2004 DPM  
In late 2004, the World Bank agreed to take on rural development. 
Infrastructure & ICT  EC & Mininfra Has never met  EC agreed to take it on in late 2004. 
Education  DFID & Mineduc  Regular meetings since 2001. Held 
two retreats; joint reviews 2003, 
2004, 2005.  
Considered model sector. Active in terms of joint reviews and retreats. Meetings in 2004 as the 
Education Development Partners Group, but not involving Mineduc, although aim is for 
Mineduc to assume leadership.  
Social Sector 
Health  Belgium & 
Minisante 
 
Task Force met December 2002; 
dormant until September 2004. 
Confusion over leadership between USA and Belgium while it was dormant. Revitalised with 
new Belgian staff and German interest. By late 2004 Terms of Reference being prepared and 
some input to health sector strategic plan.  




UNDP & Mifotra Has never met Brought up in both 2003 and 2004 at DPCG meetings that its role is not clear and there is no 
representation.  
Private Sector, Industry Private Sector USAID and 
Minicom 
Regular meetings since January 
2003.   
Reports back at most DPCG meetings; mainly acts as a forum for information sharing on 
activities and runs thematic discussions (e.g. agriculture, tourism).  
Governance  UNDP & Minaloc  
 
Meetings of full cluster in March, 
September, October 2004.  
 
Decided in October 2004 that the ‘governance’ cluster should be a platform for political 
dialogue and sub-clusters for technical dialogue. Broken down into sub-clusters: Public Sector 
Reform, Decentralisation, CDF; Justice; Economic Governance; Media and Civil Society.  
Election (Task 
Force) 
UNDP May and July 2003 Support to electoral commission and civil society in 2003 through a basket fund involving 







Several meetings in 2004.  Not originally part of cluster system, but now considered a justice sub-cluster. Also have 








May and September 2003; then 
September 2004   
Confusion over CDF/Decentralisation as separate cluster or as sub-cluster of Governance; 
overlaps with rural development. Decision late 2004 to divide into support for CDF (led by 
Netherlands) and support for Minaloc (led by UNDP).  
HIV/AIDS HIV/Aids USAID & 
Minisante 
Regular meetings; reports back at 
most DPCG meetings.  
Under UN at first, then taken over by USAID in April 2003. Concerns about overlap with health 
cluster. Considered ‘showcase’ example with pilot study being undertaken end 2004.    
* Acronyms: Minagri (Ministry of Agriculture); Mininfra (Ministry of Infrastructure); Mifotra (Ministry of Public Services & Labour); Minicom (Ministry of Commerce); 
Minaloc (Ministry of Local Affairs); Minisante (Ministry of Health); Mineduc (Ministry of Education); CDF (Common Development Fund) 
** The information in this column stems from minutes of meetings available and mentioned in other forums. It is possible that other meetings have taken place, so this should be 
read as illustrative only.  
Sources: DPCG meeting minutes 2003 and 2004; minutes of Cluster meetings 2003 and 2004; Smirl (2004). 
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In 2004 it was finally decided to break the governance cluster down into four 
sub-clusters:  
- public sector reform, decentralisation, Common Development Fund (CDF) 
(Netherlands and the Ministry of Local Affairs);  
- Justice (Belgium and the Ministry of Justice/Supreme Court, but possibly 
being taken on by UNDP);18 
- Economic Governance (DFID/USAID and CEPEX, but again possibly DFID 
and UNDP);19  
- Media and Civil Society (DFID and the Ministry of Local Affairs).  
Further confusion arises from this, however, as Decentralisation/CDF already 
officially forms a separate cluster. Moreover, by late 2004 there appeared to have 
been a further split of this cluster into support for the CDF led by the Netherlands, 
and support for the Ministry of Local Affairs led by UNDP.20 In addition, there exist 
various sub-groups covering the justice sector; Belgium coordinates a group of 
donors supporting the gacaca system21 and the Netherlands coordinates donors in 
support of the Supreme Court on an ad-hoc basis. Ad-hoc ‘task forces’ have also 
been established, such as on the elections in 2003. 
While table 4.1 above implies that each cluster involves a large number of GoR 
institutions, with one facilitating ministry and donor appointed, cluster meetings in 
practice have been constituted of several donors involved in the sector, led by the 
lead donor and involving at best one or two GoR representatives. As we shall see 
below, there is no evidence about cluster meetings bringing together all the GoR 
actors listed.  
Beyond this question of complexity and overlap, a core problem for the clusters 
has been their form and remit. Although terms of reference were agreed upon in 
2002, DPCG minutes indicate that the actual role of clusters was never fully 
clarified, particularly with regard to policy input. Indeed, it was decided early on that 
each cluster should develop its own working methods. This resulted in those clusters 
that were actually functioning working too vertically, without sufficient reflection on 
cross-cutting issues (Smirl 2004). As the following intervention demonstrates, a 
more formal arrangement was required:  
there was still [a] need to operationalise the cluster system but so far that had 
been impossible because there were no clear operational guidelines or 
structures.22  
As a response to this, towards the end of 2004 most of the cluster meetings had the 
adoption of terms of reference on their agendas. This was all the more necessary 
given that, at least at first, there were different views between and within the GoR 
and donors about the remit of the clusters. In 2003 the GoR saw clusters as a forum 
for developing sector strategies and for coordinating planning and resources. Donors, 
on the other hand, saw clusters more as an instrument for harmonizing procedures 
                                                 
18 Interview, Deputy Resident Coordinator, UNDP, 22 September 2004. 
19 Interview, Deputy Resident Coordinator, UNDP, 22 September 2004. 
20 Minutes of DPCG meeting, 8 November 2004. 
21 The gacaca are popular tribunals for trying lesser crimes of genocide, drawing on a traditional 
Rwandan justice system (see Uvin (2001b) and Karekezi (2004)).  
22 Intervention of Director of SPPMD, Ministry of Finance, Minutes of DPCG meeting of 6 May 
2004. 
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(Niloy 2003).23 A year later, the GoR seemed to have shifted position slightly, seeing 
clusters less for sector strategy development but more for coordinating 
implementation once the strategy was in place; for their part, in 2004, donors had 
adopted the former GoR position of seeing clusters as sounding boards for sector 
strategies (Smirl 2004). Often, however, the clusters have been little more than 
forums for exchanging information, rather than tackling serious problems and 
activities.  
Another issue is the leadership of clusters on the donor side. While there have 
been obvious leaders for several sectors, such as education and HIV/AIDS where one 
bilateral donor is dominant (UK and USA respectively), others have been more 
problematic:  
Two donors had not yet been identified for the health and Human resource and 
capacity building sectors. The Government was still waiting for confirmation 
from either USAID or Belgium on whether they would facilitate the health 
sector, while Sida, which had been nominated to lead the human resource 
sector, lacked the capacity. The Government requested either the World Bank or 
UNDP to lead this sector and was still waiting for confirmation from either of 
them.24  
There has also been some ‘trading’, for example between the EC and World Bank 
over coordination of the PRS-PR chapter in the rural development and agriculture 
sector. This raises a number of questions about why donors take on leadership of 
particular sectors; whether it reflects their comparative advantage in the sector, 
particular political interest or in response to GoR requests. The gaps in sectors 
considered particularly problematic, such as rural development, or where there is no 
clear donor leader appear to have resulted in some sectors being neglected. 
Moreover, one informant spoke about rivalry amongst donors to work in areas that 
are more interesting or ‘trendy’.25  
 
Education and Health: clusters in action 
The education and health clusters, two of the priority sectors of the PRSP, provide 
examples of clusters in practice. They are nevertheless very different in terms of the 
policy environment and donor engagement.  
The education sector is upheld as an example in Rwanda of good donor-GoR 
practice. An Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) was adopted in 2003, joint 
reviews have been held annually since 2003, and two donor retreats have been 
organised to debate coordination issues. The education sector in Rwanda is strongly 
supported by DFID which has provided a considerable number of long- and short-
term technical advisors since the late 1990s, using a programme approach to develop 
institutional capacity within the Ministry of Education. The extent of DFID’s 
engagement made it an obvious donor leader for the education cluster. There are, 
however, a number of donors providing support for education, mostly as discrete 
projects in particular sub-sectors (Hayman 2005b: 22). While there is good dialogue 
between the Ministry, DFID, UNICEF and the World Bank, some of the smaller 
bilateral donors in this sector, such as Germany, Belgium and France, have been less 
                                                 
23 Minutes of DPCG meetings, 27 March 2003 and 30 October 2003; Niloy (2003). 
24 Minutes of DPCG meeting, 6 May 2004. 
25 Interview, senior official, Ministry of Finance, 24 September 2004. 
 76 
involved in coordination activities and indeed sometimes feel excluded from 
discussions and joint review activities.26 There is no evidence to suggest that regular 
‘cluster’ meetings have taken place since 2001, although monthly meetings were 
taking place in mid 2004, and there have been no consistent reports back to the 
DPCG on activities.27 There seems to be some dialogue between TA of different 
donors located within the Ministry, e.g. between British and French TA involved in 
curriculum development, but limited cross-agency dialogue on different donor 
projects. Indeed, coordination and alignment in the education sector appears to 
revolve around a core group of donors with a particular approach to aid, raising 
questions about the scope of real dialogue on alternative perspectives.28  
A core objective of coordination in the education sector is to align support around 
the ESSP. Although this policy paper is the outcome of joint work between the 
Ministry of Education and DFID, with other donors consulted, there are questions 
about the real depth of commitment to it. It has been largely driven by the UK which 
itself focuses on particular priorities within education, notably basic education and 
teacher training; and there are signs that donors are willing to offer and, more 
importantly, the Ministry is willing to accept support outside of the core priorities of 
the ESSP framework, often to the frustration of UK officials.  
In the health sector, until mid-2004 there was no donor taking a clear lead, 
although Belgium had apparently fulfilled this role previously29 and had committed 
itself to it, this being the main area of Belgian activity:  
[G]iven its implication in the health sector, Belgium intends to play the role of 
coordinator and facilitator, at the request of donors and the Rwandan 
authorities. (DGCD 2002: 31, translated from French)  
However, as we saw above, there had been discussion about whether the USA should 
take on this role. The main donors in this sector are Belgium, the USA and Germany, 
each of which carries out projects in specific areas of the health sector. For example, 
Belgium provides institutional support to the Ministry of Health, to the Central 
Hospital in Kigali, to certain health districts and for malaria. Germany supports 
primary healthcare in certain regions as well as HIV/AIDS. The USA concentrates 
on reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. There has been little collaboration between 
these donors on an overall sectoral approach. A few meetings took place in early 
2003,30 and a matrix of donor interventions in health was elaborated but this was not 
kept up-to-date and there was a long gap until a large meeting was convened in 
September 2004. By this time Belgium had come forward once again to take the lead 
role; but there was also substantial engagement from new staff within German 
Technical Cooperation.  
                                                 
26 Interviews: VVOB Kigali, 14 October 2004; GTZ Kigali, 28 September 2004. 
27 The only reference I came across in DPCG minutes dated from April 2004, when it was reported 
that the education cluster was drawing up terms of reference and debating how to improve Ministry 
leadership (minutes of DPCG meeting of 1 April 2004).  
28 These issues are explored in more depth in Hayman (2005a). 
29 Some informants implied that in the late 1990s the health sector was considered the ‘model’ sector 
while education languished. Most of these informants were involved in the health sector at the time so 
their opinions may be biased. They felt that frequent changes in senior staff and donor disengagement 
had been detrimental to the development of the health sector (Interviews: former technical assistants 
to the health sector, 21 January 2004, 5 February 2004; former Minister of Health, 25 February 2004). 
30 Minutes of DPCG meeting, 22 January 2003. 
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As the largest bilateral donor in this sector, with a long history of support, 
including institutional capacity building in the Ministry of Health, it seemed logical 
for Belgium to take the lead. Yet limited human resources in the Belgian embassy 
and limited personal commitment by senior programme staff to coordination 
constituted obstacles. With new and additional staff in the second half of 2004, a new 
dynamism could be observed. An initial meeting bringing together all actors 
interested in the health sector was held on 30 September 2004. This involved 
Ministry of Health officials, as well as representatives of bilateral and multilateral 
agencies and a few NGOs. The large number of participants at the meeting gave 
some idea of the difficulties that could be foreseen in coordinating support to this 
sector with many agencies often undertaking small projects in specialised areas. 
Discussions during and after this meeting with various actors threw up the question 
of NGO involvement in cluster activity. Amongst bilateral donors there was a strong 
sense that NGOs’ interests and roles were very different to official donors and that 
they should not be involved in policy discussions within the cluster system. At the 
same time, it was considered essential that NGOs be involved in the broader PRS 
process.  
In parallel to this, there was a new drive to develop a health sector strategy. This 
came about largely through the PRSC mechanism. The weakness of planning in the 
health sector resulted in the World Bank bringing in a team of experts to help prepare 
the sector strategy in time to meet its own deadlines, as noted above. Consequently, 
in contrast to the education sector, this drive did not come from the Ministry itself 
nor from the main donors to the sector.31 Belgium, Germany and the USA were all 
more focused on discrete projects than looking towards a sectoral approach. Despite 
providing TA to the Ministry of Health, the relationship between the Belgian project 
team and senior health officials was not close, with the TA in late 2003 saying it was 
hard to even get an appointment with the Secretary-General or Minister.32  
The education sector provides an example of what can be achieved when there is 
strong engagement from one major donor interested in developing a sectoral 
approach, in institution building and policy-making, and with a good working 
relationship with senior officials in the Ministry. The health sector, on the other 
hand, demonstrates the problems where there is no overall donor leader, leading to a 
disjointed approach to policy and prioritisation to the detriment of a coherent 
strategy. Indeed, the health sector has suffered greatly from ‘crowding out’, with 
some sub-sectors receiving a huge amount of attention, notably HIV/AIDS, and with 
some health districts receiving considerable support while other parts of the country 
have been neglected.33 These examples also highlights the importance of individuals 
in terms of adding drive to the process. 
                                                 
31 An ODI fellow (see footnote 34) placed within the Ministry of Health felt that the support of the 
World Bank in preparing the sector strategy had built up some capacity within the Ministry’s planning 
department, but at the same time felt that it was largely World Bank priorities that were being pushed 
(interview, 11 October 2004). 
32 Interview, Belgian TA to the Ministry of Health, 10 November 2003. Note that in mid-2004 there 
was a shuffle in Ministry, with a new Secretary-General and Minister. The Belgian team was also 
changing, hence by late 2004/early 2005 the scenario could have been quite different.  
33 We see this to a lesser extent in the education sector also. Despite an overall sector strategy, actual 
donor support and Ministry prioritisation focuses on particular sub-sectors (see Hayman 2005a and 
2005b).  
 78 
In both these sectors, the same problems emerge of limited Ministry engagement 
in the cluster and recourse to external assistants to drive it. In the health sector, at the 
cluster meeting on 30 September 2004, Ministry of Health staff seemed confused by 
the concepts of coordination, with the British ODI fellow placed in the Ministry 
acting more or less as the spokesperson;34 likewise this ODI fellow had been 
responsible for attempting to put together a matrix of support to the health sector. A 
similar situation was evident in the governance sector, where the organisation of 
coordination activities was delegated to one of the ODI fellows in the Ministry of 
Local Affairs. In the education sector, coordination has very much been in the hands 
of the UK. A desire was expressed by one DFID representative that it be run by the 
Ministry, but it appeared that nothing would happen without pressure from DFID. 
Indeed, although joint reviews have seen close collaboration between the Ministry of 
Education and donors, most coordination activities appear to be the domain of donors 
alone with no sign of it becoming a Ministry-led activity.  
These experiences provide some indication of the reality of translating the general 
concept of ‘coordination’ around the PRSP into practice. The second area which 
throws up a separate set of issues is that of the harmonisation of budgetary support. 
 
 
Budget Support and Harmonisation 
 
In parallel to the cluster activity, harmonising the procedures of budget support 
donors was high on the agenda in late 2003. As mentioned above, in early 2003 the 
RHAI group began work on a Partnership Framework. This had been mooted during 
a mission of the SPA Budget Support Working Group to Rwanda in October 2002 
which, after conducting an overview of existing budget support programmes and 
harmonisation issues, made recommendations “to promote better alignment of 
budget support programmes with national PRS and budget processes in order to 
improve aid effectiveness and strengthen government ownership of its policies” 
(SPA 2003: 2). The SPA had observed that assistance to the budget in 2002 was: 
typically uncoordinated; weakly or not at all aligned with the PRSP and GoR systems 
in terms of policy, priorities, performance monitoring and reviews; made high 
demands on the GoR for conditions, activities and information; demonstrated weak 
links to poverty outcomes; and involved too many reviews and reporting 
requirements. 
It should be noted that this mission occurred before the DPM of November 2002 
at which donors expressed a stronger willingness to coordinate around the PRS 
process; so the points made by the SPA occurred when both donors and the GoR 
were only just beginning to articulate their views on operationalising the PRSP and 
considering how to align aid around it. It also predated the Rome Declaration of 
February 2003 where donors committed themselves to making progress on 
                                                 
34 The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in the UK runs a fellowship programme, with support 
from DFID, which provides 1-2 year placements for recent economics graduates within ministries in 
developing countries. The Ministry of Finance in Rwanda has had ODI fellows in different 
departments for a number of years. Other ministries in Rwanda hosting these fellows are the 
Ministries of Local Affairs, Education and Health. These fellows are highly regarded by Rwandan 
officials and work in close collaboration with very senior civil servants. Fieldwork observations 
indicated that these fellows often act as ministry representatives in GoR-donor forums. 
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harmonisation. By 2003 there was therefore more pressure to move ahead on 
harmonisation. The initial activity of the RHAI was to draft an issues paper which 
recognised explicitly the requirements on both sides:  
actions by [development partners] to increase alignment, harmonise practice 
and streamline requirements are necessary but will only have significant effect 
in the context of equivalent action by GoR to develop a robust, internally 
coherent national process. (RHAI 2003: 5, emphasis in original) 
When the SPA returned to Rwanda in November 2003 it noted that “significant 
steps” had been taken, that the “focus on improving aid effectiveness is stronger and 
collaboration has deepened” and that GoR “frustration” at donor practices “has 
evolved into a constructive dialogue and initiatives to improve the situation” (SPA 
2003: 2). However, although it was generally “agreed that macroeconomic and 
budget support provides substantial scope and high potential returns (in terms of 
reduced transaction costs and more effective aid) for increased harmonisation and 
alignment”,35 reaching agreement on harmonisation in practice was not plain sailing.  
At a meeting on 17-18 November 2003, the budget support donors, as well as the 
IMF, came together in a two-day meeting to adopt the ‘Partnership Framework for 
Harmonisation and Alignment of Budget Support’. The aim of the Framework was to  
reduce transaction costs and increase Government effectiveness, in particular by 
streamlining conditionalities and holding joint Government-donor reviews. 
Donor alignment behind the PRS and Government-led review processes will 
increase Government ownership of economic and social policy, and should be 
accompanied by improvements in the predictability of donor inflows.36  
The core components of this Framework were as follows: 
- donors would rely on coordinated37 review missions linked to three 
Government-led review processes: the annual PRS Progress Review; the 
annual Public Financial Management (PFM) review; and the six-monthly 
PRGF review; 
- donors would draw conditionality from government-owned policy matrices 
and action plans and align their missions to the review cycle; 
- donors would rely on Rwanda’s own systems for PFM;  
- donors would improve the predictability of their support by informing the 
GoR about their disbursement plans for the following year in good time, and 
would “avoid where possible in-year suspensions of budget support, and 
allow for dialogue and time for remedial actions where problems arise”;38 
- donors would provide coordinated technical assistance to support monitoring 
systems; 
- a Government-budget support donors group would be established to discuss 
technical issues.  
The Framework was signed by the GoR, the EC and DFID, and endorsed by Sweden, 
the IMF, the AfDB and the World Bank.  
There is clear resonance here with the broader global reflections on budget 
support and harmonisation in seeking to tackle aid effectiveness through undertaking 
                                                 
35 Letter from the European Commission to Minister of Finance, 18 July 2003.  
36 Partnership Framework, draft 3, November 2003, page 1.  
37 Note that an earlier version of the Framework referred to ‘joint’ rather than ‘coordinated’ reviews. 
38 Partnership Framework, draft 3, November 2003, page 10. 
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coordinated missions, aligning around the GoR’s own systems, drawing 
conditionality from a common framework and improving predictability. However, 
the nature of this Framework and the process of preparing it raised a series of 
questions,39 the first of which relates to the driving forces behind it and donor 
commitment. In its report, the SPA was eager to emphasise how ‘government-led’ 
the process was, while at the same time 
the involvement of local donors in the design of the Partnership Framework, 
through intensive dialogue and active technical support, has been helpful in 
empowering Government leadership and ownership of the process without 
substituting for it. (SPA 2003: 11, emphasis in original)  
The principal authors, however, were an economist from the European Commission 
and an ODI fellow based in the Ministry of Finance with support from DFID. DFID 
and the EC were the only two donors able to sign the Framework at the time of the 
meeting, with other donors agreeing to “recommend to their authorities that they 
should also become co-signatories” (SPA 2003: 3). The EC and UK were clearly 
pushing the initiative, with the other donors demonstrating more qualms about the 
draft documents. At times the World Bank representatives appeared quite hostile, 
demanding significant changes to drafts. Given that the purpose of this meeting was 
precisely to adopt this Framework, with drafts circulated in advance, the depth of 
debate on the wording was quite surprising. Moreover, there was a clear difference 
between those donors with authority to commit to such an agreement in country 
(namely the UK and EC) and those with restrictions on their authority to act. 
Different views from the donors involved also emerged in discussing the drafts. For 
example, the Swedish representatives placed a great deal more emphasis on GoR 
commitments to political governance,40 and the World Bank implied that it had 
limited confidence in the GoR’s own accountability systems.    
The World Bank’s attitude with regard to the Framework and to harmonisation 
more broadly is particularly confusing. Around the same time that this Framework 
was being put together, the Bank appeared to be striking its own path on 
harmonisation from Washington. In December 2003, the World Bank produced its 
own Harmonisation Framework and Action Plan and was planning to run workshops 
and undertake studies in Rwanda on harmonisation. This did not involve 
collaboration with other donors. This situation continued into 2004. In October 2003 
the Bank began preparing a case study on harmonisation in Rwanda for the Paris 
Forum without clear consultation with actors on the ground.41 It was discussing the 
need for frameworks and calendars for predictable aid while ignoring ongoing 
processes on precisely these issues. And it was engaging in unilateral discussions 
with the GoR on topics such as when a ‘silent period’ from missions should be 
considered and sector strategies without including ‘lead’ donors. This aroused 
considerable frustration among other donors in Rwanda with informants expressing 
                                                 
39 Insights here come from observations at meetings on 17 and 18 November 2003.  
40 The SPA recommended against explicit reference to political governance issues within a budget 
support framework, as these “do not easily lend themselves to explicit conditionality and predictable 
donor commitments.” The SPA felt that these should rather be dealt with in the donor’s overall 
dialogue with the GoR (SPA 2003: 6). 
41 ‘Harmonisation Case Study on Rwanda for the Second High Level Forum on Harmonisation and 
Alignment for Aid Effectiveness’ (UNRCO 2004), concept note draft 20.08.04.  
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concerns about parallel processes, with the UN and World Bank each interacting 
with a different set of officials in the Ministry of Finance.  
Secondly, the Framework represented a set of ‘reciprocal commitments’ which 
were unenforceable with no legal standing. Indeed, several participants were keen to 
stress that it must be subordinate to bilateral or international arrangements between 
the GoR and individual donors.42 Aspirations for harmonisation were dampened in 
reality by constraints on donors set by their headquarters. Profound changes would 
have been required in practice amongst donors. Indeed, one participant at the 
meeting stated that the best the Framework could be was ‘a legitimate attempt to 
move to a coherent framework for budget support.’  
As an ostensibly Government-owned document, setting out its approach to the 
harmonisation of budget support in agreement with donors, this example 
demonstrates just how complex moves towards harmonisation can be in reality. 
Ultimately, the Framework represented little more than a general set of principles, 
given that bilateral agreements took precedence. Each donor could choose with the 
GoR which elements were to be used in their bilateral agreements, and each donor 
would meet commitments at different speeds with no overall timetable. In what 
ultimately resembled more of a move away from harmonisation, it was felt that a 
“pluralism of approaches” would minimise the risk to the GoR of complete 
harmonisation given the “damaging” situations which could arise if all donors 
stopped budget support disbursements at the same time.43 This plurality was also 
considered more conducive to predictability in that if all donors followed the same 
pattern and there was one condition unfulfilled which prevented disbursement, then 
the GoR could hit real problems. In this respect, having one overall framework but 
different approaches was considered a better option.44  
Thirdly, these discussions concerned only a very small group of donors. Although 
a few donors who do not provide budget support did participate in the opening 
sessions of the two-day meeting on this Framework in November 2003, there was 
limited real engagement with or by them. In some respects, this reflects a two-tier 
process, with budget support donors engaging in a different relationship with the 
GoR to non-budget support donors.  
The application of this Framework in 2004 was patchy at best. In March 2004 
there was a joint PFM review, and in September 2004 a joint review of support to the 
Ministry of Finance, which was not limited to budget support alone. However, the 
PFM joint review did not appear to have reduced individual missions:  
the PFM exercise also provided an example of limited coordination, as 5 of the 
6 budget support donors had PFM related missions/reports in the first quarter of 
2004. (Minecofin 2004: 37).45   
Indeed, Minecofin reports that between January 2003 and April 2004, it received 143 
different missions, mainly from budget support donors, not including visits to the 
macro-economic department which are not consistently reported (idem: 36). Only 
two formal meetings of the Budget Support Harmonisation Group (BSHG) were held 
during the period covered by this study (in December 2003 and February 2004) 
                                                 
42 This point was removed from the first draft of the document then put back in by the final version. 
43 Partnership Framework, draft 2, pg.5.  
44 Intervention, representative of EC, PRSC update meeting, 5 October 2004. 
45 This was also raised at the HARPP meeting of 1 June 2004. 
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where discussions focused on the practical functioning of the group and financial and 
economic developments, such as the budget and negotiations with the IMF.46  
This experience points to considerable problems around the harmonisation of 
budget support. For the GoR, budget support is the most favoured instrument for aid 
delivery: 
The GoR has restated in several fora and meetings its preference for predictable 
budget support as the primary modality of assistance. The GoR believes that 
clear budget support, when accompanied with accountable and transparent 
institutions, will deliver superior results compared to the traditional project 
approach. (Minecofin 2004: 36) 
However, the risks are clearly recognised by the GoR, as the following statements 
from GoR officials demonstrate: 
Budget support responds better to our expectations but is often too demanding. 
(Member of Rwandan Parliament, 31 October 2003) 
Those accepting to provide budget support are very important … [but] it is a 
problem if budget support does not come. (Member of Rwandan Parliament, 23 
April 2004) 
We are encouraging budget support which has lots of advantages, but it also has 
conditions placed on it. (Official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 November 
2003) 
The main problem is that of predictability of aid flows, which for the GoR was a 
central purpose of establishing the harmonisation Framework and which has been a 
point of some contention. At the November meeting, several Minecofin officials 
stressed the importance of predictability of funding and the problems caused by not 
receiving information on intended disbursements early enough, or not receiving 
funds when anticipated. This was further reiterated at a meeting organised by the 
World Bank on the PRSC on 5 October 2004, where one Minecofin official stressed 
the difficulty of establishing a calendar of budget support disbursement when each 
donor followed a different pattern. Moreover, planning was impossible when there 
were constantly delays in disbursement, either due to the GoR not fulfilling 
conditions on its side or administrative delays on the donor side. Ideally for the GoR, 
there would be one single instalment of budget support at the start of the year with an 
evaluation at the end of the year. If this assessment threw up problems, then 
conditions could be attached to disbursements for the following year, thus allowing 
predictable and transparent flows.47 Such an approach to applying conditions was 
supported by the SPA which recommended that “donors consider ways of ensuring a 
graduated response to changes in GoR’s performance (both improvement and 
deterioration)” (SPA 2003: 6). As we shall see in chapter 7, this is theoretically the 
approach that the UK has adopted, in providing for a window of dialogue before 




                                                 
46 Minutes of BSHG meeting, 17 December 2003. 
47 Intervention by Director of Macro-Economy, Minecofin, PRSC update meeting, 5 October 2004. 
This point was also raised in an interview with the Director on 27 October 2003. 
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Government Leadership and Internal Coordination Issues 
 
The above discussion of clusters and harmonisation of budget support begins to 
provide some indication of the complexity of turning the concept of aid coordination 
into workable practice. Central to the whole framework of new programme aid is that 
there should be government ownership of the PRSP process. Ever since 1994, the 
GoR has expressed frustration with the aid system. Indeed, President Kagame (Vice-
President at the time) publicly stated that coordination “stinks” in his speech to the 
July 1995 Round Table (UNDP 1995a: 144). The GoR has constantly been 
demanding greater control over aid flows, more predictability and flexibility in 
funding, greater transparency and better coordination amongst donors. In response, 
donor rhetoric implies common agreement that the GoR should be leading the 
coordination process. Indeed the first two progress indicators outlined in the draft 
HARPP Partnership Framework are that “Government sets its agenda in a country-
based action plan for harmonisation and alignment” and that there is “Government 
leadership of the national coordination process”.48 The practice has been quite 
different. As we saw above, the question of whether DPCG meetings should be for 
donors only was on the table in early 2003; likewise the RHAI at first was just a 
donor group, to which GoR representatives were invited. However, by July 2003 the 
RHAI began to request that it be a Government-led process with meetings co-chaired 
by Minecofin,49 and by March 2004 the DPCG was being co-chaired by the UN and 
Minecofin. Indeed, the entire system has become increasingly formalised, with the 
GoR asking that formal invitations be sent to Ministers rather than the semi-formal 
emails which had previously been used. Meetings of the DPCG and many cluster 
groups now take place alternately in the offices of the UN and government ministries 
to “avoid misconceptions of perception”, to “demonstrate that partnership is 
respected” and to ensure “ownership”.50  
The desire for this formality on the side of the GoR is indicative of internal 
debates on coordination, inherently tied up with questions of ownership and local 
control of processes. Since 1994 a whole range of instruments have been established 
in Rwanda, often with donor support, to improve coordination of aid flows, 
development programmes and internal policy coherence. These include: 
- the Guidance Committee (Comité d’orientation) established within the Prime 
Minister’s office following the UN Round Table in January 1995 as a forum 
for dialogue between the GoR and donor representatives to track financial 
flows and monitor commitments, as well as to prepare follow-up activities 
(UNDP 1995b);  
- the Inter-sectoral Technical Committee (Comité Technique Intersectoriel) set 
up to ensure equitable distribution of funds across sectors;  
- the Permanent Technical Secretariat for Monitoring the Round Table 
(Secretariat Technique Permanent pour le Suivi de la Table Ronde); and  
- the Development Programme Coordination Committee (Commission de 
Coordination du Programme de Développement National) created in 
February 1997 to coordinate activities of different departments involved in 
the national development programme. (UNDP/UNOPS 1997)  
                                                 
48 HARPP Partnership Framework. Preliminary Draft for Discussion. Kigali, July 19, 2004. 
49 Letter from the European Commission to the Minister of Finance, 18 July 2003.  
50 Minutes of DPCG meeting, 4 March 2004. 
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In 1998 the decision was made to establish the Central Bureau for Public 
Investments and External Funding (CEPEX) in order to tackle concerns that 
development projects were not performing.51 By this time, overall responsibility on 
the GoR side for coordination lay clearly with Minecofin.52 CEPEX was initially 
created as a Task Force and was shaped into a proper institution by 1999 with UN, 
Belgian and AfDB support. It later became a semi-autonomous body attached to 
Minecofin, promulgated into law in February 2002, with a very broad mandate far 
outstretching the resources allocated to it: to monitor and programme public 
investments, including the National Investment Strategy, Public Investment 
Programme, and the Development Budget; to mobilise and coordinate external 
resources, providing information on the use of public investments via projects, 
managing the coordination of donors and NGOs with GoR policies; and to monitor 
donor disbursements and assess portfolio performance (GoR 2002f).  
Despite these mechanisms, in 2003-2004 the GoR appeared no clearer on 
coordination in practice than many donors. The minutes of DPCG meetings 
throughout 2003 demonstrate a lack of clarity within the GoR about how it should be 
engaging with the DPCG and clusters. It wavers between wanting to keep the GoR 
and donor sides separate, only coming together occasionally, and wanting to be kept 
fully abreast of discussions through joint meetings. This concern with transparency 
from donors does not, however, extend to ensuring that donors are fully aware of 
what is happening on the GoR side. As table 4.1 (page 69) indicates, a large number 
of GoR institutions are supposed to be involved in each of the clusters. However, 
little feedback is provided to donors about cluster meetings within the GoR or about 
how information is exchanged between Minecofin and line ministries. Indeed, mixed 
messages emerge about this. In March 2003 officials stated that the system was 
working well on the GoR side, with regular meetings taking place,53 but later in the 
same year officials noted that the mechanism was not working on the GoR side, with 
a lack of clear understanding across ministries about the process.54 In fact, there is 
very little evidence of meetings taking place at all on the GoR side which would 
constitute ‘cluster’ meetings.55  
Part of the problem is a debate over the internal remit for aid coordination. 
Coordination tends to be seen as a Minecofin matter, rather than of relevance to all 
line ministries,56 but even within Minecofin there is confusion about the coordination 
agenda, how much of a priority it is, and who should be responsible. Since its 
establishment CEPEX has been beset with problems. With a wide ranging mandate, 
limited human resources and frequent changes of director it was greeted with 
hostility from both line ministries and donors. On the GoR side, some government 
ministries saw CEPEX as a control tool which would diminish their direct 
                                                 
51 ‘Meeting with donor agencies on external aid coordination, the roles of the development committee 
and central projects bureau’, Minecofin, 12 August 1998. 
52 Prior to a merger in 1997, Minecofin was two separate Ministries - Planning and Finance. The 
Planning section of Minecofin has been the main actor with regard to coordination activities. 
53 Minutes of DPCG meeting, 27 March 2003. 
54 Statement by Minecofin official at DPCG meeting, 30 October 2003.  
55 When asked for minutes or reports of internal coordination meetings, officials in Minecofin 
informed me that although the subject was occasionally raised in the Inter-Ministerial Committee and 
the PRS Steering Committee, there was no official record of GoR ‘cluster’ meetings (interviews, 
Minecofin, September-October 2004).  
56 Interview, Minecofin official, 24 September 2004. 
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negotiating role with donors and therefore represented a threat to their power.57 The 
general reaction from donor representatives to CEPEX was dismissive at best, with 
exasperation at poor organisation, incoherence and overlaps between departments, 
lack of direction, constrained resources and weak management which it was felt 
rendered it obstructive rather than constructive. It was seen as doing little beyond 
gathering (often incomplete) information on donors, using complicated 
questionnaires, rather than taking the initiative on coordination. This refers to the 
CEPEX matrix of donor interventions which has been produced annually since 2000 
and which attempts to capture aid flows from multilateral and bilateral agencies as 
well as larger NGOs. In theory this represents an instrument for coordination in 
providing information on potential duplication of activities and gaps. However, every 
year CEPEX struggles to get donors (including NGOs) to provide complete 
information in a timely manner, finding some particularly secretive. CEPEX staff 
have no power to force donors to provide this information, and donors for their part 
complain that the way in which information is requested does not fit with their 
systems, making questionnaires hard to complete. This implies that discussions have 
not been held to establish how best to request information in such a way as to ensure 
donor cooperation. Donors also complain about receiving overlapping requests for 
information from CEPEX and line ministries.  
Some pressure appears to have been placed on the GoR to dismantle CEPEX in 
the interests of efficient use of resources, but there has been strong support for it 
from the Minister of Finance. 2004 saw another shake-up of senior management in 
CEPEX, and under the wider restructuring of Minecofin it was due to be 
fundamentally re-organised, with overall responsibility for aid coordination moving 
to Minecofin, responsibility for the development budget moving into the budget 
department of the Ministry, and CEPEX retaining responsibility only for project 
management.  
Perhaps because of the weaknesses of CEPEX, and in turn exacerbating the 
problems, many donors appear to have been more willing to engage with the 
Strategic Planning and Poverty Monitoring Department (SPPMD) of Minecofin, a 
unit set up to frame the PRSP process and heavily funded by DFID. SPPMD is 
responsible for both the PRSP and sector strategies around which coordination is 
supposed to revolve. Indeed,  
SPPMD was not originally intended to have donor interface but since it was 
closely involved in the PRSP preparation, donors developed a level of comfort 
and familiarity with the SPPMD which has ensured an ongoing interface. (Niloy 
2003: 12)58 
Consequently, there is no single focal point for donor interaction with the GoR on 
coordination, leading to not one but many counterparts. This goes some way to 
explaining the situation mentioned earlier where the World Bank engages with one 
set of people and other donors with another.  
                                                 
57 Interview, former CEPEX official, 29 April 2004. 
58 It is also possible that donors prefer to engage with their ‘own’ structures, i.e. the ones they have 
essentially constructed and supported, rather than ones established by the GoR to deal with particular 
issues. DFID strongly supports SPPMD, but DFID staff were very dismissive of CEPEX. The UN and 
Belgium, both of which have funded projects with CEPEX, have appeared more willing to engage 
with it as a structure. 
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However, this situation demonstrates much deeper concerns within the GoR about 
coordination and what it might mean for national sovereignty. This is best illustrated 
by the preparation of a Cabinet Paper on clusters and coordination in 2004. 
Throughout 2004, there were frequent requests from donors for the GoR to provide 
them with guidance on what it expected of both the DPCG and the cluster system. In 
response to this, and following an internal discussion between heads of lead 
ministries, in May 2004 Minecofin announced that a Cabinet Paper would be 
prepared.59 By the end of 2004 this had still not been presented to Cabinet, nor 
formally to donors, even in draft form.  
SPPMD was responsible for drafting this paper (again raising questions about the 
division of labour between SPPMD and CEPEX), then presenting it to Secretary-
Generals before finalising it for Cabinet review. The preparation of this paper 
pointed to wider questions of technical and political significance. As we saw above, 
there are issues of overlap between the different cluster groups. This points to 
administrative problems of coherence and division of labour between ministries with 
regard to sector strategies, notably the question of where one ministry’s remit ends 
and another begins. One example is that of education, human resource development, 
capacity development and the labour market. There are strong connections between 
these activities yet they are spread across the Ministries of Education, Public Service 
and Labour and Local Affairs.60 Linked to this, in order for the clusters to function it 
was recognised that sector strategies were required to provide a lynchpin for 
coordination. This relates back to the earlier point about whether clusters should aim 
to provide input to sector strategy preparation or rather to coordinate assistance for 
implementing strategies.  
However, the process of preparing sector strategies revealed problems in 
understandings across ministries. SPPMD was responsible for overseeing the 
development of sector strategies and supporting ministries to draft them; indeed, one 
official stressed that lack of capacity was no excuse for delays as there was support 
there if required.61 Throughout 2004 this process was ongoing, as we have seen 
above. By the end of 2004, the majority of sector strategies had officially been 
validated – some with more participation than others62 – but this does not necessarily 
mean that they were of good quality or workable. The pressure to produce sector 
strategies often resulted in them being seen as end goals rather than as living policy 
instruments. Officials in SPPMD confessed that many of the ‘sector strategies’ much 
more closely resembled ministerial plans, raising concerns that ministry staff had not 
really grasped the SWAp concept. Many of the plans had not been adequately costed 
or had ambitions well beyond available resources. For example the draft health sector 
                                                 
59 Minutes of DPCG meeting, 6 May 2004. 
60 See Hayman (2005b) for a longer discussion of coherence in the broader education sector. 
61 Interview, CEPEX official, 10 October 2004. 
62 For example, the justice sector strategy involved no participation from donors at all; they were 
merely invited to a meeting to validate it once it was completed. The justice sector cluster never met 
before this, the attitude of the Ministry of Justice being that if there was no sector strategy then there 
was nothing to discuss. It did not see a role for donors in preparing the sector strategy; their role was 
to validate it and support it. Donors involved in the justice sector had a very different perspective. For 
them, the whole point of the cluster was to discuss the sector strategy and prepare it jointly. They felt 
that donors were more likely to support a strategy if they had been involved (interviews, Embassy of 
the Netherlands, 23 September 2004; UNDP, 22 September 2004). This contrasts with the education 
and health sector strategies which involved quite wide-ranging consultation.  
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strategy began by outlining what was required to meet the Millennium Development 
Goals resulting in a budget which would have required 50% of the national budget as 
opposed to the 3% available. Indeed, the Minister of Finance admitted that the quest 
for ownership had possibly been detrimental to the preparation of well designed 
strategies,63 a viewpoint echoed by one donor TA who felt that it might be better to 
sacrifice ownership in order to develop a realistic plan.64 At the same time, demands 
to produce sector strategies rapidly were also considered detrimental to the process. 
Several donor representatives felt that years rather than months were necessary to 
produce decent strategies.  
Not only did it appear that ministries were not fully abreast of the sector strategy 
concept, but the question of power also arose during this process. This takes us to the 
second major issue surrounding the Cabinet Paper. Officials in Minecofin mentioned 
concerns amongst ministries that if they were not designated as sector leaders then 
they would lose power and resources. Officials likewise stressed the need for clusters 
to be designed in such a way that did not take away ownership from the GoR. In light 
of this, it was felt that a Cabinet Paper was the most appropriate way to ensure that 
all Ministers were on board, were collectively responsible for the process and could 
kick-start the non-functioning clusters from their side. A crucial sticking point, 
however, appears to have been around accountability and reporting requirements.  
As figure 4.1 (page 66) indicates, the coordination system provides for clusters to 
report to the DPCG on progress, with joint management by both the GoR and donors. 
However, if clusters are aimed at fine-tuning support for sector strategies then they 
contain a substantial policy element. Minecofin officials were concerned that neither 
Ministers nor Secretary-Generals would accept reporting to the DPCG; they should 
only answer to the Cabinet or the Prime Minister’s Office. Given that the DPCG 
started out very much as a donor initiative, it may then appear that Ministers are 
accountable first and foremost to the donors. This elicits concerns that if a Minister 
makes a decision it may then be overruled by a cluster. Ultimately, it was felt that 
Ministers must be able to make final decisions on policy, perhaps with some 
dialogue within the DPCG. Despite the GoR concern, expressed earlier, that clusters 
should be aimed at developing sector strategies, the line of thinking feeding into the 
Cabinet Paper was that clusters should be about technical coordination, represented 
at Secretary-General level, but that policy should remain a Ministerial remit. While 
clusters could make commitments and recommendations, for policy guidance they 
must turn to the Minister.65  
This points to quite fundamental questions about sovereignty and power, which 
will emerge in subsequent chapters of this thesis, but also to issues about different 
perspectives on the ‘coordination’ agenda. 
 
 
                                                 
63 Interview, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 24 September 2004. 
64 Discussion with Belgian TA to Minecofin (Fieldwork diary, 14 October 2004). 
65 Interviews, Ministry of Finance, September-October 2004. 
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Box 4.1 : Survey on Coordination: a few findings 
In total there were 47 respondents from the GoR (22), donor agencies (21) and NGOs (4) 
 
Respondents were asked to list three advantages of coordination. The most popular answers were 
less duplication/overlap (29), sharing information and knowledge (19), and making more effective 
use of resources (13). Reducing transaction costs was mentioned by 9 respondents. Almost 50% of 
respondents gave answers which could be loosely grouped together as pertaining to aid efficiency.  
 
Respondents were then asked to list three disadvantages of coordination. A very wide range of 
answers were given, with different procedures, weak GoR capacity and poor information flow 
occurring most frequently. Answers could be grouped into:  
 Will, e.g. lack of political will or interest to be coordinated, lack of trust, competition 
amongst donors, power issues, prejudices. 
 Divergence, e.g. different understandings, priorities, procedures, policies, incompatible 
agendas, headquarter rules, reporting formats, mentalities. 
 Structure, e.g. slow mechanisms, lack of GoR leadership, no coherent framework, weak 
capacity, dependence on donors, weak sector strategies.  
 Costs, e.g. costs of meetings, cost in relation to benefit, time consumption, workload. 
 5 respondents mentioned ‘empire building’ by donors or the GoR as an obstacle to 
coordination.  
 
Over 90% of donor respondents felt that coordination was very important within their agencies and 
was receiving greater attention at headquarters level. Most respondents thought that aid 
coordination in Rwanda was fairly effective.  
 
Space was given for additional comments, which threw up a range from the positive (‘situation is 
improving’, ‘Government has taken the initiative’, ‘it’s a learning process’) through the constructive 
(making suggestions on how to improve coordination) to the negative (‘a lot of misunderstandings’, 
‘a long way to go’ and ‘it’s a complete nightmare’).  
 
Perspectives on Coordination: how far, how fast, where to? 
 
In October 2004, I was asked by the UN coordination specialist to facilitate an 
informal discussion group on coordination with members of the HARPP, and to 
share some of my findings on coordination issues in Rwanda with aid actors. To 
complement existing material, a short questionnaire was circulated beforehand (see 
Appendix 4). Methodologically this was problematic – it was conducted in a very 
short period of time, during the last month of fieldwork, reaching only a small range 
of actors who I had easy access to in meetings and institutions. The questionnaire 
itself was somewhat crude having been put together rapidly without time for piloting 
or deep reflection and it was only circulated in English given time constraints. 
Moreover, the language of the questionnaire was replete with buzzwords as were the 
responses which raised questions about whether answers reflected what people really 
thought, whether they were repeating rhetoric or whether they were providing what 
they thought should be the answer. The findings, some of which are presented in box 
4.1, therefore cannot be considered representative nor robust and an in-depth analysis 
is not attempted here. However, the exercise did throw up some interesting issues 
which shed additional light on coordination processes in Rwanda. If treated as a pilot 
exercise, it demonstrated that a well-organised and deeper survey on this topic could 


























In general the findings demonstrated an overwhelming belief that the GoR should 
lead the process, that coordination was fairly effective in Rwanda, and that there 
were a huge range of both advantages and obstacles. Information sharing was more 
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widely associated with coordination than harmonisation of procedures. Although 
problems of capacity to coordinate came up frequently, there was considerable 
concern that the main obstacle was political will on all sides to actually coordinate. 
Deep down, what this exercise demonstrated in light of the broader research was that 
mutual comprehension about coordination was lacking. Crucially, there was no clear 
agreement around the three concepts of ‘coordination’, ‘harmonisation’ and 
‘alignment’ and their interconnectedness. As we saw in Chapter 2, these each hold 
specific meanings; however, there is a tendency among many actors to talk just about 
‘coordination’. For some people there is a linearity to this concept. Several 
informants, notably those most engaged in these debates, felt that the agenda had 
moved on from ‘coordination’ to harmonisation and alignment. At the other end of 
the spectrum, a number of respondents saw ‘coordination’ primarily as a tool for 
information sharing with no obvious link between coordination, harmonisation and 
alignment.  
This lack of mutual understanding is well illustrated by the drive to negotiate a 
framework for harmonisation amongst project donors. In December 2003, the UN 
Resident Coordinator began mooting this idea, partly in response to the budget 
support Partnership Framework mentioned above, but also as a response to donor 
commitments to the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation in the face of what was 
seen as slow progress by mid-2004. This idea was raised at each DPCG meeting by 
the UN Resident Coordinator until a decision was finally made in May 2004 to 
establish the HARPP. In drafting the Framework for the HARPP it was recognised 
that full harmonisation might not be feasible in the short term but that this was no 
reason why there could not be better cooperation between the GoR and donors and 
amongst donors (UNRCO 2004: 1). This led to an emphasis on ‘strategic 
pragmatism’, ‘quick wins’, progressive steps, and finding common ground. This 
process highlighted the weak understanding of each others’ constraints, and the need 
to work out where the problems lay, as the following quotes illustrate:66  
Government felt that there was not enough accountability from the Donors 
regarding work being done in certain sectors or provinces… there was a great 
need for a better monitoring system of allocations coming into the country. 
[I]t is difficult for donors to get clear instructions from the government on what 
needs to [be] done in some sectors. Donors need to be reassured that all 
government Ministries are of the same understanding/agreement of what needs 
to be done and the extent to which private sector and civil society organisations 
were involved at the entry level. 
Almost two years after the cluster system was set up, following two papers on aid 
coordination (GoR 2001b; Minecofin 2002a) as well as various studies of 
coordination in the country (Stephens 1999; SPA 2002b; Niloy 2003; SPA 2003), not 
to mention the large number of meetings stretching back to the Round Table 
discussions of 1994 and 1995, this basic lack of mutual understanding seems 
somewhat surprising. One official said: “it is a shock that after two years of agreeing 
the system, nobody can even define it.”67  
Agreeing on the basic principles of coordination in itself was clearly problematic. 
A further problem for many donors was that of incapacity to act, either due to limited 
                                                 
66 Minutes of HARPP meeting, 26 June 2004. 
67 Interview, Director of CEPEX, Minecofin, 13 October 2004. 
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staff in-country or limited autonomy vis-à-vis headquarters. The Director of SPPMD 
was enthusiastic about the reinvigorated coordination process in 2004; he felt that 
things were “moving very fast”, but noted how it was “putting a huge strain on 
Minecofin” which needed to provide support everywhere for sector strategies and 
clusters and that “donors are also stretched in terms of man-power.”68 Within both 
the HARPP Partnership Framework and the budget support Partnership Framework, 
a series of principles were negotiated and agreed upon, demonstrating a willingness 
to reach some degree of consensus in-country. Applying these principles is a 
different matter. We saw above how bilateral agreements and specific donor 
procedures ultimately took precedence over the budget support Framework. 
Likewise, within the HARPP Framework it was recognised that there were areas 
where harmonisation was easier than others. At the implementation phase of projects 
there was considered to be the least flexibility due to differing rules on recruitment, 
procurement, monitoring, training, and disbursing funds; a similar story existed for 
the alignment of projects with the GoR calendar. On the other hand, it was felt that 
harmonisation might be more feasible at the design and evaluation stage through the 
use of common analytical and monitoring frameworks, common indicators and joint 
missions (UNRCO 2004: 2). This points to a fundamental issue of how much 
capacity country offices have to change their practices to reflect such agreements, or 
whether they are confined to applying only those elements which fit within their 
existing remit; of finding the lowest common denominator for action or striving for 
profound change in practices to allow full harmonisation; and of taking small 
progressive steps with some donors moving faster than others or waiting until all 
actors are capable or willing to act in concert. 
The question of transaction costs for donors and GoR alike was also highlighted 
in the questionnaire responses. Reducing transaction costs is considered an advantage 
of coordination; yet among the obstacles mentioned were the high cost of meetings 
and coordination in terms of time consumption and workload. Setting up joint 
reviews, basket funds and silent partnerships was felt to be onerous. The election 
basket fund was mentioned by one informant. This required substantial work as 
every detail had to be carefully planned and agreed upon by all actors involved. 
Another spoke about the bureaucratic complexity of establishing a joint programme. 
Coordination below the national level was raised by a few informants, for 
example in the health sector where several donors support a particular province, 
district or cell. A representative of a Belgian NGO active in the rural development 
sector in one region of the country said that there was no sign of any coordination or 
dialogue in the field amongst aid actors. Indeed, there were few signs of any 
discussion amongst aid actors about coherence at the sub-national level in terms of 
ensuring that all areas of the country were covered by donor interventions; nor of any 
discussion about dialogue on coordination amongst local authorities, NGOs, project 
assistants or donor agents in the field.  
A final issue behind these reflections is that of the ultimate goal of coordination. 
As we saw in chapter 2, the concepts of coordination, harmonisation and alignment 
are seen as enhancing space for recipient ownership. As such, the idea of progression 
towards a specific objective is implied. However, the fact that some donors see 
coordination more as information sharing, while others are aiming at harmonisation 
                                                 
68 Interview, Director of SPPMD, Minecofin, 17 March 2004. 
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of procedures demonstrates that this is not a common perspective. For many GoR 
officials, coordination should be a linear process with donors shifting increasingly 
towards budget support. Coordination around sector strategies would progressively 
lead to more donors adopting a programme approach, including basket funding, and 
ultimately moving towards budgetary support.69 This viewpoint is shared by some 
donors, but not all. Indeed, at the DPCG meeting of 4 March 2004, the UN Resident 
Coordinator was promoting a particular trajectory in terms of harmonising projects in 
line with budget support donors. There appeared to be some hostility amongst certain 
project donors about being pushed down this path.70 As we saw in the previous 
chapter, there are signs that more donors are adopting a programme approach, but 
this does not imply that budget support will follow.  
 
 
Conclusion: issues, constraints and questions  
 
As fieldwork was being conducted for this study, coordination became 
increasingly topical. When asked about coordination during a first round of 
interviews between September and November 2003, most donors indicated that they 
were involved, but several pointed out that it was very time consuming, they had 
limited resources to devote to it, and that very little was happening in comparison to 
other countries with which they were familiar. By the end of 2004 coordination was 
occupying a more central role, with a growing sense of peer pressure to demonstrate 
performance. By this time preparations for the Paris Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
were underway. Throughout 2004 many donors were preparing Harmonisation 
Action Plans; regional workshops had been held in Asia, Latin America and Africa 
to provide input to Paris; a number of case studies had been carried out; and the 
search was on for examples of best practice.  
Although donors have signed up to the harmonisation agenda at the international 
level, the actual processes of coordination in a country like Rwanda demonstrate 
considerable complexity. By the end of 2004 a great many activities were underway 
that could be classified as ‘coordination’: information sharing; matrices of funding; 
sectoral meetings; GoR-donor-NGO forums; joint reviews and missions; thematic 
meetings; basket funding arrangements; harmonisation frameworks and agreements. 
The GoR and donors were devoting a large amount of time to these. The first task on 
the HARPP Principles list was to establish structures for enhancing donor 
coordination71 and this had certainly been achieved in Rwanda.  
At the same time, there are a large number of practical and theoretical questions 
arising and remaining to be resolved about coordination in practice in Rwanda. The 
international declarations which underpin aid relations imply that there is a unity of 
vision amongst actors. This overview illustrates that different actors have very 
                                                 
69 Interventions by the Minister of Finance and Secretary-General of Minecofin, meeting on 
Harmonisation of Budget Support, 17 November 2003. Interview, Director of Macro-Economy, 
Minecofin, 27 October 2003. 
70 Observations, DPCG meeting, Kigali 4 March 2004. It is interesting that in the early meetings of the 
HARPP, set up to bridge the gap between budget and project donors, the most active members were 
once again the budget support donors (Netherlands, EC, Sweden, UK). Some project donors have 
become more active subsequently, such as Switzerland, Germany and Canada.   
71 HARPP Partnership Framework. Preliminary Draft for Discussion. Kigali, July 19, 2004. 
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different perspectives about what coordination should be achieving at different 
levels: political, administrative, operational, technical, sectoral, and on the ground; 
about who should be leading; and about what the expected outcomes are. To some 
extent, this reflects the differences between donor agencies which we explored in the 
previous chapter. Furthermore, the implementation of the PRSP through sector 
strategies has led to the development of a complex system of collaboration between 
internal government actors, wider members of Rwandan society and external donors. 
Donors are becoming increasingly involved in policy processes as aid patterns shift.  
This chapter demonstrates that arriving at a consensus is far from easy. Beyond 
questions of mutual comprehension of the process lie more profound concerns about 
ownership, control and power. Coordination activities are taking place in a constantly 
evolving context. Alignment around the PRSP is closely related to the consolidation 
of a particular policy agenda, which in turn reflects the evolution of the national 
policy environment. Throughout 2003 and 2004, Rwandan government institutions 
were being transformed, new structures were being established and senior positions 
in ministries were changing hands. None of this was happening in a vacuum. Beyond 
the everyday meetings, workshops and seminars and the technical aspects of 
rendering coordination functional Rwanda itself was undergoing profound changes. 
This can be seen in the topics debated within the DPCG: the elections, Great Lakes 
regional relations, and African development initiatives.  
Arguably many of the complications with coordination mentioned in this chapter 
could be attributed to teething problems, the particular circumstances of Rwanda or a 
lack of clarity throughout the aid system about the agenda. However, the way in 
which the GoR and donors interact within the framework of coordination is also 
symptomatic of deeper phenomena, closely linked to the different perspectives of 
donor agencies explored in chapter 3. Most importantly, debates around aid and 
coordination in Rwanda today cannot be divorced from the historical, political and 







From Emergency Aid to the Poverty Agenda: Donor-





The previous two chapters have given an indication of what aid looks like in 
Rwanda today. It is a very mixed picture, with considerable differences amongst 
donors in terms of their policies, objectives and strategies. Various instruments are 
being employed, with the project approach continuing to dominate. By 2002 donors 
had come to accept Rwanda’s PRSP as the strategy around which to coordinate their 
aid. Mechanisms were being established to translate global agreements on aid 
effectiveness into practice, leading to the development of a complex coordination 
system within which very different perspectives can be observed.  
Only eight years previously, Rwanda was a country in chaos, reeling from a civil 
war and genocide which had left the country socially and economically devastated. 
The international community had failed to act to halt the genocide, and most donor 
agencies had withdrawn from the country, only to return after the crisis was over. 
While international shifts in aid thinking and practice clearly frame the working 
relationship between the GoR and donors today, behind this lies the very specific 
context of the Rwandan experience. This legacy underpins the evolution of relations 
between donors and the Government established in 1994 in Rwanda, and profoundly 
affects the perspectives of all actors involved. Retracing the recent history of 
Rwanda’s relations with donors and the international community provides important 
insight into the diversity amongst donors and into the GoR’s perspectives on aid and 
donors. We have seen in previous chapters how decisions about how to engage with 
Rwanda are determined by a range of factors – political, practical and technical. 
Through an exploration of the recent history of aid, we can begin to understand the 
problems of translating the dominant international aid agenda into practice in a 
country like Rwanda.  
This chapter traces the evolution of interactions between the GoR and donors 
between 1994 and 2004. It considers three periods in Rwanda’s recent aid history, 
summarised in table 5.1. The first of these is 1994 to 1997 when aid primarily flowed 
as emergency assistance coordinated through the United Nations Round Table 
system. Donors were grappling with their individual histories in the country and 
ongoing events and the GoR was seeking to establish control over a country still 
wracked by crisis. The second period, 1997-2000, saw the consolidation of policy-
making within the GoR and a shift from humanitarian aid to more development-
oriented assistance. There was a move away from the UN-sponsored aid mobilisation 
system to negotiations with the World Bank. This period also saw the rise of new 
donors championing the GoR and calling for increased direct support. However, 
although Rwanda was stabilising internally, it was engaged in war with the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which impacted upon donor willingness to 
provide assistance. The third period, from 2000-2004, brings us to the situation 
described in chapters 3 and 4, with donors coming together around an agreed poverty 
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reduction strategy, establishing coordination mechanisms, yet continuing to be 
affected by broader political events in the country and region. 
 
Table 5.1 History of Aid in Rwanda 1994-2004 












 Emergency  Reconstruction  
Ongoing insecurity and 
stabilisation issues:  
 refugee return (Dec 
1996-Jan 1997) 
 justice challenges 
 human rights issues 
 frequent government 
reshuffles 
Insurgency in northwest (1997-
1998) 
Internally, economy stabilising 
and security normalising 
Regional insecurity remains   
1998-2002: Rwandan troops 
involved in conflict in DRC 
Reintegration/resettlement of 
population (emergency over) 
1999 & 2001: local elections  
2003: Constitutional referendum; 
Presidential and Parliamentary 
elections (transition complete)  
2001 Lusaka Accord; 2002 
Pretoria Agreement  end of 
conflict with DRC but tensions 
remain  
2004 Rwanda threatening to 
take action in eastern DRC 
again 
Rwanda joins East African 
















Poor policy environment 
Emphasis on emergency 
rehabilitation, resettlement and 
reconstruction  
No long-term development 
objectives 
Policy supported by UN  
Ministries functioning with 
minimal resources.  
Strong discourse against the 
international community linked 
to genocide and post-genocide 
response 
1998: Internal policy discussion 
begins; ESAF negotiated with 
the IFIs  
1999: first drafts of Vision 2020.  
1999: preparation for PRSP 
2001: interim-PRSP adopted 
Strong external involvement in 
policy processes.  
GoR making increasing 
demands for aid in programme 
form and debt relief 
 
2002: final PRSP adopted  
Becomes focus of relationship 
between GoR and donors.  
By 2004, onus on transforming 
the PRSP into strong, sector 
strategies.  
Capacity still problem, with 
heavy reliance on technical 
assistance  
GoR calling for alignment with 
national budgeting processes; 











Aid through UN agencies and 
NGOs 1994-1996 
Humanitarian aid to refugee 
camps outside Rwanda  
Gradual resumption of bilateral 
aid by 1996/97 (projects)  
Limited direct support to GoR 
Main donors: EC, Netherlands, 
Japan (through UN Trust 
Fund); Germany and Norway;  
Many ‘old’ donors struggling to 
come to terms with events 
Some doubts about legitimacy 
of GoR 
Aid reduced as humanitarian 
programmes wind down 
(Norway, Japan, Austria 
disengage) 
Rise of ‘new donors’ (UK and 
Sweden) 
IFIs replace UN as prime movers  
Rwanda as ‘special case’ for 
assistance,  
Split between positive donors 
like UK and more sceptical ones 
Shift towards more programme 
aid and budget support 
Still split between those 
increasing and those decreasing 
(or stabilising) aid.  
UK is largest bilateral donor 
Old donors re-asserting position 
(e.g. Belgium, Japan, Canada) 
Aid instruments: split between 
project and budget support; 
debates around sectoral support 
Variety of channels used, often 
with a geographical or sectoral 
focus determined by donor 










Large number of NGOs and 
UN agencies active – minimal 
coordination/coherence 
Weak absorption capacity in 
GoR.  
Round Table (RT) process 
1995-1996 organised by UN 
outside Rwanda 
GoR bitterness about failure of 
donors to fulfil pledges 
RT process ends as bilateral 
donors re-establish direct 
programmes 
1997: first Partnership Talks held 
to mobilise direct support 
Process driven by UK and WB 
2000: annual Development 
Partner Meetings (DPM)  begin 
in Rwanda  
GoR establishing own 
coordination mechanisms, e.g. 
CEPEX 
2001: DPM adopts PRSP as 
framework 
2002: DPM adopts ‘cluster’ 




Coordination Group; various 
technical working groups 
Large number of coordination 
mechanisms, but problematic 
conceptually and practically 





The Emergency Response to the Genocide and the Round-Table 
Process 1994-1997 
 
The response of humanitarian aid organisations1 to the crisis in Rwanda in 1994 
has been widely documented (Borton, Brusset and Hallam 1996; van der Meeren 
1996; UN 1996; Whitman and Pocock 1996; Storey 1997; Pottier 2002; Scherrer 
2002; Terry 2002). As the genocide unfolded, the majority of non-Rwandan citizens 
and international organisations withdrew from the country, with the notable 
exception of the Red Cross. Only a small UN peacekeeping force remained, whose 
predicament has likewise been widely explored (des Forges 1999; Melvern 2000; 
Jones 2001; Barnett 2002; Prunier 2002; Dallaire 2003). But the humanitarian 
agencies were back in force by July 2004, both inside and outside Rwanda’s borders. 
Externally, they provided assistance to the camps in Burundi and Tanzania as well as 
to the mass of refugees who crossed into Zaire2 as the Rwandan Patriotic Army 
(RPA) advanced. These refugees were driven both by fear of persecution and by the 
former regime which fled the country taking with it all it could – population, military 
equipment, vehicles, mineral resources, and the entire local and foreign currency 
reserves of the central bank (Terry 2002). Images were broadcast around the world of 
the terrible conditions of the refugee camps, particularly in Zaire where tens of 
thousands died from disease. In stark contrast to the response to the genocide within 
Rwanda, military and humanitarian resources were swiftly mobilised to provide 
relief to the refugees.  
Although around two-thirds of emergency and rehabilitation assistance went to 
the camps outside Rwanda (Kumar, Tardif-Douglin, Maynard, Manikas, Sheckler 
and Knapp 1996: 32), humanitarian aid also flowed into Rwanda, primarily through 
UN agencies and NGOs.3 By October 1995, up to 200 NGOs, some newly created 
for the task, had flocked to help the Rwandese begin the task of rebuilding the 
shattered country. Various programmes and mechanisms were established by 
multilateral agencies to mobilise and coordinate assistance, including the Secretary-
General’s Trust Fund (SGTF) for Rwanda, established in July 1994, the United 
Nations Trust Fund (UNTF), set up in December 1994, UNHCR Special Appeals, 
and UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals (Stephens 1999). The SGTF aimed at 
meeting the immediate needs of the Rwandan Government in mid-1994 but received 
only limited donor input for a few humanitarian projects (UNDP 1996b). The UNTF, 
which operated until 2000, was more successful. This was targeted towards 
rehabilitation and government capacity building, providing quick-disbursing support 
for GoR identified projects within its overall rehabilitation programme. The UNTF 
undertook a substantial number of projects and programmes in fields such as justice, 
support to the local and national administration, urban rehabilitation, and refugees 
                                                 
1 As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis focuses on bilateral aid agencies which are different from 
humanitarian aid organisations. The latter are mainly bodies of the United Nations or international 
NGOs. Bilateral donors, which work primarily with governments, tend to provide support for 
humanitarian relief efforts through these bodies. 
2 Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 when the government of Mobutu 
Sese-Seko was toppled by Laurent Désiré-Kabila.  
3 For example, between July 1994 and January 1995, Ireland channelled around $6 million through the 
UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and four Irish NGOs (UNDP 1995b: 
120); the UK provided humanitarian relief of £60 million in 1994 through the European Union, ICRC, 
UNHCR, UN agencies and British NGOs (idem: 163). 
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and internally-displaced people. Although the funds did not go directly to the GoR, it 
was nonetheless accepted by the Government as a useful mechanism which 
responded to GoR priorities. By 1999 the UNTF had received over $100 million 
from 15 bilateral donors – ranging from $52 million from the Netherlands to 
$200.000 from Spain and Finland (UN 2000a: 37). The main contributors were the 
Netherlands, Japan, Belgium and the UK, with some resources also provided by 
Ireland, Norway, Denmark and the USA (UNDP 1996b). Donors used this 
mechanism as a way of channelling resources quickly through a secure instrument, at 
a time when many bilateral donors did not have representations on the ground and 
there was a lack of faith in the GoR’s own institutional capacity to manage funds.  
In addition to these funding mechanisms, ad-hoc meetings were also convened, 
such as World Bank meetings in Paris in September and October 2004 to discuss an 
Emergency Recovery Programme (World Bank 1995), and in Geneva and Kigali on 
the education sector in October and November 1994 (GoR 1994). However, the main 
forum for bringing together bilateral and multilateral donors in discussion with the 
GoR to mobilise official aid resources for the reconstruction of Rwanda was the 
United Nations Round Table.  
 
Round Table process and aid flows 
The prime objective of the Round Table mechanism is to “foster dialogue and 
consensus between a developing country and its assistance partners on policies, 
strategies and programmes” (Stephens 1999: 2). Round Tables (RT), designed for the 
least-developed countries, began to be held in 1982 and represented a core 
coordination mechanism for reviewing the economic situations of countries and 
external finance to support them (Cassen 1994: 181). RT conferences had been 
convened for Rwanda in November 1990 to support the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP), and in 1992 to discuss socio-economic reconstruction 
programmes to address the consequences of the civil war which erupted in October 
1990 when the RPA invaded the country (GoR 1992). A further RT was planned for 
early 1994 following the signature of the Arusha Accords in August 1993, which 
officially brought an end to the civil war, laid the way for a Transition Government 
to come into effect, and foresaw the deployment of the UNAMIR peace-keeping 
force (UNDP 1994b).4 This conference did not take place because of the 
deterioration of the internal situation culminating in the genocide.   
It was January 1995 before the next RT was convened, followed by a Mid-Term 
Review in July 1995 and another full conference in July 1996. Organised under the 
auspices of the UNDP, these all involved a very broad participation of donor 
                                                 
4 This document focuses on addressing the needs of internally displaced people (IDPs), as well as 
demobilised soldiers and their families. Mention is made of IDPs and refugees in Uganda and 
Tanzania from the early 1990s, but there is no mention of the long-standing issue of Rwandan 
refugees from earlier decades located throughout the region. The return of these was fundamental to 
the agenda of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). This omission reflects a lack of understanding about 
the broader regional dynamics of the conflict, and intentional and unintentional ‘blindness’ of the 
international community towards the brewing cataclysm (see Uvin 1998; Melvern 2000; Adelman and 
Suhrke 1996). The preparations for the 1993 RT reflected strong external faith in the flawed Arusha 
process: “With the signature of the Peace Agreement at Arusha on 4 August 1993, Rwanda resolved 
to embark upon a new era. Filled with challenge no doubt but also filled with hope… the return to 
peace and the possibility of sharing responsibility in running the nation’s affairs offer an opportunity 
for a thorough reordering of the economy and of public finances” (UNDP 1994a: 10). 
 97 
countries, observer states from Africa, multilateral agencies and international NGOs. 
Several thematic meetings were also held during this period on issues like food 
security, capacity building and humanitarian assistance. Primarily aimed at 
mobilising funds, these pledging conferences also offered the new GoR the 
opportunity to present itself to the international community and to put forward its 
plans and programmes for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Although the RT process 
was traditionally an occasion to present such agendas, it appears to have increasingly 
become an instrument for mobilising resources for post-conflict countries in the 
1990s. Consequently, the GoR was seen as somewhat unique in using the RT not 
only to dialogue with the international community on its political concerns but also 
to present concrete programmes (Stephens 1999).5 
The force behind the RT was the UNDP, which provided technical assistance to 
plan and organise the events, to monitor outcomes, and to prepare documentation and 
programmes. Given the severe shortage of capable manpower within the GoR at the 
time, it fell to the UNDP to ‘take such matters in hand’.6 Indeed, support from the 
UNDP seemed to centre more on producing documents for the conferences than 
supporting Ministries to prepare them themselves, raising questions about the voice 
of the GoR in this process (UNDP/UNOPS 1997: 7). By the July 1996 RT, the World 
Bank was becoming increasingly involved, leading to some friction between the 
agencies. While the UNDP was helping to prepare a series of thematic papers, the 
World Bank was putting its energies into the Medium-Term Development Policy 
Framework Document 1996-98 and the accompanying Public Investment 
Programme (GoR 1996). 
Despite the strong hand of the multilateral agencies in the RT process, from the 
outset the GoR struck a clear tone about its expectations. It was faced with a 
mammoth task, with very scant resources, and felt that the international community 
had a responsibility to respond: 
the implementation of this programme will make it possible to restore the 
situation to "normal" by 1996 and will genuinely promote national 
reconciliation and the construction of a new Rwanda. On the other hand, if the 
programme were not carried out, if the people continued to live in a state of 
almost total deprivation and to depend on international humanitarian aid for 
their survival, if the State were left without the resources to play its proper part, 
if people lacked the means to pick themselves up and get on with their lives, 
insecurity would in all likelihood continue to prevail and the international 
community will again have to intervene in the face of an emergency. The 
Rwandese people therefore appeal to their partners to help them to achieve 
genuine human development on a new and lasting basis. (GoR 1995: 1) 
The outcome of the RT process was disappointing for the GoR, however. Only a 
small proportion of the pledged funds were disbursed and only limited resources 
actually reached the Government. Donors preferred to use other channels, as the 
intervention of the UN Special Representative to Rwanda at the July 1995 Mid-Term 
Review meeting demonstrates:  
                                                 
5 This viewpoint was also expressed by a former UN Resident Representative in Rwanda (interview, 
Brussels, 27 May 2004).  
6 Interview, UNDP project coordinator, Minecofin, Kigali, 16 April 2004. 
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all of us who attended the Geneva Conference were encouraged by its major 
achievement in mobilizing, in terms of pledges, an impressive amount of 
financial resources. The Government then waited during the next few months 
expecting that most of the pledged resources will automatically flow to Rwanda 
to meet the costs of salary payments and rehabilitation tasks. Their initial hope 
was not readily realized as the donor countries and international organizations 
moved through the time consuming process of making commitments, 
programming, disbursement and delivery. The Government had also to realize 
that much of donor contributions continue to flow to the humanitarian relief 
activities in support of internally displaced instead of those who have returned 
to their communes in need of rehabilitation. (UNDP 1995c: 60) 
Indeed, by September 1995, of the $707.3 million pledged under the RT process, 
$523.1 million had been committed and only $245.1 million disbursed. Of this 
amount, 31% was outside the priorities of the Rwanda Recovery Programme (Kumar 
1996: 30). This record did not improve greatly over time. Of $2.8 billion pledged 
between 1995 and 1997, only about $1.5 billion or 65% was disbursed (Baaré, 
Shearer and Uvin 1999: 62). Moreover, aid flowing into Rwanda transited through a 
wide range of channels. Table 5.2 provides a breakdown of aid between 1995 and 
1997, during which time 35% of aid came from bilateral donors, 29% from UN 
agencies, 30% from other multilaterals and 8% from NGOs (UNDP 1998: 25). By 
1997 emergency aid was diminishing and investments were rising. This table also 
shows the high proportion of aid provided in the form of technical assistance (17-
18%). Balance of Payments Support to the tune of $113.2 million was provided in 
1995, mainly as debt relief with bilateral donors paying off the arrears on debts 
incurred by the former regime to the World Bank, the IMF and AfDB.  
 
Table 5.2 : Breakdown of Aid to Rwanda 1995-1997 
 1995 1996 1997 
 $ million % $ million % $ million % 
Technical Assistance 87 17 86.2 17 103.4 18 
Emergency 181.8 36 234.1 48 57.8 10 
Balance of Payments 
Support 
113.2 22 31.7 6 37.4 7 
Investment 121.4 24 140.2 28 238.4 42 
Unspecified 3.2 1 0,4 0 131.6 23 
Total 506.6 100 492.6 100 568.6 100 
Source: (UNDP 1998: 25) 
 
There are different explanations about why limited funds flowed directly to the 
GoR at this time. As we have seen, a large proportion of aid was allocated to refugee 
and displaced peoples’ camps rather than the Rwandan administration. Disbursement 
was also affected by the bureaucratic procedures of donors which were often ill-
adapted to realities on the ground. Projects were often too oriented by the perceptions 
of the implementing institutions rather than being designed in participation with local 
experts or the ultimate beneficiaries. Translating aid pledges into actions was 
hampered by the weak absorption capacity of the Rwandan institutions and economy, 
where qualified manpower and systems to programme, manage and monitor 
activities were lacking. Coordination of aid was a major problem, partly due to the 
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weak institutional capacity of the GoR and partly due to donor systems, complicated 
still further by the vast number of actors involved. Poor information flows and donor 
preferences based more on expediency than on any analysis of real needs led to 
overlap in some sectors and geographic areas, inconsistencies in the practices of 
different donors, and neglect of other sectors (Stephens 1999: 8; UNDP and GoR 
1999: 19, 53).7 The overall result was that some projects were not fully carried out 
for lack of resources and others were encumbered by delays (UNDP 1998). At the 
same time, the GoR was clearly receiving some support from donors. The UNTF 
financed a series of projects aimed at rehabilitating and strengthening government 
institutions, and projects were being undertaken by different multilateral donors. By 
1996 many bilateral donors had restarted direct programmes, such as Belgian support 
to the Ministry of Justice and German support to the Ministry of Finance (UNDHA 
1996). Moreover, many donors provided in-kind support to the GoR, ranging from 
substantial technical assistance to strengthen institutional capacity to the provision of 
small but essential items on an ad-hoc basis to ministries, such as office equipment 
and vehicles.  
There is no evidence to suggest that the GoR refused this material and technical 
support, although most of it was going directly to line ministries rather than the 
central Finance and Economic Planning ministries. This contrasts with the public 
frustration of the GoR about the international response to Rwanda’s needs. It was 
particularly aggrieved about the limited resources coming to the Government’s 
central budget in contrast to the quantities flowing to the refugee camps outside 
Rwanda’s borders. Despite the large amounts pledged, few resources were actually 
provided to allow the GoR to implement its own programmes, many of which 
remained under-funded. One example is the programme presented at the Mid-Term 
Review in July 1995 to address refugees and repatriation, an area of core concern to 
donors, in which the GoR sought to focus attention on the developmental and 
rehabilitation side of the refugee question away from the humanitarian side (Stephens 
1999: 10). Donors, however, preferred to use multilateral channels to deliver relief 
rather than supporting the GoR’s own programme. The GoR consequently vacillates 
between thanking the international community for its support and chastising donors 
for not providing the resources to deal with the aftermath of a crisis which they had 
done nothing to prevent. As far as the GoR was concerned the international 
community had been inextricably implicated in the crisis through its implicit and 
explicit support for the Habyarimana regime and through the actions of the UN 
Security Council.8 Speeches by high-level Rwandan officials at the RT conferences 
demonstrate a growing bitterness that donors were failing to treat Rwanda as an 
exceptional case.9  
                                                 
7 One example provided by a Rwandan official was of micro-finance projects where rates of interest 
varied from district to district depending upon which donor or NGO happened to be active at a given 
time; similar situations were observed for the delivery of public services, such as housing, water and 
schools (Interview, CEPEX, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kigali, 9 October 2003). 
8 For example, Juvenal Nkusi (Head of the Rwandan National Assembly at the time) states ‘In the 
past, Rwanda benefited from aid which allowed it to build schools, health centres, cultural centres, 
meeting halls, etc. Public and private organisations and NGOs invested, but they invested in a bad 
system, one which swept it all away in 100 days!’ (UNDP 1995a: 58, translated from French).  
9 See the interventions of President Bizimungu, Prime Minister Twagirimungu, Planning Minister 
Birara and Vice-President Kagame (UNDP 1995a ); Prime Minister Rwigema and Planning Minister 
Birara (UNDP 1996a).  
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These interventions also displayed frustration that much of the aid was transiting 
NGOs and implementing agencies without the GoR being sufficiently informed; that 
agencies were not always respecting the priorities of the GoR; that agencies were not 
transparent enough in their actions yet the GoR would be accountable for the use of 
resources; that aid was too oriented towards donor sectors of interest (such as 
justice); and that aid was too emergency-focused with negative consequences, such 
as the provision of food aid affecting the normalisation of rural food production. The 
Government was concerned that it would be “seen by the people as having 
surrendered responsibility for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country” to 
external agencies (UNDP 1995a: 144). 
This reflects the question of GoR ‘ownership’ of aid. Throughout this period, the 
GoR was demanding greater control over resources in the name of policy coherence 
and to ensure that aid was attuned with GoR programmed sectoral priorities. At the 
conferences, the GoR presented its plans for better internal coherence between 
ministries, with overall responsibility lying with the Ministry of Planning, and for 
better external coordination, particularly the circulation of information between 
headquarters and donor representatives on the ground.  
The GoR’s strongest criticism, however, was of aid delivered by NGOs, often 
without GoR knowledge. In 1995, the GoR Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social 
Integration had established, with UN support, the Humanitarian Assistance 
Coordination Unit which acted as a forum for information sharing and regular 
meetings between the GoR, UN agencies and NGOs. Relations were increasingly 
strained, however, and in December 1995 the GoR suspended the operations of 18 
NGOs and 38 were told to leave within a week, of which one third were French 
(Baaré et al. 1999: 14). While recognising the value of NGO work, the GoR was 
nevertheless overtly hostile:  
The NGO community has greatly assisted the population of Rwanda… The 
success however pronounced cannot overshadow the feeling or the debate 
relating to the efficiency/effectiveness relative to the amount of funding 
provided to Rwanda through NGOs. (GoR 1997: 26) 
Reports produced in 1996 and 1997 claimed NGOs were uncontrolled, 
uncoordinated, competitive, diverting human resources from the Government, often 
overlapping in some areas while completely neglecting others, not cooperating in 
evaluations, not transparent about budgets or activities, lacking in qualified staff, 
spread too thinly, and encouraging limited knowledge transfer (GoR 1997).  
However, poor performance, slow disbursements and inefficiency were not just 
attributable to bureaucratic procedures. Underlying the provision of resources was a 
growing concern over political events within Rwanda and the region which affected 
donors’ perceptions of the new regime in Kigali, particularly those with a more long-
standing presence in the country.  
 
Socio-political context and donor responses 
The Round Table meetings did not take place in a vacuum, and interventions at 
the conferences clearly demonstrated donor preoccupations with the turn of events in 
Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. As soon as it had taken power, the new regime 
in Kigali had to reassure the international community of its commitment to creating a 
climate of peace and security, to achieving national unity and democracy through the 
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establishment of a broad-based government, and to addressing the issue of refugees. 
Indeed, the return of the refugees and the treatment of IDPs dominated discussions 
throughout 1995 and 1996. For the donors, addressing this question was considered 
essential to creating a foundation for reconciliation and economic recovery, including 
assuring internal security, establishing an effective justice system, respecting human 
rights, and democratisation. This was present beneath the surface at the January 1995 
RT despite the generally positive atmosphere: expectant on the part of the GoR, and 
supportive on the part of donors. The July 1995 meeting was another matter, a 
reminder that the internal situation was far from stable:  
donor countries and international organisations were concerned as the number 
of arrests and the security situation began to deteriorate in many parts of the 
country. Mutual doubt reached its peak at the time of the outbreak of the Kibeho 
events in late April. (UNDP 1995a: 60) 
The Kibeho incident referred to here was something of a watershed in post-
genocide relations between the GoR and the international community, brought up 
frequently by those analysing post-genocide relations (see da Câmara 2001; Pottier 
2002). In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the new regime was faced with 
rebuilding the economy of the country from scratch, but also with ongoing security 
concerns from hostile elements located within and outside its borders. Internally, the 
main issue was the Zone Turquoise, a ‘safe humanitarian zone’ established in the 
south-west of the country by the French during the genocide to which many Hutu, 
including members of the Habyarimana government, fled as the RPA advanced 
(Terry 2002: 163). Camps for IDPs in this area became “festering sores where former 
Interhamwe hid and from which they carried out terrorist raids” (Prunier 2002: 363). 
In April 1995 the GoR took decisive action to empty by force the final camp at 
Kibeho, resulting in the massacre of thousands of people. The number of casualties, 
whether they were innocent civilians or armed Interhamwe, is highly disputed. 
Prunier sets the figure at around 4000 drawing on the eyewitness account of a 
UNAMIR doctor, noting that newspaper reports mentioned around 2000 deaths 
(Prunier 2002: 363); the GoR on other hand admits to the deaths of just over 300 
people in its operation to “liberate the innocent population from the genocidaires 
who were holding them hostage” in what it termed “a sanctuary of criminals” (GoR 
1999a: 4).10  
This incident led a number of donors to suspend some of their aid, including 
Belgium and the European Commission (Pottier 2002: 165). Both the Belgian 
cooperation minister of the time, Eric Derycke, and the Dutch cooperation minister, 
Jan Pronk, condemned the massacre as ‘brutal’ and ‘planned’ (quoted in Pottier 
2002: 77). The reaction was by no means uniform, however, with the USA and UK 
backing the GoR over the incident (idem: 165-166). Much of this aid was resumed 
by July 1995 after the GoR published a report into the incident, but the events had 
the effect of planting “seeds of doubt” for several donors about the GoR.11 At the 
July 1995 RT, the Belgian representative stated that Kibeho had eroded the mutual 
                                                 
10 Interhamwe, meaning ‘those who work together’, was the name of the militia created by the 
Habyarimana regime which was widely responsible for the slaughter during the genocide. 
Génocidaires is the term used in Rwanda both by French and English speakers to describe 
perpetrators of genocidal acts.  
11 Interview, FCO official, London, 4 June 2004. The British response to Kibeho was to accept the 
explanation given by the GoR of an operation ‘gone wrong’.  
 102 
understanding between partners (UNDP 1995a: 97). For the Dutch it constituted a 
“serious crisis of confidence and a break in otherwise encouraging political, 
economic and social developments” (idem: 116).  
The question of hostile militias located within the IDP camps inside Rwanda was 
the thin end of a much broader problem, however. The refugee camps, located very 
close to Rwanda’s borders in eastern Zaire, housed genuine refugees, killers evading 
justice and members of the former regime. Co-opting humanitarian aid and 
controlling to a great extent the population within the camps, the former regime was 
able to prepare itself for an armed return to Rwanda, with the tacit support of the 
Zairian authorities. Raids into Rwanda launched from the camps began soon after the 
exodus creating a climate of insecurity within Rwanda (Terry 2002). This situation 
was recognised by the humanitarian agencies, giving rise to a moral dilemma for 
many and the withdrawal of some, such as Médécins Sans Frontières from the 
Zairean camps in September 1994 and the Tanzanian camps in November 1994 
(Prunier 2002: 313). The presence of the camps also exacerbated ethnic tensions in 
eastern Zaire (Longman 2002; Pottier 2002; Prunier 2002; Terry 2002).  
Although the destabilizing effects of the camps and Rwanda’s legitimate security 
concerns were recognized by the international community, no consensus was reached 
about how to deal with the problem. The refugee question came up for discussion 
frequently in donor talks with the GoR, as well as whether the GoR should be 
attempting to negotiate a settlement with the former regime. Indeed, a pattern 
emerges from RT reports between those donors concentrating on technical remarks, 
such as concerns about absorption capacity of aid and institutional strength, and 
others making more political statements, in effect laying down conditions for their 
support. In the former group fall donors like Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, 
Ireland, Italy, the UK and Sweden. The latter group includes Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and France, whose concerns focused on: 
the return of refugees; property rights; impunity, justice proceedings and prison 
conditions; reconciliation and dialogue with Rwandans outside the country, including 
in the refugee camps; democracy and human rights (disappearances, arbitrary arrests, 
detentions without trial); and dialogue with neighbouring countries. For some of 
these donors, the resumption of bilateral aid in 1995, suspended during the genocide, 
was conditional upon certain demands. For example, “the respect of human rights, 
the rule of law and democracy [were] prerequisites for a normalisation of political 
relations and cooperation” with Germany; Belgian aid was conditional upon aid 
benefiting the entire population, being proportional to political progress, and 
favouring real reconciliation (UNDP 1996a). The USA, Norway and the European 
Union were also making more political statements by mid 1996.  
The issues raised here reflect the second major concern of donors during this 
period, namely that of Rwanda’s internal governance. Indeed, as Prunier observes: 
The terrible paradox of Rwanda’s situation in the aftermath of the genocide was 
that, while it needed economic aid above all else in order to try and make a 
fresh start, the main preoccupation of the potential foreign donors was that the 
political conditions should be right. (Prunier 2002: 328)  
In forming the Transitional Government of National Unity on 17 July 1994, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) committed itself to establishing a power-sharing, 
broad-based government during a transition period leading to multiparty elections. 
The Transitional National Assembly was created in November 1994. In doing so, the 
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RPF was abiding by the terms of the Arusha Accords signed in August 1993, albeit 
with some modifications. The Transitional Government only included those parties 
which had not actively participated in the genocide, and the position of the RPF 
within the Government was strengthened (Reyntjens 2004). By December 1994, the 
Transitional Government had adopted a Declaration of Principles for the ‘New 
Rwanda’, laying out its vision for political, economic and social reform, which we 
will return to in chapter 6.  
At the same time, the new regime was also carving out its political space in a 
hostile internal environment, where stability was not yet fully established. Accounts 
indicate that not all members of the new government were on the same wavelength, 
with the “precarious security situation, as well as the latent ethno-political tensions 
which had been radicalized during the genocide, [beginning] to cause serious dissent 
in the new government” (Kimonyo, Twagiramungu and Kayumba 2004: 7). Space 
for freedom of political expression was limited in order to combat divisionary 
politics and to contain internal security. The early years following the genocide saw 
frequent re-organisation of government ministries and Cabinet reshuffles (Reyntjens 
1999a, 2001). There were incidences of human rights abuses committed by soldiers 
and left largely unaddressed (Prunier 2002: 324-325). By the second half of 1995, 
prominent politicians including Prime Minister Faustin Twagirimungu, the Interior 
Minister and the Justice Minister had resigned and many prominent members of 
government and the civil service were fleeing the country amid allegations of 
discrimination and violations of human rights (Reyntjens 2004). Such events led to 
criticism of the internal political process in Rwanda, condemning the concentration 
of power in the hands of a small RPF clique (Reyntjens 1999a). This situation 
becomes more important by 1997, as we shall see.   
These events are reflected in the statements being made by donors at the RT 
conferences, in their demands on human rights, democratisation and reconciliation. 
Behind these statements lies the fact that many donors were still coming to terms 
with their own implication in Rwanda’s crisis and had not reached anything like 
consensus on what they thought of the new regime. On the one hand, donor support 
reflected a sense of moral responsibility towards Rwanda. At the January 1995 RT 
the United Nations’ statement highlighted the “humanitarian duty” of donors to 
respond to Rwanda’s needs, and Belgium urged the international community to 
assume its responsibilities (UNDP 1995b). On the other hand, the more critical 
statements and demands at the RT conferences generally came from those donors 
who were important players prior to the genocide, such as France, Belgium and 
Germany. For several donors, this was a period of soul-searching about what had 
happened in a country widely portrayed as a ‘development success story’ in the 
1980s and even early 1990s (Uvin 1998). A comprehensive study of the international 
response to the crisis was commissioned by the Danish Government (Eriksson 1996); 
Switzerland, Canada and the USA conducted their own studies (Larose-Edwards 
1994; Kumar 1996; Voyame, Friedli, Gern and Keller 1996); Belgium and France 
held parliamentary enquiries, published in 1997 and 1998. Academics in these 
countries also explored their countries’ involvement.12  
As we saw earlier with regard to aid flows, the GoR reacted quite strongly to the 
response of the international community to the crisis. The stances being taken by 
                                                 
12 On the roles of France and Belgium pre-genocide see for example Verschave (1994), Willame 
(1997), Ambrosetti (2000), Willame (2000) and Prunier (2002).  
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donors on refugees and democratisation raised considerable bitterness, especially 
demands that the GoR negotiate with the former regime and allow the early return of 
the refugees without true comprehension of the complexity of the problems. Prunier 
writes how these demands were met with “uncomprehending amazement from the 
new authorities” (Prunier 1997: 315), more so as it was clear that there was little 
remorse evident amongst the génocidaires and that the calls for national 
reconciliation and a regional dialogue were coming from donors implicated in the 
crisis, such as France and Belgium.13 Speeches by senior Rwandan political figures 
at the Round Tables in July 1995 and July 1996 indicate that the GoR was in favour 
of democratisation but was adamant that it would not enter into dialogue with “any 
old association whose principal objective is to sow confusion” (UNDP 1996a: 68). 
This experience appears to have left a lasting trace amongst Rwandan officials, with 
one informant describing the conditions as “shocking” and aimed at “irritating the 
government as much as possible”.14 Moreover, Stephens notes how Rwanda was 
subject to “unfairly heavy scrutiny of its domestic and sub-regional political actions”, 
going beyond economic reform and good governance to “specific intrusions into 
areas that touched on Rwandan national security” such as human rights, the judiciary 
and involvement in the DRC. This gave the GoR the sense that political 
conditionality “was being unequally applied to Rwanda in comparison to other 
neighbouring countries” (Stephens 1999: 20). 
At the same time, despite this rhetoric coming from donor agencies, in reality the 
international community did little to force GoR compliance or to hold the GoR to 
account for human rights abuses. Indeed, there was a positive lack of pressure with 
regard to suspected RPF human rights violations, which reflects the broader 
phenomenon of ‘genocide credit’, whereby many donors gave the new Government 
considerable leeway. As Prunier observes,  
any hint that the RPF might be guilty of massive human rights violations is 
immediately countered by the present regime with an indignant reminder of the 
genocide, and since the international community has lost any moral right to call 
the RPF to task because of its passivity during that tragic time, the question is 
unresolved. (Prunier 2002: 362) 
Likewise, there was a limited reaction when the Alliance of Democratic Forces for 
the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), backed by Rwanda and Uganda, took 
decisive action to close the refugee camps in Zaire by force in October 1996, and 
then went on to topple the Mobutu government in Zaire within five months (Pottier 
2002). Terry notes how the GoR denied direct involvement in this operation until 
July 1997 although its involvement was widely assumed; ultimately the closure of 
the camps suited the international community which had reached an impasse on what 
to do (Terry 2002: 184-185). The closure of the camps led to a mass return of over a 
million refugees in less than two months from Zaire and Tanzania. The changing 
demands on the GoR brought about by this mass influx, coupled with the GoR’s 
disappointment with the mobilisation of resources through the RT mechanism led to 
                                                 
13 See, for example, the statement of the Belgian Secretary of State for Development Cooperation in 
January 1995, calling for dialogue with former civil servants and soldiers (those who are not guilty of 
genocide) to facilitate their reintegration, as well as dialogue with neighbouring countries and the 
organisation of a national debate on reconciliation (UNDP 1995b: 123-124). Such demands also came 
from the USA in 1995 (Terry 2002: 172). 
14 Interview, UNDP project coordinator, Minecofin, 16 April 2004. 
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a new approach being adopted.15 It increasingly turned away from the UN towards 
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for support. 
 
 
From Emergency Assistance to Budget Support: Rwanda as a ‘special 
case’ 1997-2000 
 
During the post-emergency period of 1994 to 1996 there was general agreement 
amongst donors about the need to help with reconstruction and rehabilitation in 
Rwanda. However, we have also seen that not all donors were thinking alike, with 
some taking a more critical stance towards the new Government than others. 
Between 1997 and 2000, this divergence in views began to come out more strongly. 
On the one hand, there were positive assessments of the progress the GoR was 
making in terms of establishing social, economic and political order. To support 
these efforts, various attempts were made at mobilising direct support for the GoR. 
On the other hand, continuing insecurity in some parts of the country and in the 
wider region, compounded with questions about the intentions of the regime with 
regard to the internal political process raised concerns in other quarters. A stark 
difference emerged between the IFIs and a few ‘new’ bilateral donors on one side, 
and a larger group of more critical, often ‘traditional’ donors, on the other.  
By 1997, new avenues were opening up for the GoR for assistance. In the minds 
of Rwandan officials, the RT process had achieved as much as could be expected, 
although the UN continued to support thematic group activities in 1997 and 1999 
with the aim of developing priority sector strategies (Stephens 1999: 12), as we saw 
in chapter 4 (footnote 9), and the Trust Fund continued until 2000. The 
circumstances facing the GoR were changing rapidly, with policy barely keeping 
pace. With the return of the refugees, sectoral programmes prepared during 1996 
were quickly outdated, and the planned RT Mid-Term Review of 1997 and full RT 
for 1998 never took place. By this time many bilateral donors were re-establishing 
bilateral programmes and representations in Rwanda, leading to less reliance on UN 
agencies. Moreover, the IFIs were producing positive assessments of Rwanda’s 
progress in its economic recovery (IMF 1997; World Bank 1997). This period 
therefore saw an overlapping of emergency aid and reconstruction aid with the 
regime expressing a desire to move rapidly from an emergency situation to one of 
sustainable development. Turning to the IFIs as a means of accessing the necessary 
resources to cope with the budgetary pressures caused by the return of the refugees 
and to fund longer term development plans was especially important in light of 
decreasing aid resources. As we saw in figure 3.2 (p.51) the reduction in aid 
following the closure of the camps was not accompanied by a rise in support for the 
resettlement process. As in the earlier period, this was greeted with frustration by the 
GoR: 
                                                 
15 One informant was of the opinion that the GoR had never really had any faith in the RT process; 
that they were persuaded into it by the UN. The July 1996 meeting was recalled as a ‘disaster’ and a 
‘non-event’ with the GoR making inflammatory statements, signs of donor fatigue, and concerns 
about human rights (telephone interview, former UK civil servant, 23 August 2004). Another called 
the same meeting ‘awful’, adding that the RT process was badly managed throughout (interview, 
former UK civil servant, London, 2 June 2004). 
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The Government, in reality, received very little external assistance to respond to 
this massive refugee return.16   
In 1997 Rwanda began to negotiate an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) with the IMF which was signed in June 1998 (GoR 1999a: 62). Officials 
admitted that perhaps Rwanda was not quite ready at this stage, but they also felt that 
Rwanda had little choice if it wanted to secure resources, and loans would also allow 
for greater control.17 This situation shifted coordination processes away from the UN 
agencies and brought the World Bank more to the fore, with Rwanda acquiring 
Consultative Group status. As we saw in table 3.7 (page 60) the IFIs had been 
present throughout the emergency years, in particular the World Bank, mobilising 
donor support for emergency grants worth $20 million in August 1994, $50 million 
in January 1995 and another $50 million in 1997 (World Bank 1995; Kumar 1996: 
42; IMF 2004).18 In 1997, the IMF approved two emergency post-conflict credits to 
Rwanda of $12 million and $8 million (IMF 1997).  
In July 1997, at the request of the GoR, a meeting was organised by the World 
Bank in Paris to mobilise budget support to meet the challenges of settlement and 
reintegration, as well as to continue the socio-economic reconstruction of the country 
(World Bank 1997: 3). This was set out in the Reintegration, Reconstruction and 
Transition Programme, designed by the GoR, World Bank and UNDP, discussed 
with donors in December 1996 (Minecofin 2004b) and adopted in March 1997. The 
World Bank’s background paper for the 1997 meeting laid down plans to improve 
Rwanda’s economic management and focus attention on education, health and public 
services, while rationalizing the civil service. It noted commitments to the budget 
from the AfDB, the Netherlands, and the EC with small amounts in counterpart funds 
from Belgium and Japan (World Bank 1997: 7). For its part, the GoR called for 
direct budget support to help service internal and external debt, to launch the 
demobilization programme, to provide the initial basis for the Genocide Survivor’s 
Fund and to support general development programmes, helping to improve 
absorption capacity.19   
The organisation of this meeting by the Bank was a clear demonstration of the 
changing coordination system with the IFIs replacing the UN as the prime movers. 
This was not uncontested, however, as communications between the World Bank and 
the UN in 1998 indicate.20 Tensions were mentioned by Stephens (1999: 21) and by a 
number of informants. The Bank claimed that it should have the lead role as it was 
more involved in most sectors and the UN accused the Bank of undermining the RT 
process, with neither institution wanting to cede control. One official in Kigali 
described the UNDP as seeing itself as the ‘absolute master’ of the coordination 
process over the 1994-1998 period, taking a paternalistic approach towards the GoR, 
                                                 
16 Speech of Minister J-B Birara, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Donor meeting on 
budget support, Paris 24 July 1997 (translated from French).  
17 Interviews, Minecofin, 5 and 16 April 2004. One UN informant saw this move as a GoR desire to 
project an image to the outside world of a stable Rwanda (interview, former UN Resident 
Coordinator, Brussels, 27 May 2004). 
18 Disbursement of the early credits was problematic, however. Kumar (1996: 29) observes that by the 
end of 1995 direct funding to GoR under the WB credit had not been disbursed. The earlier allocation 
of $20 million in August 1994 saw a weak disbursement record also, with only 60% of the first 
tranche of $11 million spent by January 1995.     
19 Speech of J-B Birara, Paris 24 July 1997 (op.cit.).  
20 Fax messages between UNDP Kigali and UNDP Headquarters, dated 09.06.98 and 20.05.98. 
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and wanting to increase its role by undertaking its own projects. For another 
informant, the overlap and tensions merely added to GoR perceptions of the lack of 
unity within the international community.  
The 1997 meeting was not a success; indeed, one informant said that it ‘failed 
completely’.21 No official written record could be traced and it apparently failed to 
rally donors due to the location (in France) and the timing, given the outbreak of the 
insurgency in the northwest of the country in May 1997 and alleged violations of 
human rights committed by the RPA, to which we will return below. The cause of 
budget support was not dropped, however, and a further meeting was convened in 
Sweden in 1998, again oriented towards mobilising direct support for the GoR. The 
meeting was chaired by the World Bank, but by this time the GoR was receiving 
increasing support from new, bilateral quarters, notably the UK and Sweden. The UK 
in particular was becoming a strong proponent of the new Government in Kigali.  
As we saw in chapter 3, prior to the genocide the UK had provided no bilateral 
assistance to Rwanda. It established a presence in the immediate aftermath which, 
although negligible in monetary terms over the 1994 to 1997 period, was highly 
supportive of the new regime in political terms. The UK government which came to 
power in 1997 heralded a new commitment to international development, and 
Rwanda became a focal point of UK aid. By 1999 the UK was Rwanda’s principal 
bilateral donor, providing substantial quantities of budgetary and institutional 
support. The UK, and to a lesser extent, Sweden began to push a new agenda of 
support for Rwanda, fighting its corner on the international stage, providing aid 
directly to the GoR, and ushering in a new phase in coordination meetings in 
Brussels and Stockholm in 1998, London in 1999, then Kigali since 2000. These 
meetings had a different flavour to the RT conferences which had been about 
mobilising funds through pledging. Now the emphasis was on a dialogue between 
partners to muster support for Rwanda’s development programmes, with the GoR 
calling for long-term and flexible support to address education, health and poverty, 
through budget support and external debt relief. The UK had a strong hand in 
organising these meetings; it saw the RT process as badly managed and was keen to 
help Rwanda gain Consultative Group status with the IFIs in order to address hard 
questions on the budget at a time when it was preparing a budget support programme 
for Rwanda. The UK’s presence on the Boards of the IFIs gave it weight in pushing 
this agenda.22  
The Brussels meeting, held at the British Embassy on 18 May 1998, and the 
Stockholm meeting in July 1998 sought to focus attention on Rwanda as a ‘special 
case’ for assistance in light of its specific circumstances. This term peppers the 
documentation of these meetings, with the GoR presenting “the ‘special’ case of its 
position”23 and the press release from Stockholm highlighting how “donors 
recognized that Rwanda [was] a special case.”24 Policy papers produced by some 
donors around this time mirror this language:   
                                                 
21 Interview, Director of Macro-Economy, Minecofin, 2 March 2004. 
22 Interview, former UK civil servant, 2 June 2004. 
23 Donald Kaberuka ‘Rwanda’s External Financing Requirements for the Transition from Emergency 
to Sustainable Development 1998-2000’, Statement prepared by the Rwandese Authorities for the 
Stockholm Meeting, June 2-3 1998. 
24 Press release, Donor Meeting on Rwanda, June 2-3 1998, Stockholm. 
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The case for treating Rwanda as a special case remains valid today as in 1998. 
Rwanda needs exceptional international support in its efforts to tackle the 
legacy of the 1994 genocide, and the attendant difficulties in re-building a 
legitimate state and a tolerant society. (World Bank 1999: 11, emphasis in 
original)  
The Government of the United Kingdom recognises the efforts made and the 
progress achieved … to secure post-conflict recovery in Rwanda. It believes 
that Rwanda should be treated as a special case for international assistance. It 
recognises that without substantial, sustained and flexible support from the 
donor community it will not be possible for the Government to manage the 
difficult transition from conflict to peace and stability. (DFID 1999: 9) 
One year after the Stockholm meeting, a further gathering took place in London 
on 22-23 July 1999, instigated by UK Secretary of State for International 
Development, Clare Short, in discussion with Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame 
with the aim of laying the foundation for regular dialogue between the GoR and 
development partners.25 It followed a similar pattern to the Paris, Brussels and 
Stockholm meetings focusing primarily on budget and sector support to plug budget 
financing gaps and fund work in the social sectors. By this time poverty was 
becoming a central theme in the policy process: the UK had tabled its Country 
Strategy Paper for Rwanda (DFID 1999), the World Bank had a new Country 
Assistance Plan (World Bank 1999) and the UNDP had produced a Poverty Paper. 
The GoR had also produced a draft paper in which the foundations were laid for a 
national poverty reduction strategy (see chapter 6). Coordination and aid coherence 
were on the agenda, with the establishment of a working group to provide 
recommendations for improving aid coherence, coordinated by the UNDP which was 
given a renewed mandate for aid coordination, involving the GoR, UK, the 
Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, World Bank, IMF and the AfDB.  
However, as with earlier conferences, pledges and disbursements made at these 
meetings fell short of GoR expectations. For example, of $27 million pledged to the 
Multilateral Debt Trust Fund established in Stockholm to meet debt service 
obligations prior to eligibility for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative, only $12 million had been paid by mid-1999 from the 
UK and Sweden. Pledges made in Stockholm of $247 million in support of 
Rwanda’s economic reform programme fell well short of the $767.2 million 
requested. These pledges came from the World Bank, EC, UK, the Netherlands, 
AfDB, Sweden, Canada and Switzerland (Stephens 1999: 11-14). In London, new 
commitments were confirmed by the World Bank, AfDB, EC, UK and the 
Netherlands with total pledges amounting to $140 million (UN 2000a).  
The forces behind these meetings, the agencies getting involved in coordination 
efforts and the pledges made point to a growing gap between the IFIs and Rwanda’s 
‘new’ donors on the one hand, emerging as ‘champions’ of the GoR, and Rwanda’s 
‘traditional’ donors on the other, who seemed increasingly sceptical about the 
direction the country was going. Underlying this gap lay very different perceptions of 
the socio-political situation in Rwanda.  
                                                 
25 Letter from Clare Short to Mark Malloch-Brown, UNDP New York, dated 22 June 1999. In this 
Short states that she had discussed this idea of an informal donors meeting with Kagame, who had 
been “supportive” of the idea, to lay the foundation “for a regular and deeper GoR/donor dialogue 
around the budget”. 
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The ‘new’ versus ‘traditional’ donor debate and socio-political events 1997-
2000 
As in the previous period, the dialogue between donors and the GoR was affected 
by what was going on in the country and the region, translating for some donors into 
conditions upon aid with regard to democratisation, human rights, justice and 
regional relations. The same issues continued to underpin the donor-GoR meetings 
taking place between 1997 and 2000, deepening for some donors. While the IFIs, the 
EC, the UK and Sweden were striving to bolster support for the GoR, relationships 
with several donors were particularly strained on a diplomatic level, such as Belgium 
and France. In contrast to the earlier period when the Netherlands had been a strong 
supporter of the GoR, it was becoming more critical, and Norway and Ireland phased 
out their bilateral support altogether, as we saw in chapter 3.  
This split reflects different portrayals of the situation in the country. Some 
analyses of Rwanda around the 1997-98 period give the impression of a country 
returning to normality. By mid-1996 and into 1997 the IFIs were praising Rwanda’s 
progress and the economy was rebounding, although the GoR faced massive 
challenges to overcome structural imbalances dating back decades which had been 
compounded by the war (André 1998; Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000). Diplomatic 
representations were being re-opened. While the mass return of the refugees had 
created a new emergency for the GoR to deal with in terms of resettlement and 
reintegration, the GoR itself was insisting that the emergency was over. Although 
this drive to move beyond emergency assistance to longer term development had 
been evident in GoR rhetoric since as early as 1995, in retrospect the GoR tends to 
see the 1994-1998 period as one of emergency with a change coming in about 
1998.26  
This perceived break between 1994-97 and post-1997 came through strongly in 
interviews. Informants spoke about more direct aid flows by this time, about 
increased GoR policy-making and human capacity, but also about changes in the 
lives of ordinary people. Recent and long-term refugees were returning, people were 
picking up their lives, and a sentiment was expressed of a changed atmosphere by 
1997-98. Whether this overall sense of improvement stems from a sense of greater 
security, from increased GoR administrative and policy-making capacity, from the 
visible impact of reconstruction activities, or from people naturally starting to rebuild 
their lives after the first few traumatic years is hard to judge.  
This picture of ‘normalisation’ contrasts, however, with events in the country and 
region at the time. Indeed, in 1997 security in Rwanda was anything but assured. The 
closure of the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania in late 1996 did not remove the 
threat to Rwanda from armed militias. With their protection within Zaire 
evaporating, the options became more limited for the rebels and raids into Rwanda 
increased. This resulted in a full-blown insurgency in May-June 1997, mainly in the 
northwestern provinces of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, but also affecting the central part 
                                                 
26 A broad range of positions exist about when the emergency was considered to have ended, as early 
as 1995 in some UN documents and by the GoR within the RT framework. Later GoR documents 
often detail the emergency period as lasting from 1994 to 1998 (Minecofin 2002a), but often divided 
into an emergency period from 1995-96 with 1996-98 more a transition period of reconstruction and 
relaunching of development (GoR 1999a: 57). For Switzerland, the emergency period was considered 
to have lasted until as late as 2001.  
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of the country, coming within reach of the heartlands of Gitarama and Greater Kigali. 
With the active support of many local civilians, the aim of the insurgents (commonly 
known as ‘infiltrators’) was “to make the region ungovernable” (African Rights 
1998: 3). The outcome was socio-economic disruption, with widespread shortages, 
hunger in the most fertile region of the country, trade, farming and education 
disrupted, and widespread fear. Aid agencies withdrew from these areas, with donor 
representatives mentioning how they were only able to operate in some parts of 
country during the period.27 Moreover, donors were concerned about the handling by 
the Rwandan army of the insurgency, with many civilian casualties reported widely 
by human rights organisations (African Rights 1998).  
The insurgency was largely over by April 1998. However, a new phase of 
regional conflict broke out in August 1998, when Rwandan and Ugandan troops 
invaded the DRC, this time fighting against the Kabila regime which they had helped 
bring to power in 1996. The explanation advanced to donors for Rwanda’s 
engagement was the necessity of dealing with the “perpetrators of genocide” and of 
addressing “national security concerns”28 as hope faded of the Kabila regime 
fulfilling its promises in this regard. The realities were more complex. The official 
justification of dealing with Hutu rebels based in the eastern DRC and protecting 
Congolese Tutsi was accepted as legitimate in many quarters (see Kimonyo et al. 
2004; McNulty 1999). However, alternative motivations are also proposed, such as 
“the need to quell domestic unrest, opportunities for personal and national 
enrichment, and the desire to be a regional power” (Longman 2002). These 
alternative explanations made several donors more sceptical about the invasion, in 
contrast to their tacit approval of the rebellion which had brought down Mobutu in 
1996. As the conflict escalated into what has been termed ‘Africa’s first world war’ 
with a devastating impact on civilian life, sympathy with the Rwandan cause began 
to wane in some quarters, with consequences for aid.  
The “unifying effect on the ruling elite in Kigali” (van Hoyweghen 2000: 31) of 
the war in the DRC was set against the backdrop of growing divisions within the 
army and elite, plus resentment of the GoR by francophone Tutsi and genocide 
survivors in general. In some respects, fundamental human rights were considered to 
have improved between 1998 and 2000 with the end of the insurgency (Kimonyo et 
al. 2004: 7; Reyntjens 2004). However, reports of wider abuses by the GoR – 
disappearances, retributive justice, muzzling of political opponents, etc. – continued, 
compounded by signs of increased authoritarianism and what Reyntjens calls the 
“tutsisation of the state machinery”, that is the concentration of power in the hands of 
the Tutsi and the RPF (Reyntjens 1999a: 5).29 Although senior officials within the 
Transitional Government were drawn from different political parties, by 2000 RPF 
control over the political arena was considered “almost total” with the resignation 
and flight into exile of the President of the Parliament and the Prime Minister, and 
                                                 
27 This situation had knock-on effects for the geographic distribution of aid activities, some of which 
remain unaddressed. Cyangugu, Gikongoro, and the northwest continue to receive the least aid in 
Rwanda, partly because these areas were unstable when donors were staking out their programmes in 
1997-98. For example, the original rationale for Belgian support to particular health districts around 
Kigali was to do with the security situation when the programme was designed in 1998.  
28 Statement from Paul Kagame (read by Donald Kaberuka), delivered to Government of Rwanda / 
Donors Meeting, London 22-23 July 1999. 
29 This situation has been monitored on an annual basis by Reyntjens who has grown increasingly 
critical of the RPF regime in Kigali over the years (see Reyntjens 1997, 1999a, 2000, 2001, 2004).  
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the resignation of the President (Kimonyo et al. 2004: 7).30 Vice-President Kagame 
was subsequently sworn in as President and it came as no surprise to external 
observers and the international community when the transition period, which was 
initially due to last for five years, was extended for a further four years in 1999. The 
official explanation for this was to allow for the completion of the constitutional 
revision which ended in the adoption of a new constitution by popular referendum in 
June 2003.  
These contextual factors underpinned the meetings to mobilise more assistance for 
the GoR. The human rights situation in northwestern Rwanda, progress on 
governance, justice and the rule of law, and debates on the presence of Rwandan 
troops in Zaire were all mentioned in the press release from the Stockholm meeting, 
for example.31 Behind the scenes debates revealed a more critical picture still:  
The official interpretation of the pledges during the ensuing Stockholm meeting 
was that donors were satisfied with the GoR’s answers and saw continued 
support as the only viable option. The off-record assessments of donor 
representatives interviewed ranged from “it was a message to the GoR that 
donors are not satisfied with its record”, to ”the pledges clearly are a positive 
response to GoRs economic performance”. (Baaré et al. 1999: 32, emphasis in 
original)  
The outcome of the Stockholm meeting was consequently mixed, with some donors 
placing additional conditions on aid, some not disbursing at all and some disbursing, 
leading to an inconsistent message reflecting individual donor perspectives and 
priorities. A similar situation prevailed at the London meeting in 1999, where there 
was again disjuncture between those donors strongly supporting the GoR and donors 
withholding aid for political reasons (Stephens, 1999: 8). The intervention of 
Norway, for example, lays down strong political conditions on aid, stating that state-
to-state aid would only be unfrozen when Rwandan troops withdrew from the DRC. 
Norway was also concerned about the security situation within the country, human 
rights and the prison population.32 This led to analysts placing donors into two clear 
camps, ‘new’ and ‘traditional’, as we saw in chapter 3.  
While this was going on outside Rwanda, within Rwanda there also appeared to 
be a tangible split amongst donors. UK officials posted to Rwanda at the time 
mentioned how few donor meetings took place; those that were held were difficult 
and political with EU Heads of Mission for example concentrating on political 
issues, human rights abuses and relations with the DRC. The UK and the Netherlands 
were seen as being at opposite ends of a spectrum to France and Belgium, with the 
UK at times appearing quite out on a limb.33 This split was even present in 
geographical terms, with the ‘new’ donors located on Kacyiru Hill in Kigali, close to 
the Parliament and President’s Office, while ‘traditional’ donors had their offices in 
                                                 
30 An alternative explanation for the resignation and flight of several senior officials is the enquiries 
launched by the Transitional National Assembly in 1999 into the activities of some politicians, leading 
to allegations of corruption (see http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/index_en.htm, accessed 
17.02.03).   
31 Press release, Donor Meeting on Rwanda, June 2-3 1998, Stockholm. 
32 Statement by the representative of Norway to the Government of Rwanda / Donors Meeting, 
London 22-23 July 1999. 
33 Interviews: former UK ambassador to Rwanda 1996-1998, telephone interview, 23 August 2004; 
FCO official, 4 June 2004; former UK ambassador to Rwanda 1998-2001, 1 December 2003; former 
UK civil servant, 2 June 2004.  
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the older central part of Kigali, in Kiyovu. Nevertheless, despite these issues, aid 
continued to flow to Rwanda and by 2000 a new era dawned as regular coordination 
meetings began to take place in Rwanda in tune with the preparation of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper. 
 
 
The Shift to Rwandan Soil and the Poverty Reduction Agenda 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the GoR had only limited ‘ownership’ 
over discussions about aid instruments, flows and coordination. The Round Tables 
were run by the UNDP and the meetings to mobilise budget support were organised 
mainly by the World Bank and the UK. This is not to say that the GoR had no role; 
on the contrary. The GoR’s voice was clearly expressed in background 
documentation for these meetings, in the agendas and in the interventions made by 
Rwandan officials. It was a voice expressing frustration and bitterness at the failure 
of many donors to provide adequately for Rwanda’s needs and to understand 
Rwanda’s security and stability concerns. 
Internally, the attempts at creating mechanisms within the GoR to improve aid 
effectiveness, as outlined in chapter 4, did not overcome the persistent problems. 
These included: a lack of inter-ministerial coherence; burdensome bureaucratic 
procedures of projects which were draining essential and often senior staff from GoR 
ministries; a lack of coordination and absence of an effective interface with donor 
agencies; donors not using the budget framework as a planning tool exacerbated by 
the absence of a coherent strategy for national development priorities; projects using 
their own procedures at high cost, often scattered and with minimal impact; long 
delays in the implementation of projects; and the tendency of donors to work directly 
with line ministries or NGOs rather than coordinating through the Ministry of 
Finance (UNDP and GoR 1999). Moreover, the main meetings between the GoR and 
donors were organised by external actors and held outside the country which 
diminished GoR control over dialogue around aid. In Rwanda itself, meetings 
amongst aid actors were informal at best beyond the regular meetings of EU member 
states. Consequently, it was felt to be of vital importance “to move beyond the 
current tendency of coordination to consist of simply holding periodic meetings that 
primarily ‘exchange information’” and to develop constructive forums for aligning 
aid with Rwandan policy priorities (UNDP 1999: 44). A turning point came in 
November 2000 when the first Development Partners Meeting (DPM) was held in 
Kigali, the stage for which had been set at the London meeting in July 1999. DPMs 
were subsequently held in November 2001, November 2002 and December 2004 in 
Kigali.34  
By the time of the first DPM on Rwandan soil in November 2000, the country’s 
internal security was stabilising and indeed the occasion was used not only to outline 
ongoing problems but also to demonstrate to the international community how far 
Rwanda had come. Visits to various parts of the country were organised.35 The 
                                                 
34 No meeting was held in 2003 due to presidential and parliamentary elections. 
35 ‘Debt in Rwanda to be reduced by half in December 2000’, La Nouvelle Relève Nº413, 30 October 
to 15 November 2000. The following issue (Nº414 of 30 November 2000) carried further information 
on the coordination of aid with an article spread over the front and 3rd page on the ‘Intervention of 
Development Partners in Rwanda’.  
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insurgency in the northwest had died down, and political reforms were underway 
with the first elections held at cell level in March 1999.36 Rwanda’s policy-making 
capacity was also strengthening, with the poverty agenda taking an increasingly 
prominent place. The groundwork was laid for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) in 1999, with a participatory poverty assessment conducted over 1999-2000. 
The ESAF had been transformed into a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) in 1999 and Rwanda reached HIPC decision point in December 2000 
opening the way to debt relief (Mutebi, Stone and Thin 2001: 6). The PRSP, its 
preparation, implementation and progress, rapidly became a focal point for dialogue 
between donors and the GoR, and a central theme of discussion at the DPMs. This 
ushered in a new phase in Rwanda’s recent coordination history, one which 
emphasised that  
a new type of partnership is needed, based on mutual accountability, 
predictability of aid flows, flexibility of financing and long term commitment of 
development assistance. This requires the harmonisation of donor practices. 
(GoR 2001c) 
Commenting on aid coordination in 2001 da Câmara highlights the “uncertainty 
about which entity should provide direct leadership, or indeed, if direct leadership is 
even desirable or achievable” (da Câmara 2001: 16). Furthermore, although donors 
“acknowledge that the primary coordinating role should be taken on by 
government… they are unwilling to give the government the necessary resources, 
time or authority to actually take on this role” (idem: 18). Recognising that aid 
coordination remained problematic, at the 2001 DPM the Ministry of Finance 
presented a document entitled ‘Guidelines for Productive Aid Coordination Process 
in Rwanda’, which had been developed by the working group created at the 1999 
London meeting. The proposals set out in this document correspond greatly with the 
new aid agenda outlined in chapter 2. The emphasis was on improving the 
performance of aid, with a shift towards strengthening country ownership and the 
policy environment, untying aid, providing more budget support, and better 
integrating interventions. At the bare minimum it called for more information to be 
shared amongst partners. This document proposed that aid coordination focus on 
GoR planning and budgeting processes within the framework of the PRSP and the 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF),37 looking to the elaboration of 
sector strategies facilitated by lead ministries and lead donor agencies (GoR 2001b). 
This concept was taken a step further the following year when the ‘cluster’ system 
described in chapter 4 was agreed at the DPM of November 2002. Prior to this, 
coordination issues in Rwanda had been analysed by the Strategic Partnership with 
Africa (SPA) which noted that: 
The PRS is not (yet) providing the basis for defining a new and better aid 
partnership. In rhetoric at least, PRS-priorities are said to be the foundation on 
which donors base their support. This rhetoric is more true for those agencies 
providing, or intending to provide, budgetary assistance (e.g. World Bank, IMF, 
                                                 
36 Rwanda is divided into provinces (formerly préfectures), districts and municipalities (formerly 
communes), and cells (cellule).  
37 The MTEF is a public financial management tool which aims at “the translation of policies into 
costed public expenditure programmes designed to contribute to the policy outcomes” (Mutebi, Stone 
and Thin 2001: 22).  
 114 
EC, UK, Sweden, AfDB). However, even then there is some way to go before 
aid relationships change significantly in line with PRS-principles, with reduced 
transaction costs for GoR, and hopefully leading to a more efficient use of aid. 
(SPA 2002b: 4).  
Having endorsed the final PRSP adopted in June 2002, the GoR and donors were 
looking towards implementation and how to ensure that all priority sectors received 
adequate attention. As the above citation indicates, coordination issues were still 
problematic and the GoR once again called for more flexible, predictable and long-
term resources from donors, preferably in the form of budget support, as well as the 
alignment of donor procedures with Rwanda’s budget cycle (GoR 2002e). This led to 
the establishment of the complex structure detailed in chapter 4. The progress of this 
system, as well as more general advances in implementing the PRSP through the 
preparation of sector strategies, formed the focus of the DPM of December 2004. A 
great deal of discussion at this DPM concentrated on technical and operational 
matters, such as rural development, energy, social sector prioritisation and macro-
economic stability, and there was increasing evidence of a growing consensus around 
aid coordination instruments and practices.  
However, these technical debates around development policy and cooperation 
only formed one side of the business conducted at the DPMs. As in the earlier 
periods, the DPMs provided an occasion for dialogue on matters of concern to 
donors, namely broader political events in the country and region. The communiqués 
of all the DPMs illustrate these concerns, with core themes being internal governance 
and Rwanda’s relations with the DRC. Consequently, while there may be a clear 
“meeting of minds between Rwanda and its partners” (GoR 2001c) on more 
technical development matters, these are often overshadowed by the broader political 
context.  
 
Elections and the regional context 2000-2004 
In terms of relations with the international community, the 2000-2004 period in 
Rwanda was dominated firstly by the election process and secondly by relations 
between Rwanda and the DRC. The election process began with local elections at 
cell level in 1999 and at district level in 2001. Donors on the whole accepted the 
results as the best to be expected in the circumstances and a step on the road to 
democratisation (Uvin 2001). Other analysts were more critical, accusing the 
international community of naivety (Reyntjens 2001) and condemning the pressure 
tactics and the limited real value of the elections in light of the “context of  
authoritarian management and social conformity” (Reyntjens 1999a: 7). While 
political parties were not banned, they were subject to a strict code of conduct with 
campaigning activities beyond the halls of government severely restricted. Parties 
could not campaign outside the capital nor officially run candidates under party 
labels in local elections (ICG 2002). There was a lack of secrecy during the 1999 
elections, with voters literally lining up behind the candidate of their choice. Flaws in 
the 2001 elections were similarly noted (Reyntjens 2001; HRW 2001a; ICG 2001). 
Such criticisms contrast sharply with the GoR’s portrayal of the success of the 
system, which it claims helped to avoid violence, and of the elections as a whole. 
The GoR claimed that this had been the first time Rwandans who had grown up in 
exile had been able to vote and that these were the first transparent elections for 35 
years (GoR 1999a: 119).  
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The next step in the political reform process was the preparation and adoption of a 
new constitution through a long process of consultation which started in mid-2001 
and culminated in a referendum in June 2003.38 This paved the way for presidential 
and parliamentary elections in August and September 2003 respectively, bringing an 
official end to the transition process. In contrast to earlier elections, several donors 
threatened to withhold funding for the referendum and elections in 2003, with 
criticisms emerging from official channels and not merely from human rights groups, 
NGOs and intellectuals (Kimonyo et al. 2004). The main concern was the reduction 
in space for opposition parties to operate, a ban on the main opposition group, the 
MDR, in April 2003 and the imprisonment of former President Pasteur Bizimungu in 
2001 on the grounds of ‘divisionist’ tendencies (Uvin 2003b; Kimonyo et al. 2004). 
Similar charges were levelled against the main contender in the presidential 
elections, former Prime Minister Faustin Twagirimungu. Moreover, freedom of the 
press and expression within civil society was also limited with regard to political 
debates, with local human rights groups particularly targeted (ICG 2002: 12-13). 
Indeed, Uvin and Unsworth noted in 2002 how 
there is currently very little space for civil (or political) society in Rwanda: the 
government distrusts civil society... The last few years have seen the 
introduction of laws and practices that severely constrain civil society and free 
speech, such as restrictive laws with very broad mandates, as well as 
administrative harassment and intimidation of opponents, media, NGO and 
[Civil Society Organisation] leaders. (Unsworth and Uvin 2002: 6-7).  
From the donor side, the most critical remarks came from the European Union. 
While the EU observer missions for the referendum and the elections congratulated 
Rwanda on its steps towards democratisation and the order with which the processes 
were conducted, they raised serious concerns about the space for the opposition to 
campaign, arrests and intimidation, and irregularities (EU 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). 
Disbursement of EU support for the elections was delayed, but was eventually paid 
out towards the end of 2003.  
Despite their qualms, there was not a uniform response to the elections from 
donors. While the run-up to the referendum and elections had seen “an atmosphere of 
deep antagonism between the Rwandan government and the international 
community” (Kimonyo et al. 2004: 20),39 the reactions of donors to the elections 
displayed very different tendencies. While the Netherlands withheld their aid,40 
Belgium immediately presented their congratulations.41 As far as Reyntjens was 
concerned:  
the presidential and parliamentary elections confirmed the image of a cosmetic 
operation for international consumption… Although the international 
community was, of course, fully aware of the cosmetic nature of the whole 
exercise, it endorsed the outcome despite a few timid expressions of concern 
(for example, by the Netherlands, the US and the EU). (Reyntjens 2004) 
                                                 
38 On the constitution see ICG (2002), who accuse the RPF of manipulating the process around the 
constitution and Uvin (2003a), who seeks to draw the attention of the international community to 
flaws in the constitution. An alternative perspective is provided by Kimonyo et al.(2004) who reject 
the claims of manipulation, referring to the broad-based popular consultation.   
39 This tense atmosphere in the first half of 2003 was also commented on by several informants.  
40 ‘Rwanda seeks 2.6m for Parliament Polls’, New Vision, 5 September 2003. 
41 Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, 26 August 2003.  
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Several informants in late 2003 admitted that the elections were no doubt flawed but 
that they represented a step in the right direction and a hopeful sign that there was 
political progress in Rwanda.  
A year later, hopes of a positive trend were dampened. Indeed, throughout 2004 
there were deepening concerns that political space was closing rather than opening, 
reflecting comments made by Uvin in the run-up to the 2003 elections:  
what Rwanda is currently going through is not a process of democratization as 
much as a formal election painted on top of an increasingly totalitarian state… 
As a matter of fact, this year of so-called democratization has seen an actual 
reduction in political space. (Uvin 2003b, emphasis in original)  
Donors were becoming increasingly edgy about the concept of ‘divisionism’ which 
had been salient throughout the election process. In June 2004, the Rwandan 
Parliament endorsed a report into ‘genocide ideology’, based on the findings of a 
commission established to investigate the killing of a number of genocide survivors 
in the southwest of Rwanda and the extent of sectarian thinking in the country 
(Republic of Rwanda 2004). The report documents incidences of murder and 
persecution of genocide survivors throughout the country, and investigates sectarian 
tendencies within faith-based organisations, civil society organisations, political 
parties, public institutions and educational establishments. It presents a disturbing 
picture of entrenched discrimination and clandestine mobilisation. However, the 
picture thus painted is overshadowed by the recommendations of the report which 
call for harsh condemnation of any act of dissension against the current regime, 
particularly targeting the main political opponents from the election period, and 
calling for the dissolution of a number of NGOs, including a prominent human rights 
organisation (LIPRODHOR) and warning several international NGOs not to meddle 
in political affairs. The fallout from this report has been a further limiting of the 
space for any political opposition, with greater self-censorship amongst civil 
society.42 International NGOs spoke out against the nature of this report and the 
process by which it was publicized, as did the Catholic Church.43 The European 
Union published a formal response in October 2004, expressing its concern at the 
“liberal use of the terms ‘ideology of genocide’ and ‘divisionism’” without clearly 
defining these (EU 2004).44  
The second area of tension between the GoR and donors concerns the regional 
situation. During the early part of this period, 2000-2002, Rwanda was still 
embroiled in conflict in the DRC, with donor misgivings emerging in the DPMs. For 
example, at the DPM of 2000, donors were asking questions about a levy on the 
population to subsidize the war to which the government’s response was that it was 
merely a request for voluntary contributions, although it recognised that some people 
did not really understand this.45 Pressure was increasingly asserted on the GoR, along 
with the other parties involved, to end the conflict. In 2001 the Lusaka Accords were 
signed although it took a further agreement in Pretoria in 2002 to bring about the 
                                                 
42 See Hirondelle News Agency ‘Atmosphere of Fear in Rwanda Civil Society’, February 25 2005.  
43 See Amnesty International Press Release ‘Rwanda: Deeper into the Abyss - Waging War on Civil 
Society’, 6 July 2004; African Rights ‘A Step Backwards for Rwanda. Comment on the Parliamentary 
Recommendation to Ban 6 NGOs’, 9 July 2004. 
44 See also EU-troika démarche on the Parliamentary Report on Genocidal Ideology (23 August 
2004). 
45 Statement of Minecofin to Donor Conference, 22-23 February 2000, Kigali. 
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official withdrawal of Rwandan troops in October 2002. Some of the concerns 
expressed by donors about providing budget support or programme aid (see table 3.5, 
page 53) specifically relate to this ongoing conflict and the question of funding for 
social expenditure being diverted to military ends.  
The withdrawal of the troops was an important milestone for development 
cooperation, with donors at the 2001 DPM welcoming what is termed “the 
courageous decision” of Rwanda. The event was described as a “window of 
opportunity” to enhance and deepen cooperation on socio-economic development 
and poverty reduction. Indeed, the communiqué goes on to note that “some donors 
made specific pledges to increase their level of support and/or to begin new co-
operation procedures with Rwanda” (GoR 2002e). New resources began to be 
provided for a regional demobilisation programme through a regional basket fund 
managed by the World Bank.  
However, despite this, reports continued to emerge about the presence of 
Rwandan troops in the DRC, about human rights abuses committed by Rwandan 
troops and about the illegal exploitation of resources by people close to the Rwandan 
regime.46 Moreover, the security situation in the eastern DRC has not been resolved, 
despite the installation of a transition government in the DRC and the creation of a 
regional conference on security in the Great Lakes which held its first summit in 
November 2004. The failure of Congolese authorities to deal with the ongoing 
security threat to Rwanda from rebel groups still present in eastern DRC and still 
conducting sporadic attacks within Rwandan territory has remained a thorny issue. 
Relations between the two countries deteriorated over the course of 2004, after 
attacks in April and November, and the contentious issue of whether or not Rwandan 
troops had once again entered the DRC was a source of tension between the GoR and 
donors throughout much of 2004. The GoR was frustrated at the lack of international 
commitment to dealing with Rwanda’s security issues, as we shall see in the next 
chapter. As more and more donors began to support democratic transition processes 
in both the DRC and Burundi in 2004, the belligerent tone of the GoR was 
considered a real obstacle to progress by many donors.   
This situation underpinned most donor statements at the DPM of December 2004. 
The Netherlands statement, in its capacity at President of the EU at the time, is 
particularly illuminating. It congratulates Rwanda on its socio-economic and political 
progress of the last 10 years, but while recognising Rwanda’s legitimate security 
concerns stemming from the presence of ex-FAR and interhamwe fighters in the 
eastern DRC it “demand[s] that the Government of Rwanda withdraw without delay 
any forces it may have in the territory” of the DRC, calling on the GoR “to respect 
the sovereignty of the neighbouring states”.47 As we saw in chapter 3, the situation in 
the DRC impacted upon disbursements of budget support from both the UK and 
Sweden in 2004-05.  
                                                 
46 The UN produced four reports on the exploitation of resources in the DRC by external actors with 
the final report published in 2003 (UN 2003). See ‘DR of Congo: UN panel on plunder of resources 
publishes final report’, 28 October 2003 
(http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=8706&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo). Parliamentary 
reports were also drawn up in Belgium and the UK on this issue which demonstrates a broad concern 
about these allegations within donor countries. For more on this subject see Cuvelier and Marysse 
(2003), Willum (2001) and Braeckman (2003).  
47 Statement by Presidency of the EU, Development Partners Meeting, Kigali 10-11 December 2004. 
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At the same time, the messages emerging from donors are mixed, even confused 
at times throughout this period. On the one hand, the 2000 to 2004 period sees 
deepening collaboration between donors and the GoR around the PRSP and related 
policies, with growing consensus on the need to render aid more effective through 
the establishment of mechanisms such as those explored in chapter 4. More donors 
are providing budget support or considering moving towards a programme-style 
approach. Some donors have also increased their aid, as we saw in chapter 3. On the 
other hand, there are common concerns about governance issues and regional 
security, including signs of supportive donors, namely the UK, Sweden and the EC, 





Between 1994 and 2004, it is possible to distinguish three periods in the aid 
history of Rwanda. The first was the emergency period from 1994 to 1998, when aid 
primarily flowed in the form of humanitarian assistance through UN agencies and 
international NGOs. All the GoR could do at this time was attempt to keep a vague 
track of what was coming in. Little flowed directly through the GoR which had 
minimal capacity to manage it. Emergency programmes for rehabilitation and 
reconstruction were prepared with assistance from UN agencies and the World Bank. 
However, the rapidly changing requirements brought about by population 
movements – of refugees, displaced people and the political elite – and the unfolding 
regional security situation hampered efforts to implement a coherent policy. 
Relations between the GoR and the donor community were strained by a series of 
interconnected factors: the ongoing instability in the region; doubts on the part of 
many donors about the new regime mingled with guilt; GoR frustrations, mixed with 
bitterness, over unfulfilled pledges and support to refugee camps harbouring 
génocidaires unmatched by support to survivors of the genocide within Rwanda; and 
GoR frustration over its lack of control over aid flows. Coordination amongst the 
many agencies was limited with poor information flows, weak capacity on the GoR 
side and inter-agency rivalries.  
The second period, 1998 to 2000, revealed an evolving pattern of divergence 
between supportive and hesitant donors. Internal stability returned to Rwanda by the 
end of the period once the 1997-98 insurgency in the northwest had died down. The 
conflict with the rebels was taken outside of Rwanda’s borders as the Rwandan army 
became embroiled in the escalating conflict in the DRC. Question marks over 
Rwanda’s actions in the DRC and internal political processes rendered a number of 
donors increasingly nervous about the new regime, with some bilateral agencies 
gradually reducing their presence. This contrasted with the rise of new donors who 
were strongly supportive of the Kigali government in financial and diplomatic terms. 
The UK and Sweden, as well as the World Bank and the EC, played an increasingly 
important role in providing the Rwandan government with direct aid and fighting 
Rwanda’s case on the international stage. By this time the GoR was beginning to 
consolidate its own policy positions. The failure to mobilise sufficient resources after 
the emergency phase led the GoR to diversify its sources of funding, calling for more 
budget support and signing up to an ESAF, although not refusing project aid in any 
form. There was a shift from what was widely seen as a dysfunctional Round Table 
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process to more ad-hoc meetings calling for budget support which eventually 
consolidated into regular Development Partners Meetings. By the end of this period 
not only coordination of aid, but the type of aid, as well as ownership of the process 
were becoming increasingly salient:  
In light of Rwanda’s heavy dependence on external aid, government-donor 
coordination is both a sensitive and overriding concern for Rwandan decision-
makers. The legacy of the post-genocide era – with its well meaning but 
sometimes uncontrolled inflows of humanitarian assistance – has left a strong 
sense of the need for the Government to reassert control over the development 
aid process… Succinctly stated, the issue is not less aid, but more of the right 
kinds of aid, especially direct budgetary support as well as project assistance in 
areas that correspond to specific national priorities, whether the source is 
multilateral, bilateral or non-governmental… external funding is the first locus 
of concern in improving government-donor coordination, and it, in turn, is 
linked to the quality and relevance of external support. Implicit in discussions of 
unwanted or irrelevant aid is the question of who exactly is in the “driver’s 
seat” for aid coordination. Government has implied that during the early 
humanitarian phase there were times when it was not; allocation and 
deployment decisions were being made over which it had little control. (UNDP 
1999: 43-44)  
As the poverty agenda began to take centre stage, and as regular GoR-donor 
meetings moved to Rwandan soil, a third period can be proposed from 2000 until the 
present day. This has been dominated by the consolidation of the poverty agenda on 
the one hand, and the end of Rwanda’s political transition on the other. Donors 
demonstrated a willingness to coordinate around Rwanda’s poverty strategy, which 
linked into wider shifts in perspectives amongst the main donors and their partners 
about aid efficiency at a global level. Although various channels were used for aid, 
budgetary and sectoral programme support began to play an increasingly important 
role. However, donor alignment around the poverty agenda did not diminish 
reactions to Rwanda’s political progress, with regional security and conflict, human 
liberties and institutional governance dominating dialogue between the two sides.  
While justice cannot be fully done to the complexity of the socio-political 
evolution of Rwanda here, the above discussion demonstrates the importance of 
understanding how debates on aid efficiency in Rwanda today are strongly 
determined by the historical context. Moreover, it highlights the relationship between 
two strands of analysis: the socio-political context and technical relations. 
Discussions with several representatives of donor agencies in Rwanda revealed 
limited knowledge of how aid relations had evolved since 1994. The institutional 
memory of the GoR, on the other hand, is generally longer and the early experiences 
of the new regime in negotiating support for the country have left a trace. The 
extreme needs of the GoR in the immediate aftermath of the genocide and continuing 
high aid dependence, in the face of sometimes hostile international opinion, has 
provoked bitterness from a regime which had a profound distrust of an international 
community which had done little to halt the genocide, had actively supported the 
former regime, and did little to resolve the security concerns of Rwanda right 
through to 2004. At the same time, there has been considerable collaboration 
between the GoR and donor agencies in an attempt to improve coordination of aid 
and policy dialogue over the years with mixed results, as we saw in chapter 4.  
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Although there are core areas where convergence in donor perspectives can be 
observed, such as agreement on supporting the PRSP or general concern about 
regional tensions, tangible differences can be observed amongst donor positions. 
This is not limited to differences between individual agencies. There are also mixed 
messages coming from within donor agencies. This results in situations where donors 
are making critical statements about Rwanda’s governance record while 
simultaneously increasing their aid. As we shall see in the next chapter, this reflects 
how donor agencies engage with different aspects of the Rwandan state and its 






Dependence on Aid, Independence of Mind: Policy Positions 





When the RPF-led Government of National Unity came to power in 1994 in 
Rwanda it was faced with a massive uphill task to set the country on the road to 
lasting peace and sustainable development. Ensuring an adequate flow of resources 
to fulfil budgetary and investment requirements in the face of limited domestic 
capacity has consequently been a central concern of the Government, framing the 
policy-making process. The adoption of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) in 2002 represented a necessary step for the GoR to access additional 
external support in the form of debt relief and supplementary assistance. The GoR’s 
adherence to economic and social policies which reflect the dominant norms of 
international development has solicited a favourable response from donors. It appears 
to have made a genuine commitment to improving the living conditions of the 
Rwandese through economic growth and improving social welfare, as well as 
investing in institutional structures to enhance government effectiveness. Moreover, 
‘good governance’ has been an important policy objective throughout the last ten 
years: Rwanda is considered one of the less corrupt countries in Africa,1 a great deal 
of work is being put into strengthening the accountability of government institutions, 
and popular ‘participation’ in local affairs and national policy-making has been 
encouraged.  
However, poverty reduction and good governance only represent part of the 
broader plans of the GoR. Other elements arguably take greater precedence, such as 
security and national unity. The democratisation agenda is set within particular 
boundaries determined by these concerns and the historical legacy of the country. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, harsh criticism has been levelled at the GoR by some 
external observers, also evident within the positions adopted by many donor agencies 
which has led to friction at times. The GoR’s perspective on the international 
community is framed by its experiences of the post-genocide emergency and 
reconstruction period, when it had very little control over aid flows and external 
interventions. This led to frustrations on the part of the GoR frequently vented in a 
critical discourse about the conduct of the international community before, during 
and after the genocide. The GoR has not rejected aid, however. Rather it employs a 
combination of careful negotiation couched in the language of international 
development and sheer stubbornness to avoid compromising on its core priorities and 
to assert a degree of ‘ownership’ over policies and practice. Despite its considerable 
dependence on external assistance, the GoR maintains a clear line on what it wants.  
                                                 
1 In Transparency International’s 2005 Corruption Perception Index, Rwanda ranked joint 83rd in the 
world out of 158 countries and 9th among sub-Saharan African countries after Botswana, South 
Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Lesotho and Senegal. See 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 (accessed 16 December 
2005). 
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The mixed messages emerging from the donor community in its diplomatic and 
technical relations with the GoR reflect these different aspects of the Rwandan state. 
How donors have provided aid over the years, the divergence in their understandings 
of the GoR, and how they engage in the coordination process reflect which elements 
of the GoR’s discourse and policy positions they chose to engage with and prioritise. 
This chapter provides a deeper insight into Rwanda’s development policy, focusing 
on how the GoR employs the core concepts of the new aid agenda, including 
‘ownership’, in the face of high aid dependency. After reflecting briefly on the 
problems facing Rwanda today and the extent of dependence on external assistance, 
the analysis turns to the GoR’s policies. Firstly, we consider those areas which reflect 
a ‘meeting of minds’ with the orthodox patterns of development currently being 
pushed at the international level, focused around economic growth and human 
development with a view to poverty reduction. Secondly, it highlights those areas 
where tensions are more evident, underscoring how the GoR can be understood in 
different ways.  
 
National Policy in the Face of Aid Dependency  
 
It is not uncommon for analyses of Rwanda, particularly those emanating from 
donor institutions, to emphasise the progress that Rwanda has made since 1994: 
Following the 1994 genocide, with an estimated one-third of its population dead 
or displaced, its human capital, economic infrastructure and government 
institutions in ruins, Rwanda undertook an extraordinary national regeneration. 
(IMF 2004: 6) 
Considerable progress has been made. The economy rebounded well between 1995 
and 2001 with real GDP growth rates of over 6%, indicators for education and health 
have progressively improved, and access to public services has expanded (World 
Bank 2002; Marysse and Ansoms 2003).  However, the challenges facing the country 
remain enormous, with growth rates and social development indicators often below 
those of 1990. Around 60% of the growing population falls below the poverty line, 
over 90% of the population is engaged in agriculture, mainly on a subsistence basis, 
literacy rates stand at less than 60% and rural/urban disparities are considerable 
(World Bank 2002; Hayman 2005b: 27-28). In a recent survey, people felt that there 
had been little significant change in their living conditions (Minecofin 2004a: 26), 
poverty levels remain endemic and opportunities to improve household living 
conditions are limited.2 Moreover, the private sector is small and the potential for its 
development is limited, with access to foreign direct investment hampered by the 
country’s track record and indebted status (Minecofin 2003c: 10). Indeed, the IMF 
considers that without considerable external support for the foreseeable future, 
Rwanda’s chances of achieving its long-term objectives are slim (IMF 2004: 14).   
The civil war and genocide between 1990 and 1994 created new problems, but 
many features of the socio-economic environment pre-date the conflict, and indeed 
go part way to explaining the decades of cyclical strife in the country (Sellström and 
Wohlgemuth 1996; Uvin 1998; Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000; Verwimp 2003). If the cycle 
of violence in Rwanda is to end, then fundamental, structural problems need to be 
                                                 
2 For more on Rwanda’s poverty profile, see Hayman 2005b. 
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addressed. The expanding population (estimated to rise from 8 to around 11 million 
by 2015 (UNDP 2003: 253), high population density, few natural resources, and a 
very small industrial sector, compounded by a land-locked position in a conflict-
ridden area of central Africa, raise serious questions about Rwanda’s potential 
sources of growth. The GoR sees the future as lying in the development of human 
resources to enable the country to become a service hub in Central Africa, which will 
rely on private sector expansion (GoR 2002a). Faith is being placed in the 
opportunities afforded by membership of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community and the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). However, given Rwanda’s low starting point, 
this is a very much a long-term vision.   
Addressing Rwanda’s economic problems is not sufficient of itself, however. The 
preoccupation of both the GoR and donors is that Rwanda’s ‘pathway out of poverty’ 
requires substantial socio-political change to address long-term regional and internal 
security and stability and to foster reconciliation within a deeply divided population. 
The legacy of the genocide adds an additional socio-economic strain with regard to 
justice and support for vulnerable groups. Furthermore, there are growing 
inequalities between an urbanised elite and the mass of rural and urban poor.  
 
Table 6.1 : External Financing of Rwandan Budget 1994-2003  
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total Budget (RWF 
millions) 7,5 61,5 70,8 95,7 99,0 103,8 132,8 150,4 172,0 175,4 
 
Foreign Grants (RWF 
million), of which: 1,5 38,4 31,4 37,7 33,0 37,8 64,1 64,2 70,8 53,4 
  current (budgetary 
support) 0,0 12,0 0,1 2,7 3,5 14,1 40,0 34,7 39,3 52,1 
  capital (projects) 1,5 26,4 31,3 35,0 29,5 23,7 24,2 29,5 31,5 1,4* 
 
domestic revenue as a % 
of total expenditure 22.7 33.3 41.3 53 56.2 40.8 46.5 51.7 52.7  
Foreign financed as % of 
total capital expenditure 93.3 100 99.6 99.8 94.1 89.2 97.5 93.5 88  
Source: Rwanda Development Indicators 2003 (Minecofin 2003c), National Bank of Rwanda 
* This figure will be revised upwards once full information is collated  
 
In light of this, Rwanda’s high dependence on external resources is not surprising. 
Although the proportion of external financing in the GoR’s budget has decreased 
since 1994 as domestic revenue has risen, it remains high at around 50% of the 
                                                 
3 As mentioned in chapter 3 (page 60), there is often a discrepancy between what the GoR accounts 
for as external assistance in its budget and amounts individual donors report as aid to Rwanda to the 
OECD. The Ministry of Finance and National Bank only capture in their statistics so much of the aid 
which flows into the country, as this depends largely upon donors providing that information 
(Fieldwork Diary: 23 April 2004).  
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overall budget (see table 6.1).4 However, the nature of external financing has 
changed in important ways, as we explored in chapter 3. Table 6.1 indicates that the 
total amount of foreign grants has increased, particularly since 2000. The proportion 
of support for the current as opposed to the capital budget has changed significantly. 
It was about this time that the first UK budget support allocations were provided to 
Rwanda, and this also coincides with increased resource flows from the IMF under 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and from the European 
Commission in the form of budget support. This implies that Rwanda is in fact 
becoming more dependent on aid, as increasingly it relies on foreign grants for the 
payment of operational and recurrent costs. In comparison to budget support, capital 
grants (mainly for developmental projects) have remained relatively steady since 
1995. However, the percentage of foreign financing for capital expenditure indicates 
that the GoR is almost completely dependent on donors for investment activities.   
Beyond this financial dependence, the GoR also relies heavily on external 
technical assistance. When the current Government came to power in 1994, there 
was a huge shortage of skilled workers, particularly in the public sector, many having 
been killed or fled the country.5 Officials holding ministerial and senior positions had 
very little experience of government or public sector management and many of them 
were returning from abroad, having grown up in exile. These returnees came from 
very different institutional, educational and cultural backgrounds, from Uganda, 
Tanzania, Kenya, Burundi and Congo as well as further afield from North America 
and Europe. Ten years later skills, motivation and efficiency remain a problem 
within the public sector despite numerous attempts to devise capacity building 
programmes.6 Middle-management in ministries is particularly weak, placing a 
heavy burden on senior staff. It is hoped that a public service reform, ongoing since 
2002 but which only really took off in 2004 will begin to address some of these 
problems through the rationalisation of ministries and local authorities, an 
improvement in efficiency (qualifications and positions) and coherence, greater staff 
motivation (salaries and other incentives), and the retention of qualified staff 
(Mifotra 2003). In the face of high demand from the private sector and donor 
agencies, retaining qualified staff within the civil service has been a perennial 
problem.7  
                                                 
4 ‘Budget Statement 2004 delivered to the Chamber of Deputies’ by Donald Kaberuka, Rwandan 
Minister for Finance and Economic Planning, 4 December 2003. It is not possible to compare this 
situation with before 1994 as the budget did not include external financing prior to 1994 (GoR 1999a: 
62). 
5 An IMF report from March 1995 estimated that only around 20-30% of civil servants in November 
1994 had been there before what it terms ‘the events’; in early 1995 the Directorate of Budget had 
only eight staff, including one secretary, of whom only one had been there before the genocide (Abed, 
Bédague, Grandcolas and Scheider 1995).  
6 For the 1996 Round Table a national capacity building study was prepared (GoR 1996b), followed 
by various human resource development initiatives. In 2004 the Human Resources and Capacity 
Development Agency (HIDA) was established after many years of debate (see Hayman 2005b for 
more detail on skills training in Rwanda).  
7 Development projects ‘poaching’ skilled staff from the public sector was considered a problem in 
1994, and discussed at length in a UNDP report in 1999 (UNDP and GoR 1999). At the DPM in 
December 2004, this issue once again gave rise to a heated debate, notably around the surge in 
activities to tackle HIV/AIDS, with NGOs apparently recruiting skilled medical staff to work on 
projects, offering much greater benefits than the public sector (observations at DPM, Kigali, 9-10 
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In response to this, many donors have provided long and short-term advisors to 
Government ministries, or provided skills training in Rwanda or abroad to bolster 
local capacity. Other programmes have specifically provided salary supplements for 
qualified staff. For example, Belgium provides supplements for the public officials 
who act as local counterparts on their projects; the UK provides supplements for the 
Strategic Planning and Poverty Monitoring Division (SPPMD) of the Ministry of 
Finance. However, both these donors are attempting to phase out this practice, as it is 
inherently unsustainable and problematic for the central authorities. The recourse to 
external technical assistance (TA) has had both positive and negative consequences. 
One informant felt that more TA did lead to greater, or more subtle, external 
influence over government processes, but that this was not necessarily a bad thing as 
long as the assistance was well delivered, built capacity and remained under GoR 
control. The problem, this informant felt, was that it became too easy to rely on TA. 
It was therefore a question of knowing how to use TA but also of taking 
responsibility. He went on to say that the GoR does try to make demands on the TA 
offered. While some pass on lots of skills, others are not so good and keep 
information to themselves.8 Another official felt that ministries often misunderstood 
the role of TA; they thought that Rwanda could do it alone and that TA just used up 
money. For this informant, however, TA added to ownership rather than taking it 
away.9  
The main problem seems to be TA substituting for local staff without building 
local capacity. This was observed during the emergency period (UNDP and GoR 
1999), but was also mentioned by several informants. Attempts to reduce this effect 
have been mixed, as the following examples illustrate. Belgium used to provide a 
large number of substitute medical specialists in tune with its health programmes. It 
has tried to reduce these in favour of fewer technical assistants whose primary role is 
to build local capacity and manage projects. However, the severe shortage of skilled 
medical workers has led to the Ministry of Health requesting substitute doctors from 
Belgium once again.10 British TA placed in the Ministry of Education spoke about 
the difficulties of balancing their technical and capacity building roles.11 On the other 
hand, British support to the Rwanda Revenue Authority provides an example of a 
large team of external TA being gradually reduced over the years as local capacity 
has been built up.12  
 
Fighting dependency: GoR views on ownership and aid 
This dependency on external financial and human resources is very much 
recognised by Rwandan officials, yet there is a concern to combat any culture of 
                                                                                                                                          
December 2004). The harmonisation of donor policies on this was on the table at a meeting of the 
health ‘cluster’ in September 2004 (observations, 30 September 2004).  
8 Interview, senior official, Minecofin, 23 September 2003. 
9 Interview, senior official, Minecofin, 24 September 2004. 
10 Interviews: officials, Ministry of Health, 16 April 2004 and 2 May 2004; Belgian TA, Kigali 
Central Hospital, 5 March 2004.  
11 Round-table discussion with CfBT technical assistants, 29 March 2004. 
12 Interview, British TA to Rwanda Revenue Authority, 20 November 2003. 
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dependence, with officials reminding the Rwandan people that they cannot rely on 
external support indefinitely, and that aid is other tax payers’ money:13  
We are undertaking a political effort so that Rwandans understand that they 
must all contribute to reconstruction, be it with money by paying taxes or in-
kind. There is not just a mentality of dependence on the outside, but also on the 
state… We are trying to maximise our use of donations and loans. We know it 
is also other tax-payers money. (Rwandan Member of Parliament, 23 April 
 2004)  
At some stage Rwanda must be self-reliant… [we] cannot rely on aid forever. 
(advisor, President’s Office, 26 March 2004) 
The President sees assistance as short-term not long-term… [the] discourse is 
about mobilising the people to not rely on aid, to think about solving their own 
problems… Rwandans are used to support… [they] have a passive mentality… 
Not that we don’t mind foreign assistance but only for the time being. It is not 
sustainable to rely on foreign aid… foreign aid is other taxpayers’ money. 
(advisor, President’s Office, 28 April 2004) 
[Rwandan] leaders are not comfortable using the money of other taxpayers for 
policy. (official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 November 2003) 
This reflects the use of the term ‘ownership’ as it has appeared in GoR documents, 
e.g. “everyone should feel that those problems are his, are concerning him, and that it 
is he who must look for solutions to them (ownership)” (GoR 1999b: 49). For the 
leadership, the aim is to change the culture of obedience to authority as it was 
perceived to be under the old regime, one of: “close your eyes and I lead you, and 
open your mouth and I feed you” (GoR 2002c: 12).  
Nevertheless, despite the realisation that external assistants do have an influence 
over policy through their work in ministries, and that much of the management of 
development activities is undertaken by donors, officials were also adamant that 
policy was Rwandan-owned. Aid dependency should not mean compromising on the 
GoR’s core principles: 
Our aim is to make it a partnership. We are not going to compromise on core 
principles, not going to beg and not going to be subservient. (Advisor to the 
President, 28 April 2004) 
We need to adopt a conciliatory profile. It is important to have development but 
we cannot take aid at any cost. We can do without some types of aid, especially 
if it affronts our sovereignty. (Member of Rwandan Parliament, 31 October 
2003) 
In Rwanda we know how to stand firm and say no. (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
8 December 2003) 
From these and other interviews, it is clear that the desire for ownership does not 
necessarily translate into a desire to dispense with aid altogether. When asked about 
                                                 
13 See also ‘Foreign Aid temporary anaesthesia – Kagame’ (New Times November 10-12 2003 p.2) in 
which President Kagame states that Rwanda would never be independent while its survival depended 
on foreigners, likening “foreign aid to temporary anaesthesia”, equating “a begging nation to a person 
who is always dragged on a rope tied around his neck” and calling on Rwandans to “work for 
economic emancipation”; implementing the 7-Year Programme will “enable us [to] liberate Rwandans 
from the longstanding yoke of foreign dependence”.  
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refusing aid, the response from officials, notably those working directly with donors 
at a technical level, tended to be a pragmatic one. Rather than refusing aid the GoR 
should seek to negotiate with the donor and try to orient the proffered activity more 
in a direction to meet GoR priorities.14 Aid is recognised as necessary for the 
foreseeable future, but this does not mean that the GoR is willing to accept 
everything that donors throw at or demand of the country; aid should be provided 
which meets Rwanda’s own priorities. Consequently, the thrust of the discourse is 
that Rwanda ‘could do without aid’ which is quite different to Rwanda ‘will do 
without aid’. Behind this lie two elements: firstly the massive needs of Rwanda 
which make any idea of self-reliance a distant prospect; and secondly the importance 
of projecting a good image on the international stage to ensure Rwanda has good 
external relations, maintains a good reputation and can procure assistance, even if 
this means accepting aid from countries not necessarily considered as ‘friends’.15  
These statements also demonstrate both pride and bitterness resulting from the 
experiences of relations with the international community outlined in the previous 
chapter. GoR discourse carries a constant reminder to the international community 
that it let Rwanda down not only during the genocide but also afterwards: by failing 
to halt the killings; by supporting the refugee camps housing genocide perpetrators 
while neglecting the victims still inside Rwanda; in not giving the GoR the means to 
reconstruct itself; and in making pledges of support that it did not honour. This 
translates into what one informant described as the GoR’s “healthy disrespect for the 
international community.”16 Many Rwandan officials interviewed felt that donors 
had a hidden agenda, had their own interests, were not working essentially in favour 
of Rwanda, and that delays in disbursements were deliberate, politically motivated 
and not merely a question of bureaucratic procedures. This opinion was expressed 
more by political actors than Rwandan civil servants. The overall perspective on aid 
emerging from interviews was by no means homogenous, with some actors taking a 
much more stringent line against donors than others. Moreover, some donors are 
clearly viewed in a better light than others. For example, the UK was generally 
regarded as a ‘friend’, providing aid in the most coveted form, acting as an 
‘advocate’ of Rwanda and recognising where Rwanda was coming from.  
 
Political Priorities 1994-2004 
The poverty reduction strategy, while wide-ranging, only represents part of the 
GoR’s overall policy perspective. It is widely recognised that Rwandan policy-
making during the emergency period was very weak in light of severe internal 
capacity problems. As a result, many of the policy papers prepared during the 
emergency period and subsequently involved considerable donor support and the 
                                                 
14 This is an attitude that leads to some confusion and frustration. The GoR is demanding more aid in 
programme form but at the same time is not refusing projects. It will often approach donors to provide 
particular forms of project aid if it suits their purposes, and it knows who to approach for what. This 
can lead to the situation where lengthy discussions around sector strategies are then undermined by 
the GoR accepting offers of funding which fall outside the priorities of the strategy, as we saw with 
regard to the education sector (c.f. chapter 4).  
15 This particularly relates to accepting aid from France. Several informants mentioned that they 
would happily do without French aid, but that it was important to maintain relations with France 
because of its importance on the world stage.  
16 Interview, EC official, Kigali, 30 September 2003. 
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voice of external actors is often very evident. This, coupled with Rwanda’s need to 
secure external financing for reconstruction and investment, has influenced the thrust 
of much Government policy. Indeed, since the adoption of the PRSP there has been a 
tendency amongst donor agencies to focus solely on this as presenting the GoR 
position. However, this approach ignores the core set of consistent policy principles 
which have directed the actions of the regime throughout the period in question, and 
a clear Rwandan perspective can be recognised which is distinct from the donor 
voice. While the national policy aspect is often overlooked by donors, there is clear 
recognition that the GoR has a strong sense of what it wants. As one donor informant 
said,  
there was no policy foundation for long-term development until late 1996… 
there were no development programmes… [but] it was an extraordinary 
government … it knows exactly what it wants. (former UK official in Rwanda, 
23 August 2004) 
 
Box 6.1 : Key Rwandan Policy Papers 1994-2004 
 
1994: Declaration of Principles (July) 
1995: Programme of National Reconciliation and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery (with 
UNDP support) 
1998-99: Policy Framework Paper and Public Investment Programme (with WB support)  
1998 (2000, 2002): Vision 2020  
2002: PRSP (interim PRSP 2001 and first draft in 2000) 
2003: 7-Year Programme 
-  
Box 6.1 provides a list of the GoR’s key policy papers from 1994 to 2004. The 
first of these is very important, as it constitutes the foundation of GoR political 
priorities over the last 10 years. The Declaration of Principles was presented as the 
‘8-point Programme of Broad-Based Transition Government’ to the Transitional 
National Assembly and members of the international community on 19 July 1994 
(Twagirimungu 1994). The Programme covered:  
- the restoration of a climate of security and peace, with an emphasis on ending 
the war and resolving internal security problems as well as beginning judicial 
proceedings;  
- the organization of central and local administration;  
- the restoration and consolidation of national unity, including combating 
divisionism and reflecting on causes of conflict;   
- the integration of refugees and displaced persons, with international support;  
- the improvement of the well-being of the population and resolution of social 
problems stemming from the war (orphans, widows, disabled), as well as the 
rehabilitation of social infrastructure and the resumption of education;  
- the resumption of the national economy, restarting commercial and 
agricultural activities as well as investment;  
- the redefinition of foreign policy, including strengthening and expanding 
international relations with ‘new’ partners;  
- the consolidation of democracy in the country, combating the culture of 
impunity, guaranteeing freedom of expression and respect for fundamental 
human rights, and promoting political and social pluralism.  
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These principles underpinned the 1995 Programme of National Reconciliation 
presented to donors at the Round Table conference in January 1995, and were further 
consolidated during a series of meetings convened at the Offices of the President 
(known as Village Urugwiro) running from May 1998 until March 1999 (GoR 
1999b: 2). These meetings brought together a wide range of actors to discuss the 
future of Rwanda as it emerged from war and the genocide. Participants included 
representatives of political parties, members of the government, national assembly 
and the judiciary, provincial leaders, representatives of the army and police force, 
advisors to the President, Vice-President and the Prime Minister, as well as  ‘special 
guests’ (including lawyers, intelligence agents, bankers, academics and journalists). 
Billed as a way of associating all Rwandans in the management of the country, these 
political consultations and debates aimed, it is claimed, to build a more united 
Rwanda based on solidarity (GoR 1999a). Issues discussed were the unity of 
Rwandans, problems regarding democracy, justice (classic and genocide-related), the 
economy (structural constraints, poverty and reconstruction), and security. Central to 
the debate was to understand how the genocide happened and to solve ongoing 
problems of discrimination, distrust and conflict. Vision 2020, a policy document 
considered the foundation of the PRSP, eventually emerged from these meetings. 
Progress towards attaining the 8-Point Programme is outlined in two reports 
published in 1999 and 2003 (GoR 1999a, 2003), illustrating how these eight action 
points represent the core manifesto of the RPF-led regime throughout the transition 
years from 1994 to 2003. The achievements presented therein to the Rwandan 
people, via the National Assembly, are distinct from the developmental objectives of 
policy documents prepared with external assistance in the post-1994 period. The 
external voice is muted, and the external audience is not specifically targeted. The 
first report makes no explicit mention of Vision 2020, but notes the importance of the 
Village Urugwiro meetings for the inclusion of the population in the management of 
state affairs (GoR 1999a: 2, 14). The second report follows a similar format, 
updating the previous report and adding additional information on activities, 
initiatives and programmes. The language is stronger on unity and reconciliation, 
particularly combating all forms of exclusion and discrimination, and emphasising 
the need to promote Rwandan core values against the ‘anti-values’ of ethnicity, 
regionalism and exclusion (GoR 2003: 9-10). By this time, the poverty agenda 
appears in the outline of macro-economic policies which now include Vision 2020, 
the PRSP and the National Investment Strategy.  
Following the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2003, the Government 
produced a 7-Year Programme, building on Vision 2020 and placing a strong 
emphasis on unity, governance and security (Makuza 2003). This manifesto is set 
against the background of the genocide legacy and Rwanda’s progress since 1994 
and strongly reflects the principles outlined above. The four ‘pillars’ of the 
programme are:  
- governance in a very broad sense, covering political awareness, media, 
international relations, security, civil society, decentralisation;  
- the judiciary, including combating genocide ideology and corruption, as well 
as upholding human rights;  
- economic development; and  
- social affairs.  
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In the English-language translation,17 the term ‘poverty reduction’ does not occur 
once, the only mention being ‘getting rid of endemic poverty’ under the economic 
section. Likewise, the Village Urugwiro meetings devoted considerable time to 
questions of unity, democracy and justice, with only a very short section in the final 
report on the economy and economic development strategies, and no discussion of 
poverty or social services. It is interesting to note how little recognition there is 
amongst donor actors of these core principles. In numerous discussions with donor 
representatives, the ‘achievements’ reports of 1999 and 2003 were never mentioned, 
nor did there seem to be much attention paid to the 7-Year Programme.  
All of these documents demonstrate that a number of core principles lie 
continuously at the heart of the GoR’s agenda, in particular security, both external 
and internal. Externally, this focuses largely on the threat posed by the DRC, and 
more specifically the elements of the former regime still present just outside 
Rwanda’s borders and the implicit and explicit support provided to these by the 
Congolese authorities and foreign powers. Internally, priority is given to 
reconciliation, governance, justice and combating sectarianism. We will return to the 
question of internal governance below, but let us first explore further the question of 
external security as this is particularly important on two fronts: firstly, as we saw in 
chapter 5, Rwanda’s relations with the DRC have been a source of tension and 
divergence of opinion amongst donor agencies since 1994, and also a condition upon 
aid; secondly, the GoR’s position on external security is illustrative of the way in 
which it deals with external criticism of its actions.  
 
Dealing with the DRC: Rwanda’s external security agenda 
At the 2002 summit of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
(NURC), telephone questions were taken from the Rwandan Diaspora. One caller 
asked “Why does Rwanda continue to disrupt security in the Great Lakes region?” to 
which the response was: “As regards the alleged disruption of security in the region, 
it was made clear that was a wrong perception of reality; Rwanda has all along been 
reacting in self-defense” (GoR 2002d: 73).  
Since 1994, the GoR has been calling on the international community to deal with 
the threat to its security from armed opponents based in the eastern DRC, failing 
which Rwanda would take its own action.18 This was given as the reason for 
supporting Congolese rebel groups in 1996, and for the invasion of 1998. However, 
for the GoR this threat has not diminished. Both the 1999 and 2003 ‘achievements’ 
documents provide the GoR’s perspective on relations with the DRC in terms of the 
security threat and outline ongoing concerns about the depth of commitment of the 
Kinshasa regime to fulfil its side of agreements reached. As we saw in chapter 5, at 
the DPM in December 2004, the GoR was once again explaining its actions, this time 
to an increasingly hostile international audience following allegations of Rwandan 
troop presence over the border. This followed attacks by rebel groups in South Kivu 
                                                 
17 The original version of the 7-Year Programme is in Kinyarwanda, with a later translation into 
English. This contrasts with documents like the PRSP which were first prepared in English, then 
French, then translated into Kinyarwanda.   
18 See for example the speeches of Prime Minister Twagirimungu and Vice-President Paul Kagame at 
the July 1995 Round Table (UNDP 1995a). This is also taken up by McNulty (1999): “Kagame had 
made plain since 1995 his determination to sort out the security problem himself if the international 
community was unable to do so.” 
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(DRC), Burundi and Rwanda which induced the GoR to threaten to send its troops 
into Congo on the grounds that neither the Kinshasa government nor the UN peace 
keeping force were capable of dealing adequately with the security threat. The Great 
Lakes Special Representative of the Rwandan President, Richard Sezibera, gave an 
ingenuous presentation, linking the regional security situation to the socio-economic 
development of Rwanda, demonstrating how the ‘rebels’ specifically targeted areas 
of economic importance around the western borders (national parks, electricity 
installations, tea and beer factories), providing specific details on incursions into 
Rwanda over the course of 2004, and highlighting throughout how Rwanda has 
attempted to keep its side of the agreements signed in Lusaka and Pretoria while the 
Congolese authorities and the international community have failed to deliver on their 
promises.19  
The presence of armed groups hostile to Rwanda is unquestionable. What is open 
to debate, however, is the extent of the threat to Rwanda’s stability posed by these 
groups. As we saw in the previous chapter, alternative explanations have been 
proposed for Rwanda’s interest in maintaining a presence in eastern Congo, many of 
which continued to hold in 2004. It is not our intention to revisit these explanations; 
what is important is the way in which the GoR presents its case to donors, and how 
they respond. The following press article highlights the GoR perspective:  
While observing that the problem of the Interahamwe and Ex-FAR [former 
Rwandan army] is well known to the world, Kagame said that the international 
community had chosen to treat them ‘with kid gloves’… He lashed out at critics 
who accuse the Rwandan government of using the security threat as a decoy to 
plunder the natural resources of the DRC, saying they (Western countries) were 
‘the actual thieves’ because they have the capacity to exploit minerals. (New 
Times, December 1-2 2004, pgs 1-2)  
This extract is fairly typical. Indeed, there is a clear pattern to how the GoR 
presents its concerns about the security threat and how it responds to critics. The 
“doctrine built around denial” (Pottier 2002: 55) is particularly noteworthy. When 
there are accusations of Rwandan troops being present in the Congo, the GoR will 
adamantly insist these are unfounded. Some time later it tends to admit that troops 
were indeed there. This happened with regard to the support the Rwandan army gave 
to the AFDL in 1996, with Kagame admitting in July 1997 that Rwandan troops had 
been involved (McNulty 1999). Likewise McNulty notes that Rwanda had not 
admitted its support for rebel groups opposing Kabila in 1998; the 2003 
‘achievements’ report, on the other hand, states that “in legitimate defence, Rwanda 
was obliged to intervene in Congo in 1996 and 1998 to fight these evil forces right 
up to the signature of the Lusaka accords (July 1999) and Pretoria accords (July 
2002).” (GoR 2003: 70, translated from French). In 2004 a similar situation 
prevailed. In early December 2004, the UN Mission to the DRC (MONUC) accused 
Rwanda of having troops in the DRC. The Rwandan Government flatly denied these 
allegations: “All the allegations about Rwanda troops in the DRC are false. Rwanda 
does not have troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”20 It also denied massing 
additional troops on the border.21 However, a Human Rights Watch press release 
                                                 
19 Observations, DPM, 10 December 2004. 
20 Richard Sezibera, quoted by Reuters, 3/12/2004 (translated from French).   
21 ‘No new troops at border’, New Times (3 December 2004).  
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(December 4, 2004) mentioned that in late November President Kagame had implied 
that some military action may have occurred in a speech to the Rwandan Senate, and 
in a letter to the African Union. The presentation by Sezibera at the DPM mentioned 
above also indicated that, out of necessity, Rwandan troops might have had to cross 
the border to pursue rebels.  
Over the years, the position of different donors about the legitimate security 
concerns of the GoR with regard to the DRC have continually shifted. Some, such as 
the UK, have been largely sympathetic, although this changed somewhat in 2004 
(Killick, Katumanga and Piron 2005). What appears to particularly frustrate donors 
in general is that the GoR does not adequately inform them about its intentions or 
actions. This emerged, for example, at the DPM in 2004 where the Netherlands 
Ambassador complained that the local diplomatic corps had not been informed of 
each incursion by rebels into Rwandan territory.22 But what this also demonstrates is 
the strength of the GoR in maintaining its position despite its dependency on aid; 
claimed security concerns are not something on which it will compromise.  
 
 
Rwanda as a ‘Developmental State’? Appealing to the International 
Community  
 
Within the GoR’s core principles mentioned above, the role of international 
cooperation is given a backseat, although international relations are mentioned in 
terms of expanding Rwanda’s cooperation agreements in order to assure it a place on 
the world stage, and in terms of eliciting international assistance to fund economic 
and social development activities. The presentation of all of these programmes has 
been aimed primarily at the Rwandan people through the National Assembly. 
Nevertheless, support from the international community is anticipated for policies 
like the 7-Year Programme. When presenting it, Prime Minister Makuza insisted that 
the implementation of the programme:  
requires willingness, zeal, abnegation and sacrifice from leaders and Rwandans 
at all levels. However, I feel confident that this programme will be implemented 
thanks to our complementarity and cooperation from all Government 
Institutions and from friendly International Organisations. I therefore wish to 
take this opportunity to renew our gratitude for the support given to us by the 
International Community which, I am sure, will not relent. (Makuza, 2003: 26) 
This appeal to the international community to support the GoR’s policies on the 
basis of ‘complementarity’ and ‘cooperation’ reflects the many elements of the 
GoR’s strategy which correspond to current concerns of donors, notably governance, 
economic development and poverty reduction. In a recent publication, Lockwood 
(2005) reflects upon whether certain states in Africa exhibit signs of the 
‘developmental state’, concentrating on Botswana, Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania. 
The term ‘developmental state’ has traditionally been used in connection with the 
bureaucratic regimes of east Asia, such as South Korea and Taiwan, where 
authoritarian rulers fostered the economic transformation of their countries in the 
1960s and 1970s. However, the term has subsequently been applied to other 
developing countries where particular regimes have sought to bring about economic 
                                                 
22 Observations, DPM, 10 December 2004. 
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development by following similar strategies: extending state control over land-use 
and rights by quashing the power of landed elites; strengthening ties with the private 
sector; developing strong state bureaucracies with autonomy from the political elite; 
fostering both internal- and external-oriented industrialisation; and allowing partial 
economic liberalisation. In Africa, there have been few examples of a developmental 
state, with the notable exception of Botswana and for some authors also South 
Africa.23  
Whether Rwanda fulfils similar criteria is debatable. Unsworth and Uvin, for 
example, have likened Rwanda to a developmental state, in that “[i]ts reach over the 
territory is significant and uniform; it values technical competence, and policy 
processes are becoming more institutionalised; there is improved oversight and 
upwards accountability at all levels; and there seems to be a genuine commitment to 
development and progressive social change (women’s rights, for example)” 
(Unsworth and Uvin 2002: 6). This analysis focuses on the institutional aspects of 
the GoR, its commitment to development and its desire to build a strong bureaucracy. 
Two years earlier, Kayizzi-Mugerwa wrote how the GoR’s ‘clean politics’ and 
promises about poverty eradication, participatory government and national 
reconciliation made it attractive to donors and the local populace, its credibility to 
restore stability in the face of daunting odds enhanced by the total discrediting of the 
former regime (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000). It has certainly been seen as “very serious 
about economic reform” (van Hoyweghen 2000: 18). The mixture of a paternalistic 
political approach, through which the GoR maintains tight control over political 
space, with an apparently genuine commitment to socio-economic reform is 
reminiscent of other post-conflict African countries of the 1990s which, for periods 
of time, have received international acclaim and attention, such as Uganda, Ethiopia 
and arguably Eritrea (see Ottaway 1999).  
The GoR’s adherence to the global norms for development dominant in the 1990s 
and 2000s – namely economic neoliberalism, poverty reduction and good governance 
– has earned it respect among many donor agencies, and in general the GoR has been 
able to mobilise support for its development agenda. Following neoliberal principles, 
the approach is to promote economic growth through the structural transformation of 
the economy, the development of the private sector and the reduction of the role of 
the state to that of a regulator, including improving state financial management and 
administrative capacity. The long-term perspective is to turn Rwanda into a “modern, 
stakeholder economy” (GoR 2001a: 11) Poverty reduction per se takes a backseat in 
this; rather, economic development policies have been more concentrated on 
stimulating growth and economic transformation, drawing on Rwanda’s human 
resources to foster growth (Hayman 2005b: 49).  
Within this approach the voice of external advisors is clearly present. This was 
evident in the World Bank’s Background Paper for the donor meeting in Paris in July 
1997:  
In the post-war economy, the international community should support economic 
reform that provides for change in the economic orientation to a more open, 
liberal economy. The current Government has expressed its intention to move in 
this direction, although implementation of structural changes has been hindered 
by the need to address emergency concerns. (World Bank 1997) 
                                                 
23 On developmental states, see Evans (1995), Hoogvelt (2001) and Kohli (2004). On Botswana and 
African examples, see Lockwood (2005), Taylor (2002) and Sindzingre (2004). 
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The World Bank and the UK in particular have provided substantial support to assist 
in institutionalising new public financial management systems like the Medium-
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) within the Ministry of Finance and other 
ministries. A series of short-term consultants and long-term advisors have been 
working with Minecofin on this since 2000.24 However, it is also important to 
recognise that certain key officials in the Rwandan government are also very attuned 
to this agenda. Several informants commented on how the arrival of Donald 
Kaberuka as Minister of Finance in 1997 provided the impetus for greater coherence 
in economic planning and policy-making. Having undertaken higher education in the 
UK and worked closely with the IFIs before returning to Rwanda, Kaberuka enjoyed 
good working relations with senior British civil servants, and had a good 
understanding of IFI policy positions.25 Indeed, as one informant said:  
You cannot say that the leadership of the Ministry was not behind the MTEF, 
that Rwanda did not own the process. If you ask the Ministry officials, they will 
always say that they are behind it wholeheartedly… So [it] definitely owned it 
in the sense of supporting it, but you can say that it did not take the initiative.26  
At the same time, however, as Rwanda became more closely associated with the 
international financial institutions and donors such as the UK in the late 1990s, the 
GoR’s commitment to poverty reduction increased within its short and medium-term 
development strategies. This can be traced through the evolution of Vision 2020 
which emerged from the discussions held at Village Urugwiro in 1998-99. Vision 
2020 expanded from an eight-page document in 1998, which made little allusion to 
poverty reduction but concentrated more on reconciliation and security, to a 
substantial policy paper by 2000 which explicitly placed poverty reduction at the 
heart of Rwanda’s long-term development strategy (GoR 2000). Vision 2020 fed into 
the preparation of the PRSP and its transformation into an increasingly sophisticated 
policy document continued in parallel to the PRSP process. In 2001 and 2002, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) funded external 
consultants who helped to transform Vision 2020 into a strategic plan through a 
series of workshops and working groups involving the consultation of government 
officials, political parties, religious groups, NGOs, academics and the private sector 
(GoR 2002a: 5). The process of developing this policy paper provides an interesting 
insight into the adoption of the poverty reduction agenda and the role of external 
support. One informant, who was involved in the workshops in 2001 and 2002, 
mentioned that the July 2000 version presented to Cabinet was considered too 
economic, not sufficiently socially-oriented and, more importantly, lacking in 
‘vision’. For him, Vision 2020 “was the beginning of everything”.27 At the same 
time, while the origins of the discussions which led to Vision 2020 were very much 
internal, it is worth noting that most of the Least Developed Countries have a 
‘Vision’ of this nature which has been used to form the basis of PRSPs and which 
has often been transformed into an acceptable strategic plan with external assistance.  
                                                 
24 Interviews, UK TA to Minecofin (Kigali, 26 November 2003; London, 13 January 2004).  
25 Interviews: former UK civil servants (London, 2 June 2004; telephone, 23 August 2004). 
26 Interview, former UK TA to Minecofin, London, 13 January 2004.  
27 Interview, Director of Strategic Planning and Poverty Monitoring Department, Minecofin, Kigali, 
11 October 2004. 
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The objective of Vision 2020 is to “build a modern and prosperous Nation, strong 
and united, worthy and proud of its fundamental values, politically stable, without 
discrimination among its sons and daughters; and all this in social cohesion and 
equity”, centred on a “prosperous knowledge-based economy” and a “modern, 
competitive Private Sector” (GoR 2002a: 6, emphasis in original). he ambition is 
to become a medium-income country by 2020. Each of the pillars of Vision 2020 is 
accompanied by a series of indicators of progress, which are increasingly linked to 
the Millennium Development Goals, and monitored via the Development Indicators 
produced annually by Minecofin. This would imply that economic and social 
development are occupying a greater place in the policy process in comparison to the 
underlying Principles of 1994 and the 7-Year Programme of 2003 (see table 6.2). 
While these documents clearly serve different purposes and target different 
audiences, it is interesting to note the primacy given to security, governance and the 
construction of state institutions in the 8-Point Programme, Vision 2020 and the 7-
Year Programme. In contrast, economic and social development take precedence in 
the PRSP. 
 
Table 6.2: Priorities of Core Policy Documents  
8-Point Programme 
(1994) 
Vision 2020 Pillars 
(2000, 2002)28 
PRSP Priority Areas (2002) 7-Year 
Programme 
(2003) 
Restoration of security 
and peace 
Reconstruction of the 
state 
Rural Development and 
agricultural transformation 
Governance  
Organisation of central 
and local administration 
Efficient and uniting state Human development (health, 




National unity Human resources 
development 
Economic infrastructure Economic 
Development 
Integration of refugees 
and internally displaced 
people 
Land administration and 
basic infrastructure 
Governance Social Affairs  
Social well-being Development of the 
private sector 
Private sector development  
Resumption of the 
national economy 
Modernisation of 
agriculture and animal 
husbandry 
Institutional capacity building  
Redefinition of foreign 
policy 
   
Consolidation of 
democracy 
   
Source: (Twagirimungu 1994; GoR 2002a: 6, 2002b; Makuza 2003) 
 
While Vision 2020 sets out the long-term objectives of the GoR, the medium-term 
strategy to progress towards these goals is outlined in the PRSP. The preparation for 
this began in earnest in June 2000, a preliminary draft being presented to donors in 
                                                 
28 The 2000 version of Vision 2020 concentrated more heavily on modernisation of agriculture, 
development of industry and human resource development to serve economic growth. It is shorter 
with much less detail, but the tone is different. The social dimensions of gender, health, education and 
environment are absent. In the PRSP (2002), the key objectives of Vision 2020 are presented in a 
different fashion to the original document: good political and economic governance; rural economic 
transformation; development of services and manufacturing; human resource development; 
development and promotion of the private sector; regional and international economic integration. 
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November 2000, with the interim PRSP adopted in 2001 and the full version 
published in June 2002. The PRSP is a comprehensive document, for which 
background information on the nature and depth of poverty in the country was 
provided by a Participatory Poverty Assessment (Minecofin 2002c) and a Household 
Living Conditions Survey (Minecofin 2002b). The “context of poverty” (GoR 2002b: 
6) in Rwanda is put down to two key factors: structural issues; and the legacy of the 
genocide and civil war. Indeed, ‘poverty’ has now been accepted within popular 
perceptions as one of the root causes of the genocide and tackling it is seen as a key 
to avoiding future conflict.29 The core philosophy of the GoR laid out in the PRSP is 
that: 
The Government of Rwanda strongly believes in the right of all its people to 
live a life free from poverty, hardship, oppression and insecurity. Rwanda’s 
Government is committed to securing for all its citizens a full range of social, 
economic and political rights and to working with its people to reduce poverty 
and exclusion. (GoR 2002b: 6)  
As in other heavily indebted developing countries, the PRSP represented a 
necessary requirement to qualify for enhanced debt relief under the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, and the more recent drive towards preparing sector 
strategies in 2004 was partly aimed at accessing the World Bank’s Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) in the core areas of health, education, water and 
energy. The PRSP is therefore aimed at two audiences, the external financiers and 
the Rwandan population. On the one hand, the preparation of the PRSP has been 
facilitated and pushed forward by the international community. Significant support 
was provided by the UK and the UNDP in the early stages, the World Bank and 
Belgium played a significant role in the preparation of core sector strategies, and we 
have seen how at the DPMs the strategy has been endorsed by the wide donor 
community. On the other hand, the PRSP is held to be a Rwandan-owned policy 
document, drawn up with wide-ranging local consultation:  
The participation in the PRSP process and sense of ownership are impressive. 
(World Bank and IMF 2002: 2) 
This contrasts somewhat with early analyses of the poverty reduction strategy which 
highlighted how prioritising was weak and policy-making often patchy (Kayizzi-
Mugerwa 2000; Mutebi, Stone and Thin 2001; Maxwell and Christiansen 2002). 
Indeed by 2004, donors appeared to be increasingly anxious to see progress on 
implementing the PRSP as well as clear indications that this policy was actually 
reducing poverty.30 There are signs of growing inequalities in Rwandan society 
which raise questions about the real focus of the GoR’s economic policies.31  
                                                 
29 Observations, seminar run by the Institute for Dialogue and Peace in Rwanda, 7-8 November 2003. 
See also IRDP (2003). 
30 Observations, meeting to launch the PRS Progress Review, 21 April 2004. 
31 One example of this is the ‘cleansing’ process which went on in Kigali city in 2004. Informal kiosks 
and semi-formal businesses were shut down; poor quality housing was condemned and in some places 
destroyed; street traders were banned; street children and beggars were forcibly removed; regulations 
were even brought in concerning the appearance of people, such as wearing shoes in the city. This 
approach to sanitising and ‘modernising’ the appearance of the city seemed out of kilter with the 
economic and social realities of Rwanda (based on personal observations and fieldwork diary entries, 
October-December 2004). 
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On the other hand, the GoR commitment to development is seen as genuine, both 
in terms of fostering economic growth, improving the access of the population to 
social services, and in terms of improving governance. This is further illustrated by 
the ways in which the GoR has sought to deal with the very specific problems facing 
the country. In amongst the orthodox policies of economic liberalisation and social 
welfare there are examples of home-grown policies which have been innovative, 
albeit sometimes controversial. The GoR has managed to secure external support for 
these activities on the whole, often pushing donors hard in the face of initial hostility. 
These policies include the gacaca courts for trying lesser crimes of genocide, the 
villagisation programme (imidugudu), community self-help projects (ubudehe) and 
the public works programmes (PDL-HIMO).32 A good example of this is the gacaca. 
Based loosely upon a traditional local justice system, the idea for the gacaca 
emerged from the Village Urugwiro meetings as a way of dealing with the massive 
problem of crimes committed during the genocide (see GoR 1999b: 61-78). All sorts 
of objections were raised by donors and human rights groups at first with regard to 
international standards of justice but in the end this process has been strongly 
supported by donors to the extent that they are the ones pushing for tangible 
progress.33  
Even in more orthodox areas, the GoR has often pushed its case despite donor 
reticence. Two examples from the education sector illustrate this. Firstly, the GoR 
push for an ICT-led economy has meant a high proportion of public funding has been 
channelled into higher education and science and technology, despite donor pressure 
to focus more on primary education. Secondly, the GoR has doggedly pushed its 
policy of trilingualism in schools, seen as a central pillar for building an inclusive 
society and providing Rwandans with comparative advantage in the global market, 
despite research demonstrating that this may be counter-productive to improving 
education outcomes (see Hayman 2005b). As we have seen above, the GoR’s 
dependence on external resources has not significantly altered its stance with regard 
to security and stability.  
These particular initiatives demonstrate the context-specific problems with which 
the GoR has to grapple, such as justice and the settlement of returning and displaced 
peoples, but also how it takes a stance on policies in which it firmly believes. We 
have seen other examples in earlier chapters, such as how the GoR handled the 
request of budget support donors to comment on the budget during its preparation, 
and how it went ahead with the constitution process and elections despite donor 
threats to withhold funding. On the other hand there are also areas where the GoR 
would prefer more aid, but it has been unable to push the donors to respond, one 
example of which is for infrastructure. In interviews, officials expressed frustrations 
at the amount of support for activities like media training and gender workshops, but 
not for essential infrastructure to boost the economy such as roads, energy and 
                                                 
32 There is no space to expand on these policies here, but they have been sufficiently covered 
elsewhere. On gacaca see for example da Câmara (2001), Uvin (2001b), IRDP (2003), Corey and 
Joireman (2004), Karekezi (2004) as well as regular reports produced by Penal Reform International. 
On villagisation see van Hoyweghen (2000), HRW (2001b), van Leeuwen (2001) and Pottier (2002). 
On ubudehe see Minaloc (2002).  
33 Observations, meetings between GoR and donors supporting the gacaca process held at the Belgian 
Embassy, Kigali, 5 March 2003, 20 April 2003; minutes of meeting on gacaca, 25 May 2004. 
Interview, advisor to the President, Kigali, 28 April 2004. 
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Good Governance: Technocratic and Political Angles  
 
The willingness of donors to support Rwanda’s socio-economic development 
strategy also reflects how the GoR has addressed governance issues in terms of 
demonstrating an adherence to sound administrative, institutional and political 
principles. In Rwanda, the specific reference to the language of ‘good governance’ 
first emerged around 1998 within the Village Urugwiro discussions, for which a 
framework document on good governance was prepared (GoR 1998). The need for 
“good governance”, “participation and ownership”, “control and accountability” was 
constantly reiterated during these meetings (GoR 1999b: 4-5). However it has been 
there implicitly since 1994 in the GoR’s commitment to improving public sector 
management, addressing privatisation and the structural reform of the economy, 
strengthening the judiciary and promoting democratisation. This terminology peppers 
subsequent policy documents, such as the 2002 National Programme for 
Strengthening Good Governance for Poverty Reduction in Rwanda, in which ‘good 
governance’ is defined as follows:  
The Government of Rwanda takes good governance to refer to the exercise of 
political, economic, and administrative authority to manage the nation’s affairs 
and the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships, and institutions as well 
as leadership behaviour through which citizens’ groups articulate their interests, 
exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences. Governance 
is good when it is effective, efficient and when the participation, interests, and 
livelihood of the governed are the prime motives of the leaders’ actions at every 
level of society. 
Good governance is not a matter of government only but a situation of multiple 
crisscrossing relationships in which different and various actors in the public 
and private sectors at national and international levels play various roles, 
sometimes mutually reinforcing and complementary, sometimes conflicting, but 
always following the same principles and practices that are agreed as 
constituents of good governance. (GoR 2002c: 8) 
Good governance in this Programme rests on four core areas: political, economic, 
administrative/managerial and social/civic governance, involving vertical actors 
(namely hierarchical institutions of government and international institutions which 
influence governance processes) and horizontal actors (incorporating civil society 
organisations, international NGOs, media and the private sector). As such it reflects 
both the broad and narrow definitions of governance outlined in chapter 2 (footnote 
6, page 16). Interestingly, while the 1998 framework document focuses more on 
governance in terms of reconciliation and combating problems within Rwandan 
society of the past, including fighting ignorance and ethnic tension through the 
promotion of “high moral values” (GoR 1998: 3, translated from French), the 2002 
Programme is strongly oriented towards poverty reduction. Poverty reduction is not 
                                                 
34 Note, however, that under the PRSC there are new commitments to infrastructure. More 
international attentions is being placed upon infrastructure in Africa (see Commission for Africa 2005; 
Sachs 2005).  
 139 
mentioned in the 1998 document and ethnicity is not mentioned in the 2002 
document. Another interesting angle is that these programmes, both in 1998 and 
2002, incorporate international institutions (IFIs, bilateral and multilateral donor 
agencies and international NGOs) into their frame of reference. This makes explicit 
not only the influence these actors have on internal governance processes, but also 
how these actors form an integral part of the national structure.  
The definition of good governance therefore encompasses both institutional and 
socio-political issues. This has been translated into activities to decentralise powers 
and planning, strengthen institutional accountability and the role of Parliament, 
combat corruption, address weaknesses in the judicial system, and establish 
monitoring systems and good financial management systems to ensure accountability 
and transparency.35 Various institutions have been established, such as the Office of 
the Auditor-General, the Rwanda Revenue Authority and the National Tender Board. 
In 1999 the Human Rights Commission, the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC) and the Commission on Legal and Constitutional Affairs were 
established. Institutional capacity building for policy-making and implementation has 
been emphasised, including civil service reform and human resources training. 
Decentralization and the holding of local elections were not only aimed at improving 
local accountability and implementation of policies, but also at “empowering the 
population politically, economically and socially” (GoR 2002c: 4); strengthening the 
judiciary and institutional accountability seek to build up the population’s trust in the 
system and to ensure that justice is served to bring about reconciliation. Respect for 
human rights, the empowerment of women, addressing environmental problems and 
land rights, and promoting private investment and the private sector are also central 
elements.  
An emphasis throughout has been on governance as a instrument of national unity 
and reconciliation. Indeed, one of the root causes of the genocide has been attributed 
to ‘bad’ governance and the manipulation of the people by politicians. This 
attribution has been present in the discourse of the RPF regime throughout the post-
1994 period, and links into a broader discourse which considers everything that 
happened before 1994 to be ‘bad’ and everything that happened afterwards to be 
‘good’. An example of this thinking can be deduced from the ‘government’ page of 
the GoR’s website under the heading ‘Achievements of the Government of National 
Unity’: 
The government of national unity of the Republic of Rwanda was established 
on July 19th 1994. Two weeks earlier the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) had 
taken control of Kigali and put an end to the genocide that had been planned 
and executed by the MRND government of Juvenal Habyarimana. The 1994 
genocide resulted in the violent deaths of one million people. Earlier cycles of 
genocide had occurred, claiming tens of thousands of lives, but failed to attract 
any interest or concern from the international community. Each life lost over 
three decades of oppression and genocide represented unfulfilled dreams and 
the betrayed hope of the people of Rwanda in their leaders and the international 
community. The government of national unity inherited a deeply scarred nation 
where trust within and between communities had been replaced by fear and 
                                                 
35 The close association of governance with issues like decentralisation and popular participation is 
evident in that the Minister for Good Governance is located within the Ministry of Local Affairs, 
which is also responsible for registering and monitoring civil society activities.  
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betrayal, whose economy had ground to a complete halt, where social services 
were not functioning, and public confidence in the state had been shattered. 
Almost the entire nation was either internally displaced or had been forced to 
flee to neighbouring countries by the perpetrators of the genocide. It was with 
these enormous challenges that the Government of National Unity set about 
rebuilding the social, political and economic fabric of Rwanda.36  
This extract implies that the RPF, at the helm of the Government of National Unity, 
sees itself as having a moral right to govern Rwandan due to its victory over the 
genocidal regime of Habyarimana. Moreover, this moral authority is reinforced by 
the fact that the RPA ended a terror that the international community had ignored. 
The Government of National Unity is seen to symbolise the ‘dreams’ and ‘hope’ that 
had been crushed by the regimes of the previous thirty years.   
To some extent, this sort of discourse also acts as a kind of safety valve in 
attributing Rwanda’s woes to ‘external’ actors or bad politicians rather than focusing 
on the role of Rwandans as individuals. This discourse of ‘moral authority’ is 
frequently turned on the international community, and drawn upon whenever the 
GoR is challenged over its actions:  
Deprived of the aid they had hoped for, Rwanda’s new leaders began to argue 
that no one outside Rwanda should have the right to criticize the regime” 
(Pottier 2002: 159).37  
Several informants felt that the reluctance of donors to apply conditions to aid to 
Rwanda, and to engage in confrontational dialogue with the GoR stemmed from this 
situation – the guilt on one side, and the reminders of that guilt on the other. 
Within the GoR’s governance discourse, political development has an important 
place but primarily in terms of institutional strengthening, national reconciliation and 
security, as well as popular participation. Freedom of expression is considered 
subordinate to these elements, although the decentralization law passed in 2001 did, 
in theory, aim at “giving people a chance to experience a culture of open debate in 
which ideas are debated rather than passively accepted” (GoR 2001a: 9). Until the 
elections in 2003, the idea of consensual politics was more important than moves 
towards multi-party democracy; indeed “consensus was [seen as] a step towards 
democracy” (GoR 1999b: 43). As noted in chapter 5, during local and district 
elections in 1999 and 2001 respectively heavy restrictions were placed on the 
freedom of political parties amid fears of a return to ethnic-based politics (ICG 
2002). This relates to Rwanda’s short and tragic experience of multi-partyism in the 
early 1990s, introduced under external pressure. In reflections on the past this has led 
to analyses like “democracy was misinterpreted in Rwanda” and “there has never 
been democracy in Rwanda” (GoR 1999b: 43). This experience has left lasting scars. 
People with whom the elections of 2003 were discussed on an ad-hoc basis 
mentioned the importance of stability before political freedom.38 Consequently, the 
twin concerns of a return to sectarian politics and internal security resulted in the 
                                                 
36 http://www.rwanda1.com/government/ (accessed 25.02.03). This page has now moved to 
http://www.gov.rw/.  
37 Pottier’s study provides very interesting insights into the RPF-led regime’s highly proficient 
information management tactics.  
38 As we saw in chapter 5, there appears to be a tendency in the more critical literature on present-day 
Rwanda to push aside Rwanda’s experiences with democracy in concentrating on the autocratic 
tendencies of the regime. Kimonyo et al. (2004) attempt to bring this aspect back into the debate.  
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GoR taking a ‘paternalistic’ approach to democracy (ICG 2002: 1), concentrating on 
education and awareness-raising about what democracy is or should be in Rwanda. 
This was seen as necessary in order to teach political leaders to be responsible 
citizens, and to teach the general population how to overcome the “culture of passive 
obedience” which had left them “open to political and sectarian manipulation” (GoR 
2001a: 9). As we saw in chapter 5, however, these fears did not diminish with multi-
party elections in 2003; rather, there was a hardening of the GoR’s stance on 
‘divisionism’ in the political sphere both before and after the elections.  
Political governance, in the eyes of the GoR, is not merely about elections, 
however, but also about representation, control and accountability by the people, and 
about people taking responsibility for their problems and finding solutions. This 
approach is also applied to the idea of participation and consultation of the local 
population which is another core element of the international governance agenda. 
Popular participation in decision-making and policy-making processes are 
considered to lie at the heart of the PRSP approach as a means of rendering 
government more accountable and enhancing ‘country ownership’ of development 
actions. For the GoR, however, civil society organisations, including the media and 
private sector, have needed to be taught how to participate. Consequently, although 
civil society is very widely consulted in Rwanda on particular policies – from the 
PRSP, to good governance policy, to the constitution adopted in 2003 – the real 
extent of their contribution is limited. The voice of civil society is welcomed, 
provided it is not in any way politically contentious, and provided that civil society is 
working in a complementary fashion with the GoR’s own activities. There is very 
little room for civil society groups to propose any form of political alternative to the 
programmes being offered; and once again the space for this appears to have 
diminished rather than increased since the 2003 elections.  
This issue has been addressed by several authors, notably around the PRSP 
process, where real civil society involvement has been questioned (see for example 
Mutebi et al. 2001; Maxwell and Christiansen 2002; Bugingo 2003; Renard and 
Molenaers 2003). My own discussions of this with representatives of NGOs in 
Rwanda revealed that the depth of knowledge about the PRSP process is weak, 
especially outside Kigali and the main policy-making circles. Moreover, civil society 
was considered to be weak, disparate, frequently co-opted by the GoR and highly 
controlled.39 Informants were particularly concerned that donors were not using their 
influence over the GoR adequately to address the question of civil society freedoms. 
Moreover, donors were willing to “pass off superficial consultation as deep 
participation,”40 which coincides with my own observations. In February 2004, I 
observed a meeting on collaboration with civil society on implementing the PRSP. 
Donor representatives were present for the first sessions of the day when the GoR’s 
programme was outlined, but almost none were present in the afternoon sessions 
where the participants were split into small groups to discuss aspects of the PRSP. 
Many of the civil society representatives seemed to have had no engagement with the 
PRSP over the preceding years, were unaware of its content, evaluation processes, or 
even of consultation meetings organized previously.41 In April 2004, a meeting was 
                                                 
39 See also Unsworth and Uvin (2002).  
40 Interview, representative of international NGO, Kigali, 27 November 2003. 
41 Observations, meeting organised by Minecofin on civil society participation in implementing the 
PRSP, 19 February 2004. 
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held to prepare the Poverty Reduction Strategy Progress Report where 
representatives of civil society organizations were present. These included 
international NGOs, national NGOs, churches, trade union representatives and the 
media. Presentations by Minecofin officials stressed how ‘participatory’ the PRSP 
process had been, yet throughout the day very little space was given to the civil 
society voice and few questions were raised by these participants.42 Yet, both donor 
officials and some civil society representatives were very positive that the GoR was 
showing a willingness to engage with civil society on policy issues in this way. 
Another example comes from a meeting organized by a local NGO specifically on 
the PRSP which I observed. Questions from the floor focused on accessing money 
rather than engaging with the process.43 The lack of real engagement with 
government programmes was a source of some frustration for several GoR officials 
with whom this was later discussed. They complained that they wanted to engage 
with civil society groups but the lack of organisation amongst local NGOs meant that 
they did not know who to contact. This raises interesting questions about the nature 
of participation and consultation processes; not just about whether the GoR is 
actively consulting local groups, but also about how these groups themselves seize 
the initiative. These experiences point to problems in the nature of Rwandan civil 
society, but also how much donors engage with the reality of concepts like 
participation.  
What emerges from these reflections on governance in Rwanda is a very mixed 
picture. The harshest critics of the Rwandan regime condemn it as increasingly 
authoritarian, warning that the GoR is using its ‘genocide credit’ to both maintain 
control of the political arena and to head off external criticism. Pottier claims that 
“Kigali’s post-genocide regime knows how to make political capital out of the 
empathy and guilt that exist within the international community” (Pottier 2002: 47), 
and has been doing so since 1994. Indeed, one argument would indicate that the 
rhetoric of the GoR demonstrates increased signs of instrumentalisation of the 
genocide over the years. In the early post-1994 documents, there is limited specific 
reference to the genocide; it is referred to more in terms of ‘tragic events’. However, 
by 2004 the genocide discourse is much more flagrant, and closely tied in with the 
harshening of language around divisionism which we saw in chapter 5. Documents 
from the late 1990s call for a fight against ‘sectarianism’. For example, in the Village 
Urugwiro report there was a proposal for a law “punishing those who continue to 
base their ideas on sectarianism, who minimize the genocide and massacres” (GoR 
1999b: 61). Comparing the recommendations of the NURC conferences in 2002 and 
2004 is revealing. In 2002, the strongest recommendations focused on the need to 
“eradicate hindrances of the unity of Rwandans, and to keep factors of disunity at 
bay”; to “come up with programmes building and promoting full fledged 
Rwandanness”; to combat “genocide ideology… by all means”; and to encourage 
Rwandans to participate in gacaca (GoR 2002d: 77-78). The recommendations of the 
2004 summit, on the other hand, propose “drafting a law urging all Rwandans to 
participate to sessions of Gacaca Jurisdictions”; providing “severe sanctions against 
whoever denies the 1994 Genocide and whoever impedes the smooth running of 
Gacaca Jurisdictions”; setting “up directives on characteristics of the ‘belonging to 
                                                 
42 Observations, meeting organised by Minecofin to launch the PRS Progress Report, 21 April 2004. 
43 Observations, meeting organised by Rwandan and regional human rights organisations (CLADHO 
and LDGL) on the PRSP, the European Union Cotonou Accord and NEPAD, 17-18 February 2004. 
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the Rwandan broad family’”; and developing “strategies for its reinforcement by 
showing don’ts (interdictions) such as criticizing and speaking ill of such belonging” 
(GoR 2004). 
This language demonstrates the vulnerabilities at the heart of the Rwandan state 
and society, the signs of fear, distrust and political conflict that demonstrate another 
‘face’ to the constructed discourse of unity and national reconciliation which has 
underpinned the ideology of the regime since 1994. The reconciliation discourse 
pervades, but there is little doubt that the people are if anything merely ‘living 
together’. This comes out particularly in the debate over history. Much debate at the 
Village Urugwiro discussions was oriented towards reviewing the history and 
‘truths’ of the Rwandan nation which allowed the descent into genocide to happen. 
This revision of Rwandan history has been a topic of constant debate both internally 
and externally, amongst Rwandans and external analysts.44 The ‘history’ proposed by 
the GoR is one where pre-European arrival Rwanda was characterized by unity and 
general peace and that hatred and sectarianism were sown by the Europeans. Popular 
acceptance of colonial history and its instrumentalisation by the post-independence 
regime led to “ethnism, regionalism, destruction” (GoR 1999b: 12, 29). The debate 
on history remains contentious. Since 1994 history has not been taught as a subject in 
schools and external academics have been called in to help with redrafting the history 
curriculum (Obura 2003; Hayman 2005b).  
A consequence of these profound vulnerabilities appears to be a search for sources 
to externalise problems rather than raise uncontrollable demons, as we saw above. 
An illustration of this was around the 10-Year Commemoration of the genocide in 
April 2004, when there were very frequent references to the failures of the 
international community to halt the genocide and particularly strong accusations 
against actors like the French.45 This culminated in a diplomatic incident as the 
French representative at the ceremonies walked out after a tirade of abuse from the 
Prime Minister.46 This is illustrative of a wider phenomenon, namely how the GoR 
deals with external criticism of its actions. This sometimes becomes vicious and 
highly personalised (Reyntjens 2001; Prunier 2002), with claims that “[v]oices 
critical of the regime become victims of character assassination, intimidation or even 
physical threat” and that “many foreign critical voices have simply become persona 
non grata” (Reyntjens 2004). The GoR is always quick to reject allegations made 
against it with regard to human rights in particular. For example, in 2002, the GoR 
launched a vitriolic attack against the International Crisis Group (ICG) when it 
published a very critical report of the democratisation process in Rwanda, accusing it 
                                                 
44 See IRDP (2003: 19, 22) on popular feelings about history and the need to reflect seriously on it, 
recognising that it can be used as a weapon of the powers-that-be and that multiple interpretations 
exist. See also Pottier (2003) on ‘rewriting history’, Eltringham (2004) for an overview of the 
literature on Rwandan history and Diaspora perspectives, and Lemarchand (1998).  
45 During the 10-Year Commemoration, a conference was hosted on the role of international actors in 
the genocide, with a repeated message from the GoR about the guilt of the international community 
and that Rwanda was owed compensation. The radio announcements about this event were strong in 
their accusations of foreign guilt. This trickled down into other media. When I attended a 
commemoration ceremony outside Kigali with a friend, I was the only white person present. My 
presence was apparently questioned by several people there, who used very similar language to the 
press reports. As a foreigner I was equated with those responsible for the genocide (Fieldwork Diary: 
6 April 2004 and 14 April 2004).   
46 ‘Premier lashes out at French’, The New Times, April 21-22 2004.   
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of waging “a misinformation campaign designed to not only malign the Government 
of Rwanda, but also to undermine the efforts of the Rwandan people regarding 
national unity and reconciliation”, and condemning certain individuals which it 
claims “have deliberately used the ICG to advance the destructive agenda of negative 
organizations, including known and recorded terrorist groups.”47 Similar attacks have 
been made against Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. 
Accusations of the GoR “institutionalising the genocide to justify its claim to 
power and to sideline potential opposition” (van Hoyweghen 2000:27)48 are strongly 
condemned by officials, however:  
It is inconceivable that anybody would trivialise these horrendous crimes by 
making the absurd charge that we derive political capital from divisions, 
genocide, and fear, as some misguided self-styled experts on Rwanda have 
suggested.49  
Moreover, GoR officials were adamant that the pursuit of ‘good governance’ was not 
merely about meeting external demands. Indeed, informants expressed indignation 
about donors pushing for democratisation and good governance as if both the 
Government and Rwandan population themselves were not committed to it in the 
interests of the future of the country:  
Sometimes [we] feel that donors have no respect, as if democracy is only done 
for the sake of donors. (official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 December 2003)  
[The] GoR does not need to be told that it needs good governance. Good 
governance is good for us but needs to come from us. For donors good 
governance is about trends, visibility – for Rwanda it is about the future and 
working for ourselves. (official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 November 2003) 
If Rwanda is pushing for democratisation it is not because the West is saying so 
but because we realise that it is necessary for development. (Member of 
Rwandan Parliament, 31 October 2003) 
Furthermore, the GoR has been praised for its commitment to democratisation and 
governance in recent years. In September 2005, President Paul Kagame was 
presented with the African National Achievement Award by the Africa-America 
Institute in recognition of the post-genocide achievements of Rwanda;50 in 2004, he 
was awarded a prize for Good Governance; and Rwanda has been a strong proponent 
of the African Peer Review Mechanism under NEPAD, offering to be one of the first 
countries to undergo the process.51 While the space for expressions of political 
opposition does appear to be diminishing, it cannot be denied that a degree of 
participatory debate has been permitted in Rwanda. Ethnicity may be a taboo subject 
in the political arena,52 but there have been signs of what appears to be a genuine 
                                                 
47 GoR press release, 19 November 2002. 
48 See also Uvin (2001a) and Reyntjens (2004). 
49 ‘Rwandans united for a new era’, speech by President Paul Kagame, Kigali Amahoro Stadium, 12 
September 2003 (official English translation of speech in Kinyarwanda).  
50 The New Times, 19th September 2005 (see 
http://www.rwandagateway.org/article.php3?id_article=1009) 
51 See Rwanda NEPAD Magazine, 2nd issue (November 2004) and 3rd issue (June 2005). Available 
from http://www.rwandagateway.org. See also http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm.php  
52 On the question of ethnicity in Rwanda after the genocide, see for example Chrétien (2000), van 
Hoyweghen (2000), Mamdani (2001) and Eltringham (2004). 
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debate about how the country reached the point of such complete collapse, such as 
the annual NURC summits, IRDP research (IRDP 2003) and national seminars 
organised by this group in 2003, and public conferences on genocide and ethnicity at 
the National University and during the 2004 10-Year Commemoration. Public 
consultation on matters of national concern have occurred, such as on the 
Constitution and the PRSP. While these may have been flawed processes, 
circumscribed in terms of expressions of a political nature and characterised by self-
censorship, the important thing is that they have happened.  
Consequently, it is possible to ‘read’ Rwanda in very different ways, and this is 
very important for reflecting on relations between the GoR and donors, as how 
donors understand Rwanda and the GoR depends greatly upon their perceptions of 
the state and country. For example, the gacaca can be seen as a progressive way of 
dealing with a massive justice problem or contributing to insecurity (Corey and 
Joireman 2004); elections as a step towards democracy (Uvin 2001a) or a 
perpetuation of authoritarianism (Uvin 2003; Reyntjens 2004). The role of many 
NGOs, particularly those concentrating on human rights, is to undertake critical 
analysis. However, for donors providing aid under a broad-based programme, a core 
question is how to balance negatives and positives, such as the presence of a more 
independent media against limitations set upon these, an improvement in 
fundamental human rights against freedom of expression, a state genuinely 
committed to socio-economic development and institutional good governance against 
a deteriorating political governance record. 
 
Conclusion: the ‘Faces’ of the GoR 
 
In 2001, Uvin wrote:  
Those who negatively judge the GoR are troubled by its continued, if not 
increasing, dominance by the RPF; the weakness of systemic checks and 
balances on the government; the increasing ‘Tutsification’ of important 
government positions; the co-optation or repression of independent forces in 
civil society; and the allegations of major human rights violations. The contrary 
point of view is that the government is multi-ethnic; has respected the spirit of 
the Arusha agreement; is trying to improve the quality of its governance; allows 
for a largely free press and broad-based civil society; and more generally, given 
the reality of the genocide and continued civil war, has been remarkably willing 
to try to live up to high standards of governance. (Uvin 2001a) 
In a subsequent piece, written with Unsworth in 2002, Uvin refers to the 
“contradictory faces” of the state in Rwanda (Unsworth and Uvin 2002: 6): on the 
one hand, the concentration of power, the weak human and financial resources, and 
the need to construct itself from scratch; on the other hand, the Rwandan state is 
“stronger and more institutionalised” than most other African states, and gives off the 
appearance of a ‘developmental state’ in the Asian model, that is an authoritarian 
regime which seems to show “genuine commitment to development and progressive 
social change” (idem). The progress that Rwanda has made since the genocide is 
highly impressive, but it is far from ideal. As Kimonyo et al. observe: 
Rwanda has moved toward higher levels of security and stability after the 
genocide. Tensions between the two ethnic groups have been greatly reduced, 
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and infrastructure has been rehabilitated in an accelerated fashion. This progress 
has been achieved, however, at the price of unbending political control by the 
party in power. (Kimonyo, Twagiramungu and Kayumba 2004: 8) 
The risk is that, rather than continuing down the path of developmentalism, Rwanda 
will veer into similar problems experienced by other potential developmental states 
in Africa, namely in displaying increasingly authoritarian and neo-patrimonial 
characteristics in its political system, with the needs of the economy and wider 
society subordinated to the political imperatives of the ruling elite (see Lockwood 
2005). 
The idea of the GoR having dual faces emerges in the writings of a number of 
different authors (see van Hoyweghen 2000; Mamdani 2001; Reyntjens 2001; Pottier 
2002; Storey 2003) and is raised frequently by actors within Rwanda. This points to a 
considerable dilemma for donor agencies, one which is reflected in the very different 
positions they have adopted over the years towards supporting the GoR. This chapter 
has demonstrated how many of the GoR’s policies and priorities resonate strongly 
with the preoccupations of the international community. Since 1994 economic 
reform and socio-economic development have featured highly as prerequisites for 
lasting peace. Since the late 1990s the language of poverty reduction has taken centre 
stage in relations. Institutional and political governance issues are being addressed. 
Part of this can be attributed to the weaknesses in GoR capacity for policy-making in 
the early post-genocide years, leading to a heavy reliance on external expertise in 
various forms - financial, technical, human and material. Consequently, the stamp of 
international agencies is evident upon many of the GoR’s socio-economic policies. 
Indeed, in a country which receives over 50% of its annual budget from external 
resources, where every Ministry is bolstered by foreign technical assistants and 
where almost every workshop or publication is in some way financed by a donor, it 
is hard to imagine that the government is wholly unimpeded by externally imposed 
agendas. Whether the evident orthodoxy that emerges within current GoR policy 
positions, which emphasise economic growth and poverty reduction through 
strengthened institutions and participatory governance, derives from the need to 
guarantee a supply of funding from donors, from the influence of external advisors, 
from the theoretical perspectives of an elite who have been educated and who have 
worked abroad, or from a fundamental belief within GoR political circles that these 
are the best policies to achieve its goals is hard to ascertain. Elements of all these 
possibilities came up in interviews with Rwandan officials.  
The proficient deployment of the language of development adds to the image of 
the GoR as developmental and poverty-focused. Speeches by officials of the GoR 
make frequent use of this. For example, at the meeting on harmonisation of 
budgetary support in November 2003, the Minister of Finance reminded donors that 
“no development agenda can succeed unless it is fully owned”, recalling agreements 
made at Monterrey in 2002 and in Rome in 2003 to achieve the MDGs by enhancing 
“mutual accountability” with a “reinforced partnership” and “coherent policies”, by 
making long-term commitments, with predictable, flexible aid.53 This language is 
also employed to hold donors to their own rhetoric, which comes out strongly in 
Rwanda’s push for more aid in the form of budget support, in its demands for better 
                                                 
53 Donald Kaberuka ‘Opening Statement at the Consultative Meeting on Harmonization of Budget 
Support’, Kigali, 18 November 2003. 
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donor coordination and coherence, and in its search for country ‘ownership’. 
Interviews with government officials were strongly imbued with this sort of 
language, with a clear desire for ‘ownership’ ever present.  
Indeed, despite the GoR’s dependence on external financial and technical 
resources, this chapter demonstrates that donors are far from entirely controlling 
development processes in Rwanda, and that the GoR does not passively defer to 
donor demands. The GoR has its own mind about the direction the country is 
heading, and has come up with some innovative policies to address the specific 
problems facing the country. Whether this means that the GoR ‘owns’ its 
development policies is debatable, however. Killick suggests that there are several 
possible levels of ownership:  
- the locus of programme initiation, i.e. with the donors or the government;  
- the technocratic dimension, i.e. the extent to which key policy-makers or 
ministries are involved and on board;  
- the political dimension, i.e. the extent of engagement by the leadership; 
- the breadth of public support, and their involvement in the process; and 
- the degree of institutionalisation, i.e. the extent to which a given set of 
policy reforms becomes institutionalised within the policy system.  
Consequently,  
Government ownership is at its strongest when the political leadership and its 
advisers, with broad support among agencies of state and civil society, decide of 
their own volition that policy changes are desirable, choose what these changes 
should be and when they should be introduced, and where these changes 
become built into parameters of policy and administration which are generally 
accepted as desirable. (Killick 1998: 87) 
The opposite case is when “reforms are donor-initiated and designed, with little 
domestic support and few local roots.” (idem: 87-88). However, he also highlights a 
blurred area in between, where donors may have a strong hand in policy processes 
due to limited government capacity, but where the nexus of decision-making still lies 
with the government.  
For their part, Renard and Molenaers consider ‘ownership’ in terms of three 
groups of actors with regard to PRSPs, stressing the importance of ownership at 
different levels within the public administration: 
- Government, within which there is  
o Technocratic ownership, i.e. the expertise to prepare PRSPs 
o Political ownership, the highest level of commitment to the PRSP 
o Bureaucratic ownership, widespread support within government; 
- Civil Society, where ownership requires representativeness, autonomy vis-à-
vis the state, embeddedness and proximity to the poor; 
- Donors, whose role includes accepting recipient priorities expressed in the 
PRSP, adapting aid procedures to allow government control over aid 
resources, and coordinating with other donors. (Renard and Molenaers 2003: 
9)  
Reflecting on these ideas, the answer with regard to Rwanda’s ownership is 
somewhat inconclusive. On the one hand, many of the ideas, both orthodox and 
unorthodox, originate from the GoR and are firmly believed in; the GoR continues to 
push its policies even where donors are reluctant. On the other hand, many decisions 
are driven by external factors, notably access to resources, and many policies are 
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drawn up with (or by) external advisors. Moreover, many of these policies are not 
internalised beyond a small group within the administration, including the PRSP and 
coordination strategies. GoR rhetoric takes a clear line that Rwanda owns its policies 
and processes; many donors and NGOs are less convinced.  
Nevertheless, there is an unwavering GoR position in its preoccupations with 
security and stability. The more recent drive to achieve poverty-oriented 
developmental targets has not detracted the GoR from the underlying principles 
which were espoused in July 1994 and which have endured through to the 7-Year 
Programme adopted following the 2003 elections. Ten years after the devastation of 
the civil war and genocide, Rwanda’s internal stability may appear assured but the 
challenges are still enormous and many of the underlying political, social and 
structural tensions within the country remain unresolved.  
This leads to very different ways of analysing the reality on the ground in 
Rwanda, looking beyond the policy rhetoric to the way in which policies are actually 
implemented. The real poverty orientation of the GoR is questionable in light of 
certain policies which appear decidedly anti-poor; likewise, the commitment to 
democratisation is cast into doubt with the closing of political space for alternative 
voices. But it is important to recognise that within the GoR there are very different 
voices. The position of the GoR may be down to a genuine fear of a return to 
violence which cannot be underestimated given evident tensions within the country, 
or increased authoritarianism due to vulnerability about retaining power. It is here 
that the concerns of donors become more evident and where the different ways in 
which the GoR can be interpreted impact upon aid relations. Some analysts would 
claim that the ‘genocide credit’ is over in Rwanda, with more overt criticism being 
made of the RPF regime both internally and externally vis-à-vis human rights, 
internal political progress and regional security (Reyntjens 2000, 2001; Braeckman 
2003: 244). However, the ways in which donors perceive the GoR, the ways in which 
they engage with the regime, how they deal with the genocide legacy and GoR 
discourse, and what they choose to ‘see’ vary widely. This is essential to 
understanding the complex world of aid in Rwanda, and in the next chapter we 
consider these questions through a detailed analysis of two bilateral donors, Belgium 















Belgium has played a central role in Rwanda’s recent history  – as a colonial 
authority, as a major donor in the post-independence decades, and as a provider of 
peace-keeping troops prior to and during the genocide. After the genocide, Belgium 
went through a period of soul-searching about its role, but despite rocky relations 
between the Belgian and Rwandan governments after 1994, Belgium has remained 
an important donor to Rwanda. Following a change in government in Belgium in 
1999 relations have steadily improved. Nevertheless, Belgium’s engagement with 
Rwanda has been and continues to be affected by divergent views on the nature of 
the GoR within Belgian society, deriving from its particular historical and social 
legacy. That, together with a series of reforms and changes within the Belgian 
administration of development cooperation has impacted on the country programme 
over the last ten years.  
The United Kingdom, in contrast to Belgium, has a very short history in Rwanda. 
Prior to the genocide, it had no presence in Rwanda at all and no bilateral aid 
programme. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, however, the UK began to 
provide military and humanitarian assistance. By 1996 an embassy had been 
established and after the election of a new government in the UK in 1997, the 
Rwandan programme expanded rapidly. It became an example of the UK’s new 
approach to aid delivery with the provision of budget support focused on key sectors 
for the reduction of poverty, in very close collaboration with the Rwandan 
authorities.  
By exploring in more depth the relationship between these two donors and the 
Government of Rwanda, this chapter takes forward a number of issues raised so far 
in this thesis. The current programmes in Rwanda of both these donors stress the 
importance of poverty reduction as their central aim. However, the nature of their 
activities differs greatly for reasons related to these contrasting histories in Rwanda, 
but also to differences in these donors’ aid and development policies more generally. 
This chapter examines why the UK and Belgium have acted as they have in Rwanda 
between 1994 and 2004, how the genocide has impacted on their activities, how their 
engagement with the Rwandan regime has developed over time, and how their 
activities reflect shifts in aid thinking at an international level. By exploring these 
two cases, a clearer picture of the complexity of aid in Rwanda emerges, with lessons 
of specific relevance to Rwanda and of broader significance. After providing a brief 
overview of Belgian and UK aid, this chapter takes a comparative perspective of 
several elements of UK and Belgian policy: history and domestic political factors, 





Belgium and the UK in Rwanda 1994-2004: an overview  
 
In December 2002, Belgium published a new policy paper on Rwanda (DGCD 
2002); DFID published its latest paper on Rwanda in February 2004, after a year-
long preparation and consultation process (DFID 2004c). The programmes outlined 
in these documents display strong similarities in terms of overall objectives and 
strategies. Both aim to support poverty reduction, peace building in Rwanda and the 
region, governance, socio-economic development and human rights; and both pledge 
to work within the framework of the GoR’s PRSP and in collaboration with other 
donors. As a consequence, these strategies also reflect broader global trends in 
development cooperation and the general policy lines of these two donors. 
The overall international development framework of the UK Labour government 
elected in 1997 and returned in 2001 and 2005 is set out in two White Papers, 
Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century (DFID 1997) and 
Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor (DFID 2000). 
These documents outline how UK aid will focus on poverty reduction and achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through a range of measures: 
promoting good governance and market-led reforms, investing in education and 
skills, addressing trade and environmental issues, and improving aid effectiveness at 
the international level. While the 1997 White Paper is more representative of 
international trends in development thinking, the 2000 White Paper articulates a 
clearer DFID line, but constitutes more of a government-wide approach to 
globalisation than dealing specifically with international development (McGrath 
2002; King and McGrath 2004: 118-119). Conflict resolution also plays an important 
role, with the Great Lakes featuring as an area to be addressed. Tackling poverty is a 
objective for DFID, closely tied to the strategies of the international financial 
institutions and the OECD-DAC, with greater support going to the poorest countries 
(Morrissey 2002).1  
Underpinning Belgium’s Rwanda policy paper is the 1999 Law on International 
Cooperation. This frames documents such as the 2000 policy paper Quality in 
Solidarity: Partnership for Sustainable Development (DGCI 2000a) and the 2003 
General Policy Note of the Minister of Development Cooperation (GoB 2003). The 
core principles are to establish strong partnerships with developing countries to 
tackle poverty and support sustainable development, with a concentration on 25 
countries (reduced to 18 in 2003) and five sectors (health, education, agriculture, 
basic infrastructure and civil society). In the 2003 Note, a greater emphasis was 
placed on achieving the MDGs, enhancing country ownership, improving aid 
efficiency and adopting ‘new’ aid instruments, including a gradual move from 
project to programme support. 
                                                 
1 Although portrayed as such (see for example Short (2004) “we exchanged enthusiastic words about 
the new focus on the reduction of poverty”), this emphasis on poverty reduction is not entirely new. 
Poverty has been a feature of UK aid objectives since the 1960s, returning regularly to the agenda 
under Labour governments in particular, and resurfacing in tune with global thinking after 1990 
(Maxwell 1996; Healey 1997; Burnell 1998; Lancaster 1999). DFID’s definition of poverty has been 
critiqued, however. For example, Booth and White are concerned that it uses a limited definition 
covering only income poverty (Booth and White 1999: 1). Biccum (2005) bemoans the lack of 
analysis of the underlying causes of poverty as well as the moral and economic overtones which see 
poverty as both degeneracy to be tackled and a threat.  
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Table 7.1 Belgian and UK programmes in Rwanda2 
 Belgium (DGCD) UK (DFID) 
Overall Aid 
Objectives  
2000: ‘do no harm’, poverty reduction and sustainable development. 
2003: MDGs, aid effectiveness, shift to new aid instruments. Restricted countries (18) 




Trusteeship of Rwanda from 1924-1962. Post-independence: one of Rwanda’s top donors 
until 1994, providing social, political, economic and military support. Post-1994: drops behind 
other donors as diplomatic relations waver. Remains within top 10 donors, with greater re-
engagement since 2000. 
No presence in Rwanda prior to 1994. Emergency response to the genocide leading to a 
permanent presence with embassy opened late 1995. Strong support for GoR on basis of 
personal relationships; rationale for aid is genocide legacy and faith in new regime’s 




1994-1999: ‘mutual suspicion’ characterised relationship, soul-searching in Belgium about role 
in genocide. Since 1999 ‘cautious engagement’, with Central Africa a priority area. Ongoing 
concerns about nature of GoR preventing provision of budget or sector support. 
Substantial cooperation programme from 1997. Since 1999 UK interchanges with USA as first 
or second largest bilateral donor, providing around 25% of all bilateral aid; fully devolved 
office by 2003 and large-scale budget support programme. 
Aid Flows 
Decline 1996-2001 from 23m to 12m. Levels affected by reform of cooperation 1999-2001. 
Since 2002 trend reversing, with new resources committed in 2004. Set to rise to 22.6m by 
2006. 
One of few ‘new’ countries where UK aid is increasing significantly. Rise from £2m in 1995 to 
planned £47m by 2008. 
Regional 
Policy 
Rwanda and the DRC are top recipients of aid, with Burundi also very important. Great Lakes 
Plan (2001) aims at security, stability and development in region. 
Strong presence throughout East Africa. No regional policy but new commitments to provide 
support to Burundi (small-scale, humanitarian) and DRC (more substantial programme to 




Bilateral projects (potential for sector support under investigation) co-managed by BTC, 
technical assistants and GoR counterparts. Indirect support through Belgian and local NGOs, 
Belgian regional bodies, universities. Each project negotiated with GoR.  
Most aid provided as general budget support. Under 2001-2003 programme one-third 
earmarked as sector support to education. Provision of short and long-term technical 
assistance in ministries (education, finance, gender, land). Some large projects and small-
scale support to NGOs. 
Sectors 
Post-genocide concentration on justice, health, rural development and education. Also 
institutional support to Ministry of Finance on and off since 1997, Ministry of Health and 
Ministry of Justice.  
Strong presence in Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance (revenue authority, PRSP, 





Overall programme framed by Convention with projects/programme negotiated in bilateral 
talks (most recently in May 2004). Overall conditions apply to the programme but subordinate 
to individual conditions negotiated for each project.  
Frequent high level ministerial visits since 1999, including Prime Minister and Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation. 
Overall programme framed by Memorandum of Understanding (signed 1999, renewed 2004) 
which sets out mutual commitments of partners. Programme approach based on close policy 
dialogue with GoR.  
Frequent visits by Secretaries of State for Development Cooperation. No high-level Foreign 
Office visits.  
Coordination 
Officially leading in the health sector for donor side, although limited activity until 2004. 
Coordinates sub-group on gacaca. Regular meetings at Belgian embassy of Belgian actors in 
Rwanda including Belgian and local NGOs supported by Belgium.  
Leader in the education sector for donor side. Heavily involved in Budget Support 
Harmonisation Group. Was driving force behind early donor-GoR partner talks. Limited formal 
engagement with UK NGOs or Rwandan civil society.  
Domestic 
Issues 
Large Rwandan and regional diaspora, with opposition groups to GoR in Belgium. Limited real 
influence over Belgian policy. Divided opinions amongst academics and NGOs, with some 
very critical of Rwanda. Fairly widespread public knowledge and interest in Rwanda. Divisions 
impede shift to more programme-based approach. 
Limited interest within political circles beyond few individual politicians, reflecting low public 
interest in GLR. Some NGOs becoming more critical of the UK’s approach and lobbying more 
strongly. Limited Diaspora voice, although survivors’ groups relatively active. Changes in 
cooperation minister impacting upon programme.  
Presence on 
the Ground 
Strong presence of Belgian technical assistants present throughout country, often with 
extensive experience in GLR. Continuity in projects despite changes within the overall policy. 
Full embassy with growing DGCD staff. BTC office expanding.  
Devolved country office with policy analysts and programme staff. Strong presence within 
certain ministries of technical assistants. Limited knowledge at first of GLR, but improving, 
although limited networks beyond GoR circles. 
                                                 
2 Throughout this chapter, aid figures are given in the currency used by the donor agency: Euro () for Belgium; Sterling (£) for the UK. Exchange rates fluctuate, but the official 
exchange rates provided by the OECD in January 2004 were $1= 0.8851 and $1 = £0.6124 
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The similarities between the policy principles of DFID and DGCD3 both globally 
and in Rwanda are evident; yet, there are also a great many differences. Table 7.1. 
provides an overview of the two programmes in Rwanda, highlighting where there is 
resonance and divergence and building on the overview given in chapter 3.  
 
History and Domestic Political Factors 
 
The first and most obvious contrast between the UK and Belgium is their 
historical trajectories in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region. This has had a 
profound impact upon the nature of their engagement in Rwanda since 1994. As 
table 7.1 shows, Belgium’s official links with Rwanda go back to 1924, when it was 
given a mandate over the territory of Ruanda-Urundi (Chrétien 2000: 228).4 Belgium 
left a heavy colonial imprint on Rwanda, economically, socially and culturally. 
Although colonial history has a fairly limited bearing on the day-to-day relations 
between the governments, as Rwanda goes through the self-reflection process 
essential to national reconciliation, this legacy and Rwanda’s contested history 
continue to resonate in broader Rwandan society as we saw in chapter 6. It is 
Belgium’s more recent history which has had the greater impact on the post-1994 
relationship between the two governments, as well as internally within Belgium. The 
strong political, cultural, social and economic ties between the Belgian population 
(and the Belgian Government) and the previous Rwandan regimes under Kayibanda 
and Habyarimana (Saur 1998) led to an atmosphere of mutual distrust between the 
post-1994 GoR and Belgium, where the same government was in power before and 
after the genocide. The withdrawal of Belgian troops after the death of ten Belgian 
paratroopers during the genocide and the pressure exerted by Belgium on the United 
Nations to halt the peacekeeping mission altogether, increased the sense of bitterness 
towards Belgium by the GoR.  
This ‘mutual distrust’ is evident in Belgium’s early approach to the new regime, 
which was marked by what has been termed ‘constructive criticism’ (Reyntjens and 
Parqué 2000).5 This was based on the belief that the RPF would not bring stability to 
Rwanda (Debar, Renard and Reyntjens 1999), as well as concerns by 1996-97 about 
Rwanda’s involvement in eastern Zaire where Belgium considered itself to be one of 
the few donors standing up for Zairian sovereignty (Verwimp and Vanheusden 
2003). Belgium was among the donors to apply conditions to aid in the post-
genocide period, freezing aid over the Kibeho incident, and was one of the more 
critical donors speaking out at the Round Tables (c.f. Chapter 5). 
Within Belgium itself, the legacy of the genocide had profound consequences, 
which have in turn affected development cooperation and political relations. The 
genocide came as a shock to many Belgians. It was a country which had been 
considered “virtually flawless” and a “model” for aid management (Renard and 
Reyntjens 1995; see also Uvin 1998). But suddenly media attention was turned on 
                                                 
3 DFID is the UK’s Department for International Development, previously the Overseas Development 
Administration (pre-1997); DGCD is Belgium’s Directorate-General for Development Cooperation. 
This name was changed in 2003 from the Directorate-General for International Cooperation. 
4 Belgium has a longer linked history with Rwanda, nevertheless, with economic and cultural ties 
dating back to the late 19th century (see Chrétien 2000).  
5 Several informants within the Belgian administration interviewed in 2003-2004 continued to use this 
term ‘constructive criticism’ to describe the Belgian approach.  
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Belgium’s past and present role, leading to a process of introspection on an 
individual and societal basis (de Lame 2003; see also Destexhe 1996). The in-depth 
parliamentary enquiry in 1996-97 into Belgium’s role in the genocide, brought 
before the Senate by the current Prime Minister who was in opposition at the time, 
Guy Verhofstadt, amongst others (Belgique-Sénat 1998),6 represented an act of 
purging. The enquiry had consequences beyond relations with Rwanda alone, 
highlighting profound flaws in Belgium’s approach to foreign affairs and 
development cooperation (Willame 1997; Lanotte 2000; Willame 2000). It led to the 
shift in foreign policy adopted by the Verhofstadt regime – a coalition of Liberal, 
Socialist and Green parties which took power in 1999 ending thirty years of 
Christian-Democrat political domination – which saw a move from ‘panic 
diplomacy’ to a more ethical, moral diplomacy based on the centrality of human 
rights (Rosoux 2002; de Lame 2003).7 This change in government in Belgium also 
brought about a significant thawing in relations with Rwanda, moving from 
‘disengagement’ (Reyntjens and Parqué 2000) to ‘cautious engagement’. This term 
was used by officials to capture an approach which aimed at supporting Rwanda as 
constructively as possible, not disengaging, but not rushing in ‘blind’ either. In so 
doing, Belgium could lay the groundwork for a deeper aid relationship as Rwanda 
stabilised. A further turning point came with the public apology to the Rwandan 
people on behalf of the Belgian people by Verhofstadt in April 2000, although 
lingering doubts about the regime have continued to affect the programme, as we 
shall see below.   
In sharp contrast, the UK had no history as a donor in Rwanda prior to 1994. 
Although strongly present in Uganda, with diplomatic representation in Zaire, the 
UK’s bilateral relations with Rwanda, Burundi and eastern Zaire were extremely 
limited. Engagement in Rwanda since 1994 has therefore been premised upon the 
UK’s ‘clean slate’, untainted by association with the former regime: “We do not have 
an historical legacy in Rwanda; we are trusted and regarded as even-handed” (DFID 
1999: 5). This lack of a historical legacy was considered central to gaining the trust 
of the new regime by officials involved in the Rwanda programme in the immediate 
aftermath of the genocide, who emphasised the UK’s innocence at the time to what 
had been building up in Rwanda.8 This ‘innocence’ has been challenged by 
researchers investigating how calls for intervention were ignored or sidelined by the 
UN Security Council, including by the UK government (Melvern 2004; Melvern and 
Williams 2004). For Williams, this reflected an attitude of “total indifference” given 
that Rwanda lay beyond Britain’s sphere of influence or interest (Williams 2004a). 
Porteous sees it rather as representative of Britain’s lack of vision vis-à-vis Africa 
                                                 
6 The enquiry was widely reported in La Nouvelle Relève in Rwanda in early 1998, with Belgium 
praised for undertaking such a public and in-depth analysis (in contrast to France). It was not without 
criticism, however. One article by Sevilien Sebasoni (an academic and RPF activist) considered the 
enquiry to have avoided the difficult questions about ethnicity and anti-Tutsi sentiments prevalent in 
Belgium (La Nouvelle Relève , 31 March 1998). 
7 This included the passing of a law on ‘universal responsibility’ which has led to high-profile legal 
cases being brought in Belgium against perpetrators of human rights abuses in other countries, e.g. 
General Pinochet and Ariel Sharon, but has also allowed genocide suspects living in Belgium to be 
tried for crimes committed in Rwanda. Note that this concern with an ‘ethical’ foreign policy mirrors 
the sentiment of the new UK government in 1997 (see Porteous 2005). 
8 Telephone interview with Lynda Chalker (former UK Minister for Development Cooperation), 8 
September 2004. 
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which resulted in “policy drift, caution and inaction verging, in the case of Rwanda, 
on negligence” (Porteous 2005). Indeed, prior to 1997 the UK, like many EU donors 
in the Post-Cold War period, was providing additional support to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, a large proportion of development assistance 
was going to middle income countries (Healey 1997). 
Despite this, the UK, unlike donors such as France and Belgium, has never 
received open recrimination from the GoR for its lack of action, beyond the general 
blame placed upon the international community as a whole.9 UK officials said that 
they never encountered a sense of specific bitterness towards the UK; quite the 
reverse in fact. The UK’s strongly supportive stance of the GoR right from the outset 
in 1994 meant it was viewed as a ‘good friend’. Although the UK only had a small 
budget for direct action from 1994 to 1996 – a mere £1m in 1994 increased to £3m in 
199510 – officials felt that it had made a considerable difference because they were 
willing to engage positively with the GoR, not to be judgemental or expect rapid 
change, and to be flexible in their approach at a time when most aid was flowing to 
refugee camps outside Rwanda’s borders (c.f. Chapter 5).11 This reflects the positive 
opinions expressed by a range of Rwandan politicians and government officials 
interviewed. The UK was described as “very supportive”, as “genuinely trying to 
help”, as having a real “will to cooperate”, and as recognising Rwanda’s 
determination to “do the right thing”.  
Hence, while Belgium was going through a turbulent time in its relationship with 
Rwanda, the UK was engaging with limited regard for the qualms expressed by other 
donors about the direction the country was taking or the nature of the new regime.12 
The policy from 1995 was to engage strongly with the GoR, for whom there was a 
great deal of respect and in whom there was considerable trust. Although the UK 
programme has been strongly associated with the Secretary of State for International 
Development between 1997 and 2003, Clare Short, there was already a UK presence 
on the ground when she came to power. The former Minister for Overseas 
Development at the time, Lynda Chalker, had visited Rwanda in July and August 
1994 and established a temporary one-person office to assist UK military personnel 
and NGOs. The decision to open an embassy in late 1995 was a sign that the UK 
                                                 
9 Certainly in the pre-1999 period, the Rwandan press did not hesitate to denounce Belgium’s 
harbouring of genocide suspects and opposition politicians, even within articles outlining new Belgian 
cooperation activities. See for example La Nouvelle Relève, No 345, 16-31 July 1997 and No 370, 30 
October 1998. In contrast, articles relating to the UK are incredibly enthusiastic about British aid (La 
Nouvelle Relève, 30 April 1999), giving Clare Short front page headlines whenever she visited the 
country (La Nouvelle Relève, 30 April 1999 and 15 May 2000), and stressing the importance of the 
UK as a provider of direct support to the GoR (New Times, 24-26 November 2003).  
10 Note that the UK was providing additional assistance through UN agencies, NGOs and the UN 
Trust Fund, as well as the World Bank and EC. It was also supporting the UN RT process itself with a 
project established in February 1995 to monitor disbursements, support thematic consultations, 
prepare future RTs and development budgets (UNDP/UNOPS 1997).   
11 Interviews: former UK Minister of Overseas Aid, 8 September 2004 (telephone); former 
Ambassador to Rwanda 1995-1998, 23 August 2004 (telephone); FCO official, 4 June 2004; former 
ODA/DFID official, 2 June 2004. Note, however, that Melvern and Williams (2004) claim that the 
UK government has used its record of support to post-genocide Rwanda as a way of deflecting 
criticism about its lack of action prior to and during the genocide. 
12 See Pottier (2003), particularly chapter 5, for a critique of the UK’s approach in its dealings with the 
GoR.  
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presence in Rwanda was to be permanent,13 although at the time there were no plans 
for a bilateral aid programme. When Short was appointed in June 1997, with a strong 
mandate for development cooperation, a Cabinet seat, an autonomous Department14 
and an expanded budget, she re-affirmed the UK’s commitment to Rwanda, visiting 
the country within three months of taking office.15 This commitment has expanded 
exponentially since. By 2003 DFID had a fully devolved office in Rwanda with a 
large number of programme and senior advisory staff on education, economics, 
governance, social development and livelihoods. 
Officials involved in Britain’s Rwanda programme in the early years accept how 
little knowledge the UK really had of the situation, speaking of ‘enormous naivety’ 
and ‘complete ignorance’, especially when Rwanda became engaged in Zaire in 
1996. Although the UK Government did draft in academics and NGO analysts to 
help with understanding Rwanda, there was very little internal knowledge within 
government circles. Even the academic basis of knowledge on Rwanda and the Great 
Lakes was weak within UK universities at the time. Nonetheless, there appears to be 
a genuine belief that the UK did the right thing in placing faith in the new regime in 
Kigali. The sense of moral imperative comes through strongly from interviews with 
UK officials. As one informant said, other donors were drawing back when Rwanda 
needed their help most. This position was “morally inadequate” and the response of 
the UK was to make up for the loss.16 This viewpoint is reflected in the 2004 Country 
Assistance Plan:  
The country’s traditional donors and the new Government were unwilling to re-
engage. The UK, through DFID, therefore committed itself to becoming 
Rwanda’s major bilateral development partner. (DFID 2004c: 15)17 
Much of this can be attributed to the very personal commitment of Short to 
Rwanda, without whom the programme would never have expanded as it did. 
Numerous people interviewed on the UK and Rwandan side spoke strongly about her 
                                                 
13 One British informant claimed that the opening of a UK embassy in Kigali was less to do with guilt 
than NGO pressure.  
14 Prior to 1997, the UK’s Overseas Development Administration (ODA) was part of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, with limited autonomy. International Development climbed significantly up the 
political agenda with the election of the Labour government in 1997, and was no longer subjugated to 
foreign policy and commercial interests as had been the case more or less between 1979 and 1997. 
The establishment of DFID also brought changes in management of aid money – greater 
decentralisation to expanded country offices, more in-house capacity for research and analysis, greater 
transparency, and frequent public consultation exercises.  
15 According to Short’s biography, her first visit was in 1998 (Short 2004:86); however, her first 
official visit took place in October 1997 (DFID Press Release, 9 October 1997; IRIN Update 167, 10 
October 1997).  
16 Intervention by DFID official, presentation of preliminary research findings, London 10 November 
2004. 
17 This sentence was revised from earlier drafts: “For political reasons related to its recent history, the 
Government of Rwanda was not willing to re-engage with its traditional bilateral development 
partners – France and Belgium” (February 2003), changed to “For political reasons related to recent 
history, Rwanda’s traditional bilateral development partners, France and Belgium, were unwilling to 
re-engage with the new Government” (May 2003). There is no explanation of why traditional donors 
were not engaging, and there is no analysis of other reasons why donors may not be so enthusiastic 
about the new GoR. Rather, the UK is taking the lead in recognising Rwanda’s need for “wide-
ranging, substantial and predictable support”, and “the commitment of the new Government to 
national reconciliation and poverty reduction for all Rwandans” (DFID 2004c: 15).  
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deep personal attachment to Rwanda. Short was shocked at the limited direct support 
the new regime was receiving from other donor agencies; she took the stance that the 
UK should champion the GoR as no-one else was prepared to do it, and she had a 
strong belief in the RPF. However, the role of individual personalities over this 
period was not just limited to Clare Short. A common thread running through 
interviews undertaken with nearly all officials involved in the Rwandan programme 
over the 1994-1999 period is a strong personal commitment, with several officials 
talking highly of their experiences. Time spent in Rwanda was described as “weird 
and wonderful”, “really interesting and very challenging”, “very interesting”, 
“rewarding” and “exciting”. Some said it had been the best placement they had had. 
Several have retained close ties with Rwanda, visiting regularly or becoming 
involved in voluntary organisations supporting the country. It is interesting that 
officials posted to Rwanda after 1999 do not appear to share the same sort of 
emotional attachment. On the other hand, Short’s very positive position on Rwanda 
provided little space for criticism of the programme by DFID staff. Former officials 
mentioned leaving the service over frustration caused by Short’s unwillingness to 
accept criticisms of the GoR, particularly with regard to the DRC.  
The role of individuals has been just as important on the Belgian side, although 
this was brought up in a less explicit fashion. Rwanda is a top posting for Belgian 
officials and technical assistants, with many having worked in the Great Lakes region 
for much of their careers. This contrasts sharply with the UK where up to very 
recently, Rwanda was something of a posting for junior officials, the office often 
staffed by young people starting their careers.18 A few Belgian ministers have been 
very influential. Over the ten year period in question, Belgium has had five different 
ministers of development cooperation. Of particular importance was Reginald 
Moreels from 1995-1999, who set in motion an in-depth reform of Belgian 
development cooperation. Coming from an NGO background, Moreels was heavily 
in favour of projects and  results-oriented aid. However, the Moreels reform only 
started to be implemented under the subsequent government; it was considered a 
constraint and was widely criticised. Scrapping the reform, however, was deemed 
more harmful.19  
The nature of the Belgian political system, with the tendency for coalition 
governments, has also influenced relations with Rwanda, with differences in political 
and ideological positions often evident between the Cooperation and Foreign 
ministers. For example, under the 1995-1999 administration, Moreels (Christian 
Democrat) was often at odds with Foreign Minister Erik Derycke (Socialist), notably 
over relations with Zaire (Debar et al. 1999; Verwimp and Vanheusden 2003); under 
the 1999-2003 administration, Cooperation Minister Eddy Boutmans (Flemish 
Green) had a different perspective to Foreign Minister Louis Michel (Francophone 
Liberal).20 This has led to some tensions between ministers, not only over priorities 
but also over responsibilities, autonomy and budgets. Development Cooperation 
                                                 
18 The demographics of aid workers in Rwanda is interesting in this respect. Many of the Belgian (as 
well as French and German officials) are older, contrasting with younger Anglophones amongst the 
‘new’ donors and NGOs. By 2005, however, older DFID staff were being appointed to the Kigali 
office. 
19 Interview with Eddy Boutmans, Belgian Secretary of State for Development Cooperation 1999-
2003. 
20 Since 2003 both ministers have been Liberals and the Liberal influence is evident in the overall aid 
programme with a stronger role being advocated for the private sector in development cooperation. 
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officially comes under the remit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but as it has its 
own minister it has considerable autonomy and a larger budget. During the 1999-
2003 legislature, when Foreign Minister Michel (who became European 
Commissioner for Development Cooperation in 2004) made Central Africa a 
priority, he sought to enhance the Foreign Ministry’s role through an expanded 
budget for conflict resolution activities. At the same time, however, there have been 
attempts to enhance coherence across departments over the Great Lakes, with regular 
meetings between the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation and 
Defence.21 
The differences in opinions within the Belgian administration reflect a broader 
story. Very different viewpoints about the Rwandan regime are expressed within 
political, civil society and academic circles, often split along political and social 
lines.22 For example, in the pre-genocide period there was seen to be a division 
between Francophone academics who were more supportive of the Tutsi and Flemish 
academics more supportive of the Hutu. Some practitioners in the field felt that this 
had become an enduring stereotype which they were struggling to shake off.23 
Although there is a new generation of Belgians working on Rwanda with few links to 
the pre-genocide era, there are a great many practitioners and academics who have a 
long history in the country and region which impacts upon their personal 
perspectives. The Rwandan government, for its part, can be incredibly hostile 
towards Belgian academics, particularly those who are heavily critical of it. For 
example, a long-running battle has been going on between the GoR and Filip 
Reyntjens of the University of Antwerp, an outspoken critic of the RPF government. 
The GoR has also been hostile to particular Belgian NGOs in the past (a number of 
whom were expelled from Rwanda in the ‘purge’ of 1995 mentioned in chapter 4) 
but also more recently vis-à-vis some Belgian NGOs active in human rights work. 
More recently, academics seem to be fairly united in their opposition to the GoR, 
although divides are still evident.24 There are also splits between those involved in 
                                                 
21 There was an inverse situation in Germany at the time of this research where the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs was Green and a junior partner and where the Minister of Development Cooperation 
was a Socialist heavy-weight. On the whole cooperation between them was fine, but they did have 
differences over the Rwandan occupation of the DRC, and how to react in tune with political and 
developmental goals. The Minister of Development Cooperation saw the occupation in terms of 
recovery from genocide (i.e. giving Rwanda leeway for security), but the Foreign Minister was 
focused on the geo-political/diplomatic side and the primacy of that before development goals. Things 
improved with the withdrawal of Rwandan troops in 2002. (Interview with representative of German 
Development Cooperation, 30 September 2003)  
22 Belgium is made up of three linguistic and cultural communities (Flemish, Walloon/Francophone, 
and German-speaking). These divisions run through political and social life, leading to complex 
federal institutions as well as political parties split along Francophone and Flemish lines; NGOs, civil 
society organisations and government-funded bodies follow a similar pattern. There have been 
profound tensions between the Flemish and French-speaking communities in the past, the Flemish 
population having been repressed under Walloon political control until the middle of the 20th Century. 
This has left lasting scars on the national identity. This is of relevance to relations with Rwanda as for 
some analysts the Belgian struggle for its national identity was transferred to Rwanda soil. Flemish 
missionaries took the side of the repressed Hutu during the colonial period, helping to develop the 
Hutu ideological position vis-à-vis the Tutsi as independence approached (see Prunier 2002).  
23 This was reiterated by the Rwandan Ambassador to Belgium (interview, Brussels, 2 November 
2004).   
24 See for example the exchanges between Reyntjens and Goyvaerts in the journal African Affairs 
(Reyntjens 1999b).  
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technical cooperation activities who are keen to keep the politics out and take a long-
term view of Rwandan development and who recommend support of the current 
process in Rwanda; and the more politicised critics who see renewed conflict in 
Rwanda as imminent and are pushing for more political sanctions. Consequently, it is 
possible to discern two tendencies in Belgian thinking on Rwanda. On the one hand, 
there are those who seem to be emerging from the distrust of the 1995-1999 period. 
These actors are looking to build a more constructive relationship with the GoR, 
which is considered to deserve support to set it on the right path to stability and 
change. This group is largely comprised of technicians, bureaucrats and diplomats. 
On the other hand, there are those who see things as deteriorating in Rwanda under 
an authoritarian regime, particularly amongst politicians, academics and civil society 
(11.11.11 2003; Reyntjens 2004). Yet, even the latter are caught between the desire 
to disengage entirely and to continue engaging in order to retain their potential 
capacity to influence events through Rwandan civil society.25 
In addition, Belgium is home to large numbers of people of Central African 
origin. Amongst the Rwandan diaspora, very different political views can be 
observed (see ICG 2002; Rafti 2004). Although Belgium has been a focal point for 
opposition groups in exile, there are also groups supportive of the Kagame regime. 
The Belgian administration has sought to engage with the diaspora, but it is 
considered to be very divided and lacking in a clear agenda which the Belgian 
government can support.26  
In contrast, there were few really critical voices amongst UK actors over Rwanda. 
Across the UK political spectrum, those politicians interested in Rwandan affairs 
seem to share a common perspective. Several members of parliament have visited 
Rwanda since 1997, and have been supportive of DFID’s approach to assisting 
Rwanda’s recovery from the genocide, which appears to be the primary point of 
reference for most politicians.27 In terms of coherence with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) there are mixed views. The line from officials is that 
the two departments are working well together, with secondment of staff between the 
FCO and DFID and close working relations in London and the field. More objective 
analyses imply less harmonious relations. Short herself recalls that   
From the beginning, the climate across Whitehall was hostile... Africa came low 
down the list of Foreign Office priorities but they certainly did not want DfID 
poking its nose in. (Short 2004: 78-79) 
This was particularly the case following the establishment of DFID in 1997, with 
Clare Short taking quite a political stance on development aid, thereby stepping into 
FCO territory (Williams 2004b; Porteous 2005).28 Interestingly, before 1997 it was 
                                                 
25 Interviews, Belgian NGO 11.11.11, Brussels 19 June 2003 and 22 January 2004. 
26 Interview, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 June 2003 and 5 November 2004. 
27 In 1998 the All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes and Genocide was established, 
bringing together MPs as well as interested NGO actors and members of the public. This Group 
organised two visits to the Great Lakes Region, holds talks and seminars, and has published a number 
of reports. See http://www.appggreatlakes.org/cgi-bin/site/index.cgi  
28 Britain’s foreign policy on Africa over the last 10 years, and notably since 1997, is contested in the 
literature. For Williams (2004a) there has been continuity marked by inconsistency between the 
poverty-focused, humanitarian agenda and strategic interests. Porteous (2005), on the other hand, sees 
the emergence of a clear Africa agenda. Since 2004, the prominent voices on Africa within the UK 
government have been more focused around Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor Gordon 
Brown than the Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn. 2005 saw Africa climb 
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the FCO which was more in favour of engaging in Rwanda while the ODA/DFID 
was not.29 This situation was reversed from 1997. There have been no senior FCO 
official visits to Rwanda since this time and FCO officials appear to be advocating a 
more cautious approach.  
It is only more recently, particularly since about 2002 and the publication of 
reports into the illegal exploitation of resources and human rights abuses in the 
eastern DRC implicating the Rwandan army and in the run-up to the Rwandan 
elections, that more critical questions have been raised about Rwanda’s intentions in 
the Great Lakes region within the UK Parliament.30 Among the British NGO 
community a similar pattern can be observed, with a largely positive position in the 
first years, giving way to more critical reflections since about 2000, but with fairly 
consistent views across the community. NGOs are concerned about human rights 
abuses, and what they saw as blind faith in the GoR under Clare Short. Despite 
public consultation exercises on policies, there is a sense amongst NGOs active in 
Rwanda, based in the UK and in Rwanda, that their voices were not being taken into 
account. At a consultation meeting in June 2003 on DFID’s draft Country Assistance 
Strategy for Rwanda, the response of civil servants to NGO concerns was that the 
GoR was misunderstood and just not very good at getting its message across.31 This 
reflected the general hostility of Clare Short towards NGOs. This position was also 
evident in the lack of an official relationship between UK NGOs and DFID in the 
field, with DFID reluctant to listen to alternative viewpoints. The main criticism 
from NGOs was that the UK was too focused on its good relations with the GoR and 
was not bringing its influence to bear on the GoR. The UK government response was 
that it could not give precedence to NGO ‘speculation’ and ‘rumour’ over its official 
partner without hard evidence. It stressed the importance of behind the scenes 
political dialogue.  
However, the position of the UK does appear to be changing. After many years of 
very positive engagement under Clare Short, a slight shift in the UK’s stance can be 
observed. Since the appointment of a new Secretary of State in 2003, the UK has 
shown more readiness to apply political conditions to aid to Rwanda, as we shall see 
below. Various reasons can be advanced for this shift, including different 
personalities and staff without such an emotional attachment to the country, a 
reduction in the GoR’s ‘genocide credit’, and accumulated years of knowledge by the 
UK government about the Great Lakes region leading to a different base from which 
to assess the situation.  
Interestingly, as the UK demonstrates more caution in its approach towards 
Rwanda, in Belgium the critical voices seem to be losing their influence over the 
policy process. The Belgian government’s increasingly positive approach to Rwanda 
runs counter to the academic and NGO lobbyists who continue to voice concerns. 
Since the 1998 war with the DRC, there has been more overt criticism about Rwanda 
                                                                                                                                          
the political agenda considerably in light of the UK’s Presidency of the G8 and the European Union, 
the Commission for Africa and the UN Global Summit. Brown’s development financing initiatives 
have however come under attack for failing to analyse the root causes of underdevelopment (see for 
example Taylor 2005a).  
29 Interviews: FCO official, London, 4 June 2004; former DFID official, 2 June 2004. 
30 Parliamentary questions and debates, various years (See  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmhansrd.htm)  
31 Observations, Consultation meeting on the Rwanda Country Assistance Strategy, DfID London, 30 
June 2003. 
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amongst civil society in Belgium (Entraide et Fraternité, Broederlijk Delen and 
Wereldsolidariteit 2000); there was a parliamentary enquiry into mineral exploitation 
in the DRC (Sénat de Belgique 2003); questions have been raised about the opening 
of political space in Rwanda, with Belgian NGOs demanding that more conditions be 
applied to Belgian aid; and people who were once considered rather favourable to the 
new Kigali regime have grown more critical.32 Although there have been some tense 
words between Brussels and Kigali over these issues,33 on the whole the signs from 
the Belgian government are of increasing warmth towards Kigali. This was 
demonstrated most clearly shortly after the Rwandan elections in 2003 when the 
Foreign and Development Cooperation Ministers visited Rwanda and praised the 
conduct of the elections, as we saw in chapter 5. This was interpreted by the 
Rwandan ambassador to Belgium as a realisation on the part of the Belgian 
government that it had been mistaken in its early analysis of the GoR and as a 
reaffirmation of the trend towards a positive engagement which began with 
Verhofstadt’s apology.34  
 
 
Development Cooperation and Foreign Policy: policies and practice  
 
Despite tensions with Rwanda at the diplomatic level since 1994, Belgium has 
never stopped providing aid. Even when relations were at their worst in the 
immediate post-genocide years, aid still flowed. A number of pre-genocide projects 
were resumed, for example in agriculture and health, where very long-standing 
cooperation relationships exist; and new ones were initiated, notably in the justice 
sector. Programme aid, such as the balance of payments support provided pre-
genocide, was not resumed, although remaining funds under this category were 
shifted to other lines. This reflected a political decision not too engage too closely 
with the GoR but to focus instead on a few key sectors. At the same time, much of 
the continuity in activity can be attributed to individual staff.35 The head of Belgian 
cooperation programmes in Rwanda prior to the genocide returned as soon as 
possible after the genocide, describing how he sought to pick up the pieces of 
Belgian projects in the aftermath with very limited resources. For the initial period, 
much of this activity was relatively informal, relying on personal networks, and 
included quite close relations with senior GoR civil servants despite the tense official 
relations between the two countries. Belgian aid workers were providing logistical 
support to the highest authorities in the country, support which was not being 
refused.36  
                                                 
32  See for example the recent book by Colette Braeckman on the DRC, a journalist who has grown 
increasingly critical of the GoR (Braeckman 2003). 
33 See for example ‘Tension entre Bruxelles et Kigali’ [Tensions between Brussels and Kigali], Rossel 
et Cie SA, Le Soir en ligne, Bruxelles, 2002. 
34 Interview, Rwandan Ambassador to Belgium, Brussels, 2 November 2004.   
35 The fact that the same cooperation minister was in place in Rwanda before and after the genocide 
may also have played a role. Belgium was negotiating projects in 1993, preparing for the end of the 
war and the installation of a new coalition government under the Arusha Accords (AGCD 1994). 
Officials talked of literally crossing the battle lines to discuss projects with the RPF who were set to 
take over particular portfolios, such as health.  
36 Interviews, DGCD desk officer for Rwanda, Brussels, 3 June 2003 and 22 January 2004. 
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However, the resumption of aid was also about the importance of Rwanda to 
Belgium. Rwanda, along with Burundi and particularly the DRC, represents a 
cornerstone of Belgian foreign and cooperation policy, as we saw in chapter 3. After 
a period of relative disengagement from Africa during which time a policy of 
‘Afrique aux Africains’ (let Africans sort out Africa’s problems) was pursued under 
the guise of expanding ownership,37 with the change of government in 1999, Central 
Africa was once again re-affirmed as a priority for Belgian foreign relations. The 
Great Lakes is seen as the one area in the world, beyond the European Union, where 
a small country like Belgium is able to have any influence on the international 
stage.38 Additional administrative arrangements were made to reflect this renewed 
prioritisation, with a Great Lakes analyst appointed to DGCD, a Great Lakes desk 
created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a Great Lakes special ambassador 
appointed in 1996 and again in 2002. 
For the UK, Rwanda does not represent any strategic importance, although it has 
risen up the list of main recipients of UK aid to around 10th since 2000, being one of 
only a few non-traditional countries to receive a steady increase in support.39 The 
rationale for the programme has remained largely unchanged since 1997 combining 
genocide-related guilt, the UK’s comparative advantage and the achievement of 
global poverty goals:  
Our engagement with Rwanda acknowledges the country’s traumatic past, its 
continuing severe needs, the potential for instability in Rwanda to spread 
beyond its borders, and the Government’s strong commitment to poverty 
reduction and democratic governance. We must also remember that the UK is 
now Rwanda’s major bilateral development partner and its most consistent ally 
in international negotiations. (DFID 2004c: 17)  
Although it has no specific Great Lakes regional policy, the UK is taking a greater 
interest in regional affairs since about 2002. There has been a growing awareness 
within the UK parliament and the government that Rwanda cannot be treated in 
isolation either developmentally or politically; moreover, the argument has been put 
forward that DFID cannot seriously be concerned with poverty reduction while 
ignoring the DRC. Consequently, the UK is becoming increasingly engaged in 
Burundi and the DRC, as well as acting as a mediator in relations between Rwanda 
and Uganda. Country Engagement Plans have been developed for Burundi and the 
DRC (although these remain unpublished); the UK was the largest donor to election 
preparations in the DRC in 2005; and in late October 2005 the Secretary of State for 
International Development, Hilary Benn, made a visit to the region, stressing how 
“[p]eace and stability have been the building blocks for recent progress” in these 
three countries.40 This demonstrates how the UK’s strategy has moved beyond a 
                                                 
37 Interview with Louis Michel, La Nouvelle Relève, 31 August 1999. 
38 Belgian ministers have tended to stress how limited Belgium’s influence in world affairs is; 
however, through its colonisation of the Congo, Belgium was a powerful force in shaping modern 
Central Africa (Clément and Roosens 2000). 
39 Between 1997 and 2006 (projected), a number of sub-Saharan African countries saw a significant 
rise in budget allocations, e.g. doubling for Ghana and Mozambique, rising by a third for Tanzania 
and Uganda. The most dramatic increases have been for Nigeria (from £9.3m to £35m), Sierra Leone 
(from £3.1m to £40m) and for Rwanda (from £6.2m to £47m) (DFID 2002a, 2002b, 2004d, 2005b).  
40 ‘Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development to visit Rwanda, Burundi and 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, DFID press release, 30 October 2005. On support to the DRC 
elections, see EURAC ‘Great Lakes Echoes’ Nº12, September 2005. 
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specific humanitarian response to the genocide to a political engagement in a 
conflict-torn, extremely poor area of Africa.   
 
















Source: DGCD statistics department (2004) 
 
Figure 7.1 provides an overview of Belgian aid to Rwanda over the period under 
study.41 As illustrated, aid flows declined from 1998 to 2001, picking up again from 
2002. While this can be attributed partly to the political qualms outlined above, aid 
flows were also affected by the reform of Belgian development cooperation. This 
followed a parliamentary enquiry into the effectiveness of Belgian cooperation in 
1996-97, which recommended its modernisation to improve predictability, quality 
and efficiency through a concentration on fewer countries and sectors (DGCI 2000b; 
OECD-DAC 2001a: II-17-18). What subsequently became known as the ‘Moreels 
Reform’, after the Minister in charge of overseeing it, saw an upheaval in the 
management of aid, with the separate Ministry of Development Cooperation 
becoming a semi-autonomous entity under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although 
with its own Secretary of State. The reform was set down in the Law on International 
Cooperation adopted in 1999. Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) was also 
established, an autonomous management agency contracted by the Ministry of 
Development Cooperation to oversee all bilateral aid projects. The project approach 
was to be favoured. It was portrayed at the time as allowing Belgian cooperation to 
move from a paternalistic approach to a relationship based on partnership.42 
However, later analyses have labelled it chaotic and disruptive. It took until 2000 for 
                                                 
41 Note that these figures were provided by DGCD and differ from those given in chapter 3 for which 
the source is the OECD-DAC. 
42 See La Nouvelle Relève, 16-31 July 1997 ‘Belgium-Rwanda: from paternalism to co-management.’ 
This multi-page spread in the Rwandan press coincided with a visit of Minister Moreels to the region, 
outlining the new programme for cooperation. This article demonstrates that the atmosphere of 
distrust between Belgium and Rwanda still existed, however, with Moreels refuting alleged comments 
he had made about the Rwanda government and its activities in the Congo. On this latter point see 
Verwimp and Vanheusden (2003).  
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BTC to be fully operational, leading to a backlog in projects and fund disbursal. 
Minor adjustments continue to be made, such as the renaming of the Directorate-
General of International Cooperation (DGCI) to the Directorate-General for 
Development Cooperation (DGCD) and the Secretary of State becoming a Minister 
in 2003.43  
The impact of this reform, coupled with political factors, was that no new 
programme was formulated for Rwanda until 2002, explaining to some extent the 
continuity in projects and activities after 1994 as no new directives were coming 
from Brussels.44 The first official, bilateral partnership talks in 15 years were held in 
2004 where a new Convention was signed, promising additional assistance to 
Rwanda.   
The major difference between Belgian and UK aid in Rwanda relates to the 
instruments employed and the way in which aid is delivered. Belgium provides aid 
through a variety of channels, as figure 7.1 shows. The main channel is direct 
bilateral assistance, which flows from DGCD to the Rwandan government via BTC. 
Indirect bilateral assistance is delivered through Belgium’s regional bodies,45 
Flemish and Francophone NGOs and university cooperation organisations. 
Multilateral aid flows through a variety of international bodies. One of the main 
complications with this rather disparate system is that the regional bodies are not tied 
by the 1999 Law on International Cooperation, so are therefore free to pursue their 
own objectives and strategies. For example, promotion of Francophone culture is a 
central objective of Francophone cooperation; Flemish cooperation works more with 
countries like South Africa. Demands for greater devolution of development 
assistance to regional bodies has raised concerns about the effectiveness of Belgian 
aid within DGCD and the OECD-DAC (OECD-DAC 2001a: II-21-22). During 
fieldwork in Belgium in June 2003, this devolution process – known as 
déféderalisation – was the main topic of debate amongst aid officials, many of whom 
considered it a step backwards in cooperation effectiveness. Elections had just taken 
place in Belgium and the government was in flux. Devolution is a highly political 
issue in Belgium, arising frequently around election times. The debate seems to have 
died down since. Although the Note Politique of 2003 mentions that some resources 
will be devolved, the government is keen to ensure coherence by encouraging other 
entities to follow the lead of DGCD.  
This study focuses primarily on direct bilateral assistance delivered in project 
form through BTC under the co-management system adopted in the early 1990s. 
Although it relies on projects, co-management ensures that these do not bypass 
government systems, but rather are closely negotiated with the relevant authorities or 
ministries. Surprisingly perhaps, it is appreciated by GoR officials for its 
transparency and flexibility as the system allows problems to be identified and dealt 
with early. At the same time it is labour-intensive with regular partnership committee 
meetings requiring the presence of the relevant line ministry Secretary General, the 
                                                 
43 In the UK a Secretary of State is more senior than a Minister; the opposite is the case in Belgium. 
44 Interviews with head of Belgian development cooperation, Kigali, 13 October 2003, 8 December 
2003, 16 April 2004.  
45 Both the Francophone and Flemish communities have international relations departments and 
associated project execution agencies. In Rwanda, the most important of these are the Association for 
the Promotion of Education and Training Abroad (APEFE) and the Flemish Association for 
Development Cooperation and Technical Assistance (VVOB).  
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Belgian cooperation attaché, both project managers, a representative of CEPEX and a 
representative of BTC. The system is administratively burdensome with frequent 
delays between project identification and implementation. This seems to have 
affected institutional support projects in the ministries of health and finance in 
particular, where by the actual start of the project the requirements and conditions on 
the ground had changed. For some within the GoR, the approach allows a strong 
degree of Rwandan ownership and a close working partnership, while ensuring 
Belgian accountability for funds. One official described Belgium as the “most 
organised” donor she was working with, mentioning that CEPEX “was involved in 
every step” and that it was “a good system”.46 Another official, however, described it 
as “paternalistic.”47 Despite this close negotiation of projects, however, there are 
questions about whose priorities truly prevail. Some projects seem to have been more 
or less forced on the GoR at first, for example technical assistance to the Ministry of 
Finance, but in others Rwandan priorities have prevailed. This was the case in the 
negotiation of support to the education sector where Belgium wanted to support 
primary education and the GoR wanted it to support secondary. The compromise 
reached was that Belgium would support lower secondary education.  
After the genocide Belgian aid was concentrated on a few sectors: health and rural 
development, where Belgium has been active for 40 years in Rwanda; governance, 
largely in human rights and civil society support through NGOs; justice, considered 
in the aftermath of the genocide to be a crucial area for engagement to support the 
reconciliation process;48 and support to economic planning. Education and training 
projects are carried out mainly by VVOB and APEFE. It has more recently started 
bilateral projects within the Ministry of Education, and under the new programme 
signed in 2004 is planning considerable support to rural development.  
The UK, on the other hand, provides nearly all of its assistance as general budget 
support, considered as having “the greatest impact on poverty” (DFID 2004c: 15). 
This is particularly appreciated by the GoR, which sees the UK as providing it with 
the chance to have ‘ownership’ of its development programmes, as listening to the 
GoR’s priorities rather than imposing its own, as helping to bring other donors on 
board this type of agenda – effectively as an example of a real partnership.49 
Although initially provided to support the cash-strapped regime in the late 1990s, the 
UK’s provision of budget support is now specifically linked to the promotion of the 
PRSP (DFID 2004b). In Rwanda, the UK takes its  
assurance from Government’s commitment to reducing poverty, from progress 
in aligning the budget with PRS priorities, and from improvements in certain 
aspects of public expenditure management. (DFID 2004c: 17) 
                                                 
46 Interview, CEPEX desk officer, CEPEX, Ministry of Finance, 3 November 2003. 
47 Interview, Rwandan Member of Parliament, 31 October 2003. 
48 Belgian support for the justice sector captures the guilt and shock response to the genocide, a way 
of dealing with direct consequences through a range of measures including support to the Ministry of 
Justice in classic justice and gacaca, and via NGOs working on governance, human rights and support 
to survivors. This is an area where Belgium considers itself willing to ‘take a risk’ (Interview, DGCD 
official, Brussels, 20 January 2004).   
49 Interview, Rwandan Ambassador to UK, London, 30 July 2003. 
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Indeed, DFID has been something of a champion of the PRSP in Rwanda, having 
strongly backed the preparation of the interim PRSP by supporting the Strategic 
Planning and Poverty Monitoring Department of the Ministry of Finance.50  
This provision of institutional support in parallel to budget support is 
characteristic of the UK programme. Strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of 
Finance has been a core element of the UK’s approach in Rwanda, not only 
supporting the SPPMD, but also the establishment of the Rwanda Revenue Authority 
and the use of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for public 
financing. The provision of short and long-term technical assistants has aimed at 
strengthening institutional governance and accountability. A similar approach has 
been taken in the Ministry of Education, where large amounts of support have been 
earmarked for institutional strengthening and the implementation of a SWAp. 
However, the UK’s approach raises two important questions. Firstly, having decided 
to provide budget support in Rwanda, it would appear that the UK has also had to 
provide additional assistance to ensure that the various mechanisms required to 
guarantee good use of resources are in place. Although the approach in Rwanda has 
been seen as innovative and brave by a number of UK officials, there has also been 
scepticism about it within UK government circles.51 Secondly, it is clear that the UK 
has been pushing particular instruments, by bolstering the PRSP process and 
advocating the introduction of SWAps and the MTEF. In the 2004 Country 
Assistance Plan (CAP), the UK admits that the PRSP, MTEF and SWAp are not 
evenly prioritised across government ministries. It therefore takes on the task of 
promoting this approach throughout the GoR: “DFID will continue to encourage all 
government agencies and all development partners to work within the PRS”. Risks to 
the implementation of the PRSP are seen to be a lack of capacity and the fact that 
“the PRS is not accepted by all parts of the Government as the overarching policy 
framework” (DFID 2004c: 20). Although the final PRSP is generally considered to 
have been more ‘owned’ than earlier versions, this situation raises interesting 
questions about Rwandan ‘ownership’ of the PRSP process, beyond core ministries 
and key senior officials.  
The UK engagement in Rwanda provides a clear example of how a country 
programme can be profoundly affected by particular changes in government. We 
have seen above how the change in government in Belgium in 1999 permitted an 
improvement in relations with the GoR, with the election of a government untainted 
by the associations of the past, and headed by a politician who had instigated the 
parliamentary inquiry and who came to Rwanda to apologise. Although this did not 
represent a completely clean slate, it certainly indicated a warming in temperature. 
The extent of the UK’s Rwanda programme today has been directly determined by 
the change in UK government in 1997. As already noted, international development 
leapt up the political agenda at this time and, more specifically for Rwanda, 1997 
saw the arrival of a Secretary of State who became deeply attached to Rwanda on a 
personal level.  
However, Rwanda also presented an opportunity for the incoming Secretary of 
State to engage in a new country where a difference could really be made, using the 
                                                 
50 Interviews: DFID officials, London 30 July 2003; former ODI fellow, London, 28 July 2003. The 
UNDP and the World Bank have also been strong players in the PRSP process in Rwanda.  
51 Interviews: former UK ambassadors to Rwanda, Kigali 1 December 2003,  telephone 23 August 
2004; former DFID official, 2 June 2004. 
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new approach advocated by DFID – concentrating on poverty reduction and using 
new instruments such as programme aid – which did not require former project and 
management systems to be dismantled first.52 It is, however, somewhat erroneous to 
talk about DFID’s approach as so ‘new’. Prior to 1997 a number of initiatives were 
set in motion which were built on by DFID, including the untying of aid, poverty 
reduction, programme aid, as well as the governance agenda bringing in political 
conditionality after 1990 (Healey 1996; Cumming 2001). Healey also notes how in 
the early 1990s programme aid was shifting towards budget support, with a stress on 
improved public expenditure management and accountability, with some specific 
sectoral programme aid and close links with IFIs. This also reflects European 
Commission thinking at the time. So there are strong similarities with the DFID 
approach, although a key difference is DFID’s more long-term perspective. Hence, 
although serious changes were wrought, the agenda was not as completely 
overhauled as is sometimes implied. At the same time, Clare Short had sufficient 
political authority to take a risk on Rwanda, and pushed her staff to come up with a 
plan for Rwanda, against the judgement of some civil servants who were concerned 
about DFID’s lack of knowledge in the region, the lack of French-speaking staff and 
the poor understanding of Rwanda’s institutional systems. It was considered a high 
risk venture administratively, politically and financially.53 Nevertheless, the risk was 
justified on the grounds that conflict may have flared up again unless a donor like 
UK took a positive approach to GoR.54  
Given this, the strategy adopted by the UK was to support an IFI lead for a 
coordinated, large-scale aid effort, with long-term financial commitments to the GoR 
budget provided that the GoR met particular benchmarks with regard to social 
services and financial management. This was a policy which made sense in 1997, 
given that the UK lacked the networks, the staff and the capacity to establish large 
scale projects. Moreover, close collaboration with the IFIs allowed the UK to use the 
IFI budget analysis to ensure good use of resources, given that the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) ensured the budget would be open to scrutiny. 
To some extent, this close linkage of the UK programme with the ESAF, working 
almost exclusively with the central Rwandan government, explains the UK’s 
promotion of partnership talks to mobilise similar support from other donors (see 
chapter 5). Rwanda was something of a test case for IFI post-conflict strategies 
(World Bank 1998; DFID 1999: 1), and likewise it became a test case and a model 
for the UK’s new aid approach. In interviews, a number of DFID officials referred to 
the Rwandan programme as a ‘model’, a ‘test case’, a ‘ground-breaking exercise’, 
‘innovative’, ‘pioneering’, with the UK working on a ‘blank sheet’, even as a ‘good 
prototype’ for the budget support approach.  
In working almost exclusively with central government ministries – and largely 
those where senior staff were Anglophone rather than Francophone55 – the UK has 
                                                 
52 For an interesting study of how the shift in UK approach from projects to programme aid affected 
existing projects and processes, see Mosse (2005), especially chapter 8.   
53 Interview, former DFID official, London, 2 June 2004.  
54 Interviews: former ODI fellow, 28 July 2003; DFID official, London, 30 July 2003. 
55 Unlike most African countries, Rwanda has the advantage of one dominant language – 
Kinyarwanda, spoken by almost 100% of the population. This is the first language of business, 
including within the administration. However, in interactions with the international community two 
languages prevail – English and French. Many of the ruling elite in Rwanda speak English, having 
been raised in English-speaking countries of Eastern Africa. Although English has become an official 
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received criticism about its lack of engagement with non-state actors or with actors 
outside the capital. This has been seen as diminishing its access to alternative 
perspectives.56 Although DFID in Rwanda has demonstrated signs of seeking to 
engage more with civil society, occasionally producing proposals to work more with 
non-state actors, there has been limited realisation of this to date. The preference to 
concentrate on government actors, and a specific group of people amongst these, was 
evident from the start of the programme. Initial attempts to engage with Rwandan 
civil society were limited to ‘influential’ groups in the scheme of power, largely 
Tutsi organisations linked into the establishment. A former UK Ambassador to 
Rwanda was very clear that it was scarcely worth engaging with others who did not 
have sufficient influence.57 As a consequence, the networks necessary to expand the 
UK’s knowledge of deeper Rwandan political and social processes are weak. Around 
15% of Belgian aid to Rwanda, in contrast, flows through international and 
increasingly through Rwandan NGOs. Moreover, the Belgian Embassy in Rwanda 
holds regular meetings with these groups to keep track of activities and exchange 
information, and has a sizeable number of technical assistants in the field. 
As the international agenda swings increasingly towards concepts of coordination 
and programme aid, the Belgian government is considering a shift away from 
projects. In the Note Politique of October 2003, Belgium placed the possibility of 
sectoral and budgetary support onto the agenda (GoB 2003: 14). However, the use of 
this mechanism in Rwanda has been hampered by continuing political caution, 
despite Belgium consistently reaffirming its desire to engage in Rwanda. The Note 
observes that budget support will not be adopted in crisis countries and will depend 
upon the existence of constructive dialogue and adequate institutional capacity 
(idem). Rwanda’s weak institutional framework for ensuring accountability has been 
the most public reason for not providing budget support to Rwanda, but behind this 
lies more political debates, lingering doubts about the nature of the RPF regime and 
political pressure exerted on the Belgian government from groups hostile to the GoR.  
Differences in opinion within the Belgian administration about this instrument are 
also evident, in Belgium and in Rwanda. Although budget support is used in 
countries such as Mozambique where Belgium is part of a large consortium of 
donors providing budget support, and sectorally for salaries in Niger and Burundi, it 
is not widespread and the project mentality seems dominant amongst officials. In 
interviews, several officials said they were strongly opposed to budget support in 
Rwanda. This was particularly the case while the Congo conflict was ongoing, with 
                                                                                                                                          
language of Rwanda, it is not widely spoken. Even French is not widely spoken outside urban areas, 
in a country largely considered to be Francophone. Research in 1996 put the number of English 
speakers at 1.3% and French speakers at 5.3% (reported in E. Williams 2003). There has been some 
speculation about Anglophone (largely American) plots to expand influence in the Great Lakes 
Region (see Huliaras 1998; Chossudovsky 2003), and a number of Francophone informants did raise 
the question in interviews about this. Although there is no space to explore this issue in any depth 
here, the expansion of the use of English in the administration and education system is very 
interesting. At the same time, we should be wary of reading too much into this. Many of my Rwandan 
English-speaking informants were trying to learn French and vice versa, trilingualism is being 
promoted, and President Kagame participated in the Franco-African summit for the first time in 
November 2004, reaffirming Rwanda’s place within La Francophonie.  
56 Much of this criticism comes from NGOs and is a very important issue which cannot be dealt with 
here. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that NGOs have a vested interest in donors working 
with non-state actors (see Randel and German 1999).  
57 Interview, former UK ambassador to Rwanda, Kigali, 1 December 2003. 
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concerns about the diversion of resources to military ends. Nevertheless, there is also 
recognition that Belgium will have to go this way if it wants to ‘catch-up’ with other 
donors (GoB 2003: 14) and by 2004 substantial internal reflection was happening 
within DGCD and BTC on this. A complication to the adoption of budget support as 
an instrument was the recent creation of BTC, which is essentially a project 
management agency, representing the technocratic project approach. BTC has, 
however, been very active in analysing how it can get on board the sectoral and 
budget support agenda and carve a role for itself within such a system.58 Another 
area of reflection is the different sort of political relationship with the GoR required 
under a budget support approach. This would focus on more central government 
authorities rather than line ministries where the project approach concentrates. At the 
same time, Belgium has approved a large new budget for Rwanda. Absorption 
capacity for projects is already problematic and budget or sector support is seen by 
some as the only possible way of shifting such large amounts of money. As noted in 
chapter 3, Belgium is not alone in its concerns about the provision of budget support 
to Rwanda for technical and political reasons. In interviews undertaken in 2003, 
informants felt that budget support would never be approved for Rwanda and there 
were strong criticisms of the UK approach. However, by the second half of 2004, 
informants were considering that the shift to sector or budget support was more or 
less inevitable.   
 
Policy Dialogue and Conditionality 
 
The UK’s engagement with Rwanda in such a substantial way, on the back of 
limited experience and knowledge, did however call for new accountability 
instruments. As we have seen, the provision of budget support to Rwanda 
represented a shift in UK thinking on aid. The lack of existing projects and networks 
allowed the UK to establish a new kind of relationship with the GoR, one which was 
based on mutual trust. The sort of trust generally required for the provision of budget 
support is expected to emerge from a long-standing relationship between a donor and 
recipient country, as we saw in chapter 2. The UK’s approach in Rwanda very much 
rewrote the rules in this respect. By the time the UK’s Rwanda Country Strategy 
Paper (CSP) was published in 1999, the UK had built up important relationships 
with key members of the GoR, notably the Vice-President (and President from 2000) 
Paul Kagame and the Minister of Finance from 1997, Donald Kaberuka. Central to 
the UK’s approach has been its capacity to use these relationships to build “a strong 
development partnership with Rwanda founded on [its] ability to have an honest, 
open and frank policy dialogue” (DFID 1999: 5). The importance of the relationship 
of ‘trust’, enabling such a dialogue, was frequently referred to in interviews with UK 
officials, and was again highlighted in the 2004 Country Assistance Plan (CAP) 
(DFID 2004c: 15). The fact that the UK was “alone” among donors in placing such 
trust in the GoR, as one former official put it, created an atmosphere of mutual 
respect, which in turn facilitated UK access to core policy-makers. This access is 
fundamental to the budget support approach. It allowed the UK to engage with the 
GoR on critical questions, often behind closed doors, and to be closely involved in 
the policy process. Indeed, when accused of not taking a sufficiently critical stance 
                                                 
58 Interview: BTC, Brussels, 27 May 2004. 
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towards the GoR, the UK falls back on the argument of ‘behind-closed-door’ 
diplomacy, stressing that more overt criticism would be damaging to the relationship 
and perhaps destabilising to the country.  
To frame the relationship with Rwanda, an innovative new instrument was signed 
in 1999 between the UK and the GoR, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 
which was renewed in 2004.59 The MoU is premised upon a ‘partnership’ approach, 
with ‘mutual commitments’ on both sides – the UK provides flexible, long-term 
support in return for the GoR’s adherence to its policies on socio-economic 
development, conflict resolution, national reconciliation and good governance (DFID 
1999: 9-12). This reflects DFID’s broader political conditionality terms, notably that 
“aid is directed at serving the development needs of the poorest countries provided 
their government demonstrates a commitment to poverty reduction”; and that DFID 
will provide resources where there is a willingness on the part of the recipient to 
“enter into a transparent partnership” (Morrissey 2002: 21).  
The 1999 MoU is a fairly weak document, however, stretching to only four pages. 
Commitments are weighted towards technocratic and institutional arrangements or 
are deliberately vague: the GoR “will work towards a negotiated settlement of the 
conflict” in the DRC; good governance is assessed by unspecified “progress”; the 
benchmarks are loose (DFID 1999: 9-12). This caused some concern in the MoU 
2002 assessment which recommended much tighter benchmarks for governance 
(Steedman and Andenas 2002). One senior official working on the MoU in 1999 said 
that the whole process was a “nightmare”. This was unknown territory, there were no 
legal precedents and no in-house legal advisors. DFID was trying to agree 
benchmarks for a country it did not know. Without the force of Clare Short behind it, 
it is unlikely that it would have happened at all.60  
There is nevertheless a clear evolution between the UK policy papers and the 
MoUs of 1999 and 2004, demonstrating deeper changes in the UK position. The 
2004 CAP is a more substantial document, including a comprehensive ‘risk analysis’. 
There was a long consultation process in the UK and Rwanda leading to significant 
changes between drafts. Coherence between UK departments, notably DFID, the 
FCO and the Treasury, is more prominent and there is tougher language with regard 
to human rights and democratic progress. Various explanations can be advanced for 
this: the impact of public consultations, where civil society groups were pushing for 
greater conditionality; a change of Minister with a less personalised view of Rwanda 
and unfolding events in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. The CAP was also 
being prepared as Rwanda was going through its election process in 2003, a time 
when many questions were being asked, as we saw in chapter 5. Between the May 
2003 draft and the final version more hints at conditionality are included and there is 
less assumption of faith in the direction the GoR will take. There are subtle nuances 
in the language which hint at a more cautious approach focusing on “critical, but 
supportive dialogue”, and working with “progressive champions for change” and 
“trusted interlocutors” (DFID 2004c: 6). The 2004 CAP is a more political document 
                                                 
59 In contrast to other donors, whose conventions between the GoR and the donor are usually signed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rwanda, the UK’s 1999 MoU was signed between DFID and the 
Ministry of Finance. This reflects the strength of relationship between these two bodies, but also 
DFID’s approach to working with Minecofin as the key interlocutor for development. Interestingly, 
the 2004 MoU was signed by DFID and the Rwandan Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
60 Interview, former DFID official, 2 June 2004.  
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than the 1999 CSP, including a political analysis of the situation in Rwanda and 
outlining the UK’s understanding of the GoR’s political ideology. It is also more 
modest, recognising that the UK has “less influence” on politically sensitive issues 
such as the media, justice reform and the operation of political parties (idem: 14), 
although it does stress its influence over certain developmental policy processes, 
such as the PRSP and education. This raises questions about the real value of the 
policy dialogue in which the UK appears to place so much faith. The GoR may listen 
to UK as its largest and most trusted donor but it does not necessarily comply with 
what the UK wants it to do. The lack of access to this ‘behind-closed-door’ 
diplomacy makes it hard to know to what extent the UK is using its influence or 
whether that influence is less strong than hoped. 
The revised MoU signed in January 2004 is also more substantial, laying down 
explicit targets for both partners. The UK commits itself to supporting the GoR’s 
strategies, utilising GoR procedures and systems wherever possible and providing aid 
in a flexible and predictable manner. The GoR commits itself to making progress on 
a range of issues: regional peace and stability, the poverty reduction strategy, 
national unity and reconciliation, human rights, democratization, and economic and 
financial management. A procedure is set out for formal dialogue if either party is 
deemed to have reneged on its commitments with a transparent and phased approach 
to reducing or halting aid (DFID 2004a). However, there are concerns that the 
indicators for political governance cannot be easily monitored, and these are areas 
where UK support is minimal. Indeed, the MoU seems to be caught between 
insufficient detail which renders the clauses too general and therefore too difficult to 
monitor, and too specific with regard to targets and indicators, with the same effect 
(Killick, Katumanga and Piron 2005). 
A core element of budget support is the provision of a predictable flow of 
resources to the central government. Analyses of budget support in practice are 
demonstrating that in fact budget support is remarkably unpredictable, as we saw in 
chapter 2. This has proved to be the case in Rwanda. As noted in previous chapters, 
2003 and 2004 were turbulent years for Rwanda, given the election process and 
ongoing tensions with the DRC. These events, coupled with poor harvests, led to 
Rwanda going off-track with the IMF (IMF 2004) which in turn created problems for 
the disbursement of UK budget support, as well as that of other budget support 
donors. 2004 saw a more serious challenge to the UK’s budget support approach, and 
to its MoU, however. In 2004 and early 2005 disbursements were delayed every 
quarter, with the delays linked to both IMF negotiations and political qualms in the 
UK about Rwanda’s intentions vis-à-vis the DRC. This reflects the caution creeping 
into the UK’s approach, but it also captures flaws in the design of the budget support 
programme. As the UK’s 2005 policy paper on conditionality states,  
Where it is necessary to reduce or interrupt aid, we will make the decision based 
on criteria and processes agreed with our partner country in advance. The 
process will allow for a substantial period of assessment and discussion between 
the developing country government and donor agencies. Any planned 
disbursements will continue during the period of dialogue. Dialogue is 
particularly important when several donors have conditions in the same areas 
and there is a risk of countries losing a substantial amount of aid at short notice 
by failure to adhere to certain conditions. (DFID 2005a: 13) 
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However, the UK failed to follow this procedure with regard to Rwanda in 2004. 
The review of the UK MoU for 2003-2004 (Killick et al. 2005) considers that the 
UK acted without due regard for the terms of the MoU in delaying budget support 
without undertaking a formal dialogue process. On the GoR side, one senior official 
expressed disappointment at the unilateral action taken by the UK which undermined 
the nature of this partnership agreement.61 The response from the UK government in 
a press statement was that it considered GoR action to be “inconsistent” with 
commitments, that it was “right and necessary” to withhold budget support, and that 
“Rwanda’s threat posed an immediate and extraordinary hazard to regional peace and 
security”. This was considered to constitute the “exceptional circumstances” under 
which the UK could renege on its agreement to provide predictable support (Press 
Release, HMG, 10 June 2005). This incident raised concerns among Rwandan 
officials about the more negative aspects of budget support. Moreover, although the 
UK continues to be Rwanda’s main ally, in discussions with certain officials it was 
clear that there had been a change in feelings towards the UK as a consequence of 
this incident – the effusive language about the UK was somewhat dampened. DFID 
field staff were also concerned about irrevocable damage being caused to the 
relationship of trust.  
The issue of policy dialogue and political conditionality is a completely different 
matter for Belgium. Belgium has tried to introduce more in the way of political 
conditionality into its programmes since the beginning of the 1990s, including with 
regard to Rwanda and other Great Lakes countries, to promote human rights, 
governance and democracy (Renard and Reyntjens 1995). In the early 1990s positive 
conditionality measures were applied in Rwanda to push for democratic reforms and 
an end to the civil war, with a degree of success at the time. But after the genocide, 
attempts to impose political conditions were undermined by the poor relations 
between the two governments, by Belgium’s record during the genocide and deeper 
reflections on its long-term role in Rwanda, and by the much more positive stance of 
other, notably ‘new’, donors (Debar et al. 1999).62 Even where Belgium would have 
considered imposing conditionalities, there was reluctance to halt support to basic 
education and health, rural development or emergency assistance (Renard and 
Reyntjens 1995). So even when aid was frozen to Rwanda briefly in the wake of the 
Kibeho massacre in 1995, emergency aid and support to the justice sector continued 
(Pottier 2002: 165). This reflects the later commitment made by Belgium to the 
OECD-DAC’s ‘do no harm’ approach (OECD-DAC 2001c). For Belgium, the 
relationship is premised on support for the country and the population, not the 
government of Rwanda. Central to this is that any poor relations with the government 
should not affect support to the people. This is quite different to the UK, whose 
relationship is quite specifically with the government.  
The Belgian policy documents which frame the Rwandan programme – the 2001 
Great Lakes Plan, and the Note Strategique – do carry quite explicit conditions. As 
with the UK, these are generally not termed ‘conditions’. Informants preferred to say 
that they were holding the GoR to its own commitments as laid down in its policy 
                                                 
61 Interview, Ministry of Finance, Kigali, 24 September 2004. 
62 The application of human rights conditions was inconsistent, however. Aid was halted to Zaire in 
1990 over human rights abuses, but at the same time supplied to the Habyarimana regime. This 
reflects the more widely held international perspective on the corrupt Mobutu versus the 
developmental Habyarimana (Verwimp and Vanheusden 2003).  
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documents, e.g. drawing ‘conditions’ from GoR policies but not imposing 
conditionality. This reflects the shift in language around conditionality highlighted in 
chapter 2. These conditions concern regional conflict resolution and peace building 
in particular, as well as commitments to good governance. The 2001 Plan 
recommends a two-tier approach to development cooperation on the basis of progress 
on conflict resolution: a ‘partnership towards peace’; and a ‘partnership in peace’.63 
In theory, as stability was established through adherence to regional peace 
agreements the relationship would progress from the former to the latter (GoB 2001). 
It should be recalled that both this Plan and the Note Strategique were prepared while 
the GoR still had troops present in the DRC. Conditions inherent in these documents 
therefore reflect the political situation at the time. The Note Strategique is a more 
technical document with the cooperation programme based on the principles of 
partnership, ownership and the priorities of the PRSP.64  
However, actual Belgian aid activities in practice are largely unaffected by these 
broader conditions. Political reasons may be behind delays in decisions on some 
projects, and as we discussed above, the use of sector and budget support has been 
hindered by political concerns in Belgium. Officially the partnership is based on a 
process of dialogue and consultation, linked to commitments outlined in the PRSP, 
but the implementation of Belgian aid policy is determined largely by technical 
requirements of specific projects. Individual projects are negotiated with the relevant 
line ministry then managed jointly; when asked about the general conditions 
underpinning the programme, the response from officials was often dismissive of 
these as of limited relevance to daily business. The conditions attached to each 
project are specific to that project, and rarely extend beyond technical issues, such as 
the provision of counterpart staff and resources and a GoR commitment to achieve 
the aims of the project. Conditionality for Belgium in reality is very much of a 
micro-economic, project-specific nature (Renard and Reyntjens 1995). This emerged 
clearly during the 2004 negotiations of a new programme and Convention with 
Rwanda. When NGOs began calling for Belgium to adopt a benchmark system, the 
administration dismissed this as unfeasible in light of the project approach. Rwanda 
is not therefore involved in the type of political policy dialogue that is so central to 
the UK approach, although there is close negotiation on technical aspects of policy 
between the GoR and Belgium in specific areas like health and justice. The 
continuity in projects despite changes in Rwanda and changes in the Belgian 
government (in terms of policy and the regime in general) demonstrates how 
embedded the project system is in local networks and systems. Although the reform 
of Belgian cooperation has brought about new styles of project management, there 
has been remarkable continuity in actual project activity, with many rolling projects 
being extended and renewed as others are completed. This system seems quite 
divorced from broader political and diplomatic considerations, and is clearly very 
different to the budget support approach. 
 
                                                 
63 Partenariat vers la paix; partenariat dans la paix. 
64 There are some question marks about the quality of the Note Strategique – it was one of the first to 
be drafted, so was part of a learning process. Moreover, there was limited GoR involvement and 
limited consultation either of civil society or Belgian staff in Rwanda, although it was supposed to be 
essentially undertaken by them (interviews: DGCD staff, Brussels 13 June 2003; DGCD staff, Kigali, 




The examples of UK and Belgian policies in Rwanda between 1994 and 2004 
demonstrate that a common overall agenda does not necessarily lead to the adoption 
of similar approaches in implementation. The main differences between these donors 
can be roughly divided into two categories: the political and the administrative. 
Within each of these categories, differences can be attributed to agency-wide 
positions on the one hand, that is the overall policy and approach of the ministry of 
cooperation in its broad strategy, and to factors specific to Rwanda on the other hand. 
These are laid out in figure 7.2 and apply beyond these two countries to the other 
countries explored in chapter 3. 
Four factors stand out from this scheme: the interpretation of events by donors; 
the impact of the donor’s history in Rwanda; the aid instruments used; and the 
domestic environment of the donor. Firstly, the interpretation of events in Rwanda by 
the donor, be they political, diplomatic, social or economic, differs widely amongst 
donors. How a donor country interprets what is happening within Rwanda and the 
region impacts upon the dialogue with the GoR, upon the types of activities and upon 
the choice to engage or disengage. For example, if a donor reduces or increases its 
budget for Rwanda, this may be attributed to administrative factors such as budget 
cuts or changes in priority due to a new minister or government strategy. Such 
decisions may also mask deeply political, unilateral decisions. No two donors act 
alike in this respect. One example of this is the contrast between the UK, Dutch and 
IFI position that categorised Rwanda as ‘post-conflict’ by about 1997, and that of 
certain Belgian officials for whom Rwanda, even in 2002, could not be classified as 
post-conflict given its involvement in the conflict in the DRC at the time, and the 
continuing instability caused by the ex-FAR/Interhamwe. For some Belgian 
informants, it is still more fitting to consider Rwanda as a ‘conflict-affected’ country.  
 
Figure 7.2 Differences in Donor Policy 
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On the other hand, however, there has been an increasing convergence of donor 
positions over Rwanda’s regional relations. In the late 1990s there were polarised 
opinions about Rwanda and the DRC. Some donors withheld aid or were taking a 
very cautious approach because of this, including Belgium. The UK position, by 
contrast, was to accept the GoR’s line on the security threat as legitimate. Indeed, the 
signing of agreements on the provision of budget support and the MoU in 1999 took 
place against the backdrop of the Rwandan invasion of the DRC in 1998. By the end 
of 2004, however, a more common position was evident with most donors eager to 
see the GoR conform to international agreements and halt belligerent activities in the 
interests of regional stability.   
The second factor is how history affects the political will of a donor country to 
provide support to a country like Rwanda, the space in which it has to manoeuvre 
vis-à-vis the Government or society, and the type of dialogue in which it can engage. 
For example, the complex recent histories of France and Belgium have led to a 
strained relationship with the post-1994 GoR. Belgium’s approach after the genocide 
reflects the profound impact of the events, leading in government circles to a much 
more cautious approach, but with reverberations beyond bilateral cooperation to 
wider Belgian society. In contrast, the UK’s positive relationship is premised upon 
its lack of history in Rwanda. History can also affect the technical areas in which a 
donor is involved, for example the traditional role of Belgium in the health sector or 
Canada in higher education can be traced back to decades of intervention in these 
areas. 
Thirdly, the type of aid instruments employed strongly affect the nature of the 
relationship between the donor and the GoR, with knock-on effects in terms of policy 
dialogue and capacity for leverage. The UK’s provision of budget support allows it 
to engage in a very different type of dialogue with the GoR, often on issues of 
particular sensitivity such as the national budget, from which the Belgians are 
excluded. In providing aid in this way, the UK is seen as the greatest ‘friend’ of 
Rwanda, compounded by its positive commitment since 1994. The projects in which 
the Belgians are engaged give Belgium a greater input at lower levels of the 
administration. The implementation of Belgian cooperation projects also 
demonstrates how shifts in policy at the global and country level do not necessarily 
affect actual activities on the ground. There is remarkable continuity, partly due to 
the co-management system.  
Finally, the domestic environment of a donor is a major factor, underpinning all 
the other elements. This affects cooperation with Rwanda in both political and 
administrative terms. The importance of civil society, of particular politicians and of 
domestic priorities impact upon the decision to engage or disengage in Rwanda, and 
impact upon the types of modalities employed. This reflects Lancaster’s observation, 
that 
aid agencies, whether bilateral or multilateral, are political entities, embedded in 
political institutions and environments. These institutions and environments 
often play a significant role in influencing and constraining aid decisions. 
Indeed, it is difficult to understand many of an aid agency’s policies without 
taking bureaucratic politics, legislative influences, political party preferences, 
interest groups, societal characteristics, and public opinion in donor countries 
and organizations into account. (Lancaster 2000) 
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What is happening domestically also reflects broader shifts in aid theory and 
practice, however. Changes in both the UK and Belgian governments impacted upon 
development policy and practice in Rwanda, but these also linked into swings at a 
global level in development thinking, tied to economic and social currents. For 
example, in the early 1990s both the UK and Belgian governments adopted forms of 
political conditionality and began emphasising poverty reduction in their aid 
programmes. This became stronger under subsequent governments throughout the 
1990s and into the 2000s in line with global trends. At the same time, particular 
donor agencies play a strong role in developing these agendas. Since 1997, the UK 
has been heavily involved in aid thinking. It is a much larger donor than Belgium, 
with a bigger international profile and policy teams working on global aid issues in 
close collaboration with international institutions, the European Union and the 
OECD. DFID has been described as both progressive (Morrissey 2002, OECD-DAC 
2001b) and ‘arrogant’ in this respect (McGrath 2002; King and McGrath 2004). 
Many DFID officials with whom I spoke were incredibly positive about and proud of 
DFID’s policies in general and in Rwanda and its ‘leading’ of other donors – this was 
‘institutionalised arrogance’ as one informant said.1 Belgium, on the other hand, has 
not been particularly prominent in these debates. It has also been faced with a lack of 
a clear internal consensus on aid practice. At the current time it is rather attempting 
to catch up with thinking around programme aid. Belgian officials often appeared 
embarrassed about their internal squabbles and the provincialism of some policies.  
Yet, the Rwandan case also raises questions about the reality of implementing 
these global policies in practice. The problems emerging with the budget support 
approach and with the MoU system instigated by the UK are a case in point (see 
Killick et al. 2005). Moreover, ownership remains subordinate to donor interests and 
systems.  
These examples demonstrate how volatile aid relationships can be. Since 1994, 
there have been no dramatic changes in relations between the GoR and these two 
particular donors, but the positions have nonetheless shifted in this short period of 
time. Where Belgium and the UK were once seen as at opposite ends of the spectrum 
of ‘new’ and ‘traditional’ donors, they now seem to have drawn closer together with 
Belgium becoming less critical and the UK becoming more inclined to question 
aspects of the relationship.  
This chapter highlights the complexity of donor engagement in a country like 
Rwanda, and it reiterates the message that the relationship cannot be simplified to 
one between donors on the one hand and the GoR on the other. Each individual 
donor has its own way of working. Moreover, there is no possible way to separate the 
political from the technical, despite attempts at defining an official separation 
through development cooperation and foreign affairs portfolios. Throughout the 
course of this research, concerns were continually expressed by development actors 
about the subordination of long-term development cooperation aims to short-term 
diplomatic and political objectives. However, demands for political conditionality, 
albeit with a human dimension, within development policy demonstrate a blurring of 
the lines between foreign affairs and development cooperation. This contrasts with 
Riddell’s findings in the late 1990s that donor discourse, objectives and strategies 
were becoming increasingly apolitical in nature (Riddell 1999).   
                                                 
1 Fieldwork diary, 8 October 2004. 
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The potential clash comes out quite strongly in Rwanda, where the GoR can be 
seen to be a progressive, developmental state in many ways. However, the internal 
political situation and broader regional environment underpin the technical policy. 
This study demonstrates the complexity of finding the balance between these 
positions. Development activities on the ground, be they projects, policy dialogue 
around the PRSP or coordination actions, are largely technical and bureaucratic. 
Development in these terms is approached by both the UK and Belgium in terms of 
measurable, tangible outcomes. There are grounds for not applying political 
conditions in the interests of predictability and the smooth application of 
programmes. Indeed, political analysis is considerably limited at the level of country 
offices. For example, governance advisors on the UK side in Rwanda focused almost 
exclusively on institutional governance and accountability measures, not on broader 
political and social governance issues. At a different level, however, both in Rwanda 
and within the donor country itself, much more politicised debates impact upon the 
programme. The gap between bureaucratic expedience in the field and broader 
political concerns leads to the absence of a deep, sustained reflection on the 
potentially crucial political and social fragmentations present in Rwanda, which often 
lie beneath the surface of the ‘face’ presented to donors, which we explored in 






Conclusions: The Complexity of ‘Ownership’ of Development 





This thesis set out to consider the seeming global consensus on aid principles 
which were developed throughout the 1990s and early 2000s; to explore what the 
ideas of development espoused within this agenda mean in practice in a country like 
Rwanda which is dependent on external assistance, yet deeply independent in its 
approach to donors and international agencies.  
Rwanda emerged from conflict at a time when the international aid agenda was 
going through a profound shift, one which consolidated itself into a complex set of 
mutual commitments focusing around poverty reduction (cf. figure 2.1, page 17). By 
the early 2000s, this had moved beyond a concern with internal governance in 
recipient countries to the practices of donors deemed to present an obstacle to the 
effective use of aid. Although this study concentrates on the post-1994 period in 
Rwanda, the rise of the new agenda was already felt in Rwanda during the civil war 
which broke out in 1990. At this time, pressure was laid upon the government of the 
day to engage with the Rwandan Patriotic Front in peace talks, and to implement 
democratic reforms in order to create a power-sharing arrangement which would 
usher in lasting peace. In support of the peace process and the structural reform 
programme signed with the international financial institutions (IFIs) in 1990, 
additional aid from bilateral and multilateral agencies flowed into the country 
between 1991 and 1994. The political opening has been described as one factor in 
explaining the 1994 genocide; and donor agencies have not been exempt from strong 
criticism for blindly supporting this process. 
Our period of concern, post-1994, can be divided into three phases with regard to 
relations between the GoR and donors. Firstly, the emergency and post-emergency 
period of 1994 to 1998 when donors were resuming aid activities and grappling with 
the consequences of the genocide. The GoR was beginning to establish its policy 
priorities and consolidating its internal and regional political position. New donors 
came on the scene and quite diverse positions vis-à-vis the new regime in Kigali 
could be observed in meetings amongst aid actors. Between 1998 and 2001, as the 
policies of the GoR took shape and began to resonate increasingly with the 
international poverty agenda, aid resources began to flow more towards the central 
budget. The IFIs and budget support donors such as the UK became prominent 
supporters of the new regime. At the same time, Rwanda’s involvement in conflict in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and concerns about the internal 
democratisation process continued to worry many donors, with some withdrawing 
support and others showing clear unwillingness to consider providing direct aid to 
the GoR. Since 2002 a new phase in relations can be observed. This saw the 
withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC, thus relieving that particular concern 
of donors, and elections in the country, marking the end of the transition period. On 
the policy front, of prime importance was the finalisation of the PRSP in 2002, which 
 178 
gave donors a clear framework resonating with the international poverty reduction 
agenda around which to begin coordinating aid interventions. Since 2002, GoR-
donor interactions have revolved around the implementation of the PRSP and various 
mechanisms to improve aid effectiveness have been established to this end. 
Nevertheless, ongoing tensions in the Great Lakes Region continue to impact upon 
the relationship and play an important part in determining how donors engage with 
the GoR and vice versa.  
Rwanda’s dependence on international assistance – both technical and financial – 
has led to considerable input of external actors in the policy-making process over the 
last 10 years. The economic and social development strategies of the GoR, while 
diverse, reflect a broader international agenda – poverty, governance, financial 
management, economic growth, social and human development. Donors have 
demonstrated a willingness to support this programme. As a small country, with a 
limited number of principal donors, easily accessible Government institutions and a 
clear adherence amongst aid actors to the dominant concepts of development 
discourse, Rwanda has constituted a good example to explore the various elements of 
the new aid paradigm. At the same time, the research had its limitations. What I 
observed on the ground in 2003 and 2004 was the construction of new mechanisms. 
The poverty reduction strategy was being turned into workable sector strategies, 
coordination systems were being established, and public financial management 
concepts were being adopted across the institutions. This research permits reflection 
on debates surrounding the establishment of these systems, not the outcomes and 
results.  
That said, by considering the nature of relations in Rwanda today between the 
GoR and various donor agencies and amongst these actors, as well as the recent 
history of these relations between 1994 and 2004, some important conclusions about 




‘New’ Programme Aid in Rwanda 
 
Debates about aid effectiveness have seen the return to favour of programme aid 
instruments, and particularly the rise of budget support. There has been a shift from 
discrete projects to much greater coherence of aid instruments, whether programme 
or project, around a government-owned policy. The Rwandan experience raises a 
wide range of questions about ‘new’ programme aid and in particular budget support 
which is inherently tied up with the concept of recipient ownership and has been the 
stated preferred aid mechanism of the GoR for many years. Only a limited number of 
donors provide general budget support in Rwanda, namely the IFIs, the European 
Commission, the UK and Sweden. The majority of bilateral donors continue to 
favour the project mechanism, which raises quite different effectiveness issues. The 
conditionality of projects is more technical, they induce higher administrative 
burdens and are not necessarily tied to GoR priorities; yet, there are also examples of  
projects which work closely with GoR systems and projects which are highly 
appreciated by the GoR. Hence, it is too simplistic to consider projects to be a poor 
instrument and budget support a better one; what matters for both instruments is the 
behaviour of donors and how they interact with and respect the recipient.  
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Several points are worth noting with regard to budget support: entry conditions; 
predictability; the impact on national sovereignty; and pressure to disburse. Firstly, 
the main reasons for using budget support are to increase predictability and stability, 
to enhance ownership, to reduce transaction costs by integrating donor support, to 
facilitate dialogue around policy processes, and to render aid more flexible and 
efficient (Killick 2004; Unwin 2004). For most analysts of budget support, a core 
entry condition should be a degree of trust in the recipient government (Killick 1998; 
DFID 2004a), with budget support subject to a considerable amount of selectivity, 
granted on the basis of a government’s proven political commitment to macro-
economic planning, poverty-focused policies and good governance (Mosley and 
Eeckhout 2000; Booth and Lawson 2004). Moreover, a thorough evaluation of the 
risks should be a prerequisite (DFID 2004a). This implies that budget support should 
only be provided where the government has a good track record, where robust 
systems are in place, and where the donor has considerable confidence. In Rwanda 
there is a potential clash between these principles and the practice of budget support.  
When the UK began advocating budget support in Rwanda, these conditions were 
clearly not in place, although it should be noted that many of the reflections on these 
preconditions have taken place since the UK began providing such aid to Rwanda. 
The UK had no real knowledge of the Rwandan government, and the relationship of 
trust was based on a brief, and very personalised, history. The UK’s budget support 
programme in Rwanda emerged from the desire to assist a cash-strapped 
government, the institutional interest in adopting a new approach to aid, and the 
absence of existing project mechanisms and networks which would have been 
necessary for any other instrument to function. Indeed, rather than budget support 
being provided once the systems were in place to adequately account for and use it, 
in Rwanda budget support has been provided to establish these systems. The UK and 
Belgian approaches to budget support illustrate two very different positions: the 
prudent approach of Belgium to engage cautiously until the systems are in place; and 
the risk-taking of the UK to support the construction of the system. Having decided 
to provide budget support, the UK has subsequently spent several years building the 
institutions and policies necessary to fulfil accountability requirements. This has 
included strengthening the macro-economic policy framework in the Ministry of 
Finance, strengthening public financial management procedures, setting up the 
Rwanda Revenue Authority, and supporting the preparation of the PRSP.  
Sector budget support has in some ways been seen as a compromise, a mechanism 
for enhancing aid effectiveness without taking the risk of channelling resources 
directly into the central budget. Indeed, there are question-marks about whether 
donors providing general budget support may fall back on sectoral approaches if 
concerns about governance in Rwanda and the real poverty-reducing benefits of 
general budget support continue, a point raised by informants in Rwanda and DFID 
officials from London. This counteracts the idea of a linear progression from projects 
to sectoral aid to budget support, which GoR officials have hoped for and which has 
been assumed in recent documents like the Commission for African Report. In 
Rwanda there is clear reticence among several bilateral donors to follow this trend. A 
sectoral approach nonetheless brings its own challenges. On the one hand, there is 
space for both earmarked budget support and discrete projects to work in 
complementary fashion, aligned with the GoR’s policies and increasingly on-budget. 
There is evidence of a shift in Rwanda to projects framed by such a programme 
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approach which represents a break with past practices. On the other hand, sector 
budget support is arguably more complicated. The Rwandan experience 
demonstrates that it requires another layer of policy planning and strong capacities 
within line ministries for financial management. Considerable effort has been put 
into developing sector strategies in 2004, but the weaknesses of these, with plans 
often unrealistic or uncosted, imply that substantial institutional strengthening will be 
required to fulfil donor accountability requirements. This raises the question of 
whether new programme aid can be adopted as a mechanism without structures, 
policies and institutions being in place. The UK approach, as we have seen, has been 
to provide programme aid in order to strengthen this capacity in the first place.  
The second major issue around budget support is that of predictability. As chapter 
4 demonstrated, one goal of the Budget Support Harmonisation Framework was to 
improve predictability in budget support disbursements by giving the GoR sufficient 
prior warning of spending plans. Ideally donors would align their disbursement 
patterns with the GoR budget. In practice, however, this may prove much more 
complex. Evidence from elsewhere suggests that predictability has in fact decreased 
with budget support (see Killick 2004). The experience of Rwanda in 2003 and 2004 
tended in this direction, with budget support disbursements frequently delayed for a 
variety of political and administrative reasons. This research took place as 
harmonisation systems were being established, so it remains to be seen whether this 
situation reflects teething problems or is symptomatic of deeper issues.  
This has important consequences when considering whether budget support may 
actually induce greater dependency within developing countries. Indeed, budget 
support is a mechanism which is considered to work best in situations of high aid 
dependence. Although the proportion of internal to external revenue is increasing, the 
GoR is still dependent on foreign assistance for almost 50% of its recurrent budget. 
The running costs of the country, including public sector salaries, therefore depend 
greatly on the disbursement of budget support. Project funds are notorious for being 
delayed, but these delays have a limited impact on the macro-economic stability of 
the country. By contrast, delays in budget support are potentially catastrophic. This 
dependency element suggests that budget support donors bear a great deal of 
responsibility for any instability caused by the withdrawal or delay of aid. Indeed, in 
its 2004 Country Assistance Plan for Rwanda, the UK explicitly recognised a 
withdrawal or reduction in aid as representing a threat to the stability of development 
processes (DFID 2004b). Disbursement patterns in 2003-2004 in Rwanda 
highlighted this risk, and it is a risk of which the GoR is aware. Harmonisation is 
intended to address this question of predictability, but it also presents another 
potential threat, namely the potential shortfall in resources if donors take a common 
stance on not disbursing budget support. Experience to date in Rwanda indicates that 
this is unlikely; rather we see considerably mixed messages emerging from budget 
support donors. For example, as the UK was holding back on budget support 
instalments due to GoR threats to re-enter the DRC in 2004, both the World Bank 
and the IMF approved new payments. Likewise, there appears to be a move away 
from cross-conditionality. In the past, disbursements of budget support were largely 
dependent on IMF programmes being in place; the UK and EC have both introduced 
flexibility to disburse even when an IMF agreement has not been finalised, although 
their decisions are still linked to the IMF analysis of the macro-economic 
 181 
environment. This situation suggests that there is in fact a shift away from 
harmonisation. 
The responsibility on the part of budget support donors brings us to a major 
concern about new programme aid in Rwanda, namely the possibility that donors are 
reinforcing a ‘poor’ government rather than supporting a ‘good’ government. This is 
highly salient in light of the very different interpretations that exist of the GoR, and 
the very different ‘faces’ that it presents to the international community. However, if 
donors were to withdraw this support they risk creating a situation of greater 
instability by weakening state capacity. Behind this lies the important questions of 
what donors engage with, what they choose to see and not to see when they assess 
the GoR’s progress against a wide range of criteria, how they balance progress in 
areas like poverty reduction and macro-economic governance against poor 
performance in areas like human rights, and how they weigh up policy commitments 
against actual practice. There is a potential risk that in seeking to pursue a particular 
agenda in Rwanda, namely one which has been viewed by some as a model of post-
conflict reconstruction and poverty reduction, donors are being complacent about the 
real political dynamics in the country. NGO activists in particular wish to see budget 
support donors making greater use of their leverage to steer the GoR along a path 
towards ‘good governance’. Donors for their part imply that they are doing this 
through policy dialogue. There have been instances where joint donor pressure has 
had an impact, for example in persuading the GoR to withdraw troops from the DRC 
in 2002 and not to take military action in the DRC in 2004. Although conditions have 
not necessarily been rigorously applied to aid, this study demonstrates that the nature 
of the GoR and some of its policy choices have affected the willingness of individual 
donor agencies to provide particular types of support to Rwanda or to engage at all. 
Nevertheless, the differences in opinion not only amongst the wider donor 
community but even amongst the small group of budget support donors point to 
serious holes in the dialogue process and benchmarking systems in terms of giving 
clear, consistent messages to the GoR. ‘Streamlined conditionalities’ therefore 
appear far from operational in Rwanda. Indeed, the different instruments employed 
by donors result in a wide range of technical, operational and political conditions 
applied to aid.  
A third important point with regard to budget support is the impact on national 
sovereignty and democratisation processes. GoR officials are adamant that budget 
support should not interfere with GoR policy processes; yet there are contradictions 
within the new aid package between local ownership of aid and policy processes and 
donor exigencies in respect of policy dialogue and conditions on aid. Budget support 
targets the policies of the government in power and reduces the engagement of 
donors with other actors in society. As we have seen, the UK’s programme is very 
much government-to-government; other donors like Belgium and the USA specify 
that their activities are government-to-country. This begs the question of whether 
there may be a clash between budget support and democratisation. Should it be taken 
as read that the Rwandan ‘people’ are in favour of the GoR’s programme of action, 
which has ultimately been pushed and supported by external rather than internal 
financiers, or that they agree with the neoliberal agenda or the participation model 
being proposed? In shoring up a developmental state in pursuit of particular 
objectives, such as poverty reduction and sustainable growth, is there a risk that 
donors are in fact damaging local political processes? The space for the population to 
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seriously challenge the GoR over its policies is diminished by the presence of strong 
external backing for these policies. 
A final point with regard to ‘new’ programme aid, one which rarely comes up in 
the literature but does in the Rwandan example, is the pressure to disburse. Although 
in theory budget support donors have greater space than project donors to ‘turn the 
tap’ on and off, these agencies are still required to spend their budgets. This may 
become increasingly the case in light of commitments made in 2005 to increase aid 
to Africa. As Belgian officials said, the only way to actually spend their new aid 
commitments towards Rwanda would be through sector or budget support channels. 
The project system is limited in what it can absorb. Will this situation then lead to a 
clash between the objectives of aid efficiency and ownership on the one hand and the 
pressure on agencies to disburse more aid on the other? Will the pressure to spend 
override both scrutiny and ownership?  Donors which have attempted to follow GoR 
procedures more closely claim that this practice has led to lower disbursement rates 
which may hamper alignment around local processes.  
 
Coordination and Harmonisation: Re-Assessing Ownership 
 
The above discussion has touched upon a number of issues regarding coordination 
and harmonisation. This study of Rwanda provides considerable insight into the 
practicalities of translating a desire for aid effectiveness into a workable system in 
the face of capacity constraints, different perspectives of the overall agenda, and 
contentions for leadership of the process. Our exploration of the coordination 
‘architecture’ in Rwanda demonstrates the efforts being put into improving 
collaboration amongst aid actors, resulting in a range of working groups, meetings, 
discussion forums and information matrices. The level of activity increased 
throughout the two years of field research. However, the core issue emerging seems 
to conform to the observation made by Calhoun and Whittington (1988) that ‘no-one 
wants to be coordinated.’ At the heart of this lies the question of whose pace and 
agenda dictates the process. 
At the Paris Forum on Harmonisation, it was agreed that  
[t]he concept of recipient country ‘ownership’ is fundamental to the 
‘coordination’ agenda – recipients are not only expected to take responsibility 
for defining national development strategies (around which donors can align 
and harmonise), but to take the lead on the coordination of aid at the country 
level. (Paris Declaration 2005) 
In Rwanda, it is clear that the GoR is not leading the drive on coordination. Although 
the GoR is a partner in the process, it is essentially donor-led. Since 1994, the GoR 
has been demanding improved coordination, more predictability of funding, greater 
transparency in aid flows, and greater control over aid resources. However, this has 
not led to greater GoR ownership despite the establishment of mechanisms like 
CEPEX. By the time this research was completed this institution still faced 
considerable obstacles with regard to efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, while 
some members of the GoR are very active on coordination, this is far from 
widespread and there is limited evidence to suggest a government-wide consensus. 
Consequently, the demands for improved coordination of aid have not translated into 
a consistent message or drive from the GoR side; rather it has been largely reliant 
upon donor initiatives. Frustrations were evident on both sides in 2004, with donors 
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presenting a task list to the GoR of what they expected, and the GoR stalling on 
telling donors what it wanted, as we saw in relation to the Cabinet Paper on the 
cluster system.  
The expectations around coordination imply that there is a fundamental tension 
between demands for results and Government ownership. In 2004 there was 
considerable pressure to produce sector strategies. For the GoR this was linked to 
making demonstrable progress on implementing the PRSP, accessing World Bank 
resources and facilitating more programme-oriented support. For their part, donors 
were under pressure to illustrate how they were meeting their commitments in the 
run-up to the Paris Forum. The tensions between actors over the Cabinet Paper offer 
an illustration of this. In the absence of GoR direction, donors continued to forge 
ahead with establishing harmonisation frameworks and cluster groups, essentially 
setting the agenda. Discussions revealed limited consideration for slowing down the 
process in order to allow the GoR time to develop its ideas and take leadership. 
Rather the imperative was to go with the existing momentum and demonstrate 
tangible progress. The desire for quick-wins and examples of good practice is rife 
throughout the aid system where there is pressure to demonstrate that mechanisms 
which have barely had a chance to become established are working. Writing on 
World Bank reform packages, Callaghy (2000: 79) describes the “overly optimistic 
expectations” of international actors, with an eagerness to see results ensuing from 
“analytic and policy hurry.” At the same time, however, the GoR was not suggesting 
a slow-down, reflecting the wider reality that the GoR wants everything and to do 
everything as rapidly as possible. In the face of capacity and resource constraints the 
general line is not ‘slow down’ but ‘give us more technical assistance and resources’.  
The experience of preparing the Cabinet Paper throws up additional questions 
which are much more profound, namely around sovereignty and power, an issue we 
touched upon in relation to budget support. This goes beyond a question of GoR 
versus donor control to processes within the GoR. Various explanations for the 
problems around the Cabinet Paper can be proposed: firstly, that this was just not a 
top priority in the face of a multitude of priorities; secondly, that there was profound 
confusion about coordination across ministries; and thirdly, that concerns about 
sovereignty placed serious obstacles in the way of a Government-wide agreement. 
Following the adoption of the cluster system in late 2002, limited attempts appear to 
have been made by Minecofin representatives in charge of coordination to grasp the 
initiative and get other ministries on board. The reluctance to keep donors informed 
about the Cabinet Paper and internal coordination processes indicates a deep-rooted 
issue.   
With the shift in aid thinking, additional power is accruing to Minecofin. It is the 
overseer of sector strategies, the focal point for the PRSP, the hub of budget support 
and the home of coordination activities; consequently it is the main interlocutor with 
donor agencies. Although clusters function at the line ministry level, the more money 
that is channelled through the central budget, the less direct access line ministries 
have to aid resources and the less direct control they have in negotiations with 
partners over resource mobilisation, both technical and financial. In the past, line 
ministries could turn to a particular donor for equipment such as vehicles, computers 
and technical assistance; now they are expected to plan those needs within a more 
coherent budget which is approved by Parliament, passing through Minecofin. In 
theory this should render lines of accountability more ‘normal’, that is internal rather 
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than external, but this also has consequences for internal power structures and 
relations. There is, moreover, no guarantee that a line ministry will actually receive 
the resources requested. Seen in this light, it is by no means given that programme 
aid or harmonisation are in the interests of many individual actors within state 
institutions. This reflects Unwin’s concerns that 
[t]he closer engagement of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and 
donors with African finance ministries has served to strengthen the power and 
capacity of these ministries relative to many of the more socially oriented line 
ministries. Hence, current donor practices not only influence policy from afar, 
but are also having an indirect effect on the restructuring of power relations 
within African governments. (Unwin 2004) 
This issue around power is not just salient on the GoR side. As we have seen, 
there are also tensions over donor leadership of coordination processes and broader 
development agendas. This was perhaps most obvious in the tensions between the 
UNDP and World Bank over the Round Table / Consultative Group process, but is 
evident at other levels also. In interviews, some GoR informants spoke of donor 
rivalry over cluster leadership and their desire to be involved in more ‘trendy’ areas. 
The creation of sub-clusters has been seen by some as a way of creating space for 
more donors to act as leaders. This implies that coordination may be becoming a new 
type of ‘flag-flying’, with donors eager to outline in their policy papers and at 
international level their commitments and best practices in this area. Both Belgian 
and UK Rwanda policy papers outline their role in leading on coordination; even the 
creation of national ‘harmonisation plans’ by donor countries reflects a desire to be 
‘seen’ to be acting on this agenda. The ‘self-promotional purpose’ (c.f. chapter 2, 
page 27) vis-à-vis coordination is as applicable at the country level as at the 
international level. 
In this regard, the problems in establishing coordination in areas where there is 
either no obvious leader on the donor side or no interest at all are significant. The 
clusters which have worked well are those where there is clear interest from a single 
donor agency and committed individuals within that agency. Once a donor does take 
the lead, however, the question of whose priorities take precedence arises. For 
example, when Belgium took over the lead on health in late 2004, it then wanted to 
stall the process until their new expert on health arrived; so essentially it wanted to 
impose its own timetable. On the other hand, where cluster establishment has been 
slow, e.g. on infrastructure, ICT or human resources, there has been no drive from 
the GoR to mobilise donors. We can infer from this that the GoR is waiting for 
donors to act rather than seizing the initiative itself.  
Underlying this are fundamental questions about just what different actors 
understand by coordination, harmonisation and alignment. As Baaré et al. observed 
in 1999, 
[t]here is a tendency to interpret every meeting of donors as ‘co-ordination’. 
Members of donor bureaucracies who participate in many of these meetings 
concede that more often than not they are accurately ‘information sharing’ and 
‘information gathering’. (Baaré et al. 1999: 31) 
This observation was based on the coordination situation in Rwanda in 1998-1999, 
before the PRSP was adopted and the new ‘architecture’ was established. Yet, this 
research from 2003 to 2004 implies that while some donors are pushing for 
 185 
harmonisation and alignment, others continue to see coordination in terms of basic 
information sharing. There is a general sense among the ‘progressive’ donors that 
they cannot wait for everyone to come on board, that they need to forge ahead with 
those who are interested and that others will join at their pace. While some donors 
appear to be attempting to catch up by engaging with the idea of sectoral approaches, 
there was also some disgruntlement (certainly in earlier discussions during 2003 and 
early 2004) about being forced down a particular path by agencies who refuse to 
listen to the viewpoints of others.  
At the same time, there are also clear signs that many people involved have a 
weak grasp of the basic concepts and little time is devoted to retrospective reflections 
and debates on such matters. Few interlocutors were aware of the recent history of 
coordination processes in Rwanda which meant that the profound tensions in the 
system were not addressed. The lack of debate on basic concepts resulted in the 
strange scenario whereby, for example, USAID was highly active in the clusters but 
generally uninterested in the harmonisation agenda; DFID, on the other hand, 
appeared condescending about the cluster system and basic coordination, yet was at 
the forefront of reflections on harmonisation. This raises questions about how 
functional coordination can really be without overall agreement on the core concepts 
and agendas. One very basic problem in Rwanda amongst donors was mere 
information sharing. For many actors, coordination should be about so much more, 
but even information sharing about aid flows, review missions, studies and technical 
reports conducted by consultants,1 and workshops and seminars was far from 
optimal. Various systems have been put in place to facilitate information sharing 
which have never taken off sufficiently.2 A fundamental starting point in establishing 
an efficient coordination system would be to optimise each potential area before 
seeking the distant goal of full harmonisation.  
This needs to be taken a step further, however. Is it enough for there to be 
agreement on concepts and procedures? The Rwandan case demonstrates that there 
are very different understandings of the nature of the state and how it should be 
helped. Harmonisation is hampered not only by different donor domestic constraints, 
but by their different understandings of what is happening in Rwanda. So is full 
harmonisation possible without consensus not only of procedures and practice but 
also of political perspectives on the recipient country? One of the dangers for the 
GoR is that, by harmonising, donors are more likely to present a unified force against 
the GoR if they deem it appropriate; so from this perspective a diversity of opinion is 
perhaps welcome. At the same time, discussions on the ground around coordination 
often seem divorced from this more political context. The coordination mechanisms 
described in this study are largely technical. At other levels aid is being affected by 
political events and undercurrents; yet these do not form part of the everyday agenda 
                                                 
1 Each donor conducts review missions, consultancy studies and evaluation reports on programmes, 
policies and activities. Yet, there is no common pool of these, nor mutual access or sharing. 
Consequently, there are often overlapping studies and frequent repetitions of activities conducted by a 
different donor. I came across various consultancy reports written in the late 1990s on topics like 
coordination which few people seemed to know about. When a new member of staff of one donor 
agency suggested some form of common pool of such studies the idea was met with derision as 
unworkable (observations, meeting on the PRSC, World Bank, 5 October 2004).  
2 I was often struck during interviews about how little senior representatives seemed to know about 
the activities of other donors. In fact, given that informants knew I was conducting research across the 
donor community, I was often asked to provide information about what others were doing.  
 186 
of those on the ground who are trying to achieve better coordination of aid. Meetings 
go on, consensus is sought, strategies and frameworks are drafted - basically the cogs 
of aid continue to turn. Much of this reflects the conscious or unconscious choices 
made by individuals and agencies in the interest of ‘getting things done’. But it also 
relates to the overlapping remits between development and foreign affairs portfolios. 
The mandate of development workers in the field requires them to focus on the 
orthodox side of technical policy, on the development strategies. Political analysis is 
someone else’s domain.  
The above discussion indicates how complicated it is to render aid more effective 
through programme approaches, harmonisation and alignment, and fostering country 
ownership. At the time this research was conducted in Rwanda, there was evidence 
of increased transaction costs in terms of time and human resources devoted to this 
process with no indication of where the agenda was leading and what the outcomes 
would be. The incentives and motivations for individuals and agencies alike are 
consequently unclear. Indeed, several informants complained that they received no 
recognition for working on coordination as their performance was still assessed on 
the basis of tangible delivery of projects and budgets. This problem has been 
recognised at the international level, highlighted in the Paris Declaration and 
preparatory work for Paris (de Renzio et al. 2004). The unrecognised problem is that 
if coordination and harmonisation begin to be evaluated as ‘deliverables’ against 
which individual or agency performance may be assessed, then donors may dominate 
the agenda more than ever rather than allowing space for this to become a recipient-
owned process. Already in Rwanda, with the appointment of a coordination 
specialist, there were signs that tangible progress needed to be demonstrated to 
justify the position and the budget; that the negative sides of coordination and the 
flaws in the system had to be ‘sanitised’ in the interests of maintaining momentum 
and interest.   
One consequence of unclear incentives is that coordination becomes the task or 
responsibility of specific people within agencies, rather than inherent to the daily 
working practice of all aid workers. Coordination in Rwanda depends greatly on 
individuals. For example, the fresh interest of both German and Belgian actors in 
cluster activity coincided with the arrival of new staff committed to this agenda. 
Participation in coordination events in practice is very self-selecting, always 
involving the same individuals. This often reflects the extent to which field offices 
have the capacity and delegated authority to engage closely in coordination activities. 
As we saw with regard to the Budget Support Harmonisation Framework, even those 
donors with devolved authority were constrained by limits set by their headquarters 
with regard to accounting requirements, procurement procedures and budget 
calendars. Furthermore, many agencies have limited staff available to engage in 
meetings and dialogue processes.  
Following on from this point of remit and staffing is the nature of information 
flows within agencies and between representatives on the ground and headquarters. 
The ‘coordination architecture’ described in figure 4.1 (page 66) gives the 
impression of a coherent system where information flows logically between levels 
and actors. Very often the same individuals are involved in these various levels. 
However, it is not evident that the outcomes of these meetings, nor that coordination 
principles and decisions, are disseminated within agencies and down to operational 
levels, e.g. from donor country office senior staff to programme officers, to technical 
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assistants on projects or in ministries, to project staff in the field, or to NGOs funded 
by the donor. Although some technical assistants participate in coordination 
activities,3 very often there is limited communication between the TA of different 
donor agencies working in the same ministry unless social relationships exist.4 A 
similar story prevails on the GoR side. Minecofin tends to be present at most 
coordination meetings, but line ministries are only involved in cluster meetings and 
there is little evidence of feedback and communication between these actors.  
Communication between the field and headquarters raises additional questions. 
Discussing coordination in Tanzania, Lehtinen observes that there is a great deal of 
pragmatism within coordination activities on the ground, with signs of “bottom-up 
approaches” (Lehtinen 2003: 10). This is similar to experiences in Rwanda. 
However, the evidence of this research suggests that aid actors are working under 
considerable constraints imposed on them from their headquarters. They are 
therefore coordinating within defined boundaries and appear to be reshaping 
concepts to fit existing activities, rather than seeking to change practice in line with 
new ideas. This was noted at the Paris Forum, but it raises questions about where the 
initiative should come from, particularly in terms of recipient ownership. Global 
declarations and frameworks on aid coordination imply a top-down approach 
whereby the actions and agendas of country offices are set at an international level. 
To what extent, therefore, is there room for lessons from the field to be fed into 
policy processes on harmonisation at the headquarters level, and from there into the 
international arena? Moreover, are there signs that  
headquarters [are] learning from country experiences, demonstrating a 
willingness to take their cue from conditions on the ground and to work at a 
pace with which country capacity can cope? Or are field offices rather obliged 
to find ways to apply an international agenda, which may distort local processes 
in the interests of achieving headquarter targets, reporting back to global 
forums, or keeping up with discussions within the OECD, the EU and amongst 
bilateral agencies? (Hayman 2005c) 
This raises the fundamental point of whether there are real changes happening in 
agency practice to bring on board the requirements of the new aid agenda within 
policy frameworks. The Rwandan experience demonstrates clearly that, with effort 
and negotiation, it is possible to arrive at agreements on coordination practices and 
procedures. There is clearly a strong desire to improve aid effectiveness, given the 
amount of time and resources devoted to this subject at international and local levels. 
However, the obstacles to donors actually implementing these arrangements appear 
to lie largely in the constraints imposed at the headquarters level.  
 
 
                                                 
3 For example, various German technical assistants are closely involved in clusters. By contrast, 
British TA implied that they were positively discouraged from attending coordination meetings or 
retreats as these were considered a policy dialogue domain and therefore the remit of the DFID 
country office.  
4 I came across this phenomenon in the health, justice and education sectors.  
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The Global Consensus Revisited 
 
The discourse of the new aid agenda dominates the interactions between actors 
involved in the aid system in Rwanda. Yet this language is inherently problematic 
and masks a great deal of divergence. The central argument emerging from this study 
is that profound differences at multiple levels between the strategies and agendas of 
aid actors present a serious obstacle to the notion of a consensus at international level 
amongst donor agencies and developing countries about the components necessary 
for effective aid. This thesis has only explored the official aid agencies, and within 
that has concentrated on the main OECD bilateral agencies active in one country, 
Rwanda. Likewise, this research has only concentrated on a few key members and 
institutions of the central Government of Rwanda who act as counterparts to donors. 
These constitute only a fraction of the entire spectrum of actors. There is a tendency 
to talk about ‘donors’ as a generic group without specifying exactly who that means. 
It is hard to avoid the term and this can easily lead to an assumption of homogeneity; 
that when we talk of donors we mean the entire gamut of potential agencies; and that 
there is a common approach, perspective and goal. This assumption is highly 
problematic. Often we refer to ‘donors’ but only mean a few agencies at any given 
time. This masks the very profound differences between them and it also masks the 
differences within them. The terms ‘agency’ or ‘institution’ or ‘government’ likewise 
obscure the importance of individuals within the system.  
This point is as pertinent in Rwanda as at the global level. Although a great many 
countries may have signed up to agreements such as the Rome Declaration on 
Harmonisation and the Millennium Development Goals, not all countries and 
agencies have played as central a role as others in preparing and pushing the agenda. 
Consequently, we need to differentiate between those who are leading the way, those 
who are pushing, those who are being led or pushed and those whose voices are not 
being heard. This came out clearly throughout 2005, a year when aid to Africa was 
high on the international agenda. The negotiations around the G8 summit in July 
2005, the compromises necessary at the UN Global Summit in September 2005, the 
role of developing countries in preparations for world trade talks in Hong Kong in 
December 2005 demonstrate the difficulty of even reaching the stage of signing a 
‘declaration’. Very different agendas are on the table - aid, security, debt relief, 
environmental concerns, human rights, trade, etc. Elements of this agenda are being 
promoted and blocked by different actors.  
Nevertheless, there is agreement at the global level that aid should focus on 
poverty reduction, that good governance and country ownership are essential to aid 
effectiveness from the recipient side, and that improved coordination, harmonisation 
and alignment5 are essential on the donor side. But what does this mean when it is 
translated into actions at the country level? The evidence from this research points to 
clear areas of divergence, such as between recipient and donor agendas, and amongst 
aid agencies.  
Firstly, our examination of development policy-making in Rwanda highlights that 
there are two clear strands to GoR policy. While poverty reduction constitutes one 
central focus, this is a wide and complex area and certain elements receive greater 
attention than others. For example, the rural sector and infrastructure have been 
                                                 
5 This has increasingly being dubbed ‘good donorship’ (see www.odi.org/pppg/cape).   
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prioritised far less than the social sectors; the GoR has a fixation with ICT. Even 
within sectors, limited resources mean that some areas are prioritised ahead of others, 
as the education sector demonstrates. Donor interest in primary education led to a 
concentration of resources in that sub-sector, while the GoR’s main concern was the 
tertiary level. Other sub-sectors have consequently been neglected for lack of 
resources (Hayman 2005b, 2005a). Furthermore, although relations between the GoR 
and donors revolve around the PRSP, this is not necessarily where the GoR’s focus 
lies. Economic development and poverty reduction are not one and the same, and the 
GoR’s policies aimed at the internal audience, as evidenced in the trajectory from the 
Declaration of Principles of 1994 to the 7-Year Programme of 2003, point more 
squarely towards economic growth first and foremost.  
The other central element within the GoR’s vision is that of security and stability, 
and it is here that the GoR displays a very different perspective on political and 
social governance to donors. There is more or less consensus on the technical side of 
governance – the GoR and donors are serious about improving public financial 
management and institutional capacity. The GoR’s perspective on democratisation 
and human rights, however, differs to that of some donors. Indeed, amongst the 
donors there are also nuances between those who are more firm on human rights and 
democratisation and those who accord the GoR more leeway in these areas. Within 
the GoR itself there are very different voices, and likewise the GoR’s vision of policy 
priorities may differ substantially from civil society actors. In this situation, no one 
agenda is more nor less legitimate; agendas may coincide, for example everyone is 
concerned with poverty, but there may be divergence about how to achieve common 
goals.   
As both the education and health examples showed, donor preferences can result 
in the crowding-out of some sub-sectors and the neglect of others. In theory, a 
programme approach should overcome this in that by providing the resources 
centrally the GoR can focus on all priority areas. But the financial, human and 
technical resource scarcity in Rwanda means that unless donors provide additional 
support for particular areas, these will not necessarily be prioritised unless they 
coincide with GoR priorities. This results in a conflict over what to prioritise when 
there are so many demands and not enough resources. Even budget support donors 
continue to focus their technical assistance, their earmarked envelopes and their 
policy dialogue on specific sectors and sub-sectors. For example, the UK focuses on 
institutional governance and education, the Netherlands on justice and Sweden on the 
police.  
The choices that donors make about how to and what to engage with in the GoR’s 
strategy reflects their understanding of the GoR and how they weigh up the different 
agendas or ‘faces’ of the GoR. The GoR’s adherence to the ‘orthodox’ poverty 
agenda has enabled it to access external resources, but it is too simplistic to claim 
that because the GoR has a good PRSP it is primarily focused on poverty reduction. 
For example, the UK’s assessment of the GoR has very much been as ‘pro-poor and 
progressive’, with low corruption and limited fungibility. But that analysis only 
engages with certain policies. Despite attempts to analyse the political ideology of 
the GoR in its most recent policy paper on Rwanda (DFID 2004c), the UK does not 
look significantly beyond the PRSP to alternative trends in the country or to the 
broader ideology of the GoR which is arguably more about long-term economic 
development and stability than about poverty reduction.  
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 Moreover, there is a balance to be struck between progress in some areas and 
weaknesses in others. From a developmental perspective, Rwanda has made 
remarkable progress since 1994; the GoR appears genuinely committed to poverty 
reduction and economic growth, as well as to social development. From another 
angle, however, it is a regime which shows signs of increasing authoritarianism and 
regional belligerence. On the basis of the former assessment, Rwanda is a prime 
candidate for increased donor assistance, and arguably increased budget support; the 
latter analysis, however, mitigates against an incautious approach. In supporting the 
GoR’s poverty strategy, particularly through the provision of budget support, it could 
be suggested that donors are shoring up a potentially authoritarian, neo-patrimonial 
regime whose primary goal may not be poverty reduction, as the following authors 
warn: 
Rwanda presents the international community with a grave dilemma. At first 
sight, peace reigns in the country… a ‘democratization’ process is supposedly 
underway, and technocratic governance is apparently satisfactory… In light of a 
dramatic past, there is a profound desire to see things moving in the right 
direction… While it is understandable that the ‘genocide credit’ and the logic of 
‘good guys and bad guys’ should have inspired a particular understanding for a 
regime born out of the genocide, this complacent attitude has incrementally, 
step by step, contributed to a situation that may well be irreversible and that 
contains the seeds for massive new violence in the medium or long run. 
(Reyntjens 2004) 
There is obviously a strong sense of history repeating itself here: the Bank is 
once again displaying a willingness to lend strong support to Rwandan state 
power, and the consequences for ordinary people – in Rwanda itself and in the 
DRC may once more be bleak. (Storey 2001) 
This sort of viewpoint has emerged frequently over the last ten years and is 
arguably becoming increasingly salient. It relates back to the concerns raised by Uvin 
on donor support for the Rwandan state before the genocide (Uvin 1998). The 
prospects for real political progress in Rwanda were, if anything, more negative in 
2004 than in 2001, when Storey was writing, yet the poverty agenda has drawn an 
increasing number of donors into a much closer, positive relationship of support for 
the GoR. Several informants expressed growing concern that the trends were 
negative following the elections. Yet despite some pressures on the GoR, the 
application of political conditionality has been limited. The aid by and large 
continues to flow. 
For several donors, the rebuttal of this argument would be that in providing 
assistance, particularly programme aid, donors are creating the space for political 
dialogue in order to steer the GoR towards better governance and service provision; 
and that by encouraging the GoR to invest in social services, justice, governance and 
accountability, a stronger civil society will emerge which will take Rwanda down the 
road towards a sustainable democracy. However, to really make a difference a very 
subtle understanding of the political dynamics of the country would be required and 
there are doubts as to whether that knowledge exists within the daily activities of 
officials in aid agencies. Reflecting back on the issue of incentives raised in the 
previous section, the motivation for individual aid workers to really get to know the 
country in which they are working is doubtful. Secondments are often of short 
duration, and my observations on the ground pointed to a considerable lack of 
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engagement among some aid workers with what was going on in the country. 
Although this lies beyond the scope of this research, it is an important area for 
reflection in terms of just how effective aid can be if the country context is not well 
understood by those working there on a daily basis.6  
The second area of divergence is amongst (and within) donor agencies. In the late 
1990s, diversity in donor approaches was interpreted in terms of ‘new’ versus 
‘traditional’ donors. However, the picture is much more complex. Over the last ten 
years the positions of individual donor agencies have frequently shifted, their 
engagement rising and falling on the basis of numerous factors. As figure 8.1 shows, 
there is no single explanation for the behaviour of donors. At a range of levels – 
international, agency, national and sub-national – a whole range of historical, 
cultural, economic and political factors impact upon donor activities. These factors 
are both Rwanda-specific and system-wide. While structural and institutional 
elements are crucial, individual agency also plays an important role throughout the 
system. This runs from the highest to the lowest levels. The personal engagement of 
individual ministers provided the driving force behind some donor programmes in 
Rwanda, as was the case for the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands in the immediate 
post-genocide period. The UK was able to take a risk on Rwanda not only because of 
its lack of history in Rwanda and strong relations with the GoR, but also due to the 
strong mandate of the minister and her political weight. Indeed, the personal 
perspectives of individual ministers often seem more important in determining the 
direction of a programme than the actual performance or needs of Rwanda and the 
GoR. The role of individuals is also crucial at lower levels, where the personal 
commitment of individual officials can determine whether coordination activities 
succeed or not, as has been demonstrated in considerable depth by Mosse (2005).  
 

















                                                 
6 See King and McGrath (2004) on knowledge management in aid agencies. The authors observe that 
knowledge of the agency takes precedence over country knowledge. 
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Within donor agencies there is also important diversity, where “[t]he national 
interests of individual donor countries, pursued by means of development assistance, 
may differ, compete and conflict” (Forster and Stokke 1999: 34). Given the limited 
trade and strategic interests of most donors in Rwanda there is perhaps greater 
potential for coherence within donor governments than in other developing countries. 
However, there have been tensions between development and foreign affairs agendas 
for several donors, including Belgium and to some extent the UK, which relate back 
to the potential conflict between supporting a development-oriented government 
versus taking an authoritarian regime to task for failing to adequately address 
governance issues.  
So what does this mean for the international consensus? The divergences between 
actors can be both problematic and beneficial. They create some considerable 
difficulties in the management of aid for the GoR, yet they also give the GoR some 
room for manoeuvre. As we have seen, there are risks with too much harmonisation, 
just as there are with too little harmonisation. The GoR is able to pursue its various 
priorities partly because there is no common agenda amongst donors. Analyses of 
donors in Rwanda in the late 1990s pointed to a polarisation amongst donors. There 
are signs that this may be lessening, with more critical donors re-engaging and more 
positive donors becoming more wary. Increased coordination allows for some joint 
positions to be taken. Yet different priorities, analyses and perspectives amongst 
donors continue to impact upon the adoption of a consensual approach.  
 
 
Ownership of Aid Policy and Processes in Rwanda: donor-dominated, 
recipient-led or joint? 
 
The above sections seek to bring together various arguments arising from this 
thesis. Finally, we return to the question raised in the introduction, namely: who is 
driving development in Rwanda? And how do the differences in donor approaches 
affect the space for the GoR to define its own development agenda?  
The concept of ‘ownership’ is central to the new discourse on aid. At the country 
level, it is also a discourse which permeates aid relationships. However, it is 
inherently problematic. The ‘ownership’ which we have explored in this thesis 
relates primarily to Government control over aid flows, over development policy, 
over choices of aid instruments and over the coordination of aid. Central to this is the 
locus of ‘ownership’ and notions of ‘having’, ‘giving or ‘taking’. Revisiting the 
quotations in chapter 2 about ownership from the perspective of international and 
donor agencies (box 2.3, page 35) demonstrates the centrality of these ideas. The 
OECD in 1996 and the Rome Declaration of 2003 emphasise the need for partner 
countries to ‘assume’ a leadership role, to ‘take’ ownership and to ‘take’ the lead. 
The UK (DFID 2005a) insists that country’s should ‘have’ leadership over 
development policies. The World Bank quote from the introduction (page 1) points 
rather to the idea of ‘giving’ ownership in the sense of putting the recipient into the 
driving seat. Ownership in this context is strongly equated with leadership, that is 
with control over and responsibility for development policies and outcomes. The idea 
of ‘having’ ownership indicates something inherent; the other notions – of ‘taking’, 
‘giving’ and ‘assuming’ – imply rather a transfer from one body to another. In this, 
there is a clear resonance with Lancaster’s view that:  
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At the heart of the ownership issue is not consultation but control. If aid donors 
truly wish to transfer greater responsibility for managing their aid to their 
recipients, they must be willing to cede a measure of control over key decisions 
involving that aid. (Lancaster 1999: 230) 
 However, this transfer is only foreseen on a number of conditions, which brings 
us back to the architecture of the new aid agenda outlined in chapter 2 (figure 2.1, 
page 17). To recap, provided that a recipient can demonstrate its commitment to a 
sound poverty reduction strategy, including accountable economic and political 
governance, then donors will support it through increased aid, debt relief, and 
improved aid effectiveness. The OECD depicts this system as a pyramid (see figure 
2.2, page 36), with ownership in the sense of the recipient setting the agenda at the 
apex. The OECD suggested a two-way reading: top-down, starting with the recipient 
setting its agenda and donors aligning and harmonising around it; or bottom-up, 
starting with establishing harmonisation arrangements, then aligning around a 
strategy, resulting in greater capacity for the recipient to set the agenda. This, 
however, is problematic when applied to the Rwandan case. The main problem is 
precisely in equating ownership with the recipient setting the agenda; but there are 
also problems with the alignment and harmonisation levels. If we take the top-down 
view, Rwanda has set its agenda in having a clear policy direction – both poverty-
oriented and broader. But, Rwanda’s poverty strategy, although officially set by the 
GoR in consultation with the Rwandan people, was strongly influenced by external 
assistance. It is not merely a Rwandan agenda, but an agenda which satisfies the 
external financiers. This is, admittedly, recognised by the OECD: “the country’s 
development agenda must be oriented toward the growth and poverty reduction 
results it expects to achieve” (OECD-DAC 2005a: 14). However, this is far from 
representing a free-rein for the recipient to ‘have’ full ownership and set its own 
development agenda.  
Moving to the next level of the pyramid, we can see that donors have aligned 
around Rwanda’s poverty agenda, but only in the sense of agreeing to make this the 
common framework for programmes and projects. In terms of the second element of 
alignment, that is relying on partner systems, most donors in Rwanda continue to 
work in accordance with their own prerogatives. The bottom-up approach, starting 
with harmonisation, does not fit the Rwandan experience either, because without an 
agreed agenda or clear implementation strategies, there is nothing to align and 
harmonise around. Nevertheless, the idea of progressively working towards country 
ownership does resonate more with the Rwandan experience and perspectives of 
many Rwandan officials.  
Indeed, in Rwanda ownership can be seen as more of an aspiration, something to 
be achieved gradually. As chapter 4 demonstrated, the GoR has been demanding 
ownership since 1994 in terms of asserting control over what aid flows into the 
country and how. These demands reflect frustration at the lack of coordination 
amongst the many aid agencies flocking into the country, the absence of transparency 
about aid activities and amounts, and particularly at how much aid bypassed the 
central government’s budget and institutions. This resulted in a discourse which was 
often very critical of the international community and insistent on national ownership 
and national priorities. However, over time, and with support from certain donor 
agencies, the GoR has been able to assert more control over aid. There has been a 
significant evolution from the situation of uncoordinated, unstructured aid in 1994 to 
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the complex coordination architecture which existed in 2004 (see figure 4.1, page 
66). This is linked to the consolidation of the institutions of government and the 
development of structured policies, as well as the increasing Government capacity 
for the management of aid and policy. With the adoption of the PRSP, donors have 
demonstrated much greater willingness to concede some ownership. Consequently, 
Rwandan ownership of development policy and aid can be seen as progressive. 
Returning to the idea of ‘having’, ‘giving’ and ‘taking’, this is a mutual process of 
donors ‘giving’ ownership as the GoR ‘takes’ it. The French for ownership – 
appropriation – is much clearer than the English in this respect, as the French word 
carries connotations of taking possession.  
The central problem with the idea of ‘ownership’ of aid and development policy 
in Rwanda is the country’s aid dependency. The GoR has had to prove itself worthy 
of donor confidence through the adoption of a PRSP, adherence to good governance, 
political progress, public financial management, sustainable development, etc. This 
does not mean that there is no government ownership; indeed, our exploration of 
GoR policy priorities demonstrates clearly that there are several agendas for 
development, not all of which are necessarily commensurate with what donors would 
like to see. The GoR’s capacity to forge its own identity and to reinforce it through 
the policy process has been a constant throughout the post-genocide period. Indeed, 
as Uvin (2001a) observes: “donors only really control the form, but not the 
substance, of the institutions they help build.” 
So does this then suggest the possibility for a linear process towards ownership, 
with the GoR progressively asserting its agenda and donors progressively improving 
their alignment and harmonisation, as the pyramid would suggest? I would argue that 
this idea breaks down in two places, firstly with regard to internal GoR processes and 
secondly with regard to donor willingness to concede control. This study 
demonstrates that the GoR is not really seeking to force its agenda for coordination 
and ownership. The rhetoric is there, with certain actors insisting that “we have had 
to impose the coordination thing”7 but there seems to be limited internalisation of 
this. There is a lack of internal comprehension about aid processes and weak 
direction coming from the government about how ministries should interact with aid 
actors; there is limited drive and initiative being taken by the GoR. The 
establishment of coordination and harmonisation systems has been largely donor-
driven. In the absence of a clear-cut internal agenda it becomes evident that the GoR 
does not ‘have’ ownership and cannot therefore ‘take’ full ownership. Indeed, in the 
face of this and the dependency of the GoR on external assistance there appear to be 
two currents within the GoR – the political and the pragmatic. Ownership is to be 
aspired to, but the GoR will leave it aside in the interests of maintaining access to 
resources.  
More important perhaps are the signs that there is a limit to how much control 
donor agencies are willing to cede over aid policies and processes. The question of 
whose pace and terms dictate is as pertinent here as it was to coordination and 
harmonisation mentioned above. Moreover, there are a number of paradoxes evident 
in donor behaviour. For example, one rationale for providing budget support is to 
expand country ownership, yet it is subject to greater conditionality than projects and 
can be given and taken away at the whim of the donors despite mutual agreements.  
                                                 
7 Interview, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 20 September 2004.  
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This brings us to the core of the contradiction in the aid agenda with regard to 
‘ownership’, one that is in fact explicit in the rhetoric of the new principles of aid. 
What we see in Rwanda is not a drive towards country ownership, but rather a 
process of establishing a system of joint ownership. Indeed, in Rwanda today it is 
very hard to envisage a situation of pure, country-led development policy and 
practice, where the genesis of policy is fully within the hands of the GoR (or the 
country), where the GoR determines the priorities (whether these reflect global 
agendas or not), where the GoR decides on the use of funds which flow via channels 
which suit it best, and where donors respect this totally. The main reason for this can 
be traced to the various constraints upon donor countries and agencies outlined in 
figure 8.1. The OECD has stressed that donor practices need to change, including 
increasing the authority delegated to country offices. But even where authority is 
more devolved, for example in the cases of the UK, the EC and the Netherlands, 
these agencies are still constrained in their actions by decisions taken at the level of 
headquarters. Fundamentally, questions of accountability underpin the obstacles to 
ownership. Donors are subject to a series of checks and balances. Some of these are 
specific to Rwanda, reflecting the particular history of the donor in the country and 
the context of that environment; others reflect much broader questions. This reflects 
the words of Hinton and Groves (2004: 9) who stress the importance of recognising 
the complexity of the aid system, one “where generalizations are dangerous and 
where understanding difference is key.”  
Within this, Rwanda’s aid dependency is crucial. Ultimately, the only countries 
where this aid agenda is being strongly pursued, involving all the various elements 
we have observed, are countries like Rwanda which are highly aid dependent and 
where there is considerable donor intervention in policy processes. The fundamental 
contradiction in the new aid system, and certainly one which needs problematising 
and clarifying, is that ownership in this sort of aid-dependent environment cannot be 
about full country control, about the country ‘having’ ownership; rather it is about 
mutual responsibility. This question of mutual responsibility is explicit in the recent 
international declarations about aid effectiveness, it is explicit in the aid architecture 
outlined in chapter 2, and it is explicit in Rwanda. Where the GoR has not seized the 
initiative sufficiently to satisfy donors, they have continued to follow their own path. 
Where the GoR does attempt to take ownership, to be the sole generator of policy 
papers, the empirical evidence suggests that donors are resistant. They demand a 
voice because ultimately the policies need to reflect donor concerns and fulfil 
requirements for donor accountability. Consequently, the policy process ends up with 
the GoR putting forward its agenda, which already reflects what donors want to see, 
then a process of negotiation ensues with donors requesting particular amendments to 
satisfy their needs. This would imply that provided donors are happy with a strategy 
they will allow the GoR to ‘own’ it; where there is dispute, which is more likely in 
sensitive areas like justice or governance in comparison to health or education, while 
donors may not refuse to support it, they will try to amend it. This is not country 
ownership, but rather joint ownership. Put another way, this is ultimately about 
constructing an effective partnership, reflecting the views of Carlsson et al.:  
aid is very much a joint undertaking between a donor and the government of the 
recipient country… The aid relationship is, in essence, a practical thing – a 
working relationship. As such, it can be understood as an interaction between 
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two organisations to do something which is jointly agreed. (Carlsson et al. 
1997: 11) 
Indeed, abandoning the pyramid, the Rwandan experience appears closer to that 
outlined in figure 8.2. What this shows is that the agenda is set through a joint 
process, which donors then agree to align with. For this to be translated into practice 
requires a series of operations. Instruments are created to enable dialogue amongst 
the partners, such as the coordination architecture outlined in figure 4.1 (page 66). 
Sub-programmes are prepared, in Rwanda’s case the sector strategies, to provide 
something concrete to hinge support upon and by which to measure progress. In 
parallel to this, mechanisms are put in place specifically to improve the 
harmonisation of budget support and the establishment of common procedures, such 
as those outlined in harmonisation frameworks. In theory, this should then provide 
the framework for donors to align around recipient systems. However, this is 
theoretical as there is no evidence that this is happening in Rwanda to date. And 
ultimately, does this enhance country ownership? The above arguments would 
suggest that this is unlikely to be the case.  
 


























Rather, perhaps we need to set aside the notion of country ownership and 
concentrate instead on the nature of the partnership, and in particular the enforcement 
of the mutual responsibilities which are seemingly so central to the new aid agenda. 
This brings us back to the question of power and control. Adherence to this aid 
Partners set the overall agenda, i.e. 
both GoR and donors 
Donors align with it, i.e. agree to use it 
as a framework 
Partners set up systems for mobilising support, 
information sharing, pooling ideas (DPM, DPCG, 
clusters, etc.) 
Partners develop sector 
strategies to implement 
overall policy (jointly) 
Partners agree on common 
procedures  (budget support, 
harmonisation of programmes and 
projects) 




effectiveness agenda is entirely voluntary; there are no mechanisms in place to force 
donors to adopt it, beyond peer pressure. Despite the current trend towards 
partnership frameworks outlining mutual commitments, there are no measures in 
place to allow recipients to enforce good ‘donorship’. The HARPP partnership 
framework implied that the onus was on the GoR, on the “extent to which 
government is proactive in challenging donors when they fail to abide by agreed… 
principles”. But as we saw with regard to the Memoranda of Understanding, the GoR 
has no power to act when a donor takes a unilateral decision on aid disbursements. 
These decisions can be highly subjective, going beyond practical and economic 
conditionality to elements which are difficult to quantify such as progress on 
democratisation or governance, areas in which there are potentially very different 
perspectives, e.g. on whether the GoR is acting belligerently or in self-defence vis-à-
vis the threat from rebel movements in the DRC. Likewise, the GoR has no control 
over amounts of aid provided nor the modalities employed which are decided upon 
unilaterally by each donor agency. Individual donor agendas ultimately take 
precedence and these are determined by a wide range of political and administrative 
factors. This goes as much for donors adopting ‘new’ programme approaches as for 
those continuing to prefer project aid. 
Is ‘ownership’ therefore passé as a concept in discussions of aid effectiveness? It 
is so frequently referred to in aid discourse and in interactions between aid actors in 
the field that these reflections would suggest rather that it needs to be revisited, and 
certainly that the inherent contradictions need to be recognised and problematised. 
Real ownership and real aid effectiveness on the ground, attuned to country-specific 
requirements, would require a complete change in donor perspectives. This would 
require that the origin of aid coordination and policy planning mechanisms really 
shifts to the recipient country, with country offices and recipients negotiating the 
entire process from policy priorities to disbursement mechanisms. The conditions 
would obviously differ greatly from country to country, therefore there could be no 
centrally-determined accountability or aid management systems, nor global agendas 
dictating what constitutes a priority. While tiny steps are being made in this 
direction, such a profound shift is hard to imagine. Ultimately, the aid system as it 
currently stands is unavoidably inimical to national autonomy. Perhaps for this very 
reason, the ideal of ‘ownership’ is essential as a reminder about the negative effects 
of aid.  
 
Concluding Remarks and Areas for Further Study 
 
What this research primarily demonstrates is that the application of a global 
consensus on aid cannot be divorced from the particular context of the recipient 
country. There is no such thing as a neutral stance in Rwanda; the actions of donor 
agencies are determined by both institutional and individual experiences, 
perspectives and histories. This thesis has attempted to capture some of this 
complexity through a multi-disciplinary analysis of the technical, political and 
personal experiences of aid in Rwanda since 1994, using a variety of research 
methodologies. It is impossible to do justice to the full depth of political processes in 
Rwanda or to the impact of donors upon the country in this thesis. However, by 
analysing Rwanda’s relations with some key donors some important issues have been 
brought to light.  
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The findings of this thesis focus on primary data gathered over the course of 2003 
and 2004. However, this is an agenda which is moving rapidly and this study can 
only take us so far. This thesis has sought to bring in some of the agency literature 
produced on these debates in 2005. Continuing contacts with Rwanda indicate that 
2005 has seen progress on coordination and harmonisation issues. In parallel to 
ongoing ministerial re-organisation, a coordination unit - funded by UNDP - has 
been established within the Ministry of Finance; a new website has been established 
which provides information on coordination activities; a retreat was held in January 
2005 to discuss coordination issues; and, significantly, a policy paper specifically on 
aid was being prepared throughout the year for debate at the Development Partners 
Meeting held in December 2005. It has been impossible to follow this evolution in 
the course of writing up this research. What may appear to be progress from the 
outside may easily mask continuities on the ground. Consequently, many of the 
issues raised here may already be out of date, particularly around the structure 
proposed in chapter 4. This research was conducted as these mechanisms were taking 
off. A year down the line the story could be quite different as new priorities emerge. 
Moreover, this study has only looked at particular actors active at the central level. 
Nevertheless, it throws up interesting questions about how the dynamics of the new 
aid agenda may affect political interactions within the Rwandan state in terms of who 
it strengthens and who it weakens. An update on this research a year or two after the 
original research was conducted could prove highly valuable to testing the evolution 
of the coordination and ownership debate, and expanding it to look deeper into how 
it affects the mechanisms of the state.  
In concentrating heavily on the example of Rwanda, this study has raised a 
number of issues which appear both specific to the Rwandan context and which may 
or may not be present in other developing countries displaying similar features, 
namely countries which are aid-dependent, with large numbers of bilateral donors 
present, and where relatively stable governments have begun to implement policies 
which resonate with international concerns. Countries such as Uganda, Mozambique, 
Ethiopia, Ghana and Tanzania come to mind. Indeed, many of the aid workers in 
Rwanda encountered in the course of this study had previous experience in some of 
these countries and it would appear that there was a great deal of cross-fertilization 
of ideas. Likewise, officials from the GoR were frequently sent on study trips paid 
for by donors to countries such as these to learn potential lessons. It would be 
interesting to undertake a comparison between these different countries, to see which 
donors are active and whether similar problems arise in translating international 
arrangements on aid effectiveness into practice elsewhere. At the same time, political 
developments in countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia in 2005, where tensions have 
mounted between donors and governments over governance issues, impacting upon 
flows of budget support and donor confidence, demonstrate considerable resonance 
with the Rwandan case. Important lessons may emerge for both academic knowledge 
and policy makers from a more comparative approach to questions raised in this 
thesis.  
A second area for future exploration relates to the regional dynamics. Several of 
Rwanda’s donor countries have regional policies covering the Great Lakes as a 
whole. Often these are more diplomatic and political statements. However, various 
donors are beginning to prepare programmes of intervention for the DRC and 
Burundi based around the post-conflict poverty agenda. Aid programmes tend to be 
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country-specific and, where devolved authority exists, tend to be managed by 
country offices which rarely have a regional remit. It would be interesting to explore 
how the regional policy statements on stability, conflict and reconstruction are 
translated into country development programme arrangements, whether lessons are 
being learned from the Rwandan experience, and how much interaction there is 
between country programmes within the region.  
Finally, this thesis touches the boundaries of various theoretical arguments which 
may warrant further reflection in order to tease out more theoretical lessons: about 
structure and agency; about links between development assistance and international 
relations; about power and the state; and about variations in the knowledge base of 
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Esther Tidjani, GTZ 
Philip Verwimp, Poverty economist, World Bank 
 
Representatives of non-governmental bodies (Belgium) 
Claver Kayumba, Research Student, Université Catholique de Louvain 
Marc Kerckhove, CNCD 
Bernard Leloup, PhD student and researcher, RUC, Anvers 
Deo Mushayidi, COPDR, Rwandan opposition party 
Jef de Molder, Bruidelijkdelen 
Joseph Ndahimana, Igihango 
Charles Ntampaka, Lecturer in Law; editor of Dialogue - University of Namur; 
Dialogue 
Robrecht Renard, Lecturer in Development Economics, RUC, Anvers 
Filip Reyntjens, Director of Centre for the Study of the Great Lakes, RUC, Anvers 
Eleazar Twagirayesu, Office of Senator de Clippele (Of Rwandan origin and running 
NGO) 
Gauthier de Villers, Director, CEDAF, Institut Africain 
Pierre Vanck, RCN  
Indra van Gisbergen, 11.11.11 
Han Verleyen, 11.11.11 
Etienne van Parijs, Director, ACODEV 
Jean-Claude Willame, Political Scientist, Université Catholique de Louvain 
 
Representatives of non-governmental bodies (UK) 
David Booth, ODI London 
Karin Christiansen, ODI London 
Ruth Driscoll, ODI London and former advisor to Clare Short 
Andrew Durrant, MSF UK, London 
Leslie Groves, former DFID and consultant, Edinburgh 
Roger Hay, Consultant (health) 
Dylan Henrickson, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London 
Tony Jackson, International Alert, Oxford 
Jens Lerche, SOAS (former DFID) 
Murray Macrae, Consultant (education) 
Stephen Martin, Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund, Glasgow 
Linda Melvern, Journalist 
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Mark Pallis, Coordinator, All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes 
Region and Genocide Prevention, London 
Laure-Helene Piron, ODI London 
Pete Sampson, FEWER 
John Short, Consultant (economics) 
Anneke Van Woudenberg, Senior Researchers, Human Rights Watch, London 
 
Representatives of NGOs (Rwanda) 
Miranda Clarke, CARE International Rwanda 
Mark Cummings, Trocaire Rwanda 
Klaas de Jonge, Penal Reform International Rwanda 
Antranik Handoyan, Danish Centre for Human Rights, Rwanda 
Phil Hudson, VSO Rwanda 
Andrew Jones, CARE International, Kigali 
Odette Kabaya, Pro-Femmes / Twese Hamwe, Rwanda 
Johnson Kyanga, Deputy Country Representative, Population Services International 
Rwanda 
Rosemarie McNairn, Programme Representative, Oxfam Rwanda 
Jean Paul Mugiraneza, IRDP, Head Researcher 
Naason Munyandamutsa, Director of IRDP Rwanda 
François Munyentwari, Country Coordinator, ACORD Rwanda 
Jean Charles Paras, Head of Office, Penal Reform International, Rwanda 
Jean Paul Pinvidic, Programme Coordination, RCN Rwanda 
Eddie Rogers, Country Director, Concern, Rwanda 
Peter Sykes, Save the Children, Rwanda 
Lars Waldorf, Human Rights Watch, Rwanda 
  
 















Donor Agency:  
 




Research is basically exploring the different ways in which donors, particularly 
bilateral donors, have delivered aid to Rwanda over the period between 1994 and 
today (so evolution of policy over the last 10 years and historical perspective on 
changes in donors); and how these different approaches affect the Government of 
Rwanda’s own development strategies. Focusing particularly on the UK and Belgium 
as representing two quite different approaches (new/old, programme/project, 
EN/FR). Theoretical basis is the shift towards recipient ownership and with that the 
question of aid coordination and donor harmonisation. Have completed the first year 
of background work; now a year of fieldwork divided between total of 8 months in 
Rwanda, Belgium and the UK. Purpose of research in Rwanda is to gain the 
Rwandan perspective on donor activity; to get a greater insight into the 
implementation of UK and Belgium policy; to look at the dynamics between actors. 
But in order to understand where UK and Belgian policy fit into the wider scheme of 
GoR and donor activities, I am trying to build up a basic picture of the activities of 
the main bilateral and multilateral donors to Rwanda. 
 
Therefore, I am following a fairly standard set of questions/issues for each agency, 
some of which may be less relevant to the particular circumstance of your agency’s 
aid. Probably take an hour in total, so depends on your schedule whether do all now 
or some later.  
 
 




Development Cooperation (separate entity, people within embassy, technical 
assistance)  
 
History of representation: 
- length of time here  
- evolution of representation since 1994  
- how recent Rwandan history has affected bilateral relations 
(guilt/suspicion?) 
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- Agency: role of personalities, changes in activities under different 
heads of office/ambassadors? 
 
Other offices in region / regional approach  
 
Relationship between Embassy and DC (foreign policy in relation to development 
objectives; coherence; ST/LT issues; difference between political and technical 
viewpoints on Rwanda). 
 
Remit of DC rep v-a-v policy (decision-making authority, autonomy, 
decentralisation, consultation) 
 
Staff of DC (number, roles, how long stay in agency) 
 
How does length of presence in Rwanda contribute to relationships with different 
actors in Rwanda, be it GoR, particular interlocutors, local community actors, etc. 
 
Information sources on Rwanda (knowledge base): basic literature and training of 
field staff; analysis by own experts or other experts; analysis by GoR. Sharing of 
information across donors? What sort of briefings do staff get on Rwanda while here 
and where does information come from? Do feel have a different perspective on 
Rwanda to other donors, and why? 
 
 
2. Development Policy on Rwanda  
 
2.1 General Development Policy 
 
How would describe relationship with Rwanda (partnership, between governments, 
country-to-country, between populations). If use ‘partnership’, what does it mean? 
 
Main development policy framework in general (legal basis, when dates from, 
‘mission statement’, main theoretical reference framework - EU, DAC, MDGs, 
overriding objective of aid).  
 
Basis of country-specific policy (how often revised? Who involved in policy-
making?)  
 
What are principal considerations which determine approach in a country (overall 
objectives, domestic concern, recipient needs – from donor and recipient perspective, 
socio-economic-political situation of recipient, absorptive capacity, agency budget, 
agency spread).  
 
2.2. Rwanda Policy 
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Why active in Rwanda in first place? What are driving forces (moral, ownership, 
rational choice, strategic, wider goals).  
 
Policy evolution: pre-1994; since 1994; now? What behind changes (global shifts, 
corporate policy, GoR). Significant changes between domestic legislatures?  
 
Size of programme (budget, multi-annual). If increasing or decreasing, why?  
 
Basic policy thrust – what does aid seek to achieve in Rwanda? What are the targets?  
If it is poverty, for example, what would say is the primary cause of poverty in 
Rwanda? How does agency strategy feel that objective can best be served?  
 
Importance of Rwanda to overall development cooperation objectives; where does 
Rwanda rank in amounts of assistance / policy priority? Is aid proportionate to size 
of country or needs?  
 
Modalities (project, programme, TA, bilateral, multilateral, INGO, local NGO). 
Agency position on aid modalities in general (not just Rwanda). Pros/cons of 
channels using. Clash/complementarity between different approaches. Who should 
be key development actor (recipient government, NGOs, community groups, 
individuals).  
 
Rationale for modalities in Rwanda: 
- if project, why (corporate, GoR); do provide programme aid through 
multilateral agencies – contradiction or less political alternative? 
- If programme, why (domestic policy, Rwandan need – conflict, 
transition, good gov, trust, ‘new’ status of GoR, knowledge)  and how 
(SWAp, BS, TA). Does PA require a positive view of GoR, trust, confidence, 
knowledge? If so, what is basis of agency perspective?  
- If not programme, do use this mechanism in any other countries. If so, 
why there and not in Rwanda? 
 
Key sectors (how are priorities determined, how decide sectors, ST/LT interventions 
– when preparing projects/sectoral activities do refer to recipient policy documents, 
discussions with stakeholders, does recipient approach you with idea or other way 
around, whose knowledge feeds decision on projects, do you feel that you adapt 
ideas to recipient realities, or does the recipient adapt ideas to suit your ability to 
support) 
 
Have you had significant input into GoR policy in the sectors you are working in? If 
so, how? 
 
Geographical distribution of activities 
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Disbursement mechanisms – timing over year.  
 
Time frame of projects / aid (depends on project, annual, LT commitment) 
 
How much are activities determined by Rwandan specificities; how much by donor 
experience and resources? What, if anything, is ‘special’ about the Rwandan 
programme?  
 
Contract/conditions/terms attached to aid (GoR commitments, mutual trust, donor 
conditionalities, M oU, policy dialogue, long ‘partnership’). How does length of 
relationship affect these terms? 
 
To what extent is the policy environment in Rwanda conducive to the effective use 
of aid?  
 
Evaluation – does follow-up funding / next year’s funding depend on outcome of 
evaluation. 
 
Is domestic public/political willingness to continue working with Rwanda premised 
on results? If so, how are these measured? How important is visibility to continuing 





How activities are managed 
 
Key interlocutors (civil society, NGOs, GoR) – progressive forces? 
 
Nature of dialogue (informal/formal relations, behind scenes discussions, TA, 
influence over policy-making, who controls) – how would characterise (easy, 
problematic, tense, constructive?) 
 
Role of the Rwandan side in activities (decision-making process, negotiation, 
management, autonomy, flexibility)  
 
If TA, then what sort of work doing; where does TA come from? How hired? LT or 
ST? Remit? Activities? 
 
What sort of leverage does your strategy give you over the GoR if any? Do you think 
some donors have more leverage than others and if so, why? What matters more – 
length of relationship or extent of support?  
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Positive/negative aspects of relationship/activities/policy. How successful are 
interventions in Rwanda? How is success determined? 
 
Engagement with PRSP or other ‘Rwandan-owned’ document. How do own 
strategies reflect PRSP framework. Views/expectations of PRSP – instrument for 
donors or instrument for Rwanda. Anything doing that is not included in PRSP and 
how justify it? 
 
 
3. Donor Coordination 
 
How much know about activities of other donors?  
 
Position on donor coordination and harmonisation. What does coordination mean 
(compromise, clashes, negotiation, interests of recipient)? What counts as 
coordination (joint meetings, joint policy, negotiation and compromise, joint 
implementation); what levels (technical/operational/political/diplomatic)?  
 
Evolution of coordination and harmonisation in Rwanda. If more coordination now, 
why?  
 
Coordination with other donors  and with GoR – why and how (formal, semi-formal, 
informal). Who coordinating with, on what? Who driving?  
 
Any clash of agendas with other donors; do activities of other donors 
complement/obstruct?  
 
Sectors where agency is leading? Has GoR asked agency to lead? How work with 
other donors in sector (joint meetings with GoR, joint meetings with donors, done 
through GoR, agency leads?) 
 
GoR literature implies that it wants to gain more control over aid flows, i.e. through 
more coherent aid, better coordination. Views on this? Has GoR become more 
demanding about aid and how? Response to GoR demands for more ownership and 
coordination. 
 
What takes primacy in compromises: recipient need or donor policy? 
 




‘Ownership’ is a concept I am engaging with:  
- is ‘ownership’ a concept used in agency policy 
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- what is the word in native language 
- is ownership more about recipient responsibility for aid effectiveness 
or about giving the recipient control (which implies donor giving it up) 
- how is position on ‘ownership’ reflected in strategies? 
- Potential for more ‘o’ (strengthened GoR capacity, good governance)  
 
5. General Issues  
 
How would define Rwanda’s current political; current economic status (stable, post-
conflict, unstable, weak, strong?). Opinion on direction country is going (model, 
success story, on verge of disaster)? Opinion on outcome of elections. 
 
Views on GoR policy strategies. 
 
What are major risks involved in the Rwanda programme? 
 
Opinion on the importance of aid to Rwanda and GoR. 
 
Several people have pointed out to me the changes in Rwanda since about 1997 in 
development terms. What to you think lies behind this? Has aid played a role and 
how? 
 
Expectations of aid now – do see difference between ‘transition’ Rwanda and ‘post-
election’ Rwanda? 
 
Importance of personalities/personal commitments of politicians or agency 
representatives to aid strategies in Rwanda? 
 
Are active in other post-conflict countries? Differences between there and in 
Rwanda?  
 
Has Rwanda ever refused aid from agency? 
 
Language an issue in work with Ministries/actors? 
 
Has President/Prime Minister/Foreign Affairs Minister visited Rwanda? 
 
How do political events in Rwanda affect aid – how quickly does aid respond? 
Fluctuations in aid quantities on graph. 
 
Differences between views in-country and in HQ 
 
Personal story of interviewee v-a-v Rwanda.  
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APPENDIX 3: Total Overseas Development Aid to Rwanda 
1992 - 2003 
 
 
TOTAL OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT AID TO RWANDA: 1992-2003 ($US million)   
             
DONOR 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
             
OECD Countries             
AUSTRALIA - - 7.67 0.48 5.44 3.18 1.57 0.02 0.02 - - - 
AUSTRIA 8.54 4.36 2.29 3.49 2.84 1.44 5.09 6.17 1.19 0.41 1.9 3.0 
BELGIUM 45.65 36.66 29.1 14.04 31.29 21.09 23.17 21.04 16.03 11.55 21.9 20.8 
CANADA 13.61 11.2 18.2 16.76 20.37 21.41 10.1 6.24 6.67 6.68 5.6 10.8 
DENMARK 1.53 0.76 0.34 0.89 0.42 1.75 2.08 1.43 1.2 2.68 0.5 1.8 
FINLAND 0.46 0.29 2.31 2.77 1.02 0.85 0.56 0.53 0.56 0.41 0.9 0.9 
FRANCE 30.16 35.53 29.8 11.75 16.56 16.07 33.17 16.22 12.69 10.61 9.3 10.9 
GERMANY 43.59 38.56 46.57 52.06 45.64 26 20.55 18.76 13.77 14.59 10.8 13.9 
GREECE - - - - - - - 0.02 0.01 0.01 - - 
IRELAND 0.07 0.01 4.04 6.31 5.46 4 3.4 2.48 1.79 1.05 1.4 2.0 
ITALY 1.87 2.97 12.44 3.85 4.18 4.06 3.86 2.46 0.81 1.18 1.0 0.2 
JAPAN 16.81 14.94 16.47 1.5 0.55 8.13 9.03 7.95 3.36 1.03 0.4 0.7 
LUXEMBOURG 0.59 1.27 1.63 1.15 1.83 2.06 3.05 1.8 2.26 1.79 4 3.9 
NETHERLANDS 6.88 7.18 32.22 46.67 41.11 29.21 29.01 20.34 20.42 19.16 19.6 23.0 
NEW ZEALAND - - 1.3 0.8 0.17 0.21 0.09 - 0.04 0.11 0.1 0.1 
NORWAY 0.34 1.26 8.78 16.33 24.49 11.07 8.8 4.84 4.27 2.03 6.1 8.0 
PORTUGAL - - 0.11 - 0.14 0.06 - - - - - 1.0 
SPAIN - 0.82 6.53 8.11 4.49 0.47 0.22 0.15 0.3 0.77 0.7 0.7 
SWEDEN 0.3 3.35 12.11 5.81 5.43 1.9 9.93 13.11 14.63 8.43 15.6 13.1 
SWITZERLAND 13.79 20.21 22.57 17.78 17.54 12.14 7.15 7.02 5.04 3.49 3.9 6.9 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.34 1.2 44.59 34.5 19.28 10.04 20.59 26.53 52.67 36.76 52.6 42.9 
UNITED STATES 7 26 194 101 10 9 22.98 39.78 22.93 31.08 46.4 52.6 
             
EUROPEAN UNION             
European Commission 82.59 36.01 45.68 18.5 55.99 46.57 27.21 39.62 49.75 45.24 41.7 54.0 
EC + EU Members 222.57 168.97 269.76 209.9 235.68 165.57 181.89 170.66 188.08 154.64 181.5 192.0 
             
UN AGENCIES             
UNFPA 0.61 0.72 0.56 0.66 0.73 1.49 0.86 1.74 0.72 1.56 1.7 2.0 
UNTA 1.24 2.24 1.67 3.07 1.11 2.76 1.12 1.85 2.88 1.49 2.1 2.2 
UNHCR 1.61 6.05 75.14 100.24 - - - - 7.65 7.43 6.9 5.4 
IFAD 2.59 2.92 0.2 - 1.61 4.15 5.78 2.83 3.96 5.3 3.8 4.6 
UNICEF 4.5 - 32.28 32.69 22.37 2.6 1.25 2.19 3.14 2.78 3.0 3.0 
WFP 7.3 53.94 47.74 150.71 80.72 -69.8 4.6 33.95 19.98 - 4.8 6.7 
UNDP 7.81 4.42 3.09 5.07 5.07 10.45 9.74 12.2 5.37 2.72 2.1 3.5 
OTHER UN 2.52 2.14 4.78 7.39 1.34 - - - 0.56 -0.43 1.1 0.6 
             
ARAB AGENCIES 2.91 - - - - - - - 1.2 6.0 4.4 6.5 
             
IFIs             
AFRICAN DEV. FUND 23.55 8.29 3.72 21.84 9.93 11.13 17.68 13.26 4 12.03 13.0 9.9 
IDA (World Bank) 31.83 39.22 11.77 34.79 42.6 52.9 66.69 69.19 37.19 65.43 87.0 38.8 
             
TOTAL DONORS 361.63 365.53 722.98 721.11 481.05 246.92 365.6 403.1 342.34 315.06 374.9 355.2 
             
Notes: The Total Official Assistance (OA) includes grants or loans to countries and territories which are : - undertaken 
by the official sector; - with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective. - at concessional 
financial terms (if a loan, have a grant element of at least 25 per cent). 
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Development Statistics, ESDS 
International, University of Manchester, accessed: 12 May 2005 
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